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1Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Water is the nature, the arch, the originating principle; water is the beginning of all
things.
(Thales)
Sustainable Development Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable manage-
ment of water and sanitation for all.
(United Nations (2015), Agenda 2030)
Water is not only the beginning of all things, as the old Greeks had already
realized, but without water, no life on earth is possible, and clean water is also a
precondition for any form of sustainable development. There is enough available
freshwater on earth (about 91,000 km3) to supply every individual on earth (about
7.5 billion in 2020) approx. 12,000 l, more than enough to live decently. However, due
to natural and man-made idiosyncracies, clean freshwater and sanitation (which we
do not cover in-depth in this book) are scarce, and thus decisions need to be taken on
the production, treatment, and distribution of water, given underlying technical and
socioeconomic conditions. Water needs to be managed efficiently, both with respect
to the growing scarcity of resources, as a natural endowment that is indispensable
for the survival of mankind, but also with respect to the variety of eco-services
it delivers. In fact, water is a multifunctional resource that provides people with
potable water, secures landscapes in different climate zones and functions as a sink
of pollutants emanating from human activities. Thus, a comprehensive approach is
required, including a technical understanding of the basic hydrological principles,
different economic allocation rules, but also the institutional framing of the use of
water.
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Problems of water supply and demand are not new; on the contrary, they exist
as long as life exists on earth. However, with rising population, environmental chal-
lenges, climate change, and adverse local conditions, and often a lack of appropriate
regulatory and institutional conditions, issues of water management have become
global in the last century. This has lead—amongst other goals—to the Millennium
Goals of 2000, calling to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. Some, but not sufficient
progress was made on this path, so that the successor document, the United Nations’
(2015) Agenda 2030, recalls and even enhances the request, to “ensure availability
and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all” by 2030; this is the
Sustainable Development Goal 6 (SDG 6). But how to fulfill these requirements,
given the challenges of water management?
The application of economic concepts is sometimes criticized in the
(noneconomist) water community, but we believe that economics can provide useful
insights. In the practical world of water, “there is a sense that economic concepts are
inadequate to the task at hand, a feeling that water has value in ways that economists
fail to account for, and a concern that this could impede the formulation of effec-
tive approaches for solving the water crisis” (Hanemann 2006, 61). In other words,
water is too important to be left to economists. Yet, on the other hand, there are hun-
dreds (if not thousands) of water, environmental, resource, agricultural, and other
economists out there that do excellent analytical and practical work on water issues,
and most of them go beyond the pure neoclassical ivory tower analysis that is some-
times full-mouthy criticized. To bridge the gap between different disciplines requires
an interdisciplinary approach that respects the complexity of water: It can be a pri-
vate good and a public good, is extremely mobile, very capital intensive, chemically
complex, etc., after all, perhaps the most complex of all goods.
This book addresses rules and institutions of water scarcity. While the book’s main
contribution is the application of economic concepts, we deploy an interdisciplinary
technical-economic approach. This introductory chapter provides an overview of
the topics covered in the book and also defines a thread to structure the multitude of
issues addressed in the various chapters. The next section provides an overview of
existing literature on water economics. Section 1.3 explains the technical-economic
approach of this book, followed by an outline of the topics of each chapter (Sect. 1.4).
In Sect. 1.5 we provide a list of important issues that we were not able to cover in
this book, and the chapter ends with acknowledgments.
1.2 State of the Literature and the Specifics of Our Approach
Water resource management is covered by a breadth of literature (economic, tech-
nical, cultural, geographic, etc.). Klaver (2012) puts water in a cultural context, and
Wittfogel (1981), describes the development of the hydraulic civilization. A com-
prehensive account of the environmental history of water is provided by Juuti et al.
(2007). Let’s also recognize the “Berliner” Alexander von Humboldt, who, two cen-
turies ago, has focussed on the water cycle in his trip to Latin America: On the way to
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Caripe as part of his trip through Venezuela, he observed the immense deforestation
with
perhaps one of the main reasons for the drought and the drying up of the springs in the province
of Neu-Andalusia. Forests (plants) produce not only water, give a large newly generated mass
of water through their evaporation in the air, they do not only beat down, because they excite
cold, water from the air and multiply the fog, but they are mainly charitable in that they
prevent the evaporation of water masses fallen by periodic rain showers by providing shade.
This evaporation is incomprehensibly fast here, where the sun is so high.1
Among the scholarly textbooks, water is part of the (important) literature on
environmental and resource economics. As such, it is featured in textbooks such as
Tietenberg (2005). Water is treated as an example of a renewable resource, yet the
more technical aspects, such as the hydrological cycle, or issues of water quality
are not extensively covered. In addition, there are some comprehensive textbooks on
water economics: The introductory textbook by Griffin (2016), deals with both, basic
economic concepts and their application to water resource management problems.
Shaw (2007), requires some prior microeconomic knowledge, and focusses on the
North American water sector; allocative questions are prioritized, while distributional
and access issues are not really covered. The classical text by Hirshleifer et al. (1969),
can be considered an interdisciplinary benchmark in the literature. These textbooks
require some microeconomic background, and we suggest Perman (2011), as a useful
and resource-oriented reference.
A third type of references are handbooks of water economics or volumes cov-
ering research contributions on the frontier of current research, amongst Dinar and
Schwabe (2015), Jordan et al. (2012), Anand (2010), and Pashardes et al. (2002).
Issues covered by all these volumes include pricing, consumption, and different
regulatory and institutional designs. At this point, let us also mention some of the
academic journals focussing on water issues, such as Water Resources Research,
Water Policy, Water Economics and Management, Water, and the Journal of Water
Resources Planning and Management. We will pick up more specific references on
specific issues as we go through the chapters of this book.
1.3 A Novel Technical-Economic Approach
Why another book? We feel that the synergies from a technical-economic approach
to the analysis of water have not been fully reaped. Water has distinct technical,
economic, and institutional features that need to be considered jointly, but that eco-
nomic tools can be usefully applied to the water sector, too: These include decisions
1Own translation from Humboldt, Alexander von (2000: Reise durch Venezuela. Auswahl aus den
amerikanischen Reisetagebüchern. Hg. von Margot Faak. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, p. 140) http://
www.hin-online.de/index.php/hin/article/view/273/513.
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on the allocation of production, distribution, pricing issues and investment, as well
as sustainability issues, the so-called triad of sustainability economics.
While the purely “economical” use of water has been addressed by various text-
books, and advanced texts are also available, a comprehensive treatment of the inter-
play between the hydrological cycle and the rules and institutions that govern today’s
water allocation rules is still missing. Therefore, the main endeavor of the textbook
is to present a modern perspective, by combining hydrological issues (such as blue
and green water, water quality, groundwater flows, river flows, etc.) with a “modern”
economic approach. In this context, the adjective “modern” refers to an approach
that includes distributional issues and issues of enforceability of human rights in
managing water resources, instead of restricting the analysis to solely technical effi-
ciency planning methods or the adoption of purely economic optimality criteria, e.g.,
the Pareto-principle. With increasing scarcity, issues of the appropriate allocation of
economic goods take on an ethical dimension, which is not covered by the efficiency
criterion.
The approach is based on microeconomic theory applied to the real world of
water, with real technologies, thus developing a truly technical-economic approach.
We assume some basic knowledge of microeconomics and try to go further in the
analysis of water-specific issues. In addition to gaining more in-depth insights into
the technical-economic interface, this approach also allows for more nuanced policy
conclusions, which builds the second pillar of this book. Ever since the UN devel-
opment goals were established, we know that the management of water is not only a
matter of demand and supply but also a result from a holistic policy approach com-
prising constitutional aspects of the human right to water and the political governance
of the water cycle as a multifunctional system that secures human livelihood. Thus,
we also include an analysis of the institutional framework of water management.
Our approach also combines the technical fundamentals of the hydrological cycle
and different economic approaches to resolve fundamental issues of water scarcity
with an in-depth assessment of the political dimension of water management and
its institutional embeddedness, such as water rights, and different approaches to
water tariffs, water markets, and transboundary water management; the latter are
provided through a series of case studies. Thus, the book addresses both, i/ advanced
undergraduates majoring in economics, and graduate students of social sciences,
engineering, natural sciences, water management, etc. (with basic knowledge of
microeconomics), and ii/ practitioners, consultants, economic experts, project man-
agers, etc., in the field of water management, interested in a deeper understanding of
current-day issues and options to handle these issues conceptually. The book is thus
conceived as a bridge between purely economic analysis of water, and the practical
work in the field, often constrained by very concrete questions. We feel that there
is a need out there, and in the university and college classrooms, too, to update and
extend the technical-economic exchange, as water management issues, sometimes
called water crisis, linger on.
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1.4 Structure of This Book
After this introduction, each chapter covers a specific topic related to water issues.
Chapter 2 provides the physical and hydrological basics of water. This includes
definitions of different categories of water, such as sweet and salt water, and the dif-
ferentiation into “blue” and “green” water. The chapter also discusses precipitation,
interception, and evapotranspiration, and the potential impact of human activities on
the water cycle.
Chapter 3 covers economic, technical, and institutional challenges of Integrated
Water Resource Management (IWRM). In addition to a basic technical-economic
model of IWRM, we discuss water management issues of a common pool resource
and derive conclusions for water policy. The chapter also includes some basic eco-
nomic analysis of social welfare, distribution, and the value of water, eco-hydrology
and the management of water as a public good, water recycling, groundwater man-
agement, water quality, and two further IWRM issues: Water allocation along rivers,
and inter-basin water transfers.
Chapter 4 covers simple and more complex issues of water tariffication. This
includes the definition of the criteria for water pricing, tariff design, and variations
thereof. An important issue discussed is the objective function, e.g., whether one
aims at welfare maximization, at universal service provision, or the simple survival
of the poorest parts of the population. In addition to the comparison of stylized water
tariffs, such as single- and two-part tariffs, the chapter also goes into more details
on increasing block tariffs, and pricing in physically unconnected water markets.
Last but not least, the chapter introduces two ways to deal with very rough scarcity:
pricing and rationing.
Chapter 5 addresses a broad range of questions regarding the regulation and insti-
tutional design of water markets, including reference to the few empirical cases
where these markets were established. The chapter first sets out institutional, hydro-
logical, and infrastructural preconditions for establishing water markets. Then a sim-
ple model of a water market along a river basin is developed, that provides insights
into alternative pricing mechanisms, such as locational or uniform prices. We report
the experience of a water market experiment in Australia, the Murray-Darling basin.
The chapter ends with a discussion of water entitlements and water allocation.
Chapter 6 extends the discussion to transboundary water resource management.
There are 276 international river basins worldwide that stretch over two or more
countries, and about 40 percent of the world population lives in these international
river basins. The first section sets the scene and describes existing transboundary
water agreements and principles of international water rights. A basic model is set
up to analyze benefits sharing along a river basin with two riparians first, and then
extended to more than two riparians, in the context of cooperative game theory. A
separate section introduces bankruptcy rules for water allocation, i.e., the physical
allocation of water to consumers. In addition, rules for flexible water sharing are
derived. The chapter includes two case studies on transboundary water issues along
the Nile and the Euphrates.
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1.5 Important Topics Not Covered
Due to constraints of time and space, we had to leave out some issues that are
nonetheless important (and that we plan to pick up for the second edition of this text-
book...). Amongst them are climate-related issues of water scarcity, the occurrence
of floods, heavy rainfall and weather-related storm surges and their impacts on the
infrastructure of an economy, and on urban water management. Water infrastruc-
ture for mega-cities is a mega subject, with respect to the use of land, infrastructure
financing, and organizational models. In that context, different types of sanitation
infrastructure need to be compared, for urban and rural areas, including adapted
technologies that can be implemented relatively quickly, such as decentralized toilet
systems. In some cases, these can be cheaper than the centralized infrastructure.
Last but not least, the theory-policy nexus needs more in-depth analysis. In fact,
the microeconomic approach, even appended by distributional considerations, is a
tool for analysis that can not take into account issues of implementation, of institu-
tional regimes, and conflicting interests beyond those covered in simple models. Take
the example of integrated water resources management, which can be operational-
ized in microeconomics and especially in welfare theory by means of optimization
approaches. However, in practice, this approach should be pursued with caution if it
is not to lead to technocratic malfunctioning. This comprehensive approach seems
utopian in its generality and it requires reference to social and economic reality if it
is not itself involved in the social process of concrete water policy. From historical
science, we know that the institutional development is a process of self-organization
and represents a circular process between ideas and actions. It is then like the suc-
cessful effort of Baron Munchausen in the novel by Erich Raspe2 who successfully
pulled himself and his horse out of the swamp by dragging himself up by his own
hair. Combining the evolutionary approach with the institutional economic approach
of identifying policy options and policy gaps is left to be developed, in the realm of
institutional water policy analysis of Ostrom (1990), Biswas (2004), Menard et al.
(2018), and many others.
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2WaterAvailability:AHydrologicalView
2.1 GlobalWater Resources andWater Cycle
The whole amount of water on earth was generated during the earliest earth ages by
volcanoes that emitted water vapor. Currently the amount of water which is allocated
to the oceans, glaciers, polar ice, groundwater, lakes, and rivers stays nearly at a
constant level.
The volume of the total water reserves is about 1,386 million km3 (Table 2.1).
The major part of these water reserves (about 96.5%) is located in the oceans as salt
water. The total volume of freshwater stocks add up to 35 million km3, or just 2.5%
of the total stock in the hydrosphere. A large fraction of freshwater (about 24 million
km3 or 68.7% of freshwater stock) is stored in the Arctic and Antarctic regions in the
form of ice and permafrost. About one-third of freshwater reserves are located in the
aquifers as groundwater. Freshwater lakes and rivers, which are the most important
sources for human water needs, contain on average about 90,000km3, or 0.26% of
total freshwater reserves (Shiklomanov 1990).
Atmospheric water in the form of vapor and clouds has a volume of about
12,900km3, or 0.04% of total freshwater reserves. This atmospheric water is of
high importance for the water cycle despite its small volume. If the atmospheric
water precipitated completely, the water layer on the surface would have a height
of just 25mm. However, the annual precipitation amount is about 1,000mm which
means that the whole water stock in the atmosphere regenerates every 10 days. All
other types of water also renew, but the rates of renewal differ. For instance water in
the rivers regenerates every 16 days on average, but the renewal period of glaciers,
groundwater, ocean water, and the largest lakes run to hundreds or thousands of years
(Shiklomanov 1990).
The “regeneration” of water in rivers, lakes, atmosphere, etc., is based on the
conversion ofwater into different types and aggregate states.Water converts fromone
form to another and moves to various places, for instance, from the ocean to land and
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Table 2.1 Water availability on earth. Source Shiklomanov (1990)
Source Volume [103 km3] Percent of total water
[%]
Percent of fresh water
[%]
Total water reserves 1,385,984 100 –
Total seawater 1,338,000 96.5 –
Total groundwater 23,400 1.7 –
Soil moisture 16,5 0.001 0.05
Freshwater 10,530 0.76 30.1
Glaciers and permanent
snow cover
24,064 1.74 68.7
Antarctic 21,600 1.56 61.7
Greenland 2,340 0.17 6.68
Arctic islands 83,5 0.006 0.24
Mountainous regions 40,6 0.003 0.12
Ground ice/ permafrost 300 0.022 0.86
Water reserves in lakes 176,4 0.013 –
Fresh 91 0.007 0.26
Saline 85,4 0.006 –
Swamp water 11,47 0.0008 0.03
River flows 2,12 0.0002 0.006
Biological water 1,12 0.0001 0.003
Atmospheric water 12,9 0.001 0.04
Total freshwater reserves 35,029 2.53 100
back under the influence of solar energy and gravity. An overall diagram of the global
water cycle is presented in Fig. 2.1. A large amount of water, about 505,000km3,
evaporates annually from the oceans’ surface. About 90% of this evaporated amount,
which is equal to about 458,000km3, returns directly back to the oceans in the
form of precipitation while 10% of this evaporated amount, which is equal to about
50,500km3, precipitates on the land side. Togetherwith evaporation and transpiration
from land (about 68,500km3), the total precipitation falling ondry land and supplying
all types of landwater is 119,000km3. Based on this water volume, about 47,000km3
per year is returned back to the oceans from land in the form of rivers, ground, and
glacial run-off. On the whole about 577,000km3 of water precipitates and evaporates
on the earth. Thus, the world water balance can be considered as a closed system,
such that
P = ET = 577000 km3
with:P...precipitation, ET ...evapotranspiration
Figure 2.2 illustrates the levels of the main components of the global water cir-
culation (Shiklomanov 1990).
2.1 GlobalWater Resources andWater Cycle 11
Fig. 2.1 Qualitative illustration of water cycle. Source adapted from Houghton (2004)
Fig.2.2 Levels of themain components of the globalwater cycle.Source adapted fromShiklomanov
(1990)
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2.2 The RegionalWater Cycle
Air humidity, soil surface, soil moisture storage, surface water (rivers and lakes),
and groundwater are the types of water stocks that exist in each catchment. The rela-
tions and interconnections between these stocks are presented in Fig. 2.3. An external
account is also introduced to illustrate the interconnectionwith the neighboring catch-
ments. If water moves from a neighboring catchment to the considered catchment,
the amount of water will increase in the addressed catchment. For instance, water
vapor import fluxes induce an increase in air humidity; external recharges raise the
amount of water in the aquifers and surface water stocks, etc. In contrast, the amount
of water will decline in the respective stocks if water moves in the form of water
vapor or surface and subsurface flows to neighboring catchments.
Water exchanges between the different water stocks also occur within the con-
sidered catchment. These exchanges and interconnections between the stocks are
important to renew the stocks and to maintain the regional water cycle.
Precipitation, including all water in a hard or liquid state that reaches the soil
surface from the atmospheric water stock (air humidity), is a very important input
for plant, animal, and human life on earth. It will usually occur if the vapor pressure
exceeds the saturated vapor pressure in the atmosphere. Falling precipitation, such
as rainfall or snow, is usually known and the quantitatively most important kind of
precipitation. Precipitation is a discontinuous and intermittent phenomenon with a
high spatial and temporal variability. It is possible to distinguish between various
forms of falling precipitation:
Fig. 2.3 Regional water cycle
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• Convective precipitation is characterized by a high intensity, short duration, small-
scale appearance, and therefore, high temporal and spatial variability. In Europe, it
usually occurs in the summer months in the form of heavy rainfall and small-scale
thunderstorms.
• Advective precipitation (steady rain) is more continuous than convective rainfall.
It is characterized by a large-scale extent, long duration, low or medium rain
intensity, and relatively low spatial and temporal variability.
• The third type of falling precipitation is the orographic one that occurs on the
windward side of a mountain and is caused by rising air masses that cool down
and condensate. Orographic precipitations are characterized by a long duration
and a large-scale extent on the windward side.
Besides the falling precipitation, which is well known, disposing ones, such as dew,
rime, and frost also exist.
Another important phenomenon that influences the available liquidwater resources
in a considered basin is the evapotranspiration. The atmosphere and the hydrosphere
of a basin are closely linked to the existence of precipitation and evapotranspira-
tion, because a share of liquid water, which is fed to the stocks by external inflows
or precipitation, is removed by evapotranspiration, a vaporization process of water.
The potential evapotranspiration, which is a hypothetical value that expresses the
maximum possible amount of water that could be vaporized, depends on various
meteorological conditions, such as solar energy supply, temperature, humidity, and
wind. While potential evapotranspiration assumes optimal water supply, the level
of real evaporation is equal to the actual vaporized water under actual water supply
conditions. Therefore, the level of calculated potential evapotranspiration exceeds
the amount of water vaporized by real evapotranspiration. This total real evapo-
transpiration includes the sum of the evaporation, transpiration, and interception.
Evaporation is a pure physical process and occurs only on the surface of water and
bare soil. Therefore, this kind of water vaporization influences the stored water vol-
umes on the surface soil and surface water resources (lakes and rivers) as well as the
moisture in the soil.
Evaporation accounts for only 10–15% of evapotranspiration in Central Europe
while this proportion is much higher in arid regions because of less vegetation and
higher solar energy supply. InCentral Europe, themajority of the real evapotranspira-
tion (about 70–75%) is related to transpiration, which is a biological process in which
water vapor is released by parts of the plants. 90–95% of transpired water is released
by the plants’ stomata while the residual proportion is released by the cuticle. The
transpiration can be regulated by opening and closing the stomata to prevent dehy-
dration of the plant. Therefore, real evapotranspiration can deviate from potential
evapotranspiration especially during hot spells. The third kind of evapotranspiration
is the interception, which accounts for about 15% of total real evapotranspiration in
Central Europe: It occurs on the surface of the plant; however, it is a pure physical
process which cannot be influenced by the plant. Therefore, interception is often
assigned to the evaporation.
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Because of interception and evaporation, the quantity of surface and subsurface
runoff is lower than total precipitation. The share of liquid precipitation that is not
evaporated directly usually becomes surface or subsurface runoff. In contrast to pre-
cipitation and runoff which is characterized as blue water, water which is vaporized
by transpiration is classified as green water. The definition of blue and green water
is explained in Box 2.1. Groundwater recharge occurs if seeped water reaches the
groundwater stock. The groundwater is that kind of water that completely fills all
cavities in the underground and whose movement is only based on gravity. The level
of groundwater recharge in a basin mainly depends on the level of precipitation, solar
radiation, ground utilization, ground properties, and the distance between aquifers
and surface. Infiltrated water can also drain as an interflow next to the soil surface.
If seeped water does not reach an aquifer the subsurface runoff is referred to as
interflow.
Box 2.1 Blue and green water
Water that is directly used for biomass production and “lost” in evaporation is
termed “green water”, while “blue water” is the flowing water in surface water
bodies (e.g., rivers, lakes) and subsurface water bodies (aquifers). Terrestrial
ecosystems (e.g., crops) are often “green water” dependent while aquatic
systems are often “blue water” dependent. The management of “green water”
flows holds potentials for saving water.
Source: GWP (2000)
Human activities significantly impact the water cycle. Both the quality and quan-
tity of water stocks are influenced by discharged wastewater, climate change and
water abstraction. Figure 2.4 integrates several human activities in the natural water
cycle. Abstractions from the groundwater and surface water body are necessary to
cover the agricultural, domestic, and industrialwater demand.Wastewater that occurs
after the usage of freshwater will eventually be purified in the sewage plant. The puri-
fied or non-purified wastewater will be discharged in surface water or groundwater
bodies by percolation subsequently. This discharge changes the quality of water in
the water stocks.
2.3 A Simplified Hydro-Economic Model
Water management is only possible on the basis of an exact consideration of the
complex relationships of the water cycle. This section introduces the basic elements
of the water cycle and relates them to the water use of the economy. It is important to
understand the circulatory character of water. In the following,more complex nonlin-
ear relationships that have been developed in hydrology, play no role in the analysis
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Fig. 2.4 Regional water cycle with human economy. Source own illustration
presented here at first. On the basis of a simple hydrological model, conclusions can
be drawn which are presented in the following chapters.
A water cycle in its simplest form can be characterized by the dynamic mass bal-
ance equation, which describes the development of a water stock, including ground-
water, water volume of surface water, etc., over time
dS(t)
dt
= R(t) + P(t) − ET (t) − (1 − h) · x(t) − r(t) (2.1)
In the balance equation, depicted in Eq. (2.1), the volume of the water stock at time t
is denoted by S(t). The water can be the groundwater under a catchment area, a lake
or the water volume of a river.1 R(t) and P(t) stand for recharge and precipitation,
respectively. Both variables are taken as exogenous, i.e., they are not determined by
the water management of the economy of that catchment area. Recharge may happen
by a river entering the area or by subterranean groundwater flows from outside. The
same applies to precipitation. Rain comes with the wind into an area and is as
such exogenously given. Of course, a certain proportion of the rain can also have
arisen through the local water cycle. x denotes the amount of water used in the local
economy. The parameter h ∈ [0, 1] gives the portion of x that is returned into the local
watershed.2 For simplicity, we take R, P , and x as time-independent. r(t) describes
the runoff at time t . Runoffs are all streams, be it on surface or underground, that
leave the area. They depend, of course, on the water management of the economy
and on the hydrology of the catchment area. ET (t) depicts evapotranspiration. It
1The humidity of the soil also plays a role, but it is not considered in the following simplifiedmodel.
2Notice that we do not include water quality aspects into this basic model. Section 3.10 deals with
water quality management.
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consists of that portion of water that leaves the area as vapor. Forests, plants, and
crops transpire and water evaporates on the surface of the landscape. This green
water rises up and is carried with the wind in various directions. A part of it returns
as rain.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume linearity of the various
interrelations between the variables of the hydrological cycle. In the following, we
assume that evapotranspiration depends linearly on the amount of water contained
in a watershed, i.e.
ET (t) = γ1S(t) (2.2)
If for example, the amount of water in a region or the soil moisture increases the
evapotranspiration will rise groundwater or the moisture of the soil increase than
the evapotranspiration will rise. Similarly, the runoff function exhibits the following
relationship
r(t) = γ2S(t) (2.3)
Inserting these two functions into the dynamic mass balance Eq. (2.1) yields
dS(t)
dt
= R(t) + P(t) − γ1S(t) − γ2S(t) − (1 − h)x (2.4)
Let us assume that recharge and precipitation are constant over time, i.e., R(t) = R0
and P(t) = P0.
The introduced equations form a dynamic hydro-economic model. The intrin-
sic dynamic forces can be analyzed with the help of a so-called phase diagram, a
graphical method to study the properties of dynamic systems. Figure 2.5 depicts the
dynamic interrelations. To begin with, the periodic abstraction of a human settlement
in the catchment area is represented by a horizontal line denoted by (1 − h)x , where
x is the raw abstraction and h · x are the return flows after usage. In this simple
model, we assume that water use of humans does not depend on the size of the local
water stock S(t). Hence, (1 − h)x is graphically represented by a horizontal line.
The negatively sloped line in Fig. 2.5, shows the rate of replenishment of the water
stock through inflows from precipitation, surface water and groundwater minus the
outflows of surface and groundwater, as well as outflows through evapotranspiration
(green water).
If the amount of replenished water is larger than the quantity of water used,
i.e., R0 + P0 − (γ1 + γ2)S(t) > (1 − h)x as indicated in Eq. (2.4), we can observe
that the water stock will increase. Whether this is the case depends on the size of
the water stock displayed on the horizontal axis. Let us assume that the current
water stock is S(t) = , then the water stock will accumulate since dS(t)/dt =
R(t) + P(t) − (γ1 − γ2)S(t) − (1 − h)x > 0. If S(t) is somewhere on the right side
of S∗, the reverse process takes place. This intrinsic dynamic behavior is identified
by the arrows pointing to the intersection of both lines at S∗.
From Fig. 2.5, one cannot infer how long it will take until S(t) reaches S∗, but
it can be concluded that the stock will approach S∗. At the point where S(t) = S∗
holds, a hydro-economic equilibrium is reached, which is stationary in the sense that
no further change of S(t) will be observed. Additionally, S∗ is also stable, i.e., if
2.3 A Simplified Hydro-Economic Model 17
Fig. 2.5 Simple hydro-economic model. Source own illustration
S(t) would deviate from S∗, let us say through a singular event like an unusual rain
shower, then S(t) would return to S∗ after a while. We call this state a steady-state
equilibrium.
The question remains whether the water use (1 − h)x can be covered by the local
water cycle, i.e., whether total water abstraction by the human settlement is sustain-
able. This depends on the level of net water abstraction (1 − h)x . From Fig. 2.5, we
can infer the equilibrium water stock level S∗ that corresponds to the quantity of
water used by humans, i.e., (1 − h)x . It follows that a higher level of water abstrac-
tion is associated with a smaller water stock in the local water cycle’s equilibrium.
Whether the water use is sustainable depends upon the critical threshold . This
threshold depends on the whole ecological system and its interaction with the water
cycle. We simply take this value as given. If the water stock S(t) is less than ,
severe ecological damages will occur due to a decrease of basic stabilizing functions
of water beyond its economic use: micro-climate stabilization, soil control, nutri-
ent retention, supporting habitats and diversity, and flood control through wetlands.
The corresponding upper bound of sustainable water abstraction can be calculated
from Eq. (2.4) by setting dS(t)/dt = 0 and solving for x . Inserting S(t) =  yields
xmax = R0 + P0 − g1 − g2
1 − h (2.5)
xmax is the upper bound of admissible water abstraction, implying that there is a
quantity range [0, xmax ] of sustainable water usage. If the human water utilization
is less than the level xmax , sustainability of the local water cycle is still assured. Of
course, the change in the water table may lead to a change in the environment. But
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this change is not detrimental to the environment itself or its provision of ecological
services nor to the people living in this catchment area. Box 2.2 describes a historic
case of over-utilization of the water cycle with the help of the simple linear eco-
hydrological model.
Box 2.2 The demise of the Mayas
TheMayas dominatedMiddleAmerica for at least 1500 years and suddenly,
around the ninth century A.D., their civilization vanished within a very short
time. It is estimated that in the pre-Columbian time over 19 million people
lived in Meso-America, and that after the ninth century only 10 percent were
left. Archeologists and historians puzzled about the reasons for this sudden
demise of this ancient civilization. Numerous explanations were presented,
such as epidemic disease, warfare, and overpopulation. Today, there is reason
to believe that severe droughts have caused the collapse of the agricultural
system, and hence destroyed the livelihood of the Mayas. These droughts
were not only the result of a long wave periodic change of the climate,
but they also resulted from the deforestation that took place to gain more
farmland. Dr. Thomas L. Sever, an archeologist with NASA’s Marshall Space
Flight Center, said that the rise of droughts in this area could be traced back
to the Mayas themselves. In some recent studies, geophysicists developed
complex hydrological and climatological models to reconstruct the impact of
deforestation on the local climate.
Sources: Cook et al. (2012), Kuil et al. (2016)
2.4 Exercises
Exercise 2.1 Water availability in the 2020s
The source we use to describe the water availability on earth is the best one available,
but it is over three decades old. Try to find reliable sources to update the values for
the major categories, such as total water reserves, total seawater, freshwater, glaciers,
etc., to the current times, i.e., the 2020s. Are there differences to be observed? If yes,
what could be reasons for this? Is the literature unified on this issue, or are there
controversies?
Exercise 2.2 The demise of Mayas
We can use our simple linearmodel to get an idea of how various factors were at work
and led to the decline of the agricultural base as a result of increased deforestation.
Our approach focusses on some pivotal interactions that cause the detrimental effects
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of deforestation. To do so we extend Eq. (2.1), by introducing a coefficient β that
indicates the capacity of the local climate system to return evapotranspiration as
precipitation.
dS(t)
dt
= R(t) + P(t) − (1 − β)ET − r − (1 − h)x (2.6)
were 0 ≤ β < 1. This coefficient captures various climatological effects that are
responsible for the creation of clouds through local evapotranspiration identified by
climatologists: The surface albedo effect, aerodynamic effects, and chemical effects,
to name some. Let us confine to the surface albedo effect. Albedo is the ratio between
reflected radiation to incident solar radiation. The higher the albedo the less radiation
(energy) is absorbed from the earth. The albedo rises with the deforestation because
cultivated land reflects more radiation. With rising albedo, the absorption of energy
from radiation decreases, which leads to less heat flux. Less heat energy causes
less vapor production and results in a decrease of cloud building. Less clouds are
associated with less precipitation.
This transmission chain is captured by β, which depends on deforestation. Let
F be total land available in an area. This land is either covered by forest or it is
utilized as cropland, whereas the latter case is denoted by A. Thus β = β(A) with
β ′(A) < 0.
In addition,we have to distinguish between forest evapotranspiration and cropland
evapotranspiration. Extending the linear model leads to
ET1(t) = γ1S(t)(F − A) (2.7)
ET2(t) = γ2S(t)A (2.8)
where Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8) represent the evapotranspiration of forest and of cropland,
respectively. We assume, that γ1 ≥ γ2. Finally, runoff is given by
r(t) = γ3S(t)A (2.9)
assuming that runoff takes place mainly in the cultivated areas. We also assume, that
γ1 < γ2 + γ3, i.e., an increase of cropland A leads to an increase of evapotranspira-
tion. If we insert these three equations into Eq. (2.6) we get
dS(t)
dt
= R(t) + P(t) − (1 − β)(γ1S(t)(F − A) + γ2S(t)A) − γ3S(t)A − (1 − h)x
(2.10)
Agricultural production depends on water availability S(t) and, of course, on the
area A. Let us assume the simple production function
C = A
F
Max[δ(S(t) − ), 0] (2.11)
where δ is agricultural productivity.Output depends not only on the area cultivated but
also on the amount of water available. This function depicts the inherent hydrological
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Fig. 2.6 The demise of the Maya. Source own illustration
and ecological preconditions of agricultural production in an extreme manner. If the
water stock is above a critical threshold, agricultural production is possible. If S
falls short of  the whole production breaks down. Figure 2.6 shows the problem of
increased deforestation.
In the course of an exogenous decrease of precipitation from P0 to P1 the dS/dt-
curve shifts downwards and the output of agriculture drops (see Eq. (2.11)). The
Maya react with expanding cropland because they try to compensate the decreased
productivity of cropland by increasing the size of it (see Eq. (2.11)). As a result, the
increased deforestation leads to a clockwise rotation of the graph reflectingEq. (2.10).
The final hydrological equilibrium is S∗1 which is located to the left of  leading to
severe crop failures, and finally to the demise of the Mayas.
2.5 Further Reading
Agoodoverviewabout thewater availability andwater cycle is givenbyShiklomanov
(1990). More details about the components of the water balance could be found in
special books which focus on meteorology or hydrology such as Brutsaert et al.
(2005), Gordon et al. (2004), as well as Holton and Hakim (2012). Introductory
references to geohydrological topics and groundwater are Karamouz et al. (2011)
and Thangarajan (2007).
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3IntegratedWater ResourceManagement:Principles and
Applications
3.1 What Is Integrated Water Resource Management?
3.1.1 Approaches to IWRM
The Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach goes back to the
establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the year 1933, which
integrated the functions of navigation, flood control and power production (Biswas
2004). Further issues, such as erosion control, recreation and public health, were
also addressed by the TVA (Mitchell 1990). The Secretary-General of the United
Nations Organization (UNO) addressed the topic of IWRM in 1957. The UNO’s
understanding of integration refers to supporting services needed to develop irri-
gated agriculture, but the coordination of different water-related functions was not
part of this IWRM concept. This deficit was remedied at the Water Conference in
Mar del Plata in 1977where the necessity of coordinationwithin the water sector was
explicitly addressed. However, issues associated with high water demand and nega-
tive environmental impacts of irrigated agriculture were not approached sufficiently
(Snellen and Schrevel 2004).
At the beginning of the 1990s, there were some observable shortcomings in tradi-
tional water management, like quality issues, overexploitation, ecosystem degrada-
tion or social concerns. Water problems also had become multidimensional, multi-
sectoral, and multiregional and filled with multi-interests, multi-agendas, and multi-
causes (Biswas 2004). To overcome these issues, four important guiding principles
were determined during the International Conference on Environment and Water
in Dublin in the year 1992 (Xie 2006). These principles (ecological, institutional,
gender, economic) became well known as the “Dublin-Principles”, which are stated
in the annex of this chapter.
The Dublin Guiding Principles represented an important input for the Agenda
21, which was agreed upon the United Nations Conference on Environment and
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Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Chapter 18 emphasized the need for an
integrated approach to manage water resources by connecting different water ser-
vices and providing good governance, appropriate infrastructure, and sustainable
financing.1
The present understanding of IWRM with its holistic approach is strongly based
on the Dublin-Principles as well as on the Agenda 21 (Chap.18) document. There are
many definitions of IWRM, for instance, in the Agenda 21.2 A well-cited definition
of IWRM is the one made by GWP (2000):
IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water,
land and related resources in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare
in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.3
IWRM cannot be seen as a blueprint or product for good water management,
but rather as a paradigm with a broad set of principles, tools, and guidelines that
must be tailored to the specific context of a country, region, or river basin in order
to implement an efficient and effective water resource management. A basic set of
principles is outlined in Box 3.1.
Box 3.1 IWRM principles
• Integrate water and environmental management.
• Follow a systems approach.
• Full participation by all stakeholders, includingworkers and the community.
• Attention to the social dimensions.
• Capacity building.
• Availability of information and the capacity to use it to anticipate develop-
ments.
• Full-cost pricing complemented by targeted subsidies.
1Chapter18.3 of Agenda 21 states:
The widespread scarcity, gradual destruction and aggravated pollution of freshwater
resources in many world regions, along with the progressive encroachment of incompat-
ible activities, demand integrated water resources planning and management. Such integra-
tion must cover all types of interrelated freshwater bodies, including both surface water
and groundwater, and duly consider water quantity and quality aspects. The multi-sectoral
nature of water resources development in the context of socioeconomic development must
be recognized, as well as the multi-interest utilization of water resources.
2A review about IWRM definitions is given by Jonker (2007).
3See Box 2 on page 22 in GWP (2000).
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• Central government support through the creation and maintenance of an
enabling environment.
• Adoption of the best existing technologies and practices.
• Reliable and sustained financing.
• Equitable allocation of water resources.
• Recognition of water as an economic good.
• Strengthening the role of women in water management.
Source: IWA/UNEP (2002)
3.1.2 The IWRM Paradigm
The IWRM paradigm contains important key concepts of integration, decentraliza-
tion, participation, and sustainability (Xie 2006). Due to the holistic view of the
IWRM paradigm, there is a necessity for the integrated management of horizontal
sectors that use or affect water resources, e.g., water supply, sanitation, agricultural
use, energy generation, industrial use, or environmental protection. In addition to hor-
izontal integration, vertical integration is also required to coordinate efforts between
local, regional, national, and international water user groups and institutions (Xie
2006). The main aspects regarding natural system integration and human system
integration are listed in detail in the chapter annex Sect. 3.13.2 (GWP 2000).
Besides the necessity of integration, there is also a need for decentralized decision-
making and responsibility at the lowest effective management level, to increase
awareness for local and regional problems. Hence, IWRM seeks to strike a balance
between top-down and bottom-up management. IWRM also wants to strengthen
community-based organizations and water user associations.
The consideration of sustainability, as a main part of IWRM, is not only restricted
to ecological sustainability for protecting the natural system, but it also covers aspects
of financial and economic sustainability. This means, for instance, that resource
allocation decisions have to be based on the economic value of water. Therefore,
water must be priced at its full costs (Xie 2006).4
The three key policy goals of IWRM are Equity, Ecological integrity and Effi-
ciency, which are known as the three’E’s (Postel 1992):
• Equity:Water is a basic need and hence there is the basic right for everybody to
have access to water of adequate quantity and quality.
4Full cost accounts for the cost of withdrawing and delivering water as well as the opportunity cost
plus the cost associated with economic and environmental externalities.
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• Ecological integrity:Water in sufficient quantities with sufficient quality should
persist in the environment. Water should be used in a sustainable way, so that the
future generation will be able to use it in a similar way as the present generation.
• Efficiency:Water must be used with maximum possible efficiency, because of its
finite and vulnerable nature. Cost recovery of the water service should be attained.
Water should be priced according to its economic value.
For supporting the application of IWRM principles in practice, the Global Water
Partnership (GWP) has created a toolboxwhose threemain categories are an enabling
environment, institutional roles, and management instruments (GWP 2000, 2004):
• Enabling environment refers to securing the rights and assets of all stakeholders
and protecting public assets. This category involves the general framework of
national policies, legislation, and regulation.
• The institutional roles involve the consideration of a whole range of formal rules
and regulations, customs and practices, ideas and information, and interest and
community group networks, which together provide the institutional framework
or context within which decision-makers operate.
• Themanagement instruments, include operational instruments for effective reg-
ulation, monitoring, and supporting decision-makers.
3.1.3 A General Framework for IWRM
For transferring the IWRM paradigm into practice, the GWP (2004) recommends
an IWRM planning cycle, which is illustrated in the chapter annex. In summary, the
complexity of thewater cycle and interdependencieswithin thewater sector and other
sectors (e.g., food sector, electricity sector) require specific methods for integrating
environmental, social, and economic issues at the level of watersheds. The paradigm
of IWRM provides us with the necessary interdisciplinary tools, which come from
natural water science (e.g., hydrology, geohydrology, meteorology), engineering,
and social sciences like political science, sociology, and economics. Often these
methods, such as optimization models or decision supportive systems, etc., utilize
mathematical models as a necessary prerequisite to capture complexity. Mathemat-
ically based hydro-economic models, which can be seen as a tool of IWRM, often
work with simulation or optimization models and node-link networks to replicate the
spatial distribution of important system elements like natural water bodies (e.g., sea,
lake, aquifer, river section, etc.), artificial water bodies (e.g., canals, etc.), infrastruc-
ture (e.g., wells, dams, pipelines, pumps, purification plants, etc.), human/artificial
impacts in the water system (e.g., point of use, point pollution source, non-point
pollution source). Box 3.2 gives an example for a numerical-based hydro-economic
model, which is extensively used, among other applications, to establish an IWRM
approach in California (Fig. 3.1).
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Fig. 3.1 General framework of IWRM. Source GWP (2000)
Box 3.2 The CALVIN Model
The CALVINmodel is a numerical-based economic-engineering optimization
model for water management in California. It was developed at the University
of California in Davis. The data set contains a wide range of monthly parame-
ters over the decades. Themodel is applicable to a variety of policy, operations,
and planning problems. CALVIN manages water infrastructure and demands
throughout California’s intertwined water network to minimize net scarcity
and operating costs statewide. Some model applications are
• Water markets,
• Capacity expansion in the water supply,
• Consequences of climate change,
• Severe sustained drought impacts and adaptation, and
• River restoration.
Source: Howitt et al. (1999), Lund et al. (2009)
The following sections introduce general but simple models that cover the major
problems of IWRM step-by-step. Specific topics and economic tools of IWRM, such
as the pricing policy and transboundary river management, are also addressed.
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3.2 The Economic Dimension of Water
If water is scarce then inevitably the economic perspective toward water gains a
particular importance. This has been stated in the aforementioned declaration of
Dublin. Principle 4 states that
water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an
economic good. [...] Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achiev-
ing efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection of water
resources. (Xie 2006)
Emphasizing that water is an economic good does not imply this resource is exclu-
sively a private good. Nor does it imply that water supply should be privatized. It
simply implies that the water cycle must be managed as a nonabundant resource.
The main difference of this kind of scarcity to other scarce goods, like e.g., precious
old paintings or fossil fuels, is that scarcity is the result of a political decision not
to overexploit the water cycle. The acknowledgment of scarcity follows from the
adherence to the principle of sustainability. This statement is open with respect to
the institutional implementation of the necessary management steps to assure sus-
tainability and economic efficiency as well. In the following subsection, we analyze
the various functions of the water cycle from an economic perspective.
3.2.1 Types of Environmental Goods
One could imagine that water is collectively owned by a society. There are many
examples worldwide of collectively owned and managed watersheds. For instance,
Ostrom (1990) reports from irrigation cooperatives in Spain and the Philippines
where the allotment of irrigation water has been fixed within a collective institutional
setting that contains conflict resolution mechanisms as well as monitoring systems.
On the other hand, there exist market-based solutions like water market institutions
in the southwest of the the USA or in Australia. There, water is often owned privately
according to traditional property rights and sold in spot and forward markets (see
Chap.5). Hence, saying that water is an economic good should not be confounded
with the notion of water as a private good. A private good is characterized by its
rivalness and by the possibility of exclusion on the basis of property rights. For
example, if farmer A irrigates his fields the same water needed is not available for
farmer B (rivalness). But the usage of water by farmer A requires also that he is able
to get hold of this water (exclusion of other users).
But water appears not only as a private good. Indeed, the water cycle assures
the livelihood of people in a watershed by satisfying many different life-supporting
ecosystem functions. For environmental economists, the ecosystem functions of the
water cycle interact with functions from other natural resources (soil, nutrients, veg-
etation, etc.), i.e., input factors that produce the total ecosystem to the inhabitants of
a watershed. These ecosystem services lead to societal benefits, as they create eco-
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Table 3.1 Types of environmental goods
Rival Non-rival
Excludable Private good
food, oil, gas, timber
Club goods
swimming pool, golf club lane, national park
Non-
excludable
Open-access resources
Deep-sea fishery, ecosystem
services
Public good
carbon-absorption capacity of the rainforest,
eco-system services
nomic value.As an example, awetlandmitigates flood damages and, at the same time,
can be used as a recreational area. Forests contribute to the recharge of groundwater
and influence the microclimate through evapotranspiration in a favorable manner.
From an economic standpoint, these life-support functions represent societal and
economic values far beyond, e.g., the plain use value of water for irrigation or for
the water supply of households respectively.
Some of the ecosystem services of water mentioned above appear as public goods.
Public goods are characterizedby the absenceof rivalness and the non-applicability of
exclusion. The localwater cycle, for instance, sustains themicroclimatic stabilization
of the watershed which is the base of livelihood for the inhabitants. All members
of that local population reap this positive ecosystem function (non-rivalness) and
nobody can be excluded (nonexclusion). Or take the example of the flood protection
capability of a forest habitat or from a wetland. Here again, the advantage accrues
to all neighbors sheltered. Table3.1 shows the classification of natural resources
and their services into different types of economic goods. Each of these types will
require a specific approach ofmanagement to assure an efficient and environmentally
sustainable supply to society.
Take natural resources as private goods. Oil, gas, and timber, for example, are
resources that are traded inmarkets. Indeed, they are private goods due towell-defined
property rights and due to their rivalness. The case of club goods is rather similar:
You pay for their services, but in contrast to the private good case your consumption
does not reduce the consumption opportunity of your fellow club members.5 Now
take the case of open-access resources. Deep-sea fishery is a good example. Nobody
can be prevented to cast for fish outside of the exclusive economic zone 200 nautical
miles from the terrestrial baseline. Hence, there is no excludability while at the same
time their fishing is rivaling. Natural resources or eco-services could also assume the
property of a public good: Everybody will benefit from these services and nobody
can be excluded from this benefit even if one does not pay for it. A very typical
example is the rainforest’s capacity to absorb carbon.
Why is this classification important for economists? To explain the importance
of these distinctions, let us take the example of the deep- sea fishery. The lacking
excludability of fishing grounds leads to an overexploitation of fish populations. Too
many trawlers are operating and do not take into account the effects of their fishing
5Strictly speaking, this case applies only if no congestion occurs.
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Table 3.2 Economic dimensions of water
Rival Non-rival
Excludable Private good
drinking water for households,
irrigation for farmers, regulated
groundwater extraction
Club goods
various types of in-stream uses, other
recreational use restricted to club
members
Non-
excludable
Open-access resources
ground water extraction, river as a
waste water sink
Public good
microclimate stabilization, soil control,
nutrient retention, supporting habitats
and diversity, flood control through
wetlands
efforts on the fish population. Moreover, if one of the fishermen would be concerned
about the future of fish stocks he not only would harm himself if he decided to
fish less but also would not contribute to protecting the fish stock: The amount of
fish he would abstain from fishing will be caught by his colleagues. Obviously, the
unregulated free market is not a suitable institutional model for an efficient and
environmentally sustainable fishery management system but, instead, it calls for
public intervention. Similarly, the production of public goods should not be left to a
market. In general, the supply of public goods through amarket where each customer
pays the same price leads to an under-provision of this good: As no customer can be
excluded from consuming the good the provider is not able to make sufficient profits.
Again, the free market solution would result in a dissatisfactory result, a situation
sometimes interpreted as market failure.
3.2.2 Economic Dimensions of Water
The economic dimension of water use can further be specified by the classifica-
tion presented in Table3.2. The various types of water usage exhibit the economic
dimensions of the water cycle. Different kinds of benefits arising from water use
and various production structures in the four peculiar specifications call for different
institutional frameworks to secure the specific water services to a satisfying extent.
Note that the notion of private good does not refer to an entitlement of owning a
water resource privately. It refers only to its characteristics of being excludable and
rival. The rules regarding how the user got hold of a certain amount of water are
not specified so far. Perhaps she had paid for that water from a private supplier or
the water had been allotted to her for free by a public agency. Or take the case of
groundwater extraction. Perhaps the groundwater is under common property law, i.e.,
it is a commonpool resource, owned by a community ormunicipality.Water extracted
from a groundwater reservoir is a private good allotted to the members according
to implemented rules. This could be accompanied by payments depending on the
quantity of water retrieved or water could be obtained for free up to a certain limit
(rationing). In this case, the financing of the necessary technical infrastructure (pipe,
pumps, energy, etc.) has to be assured by local institutions, e.g., a municipality or a
water cooperative.
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3.3.1 Fairness Criteria
As discussed above, the economic aspect of water management needs to be fully
integrated into the concept of a sustainable water resources management approach.6
Water use should not only respect the hydrological cycle and the boundaries of
ecosystems but should also strive to use water in an efficient manner. Solving water
scarcity problems by simply transferring water from one catchment area to another
is not a sustainable approach as a rule. Integrated water resource management has to
deal with the water demand side and the economic allocation of scarce water to users.
Users are households, the industrial, and the agricultural sector. Water management
activities refer not only to measures to enhance the efficiency of water use but also
to specific rules that determine the allocation of water among users. These rules
have to be institutionalized so as to make them effective.7 This process must satisfy
normative criteria or societal goals, namely, efficiency, social fairness, or equity
and environmental sustainability. These criteria gain more and more importance in
regions, where water gets increasingly scarce.
There exist various methods and model specifications to incorporate these goals
into the management process. Let us explain the basic features with the help of
an example. There are two farmers in an arid zone both exposed to water scarcity.
Let us assume that the first farmer, F1, is more productive than farmer 2, F2. F1
produces an agricultural output—let us say alfalfa—according to a simple linear
production function y1 = a1w1, where y1 is the output of alfalfa, a1 denotes thewater
productivity, and w1 represents the amount of water used. Similarly, F2 produces the
same crop according to the production function y2 = a2w2 with a lower productivity
than F1, i.e., a1 > a2. There is a sustainable water supply of W¯ , which can be
allocated to F1 and F2, i.e., W¯ = w1 + w2.
From a pure output view that respects the sustainability constraint W¯ , the best
water allocation maximizes total output y1 + y2. In this case, all the water should be
allocated to F1 leaving nothing to F2. The farm of F2will be shut down, and F2would
lose his revenue. But would this be just? The literature mentions various allocation
principles, that go far beyond the usual efficiency criterion (Johansson-Stenman and
Konow 2010).
1. Accountability principle: This principle states that persons should be remuner-
ated in proportion to their effort. Let us assume for a moment that both sites
have the same productivity in terms of soil characteristics and geological prop-
erties. Hence, productivity differences could be traced back to different levels
of effort (assuming that other reasons, like health, physical conditions, etc., are
6See, for instance, The Dublin-Principles of the International Conference on Water and the Envi-
ronment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland, 1992 (GWP 2000).
7That is the reason that some experts prefer to speak of water governance instead of water manage-
ment, which highlights the societal character of the management process.
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disregarded). The optimal water allocation would then prescribe to channel a cer-
tain portion of water to F1 and the residual to the farm of F2 depending on the
relative efforts of both. One possible rule splits total output proportionally, i.e.,
the share of total output for farmer i is ai/(a1 + a2). This, of course, requires suit-
able institutional arrangements to implement this rule. Specifically, effort must
be observable.
2. Efficiency principle: An efficient allocation implies that water is distributed
according to the users’ productivities. In this case, all water goes to F1 and
F2 receives nothing, which results in the highest aggregated output that can be
achieved by the two farms together. This is indeed efficient in terms of maxi-
mizing total output given a certain amount of resources but the allocation seems
to be at odds with fairness as nothing is left to F2. However, the economically
efficient allocation, w1 = W¯ could lead to a fair outcome if redistributive instru-
ments are available to secure fairness. In our case, the instrument consists of a
transfer rule specifying how much of F1’s output, y1, should be transferred to F2.
But how much output should be transferred if the productivity differences cannot
be traced back to different effort levels? Before we deal with this issue it should
be mentioned that a strong trade-off between efficiency and fairness exists only
if no other management instrument than the water allocation itself is available.
In the presence of other redistributive instruments, this trade-off might still exist
but it is less severe.
3. Basic need principle: According to the basic need principle, an allocation of
water has to ensure that all members of a society survive in a decent way. In the
case of the two farms, the water allocation is either such that all water goes to
F1 except for the amount w2 that guarantees F2 an output sufficient to survive.
Alternatively, all water goes to F1 while F1 is obligated to transfer a sufficient
amount of output to F2. Again, the issue of whether the allocation is efficient or
not depends on the availability of a transfer system. The transfer system might
refer either to output or to water. Whatever transfer medium is chosen the basic
need principle prescribes that all people have an entitlement to the provision of
goods or resources so as to survive in a decent way. The basic need principle is
especially important for developing countries.
4. Strict equality:There is a long-lastingdiscussion in social philosophyondistribu-
tional justice. One egalitarian view is the concept of moral arbitrariness proposed
by the philosopher John Rawls.8 In modern societies, there is a broad agreement
that the social product should not be distributed according to innate entitlements
as in feudal times. But John Rawls also denies that justice can be secured by the
institutionalization of equal opportunities as in the case of free markets, or free
markets and supporting institutions to equalize opportunities for people from all
social classes. All characteristics people cannot influence by themselves shall not
be decisive for the distribution of produced income. If somebody is highly gifted
and utilizes this advantage in a free market then the outcome will be unjust. The
8Rawls (1971), see the lucid explanation in Sandel (2009).
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Fig. 3.2 Efficiency and fairness. Source own illustration
uneven distribution of innate endowments among all people is morally arbitrary
and, hence, the productivity effects of these endowments shall be shared by the
community as a whole. This leads to the conclusion that strict income equality is
just. There is an exception: incentives. If a talented person is highly taxed then he
might lessen his effort leading to less production. Here, John Rawls introduces
the difference principle. The distribution of goods remains just if in the course
of an income increase of a successful market participant the income of the most
disadvantaged rises as well.
The four principles can be summarized with the help of Fig. 3.2. The production
possibility line shows all possible combinations of output, {y1, y2}, as a function of
the water allocation, W . The maximum potential output of F1, ymax1 , is reached if the
whole sustainable water supply, W¯ , is allocated to F1, hence the output combination{
ymax1 , 0
}
satisfies the efficiency principle. The dotted line depicts all possible output
distributions if a transfer system is available. In this case, the y1 = a1W¯ will be
distributed among F1 and F2 according to one of the fairness criteria. For strict
equalitywe have point Et . Here, both farmers receive the same amount of agricultural
output after the transfer has taken place. If one applies the accountability criterion,
the output allocation is determined by proportional rule yi = [ai/(a1 + a2)]ymax1 .
This allocation determines the proportion of both allocations, i.e., y2 = (a2/a1)y1.
The intersection of this array with the production possibility line (dotted line) is
point P2 that defines the allocation for this case. Alternatively, the proportional rule
can be applied to total water available, i.e., yi = [ai/(a1 + a2)]W¯ , which leads to
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the array y2 = (a2/a1)2y1.9 Which of the two rules should be applied depends on
what the distributandum is, water or agricultural output. Points S and St indicate the
distribution if the basic need principle is satisfied.
If the institutional framework does not permit a redistribution of goods, the con-
sideration of a fair distribution is only possible with the help of water allocation.
In this case, the production possibility line is given by the solid line in Fig. 3.2.
The corresponding allocations are then given by the points E (strict equality), P1
(proportional allocation) and S (basic needs). The lines S2 and S1 are the respec-
tive lifelines of F2 and F1, i.e., the minimum outputs that are sufficient for survival.
Moving from S to St illustrates the institutional efficiency gains that can be realized
by introducing a transfer system.
The difference principle of John Rawls is visualized by the shift from E to, say,
P2. If in the course of an institutional innovation transfers are introduced we could
move from the strict egalitarian distribution E to P2 for instance.10 In point P2 both
incomes in terms of output quantities have increased relative to point E, therefore the
difference principle is satisfied despite the deterioration of the income distribution
among the users. The increase in income of F1 is accompanied by a rise in F2’s
income. P2 is the allocation pointwhere the accountability principle is satisfied.Here,
total output, ymax1 , is divided proportionally in shares of ai/(a1 + a2). If transfers are
not possible, the accountability principle can only be applied to the water allocation.
In this case allocation P1 will be chosen.
3.3.2 Social Welfare Function
3.3.2.1 Individual Utility Functions
In mathematical policy models, the optimal allocation is often derived from a social
welfare function (SWF). Usually, these functions depend on the utility or the well-
being of every single member of the community or society under consideration. In
our simple case, the social welfare function could be written as SW F = G(y1, y2).
The well-being of F1 and F2 is indicated by their incomes, y1 and y2, respectively.
There are various specifications of this function that can be related to the fairness
principles introduced above. The SWF most prevalent in economics and also in
the IWRM literature is the so-called utilitarian social welfare function, according
to which social welfare is simply the sum of the individual welfare of every single
member of the society.Here, individualwelfare is identified as an individual’s income
and its consumption.
SW F = y1 + y2 (3.1)
9This follows from the sharing rulewi = ai/(a1 + a2)W¯ and, hence, yi = (a2i /(a1 + a2))W¯ ). Thus,
y2 = (a2/a1)2y1.
10Of course, one can also select other points on the dotted line that lead to a change in the distribution
ratio.
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The optimal allocation of water is derived by maximizing the objective function
represented by Eq. (3.1) while taking all the economic and hydrological constraints
into account. This SWF adheres to the efficiency principle. What matters is the total
sum of individuals’ well-being without any regard of the distribution of well-being.
If we insert the farmers’ linear production functions into Eq. (3.1) and stick to a an
ecologically sustainable solution the management’s objective is
max
w1,w2
[a1w1 + a2w2] s.t. w1 + w2 ≤ W¯ (3.2)
Utilizing the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions11 we get the solutionw∗1 =
W¯ and w∗2 = 0. All the water goes to F1 leading to consumption of y∗1 = a1W¯ and
y∗2 = 0.
However, as this allocation can hardly be termed fair, the program can be amended
by additional constraints to include the various fairness principles. For instance, if
we include the restriction of a minimum threshold for F2’s consumption quantities,
i.e., y2 ≥ s2, the program would lead to a water allocation such that point S, or
point St in the case a transfer system is in place, will be reached. The allocations
in points S and St satisfy the basic need principle. Or you believe in the principle
of strict equality. Then, the additional constraint to be included in the maximization
program is y1 = y2, which leads to a solution indicated by point E. In the presence
of a transfer system, we must include a1w1 − τ = a2w2 + τ where τ is the transfer
from F1 to F2, yielding the solution in point Et. The adherence to strict equality can
be expressed by a SocialWelfare Function (SWF), which states that the well-being of
society depends exclusively on the well-being of the most disadvantaged individual.
SW F = min [y1, y2] (3.3)
Maximizing this SWF leads, of course, to an egalitarian solution, as depicted by
points E and Et in Fig. 3.2. This SWF represents Rawls’ difference principle, as the
only criterion determining overall social welfare is the well-being of the poor. If in
the course of an increase in income of the more advantaged, the income of the poor
rises as well, social welfare has improved. The social improvement comes through
the income increase of the poor, not through the increase of both incomes as in the
case of the utilitarian SWF.
Thus far we have identified income or consumption as well-being. The alloca-
tion problem becomes more complicated if well-being is not directly expressed by
income or consumption but by the utility these observable variables create. Thereby,
the level of well-being does not follow consumption in a linear manner generally.
Doubling consumption leads to less than doubling of the original satisfaction level.12
Furthermore, this attitude toward consumption differs individually.
11These conditions allow to determine the optimal choice of w1 and w2, see appendix A.
12The additional value of an additional unit of a consumption good or income decreases with an
increasing level of consumption. This property is called diminishing marginal utility. It makes a
difference in the valuation of a consumptive item, let us say a wristwatch, whether you already have
three watches on your wrist or none.
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The level of satisfaction resulting from consumption can be expressed by means
of a utility function that transforms consumption quantities into some utilitarian units
of well-being or happiness.13 Let us assume that the utility functions of F1 and F2,
respectively, are
U1(y1) = A(a1w1)η (3.4)
U2(y2) = B(a2w2)η (3.5)
The heterogeneity of both farmers is indicated by the two parameters A and B,
where we assume that A < B. Thus, the more productive farmer F1 derives less
utility from consumption than the less productive farmer, F2, does.14
Similar to the production possibility frontier, we can construct a utility possibility
frontier indicating all possible utility distributions that can be achieved by allocating
water to F1 and F2. Recall that w2 = W¯ − w1, which is substituted in Eq. (3.5).
Solving Eq. (3.4) for w1 gives w1 = (B1/A)(1/η) and inserting this expression for w1
into Eq. (3.5) yields
U2 = B
[
a2
(
W¯ − (1/a1)
(
U1
A
)1/η)]η
(3.6)
Equation (3.6) is the algebraic specification of the utility possibility frontier. Note
that this frontier is derived under the assumption that transfers of output between both
farmers are not possible. In Fig. 3.3, it corresponds to the lower of the two convex
curves.
3.3.2.2 Allocation When Transfers Are Possible
If output transfers are assumed to be feasible the derivation of the utility possibility
frontier consists of two steps. First, total output is maximized by allocating all water
to F1, such that ymax1 = a1W¯ . Second, the (re-)distribution of utility from F1 and F2
can indirectly be accomplished by an output transfer, τ , such that
y1 = a1W¯ − τ with corresponding U1(y1) = A(a1W¯ − τ)η (3.7)
y2 = τ with corresponding U2(y2) = B(τ )η (3.8)
13There exists an own branch of literature that discusses the philosophical foundation of utility
functions and their application in order to derive policy options. There is also a discussion on how
to fix the scale of the utility units. Some important contributions to this literature are enlisted in the
bibliography of this chapter, see particularly the suggested textbook by Perman (2011), and Roemer
(1996).
14Recall that a1 > a2.
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Fig. 3.3 Utility possibility frontiers with and without transfers. Source own illustration
Solving Eq. (3.7) for τ and inserting the expression into Eq. (3.8) yields the utility
possibility frontier for the case that a transfer system can be established.
U2 = B
[
a1W¯ −
(
U1
A
)1/η]η
(3.9)
This function is also displayed in Fig. 3.3 (the upper convex curve). Both utility
frontiers, which assume either the impossibility of output transfers or the availability
of a transfer mechanism, present the maximum utility level of F2 given the utility
level of F1.
The lower (light gray) possibility curve represents all utility distributions when
transfers are not possible, thus F2 can only acquire utility by producing at his site.
To do so, water has to be diverted from the more productive farmer F1 to F2. Hence,
the choice of the utility distribution among both farmers cannot be separated from
the choice of the “size of the cake”. However, if an output transfer system can be
installed the issues of maximizing agricultural output and of output distribution can
be separated.
Figure3.3 plots as the first proposal the equal distribution of well-being. The 45-
degree line through the origin shows this equal distribution. There is one intersection
with each of the two utility possibility curves. The first one is E . Here, water has
to be allocated such that both farmers are equally well off. Since no transfers are
possible the water allocation has to solve both tasks, production efficiency and fair
distribution.
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The second intersection ist Et where equality of utility is ensured. Here, the
issue of distribution can be separated from the water allocation. Since F1 is more
productive than F2, all water gos to F1. However, the output is distributed such that
equality of well-being is achieved. Since F1 derives less utility from consumption
than F2 does, F1 requires more quantities consumed than F2 in order to achieve the
same level of utility for both farmers. From U1(y1) = U2(y2) it follows
Ayη1 = Byη2 ⇒ y1 =
(
B
A
)1/η
· y2 (3.10)
and since A < B it follows that y1 > y2.
Of course, to perform this calculation we must be able to compare the utilities
of both farmers, i.e., interpersonal comparability must be possible. This requires a
certain degree of measurability of happiness or well-being. If this is given we can not
only determine the optimal total output but also its distribution according to the utility
created for both farmers. This must not necessarily be the equal well-being solution,
which we just have discussed. This may also depend on other fairness principles to
which the policy maker or the community adheres.
Dating back to JeremyBentham, a philosopher of the eighteenth century, themain
goal of a free society should be to organize the economy such that it leads to the
“Greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Bentham 2008, 393). Societal welfare
is defined as the sum over all individual levels of well-being. The corresponding
SWF is simply the utilitarian specification, as in Eq. (3.2). The income distribution
matters only insofar as it contributes to achieving the goal of the greatest happiness
of all members.
3.3.2.3 Resulting Water Allocation
Again, we have to distinguish between a system without and with transfer possibil-
ities. In the case with no transfer, the optimal water allocation can be determined
by maximizing the sum of utilities, i.e., Usum = U1 + U2. Graphically, this will be
achieved in Fig. 3.3 at point G southeast of E . Here, Usum reaches the highest value
possible in an allocation system without transfer.15 The resulting benefit distribution
is not equal. The amount of water is distributed in an inequitable way. F1 receives
more than F2. This result depends on two countervailing effects. On one side, F2
should receive more consumption due to its higher marginal utility, on the other side
F2 is less productive than F1. Hence, shifting more water to F2 decreases total well-
being.16 It can thus be seen that Bentham’s approach does indeed advocate inequality
if it only leads to a maximization of aggregated well-being.
15The line is defined as U2 = Usum − U1.
16If we further increase the consumer productivity of F2, it could well happen that G would be
northwest of E .
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The corresponding water allocation point G is based on is calculated from the
following program:
max
w1,w2
[U1(a1w1) + U2(a2w2)] , s.t. w1 + w2 ≤ W¯ (3.11)
The exact determination of this allocation is not necessary here. It is sufficient to see
that Bentham’s utilitarian approach subordinates the distribution of benefits to the
criterion of aggregated welfare. As a result, the available water is allocated such that
point G is realized.
In case of a systemwith transfer, we get a similar result. The Benthamian solution
is determined graphically as in the first case.Wemove the line of the total benefit up to
the right until we touch the outermost point Gt in Fig. 3.3. The algebraic solution is
derived as follows: We start by allocating all water to F1 (see program Eq. (3.12))
and maximize total utility with respect to a transfer variable:
max
τ
[
U1(a1W¯ − τ) + U2(τ )
]
(3.12)
From the optimality condition U ′1(..) = U ′2(..), we can derive
Aη(a1W¯ − τ)η−1 = Bητη−1 ⇒ (a1W¯ − τ) =
(
A
B
)1/(1−η)
· τ (3.13)
Since A < B, it follows from Eq. (3.13) that y1 =
(
a1W¯ − τ
)
< τ = y2. Contrary
to the allocation under strict equality, F1 gets less income than F2, simply because
farmer F1 is less effective in terms of generatingwell-being throughhis lowvaluing of
consumption. Thus, pointGt is northwest of point Et . If one compares both solutions,
the egalitarian and the utilitarian in Fig. 3.3, one can observe that in point Gt total
utility is maximized, whereas in Et total utility is below its maximum value. The
utilitarian criterion is achieved at the expense of that member of society who derives
less utility from consumption.17 If one adheres to the concept of moral arbitrariness
this approach is not convincing. If the intensity of consumption pleasure is innate,
then it is collectively owned by the society. Hence, the marginal utility of income
attached by nature to the members of the society does not imply an entitlement to
more consumption. As such, equating marginal utilities so as to maximize the SFW
is morally not convincing in the view of supporters of an egalitarian standpoint.
17In the figure, we can make another interesting observation if we compare point G with point Gt:
F1 is worse off in the case of the transfer system than in an allocation system without transfer.
Perhaps this is also one reason why there is sometimes resistance to institutional innovations.
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From a practical viewpoint, it is important to note that distributional issues can be
separated from efficiency problems only as far as the society is equippedwith the nec-
essary institutional capacities to solve distributional requirements with instruments
other than the allocation of inputs and products. In our example, irrespective of the
distributional principles thewater allocationwas chosen by directing thewholewater
available to farmer F1. Many integrated water management models start from this
separability assumption focusing solely on the allocation of water and other inputs
while leaving distributional issues to social and distribution policy. If water is used
for different purposes, e.g., as input for agricultural products and as a consumption
good for households the separation of distributional and allocational issues gets more
complicated. Needless to say that the weighing of distributive and allocative issues
is a major challenge in the specific institutional environment, and that solutions must
be tailored specific to the context, too.
3.3.3 Allocation with and without Water Scarcity
So far it was assumed that no abstraction costs incur to both farmers. Without costs,
the use of water could be infinite if it was not constrained by the upper bound W¯ .
If such a constraint cannot be implemented, water will be overused. However, if
abstraction costs are present water overuse can be prevented or at least lessened.
To analyze the relation among water utilization, abstraction costs, and sustainability
thresholds, we include abstraction costs in our two-farmer model. Furthermore, it is
assumed that production of the agricultural product can be captured by the production
functions depicted in Eqs. (3.14) and (3.15).
y1 = f1(w1) = a1(w1)θ (3.14)
y2 = f2(w2) = a2(w2)θ (3.15)
Instead of assuming that one farmer is always more productive than the other,
we now introduce production functions with decreasing marginal products. For
simplicity both farmers differ only with respect to ai , where a1 > a2. Costs of water
abstraction denominated in agricultural products are determined by the cost functions
in Eq. (3.16), where F denotes the fixed cost and c the marginal cost of abstracting
water.
C(wi ) = F + cwi , i = {1, 2} (3.16)
Disregarding distributional issues, the goal is to maximize the aggregated output of
agricultural products, i.e.,
max
w1,w2
[a1(w1)θ + a2(w2)θ − c(w1 + w2) − 2F] (3.17)
leading to the optimality conditions
θai (wi )
θ−1 = c → w∗i =
(
θai
c
) 1
1−θ
(3.18)
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Fig. 3.4 Optimal allocation with and without water scarcity. Source own illustration
This allocation can also be achieved in a market economy, where farmers maximize
their profits according to
max
wi
[ai (wi )θ − qwi ] ⇒ w∗i =
(
θai
q
) 1
1−θ
, i = {1, 2} (3.19)
and a water treatment plant sells water under a price regulation scheme. The price
scheme for both farmers is a two-part tariff consisting of a volumetric component q
and an access fee M . The price regulation authority sets q = c and M = F/2. From
Eq. (3.19), it is obvious that the market equilibrium together with the water price
regulation leads to the optimal allocation. Total amount of water used, w∗1 + w∗2 =
W ∗, is determined in Fig. 3.4, where the total demand curve intersects with the
constant marginal cost line. The intersections of the respective marginal product
curves of each farmer with the marginal cost line yield the optimal allocation.
Since it is costly to abstract water, its use is finite. It remains to examine whether
the optimal allocation, W ∗, lies above the sustainable boundary, W¯ . In Fig. 3.4,
two scenarios are depicted. The first scenario assumes that aggregated water use is
less than the sustainability boundary leading to a water price of q = c. The second
scenario assumes that abstracting water is sufficiently cheap such that the aggregated
water use of both farmers exceeds the sustainable boundary. In this case, the presence
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of abstraction costs does not protect the hydrological cycle sufficiently. Hence, a
hydrological constraint must be introduced leading to the optimization program
max
w1
[a1(w1)θ + a2(w2)θ − c(w1 + w2) − F] s.t.w1 + w2 ≤ W¯ (3.20)
This leads to the optimality conditions
θai (wi )
θ−1 − c = λ → w∗i (3.21)
where λ > 0 is the respective Lagrangian of the constraint. This case is depicted
in Fig. 3.4, where total water demand is constrained by the black line of W¯ . As a
result, the marginal products exceed marginal cost by the difference which is called
scarcity rent.
Consider the respective market solution. The regulatory authority must increase
the volumetric component of the water tariff to q = c + λ in order to push back total
demand such that it does not exceed the sustainability threshold. Since the sustainable
water supply is smaller than the amount of water that the economy would abstract,
water is scarce and, as a consequence, the water price exceeds marginal costs, which
yields a scarcity rent for the water supplier. Figure3.4 shows the income of the water
supplier due to the scarcity rent,which is represented by the shaded rectangular. There
is a discussion about the distribution of the scarcity rent.18 This rent income can be
used to lower the access fee. But what should we do with residual (if there is one)?
Some people suggest that this rent income should be taxed away and redistributed
to the users. Or they take the existence of scarcity rents as an argument to claim that
the water infrastructure must be owned publicly.
Box 3.3 What are the motives of the Dog in the Manger?
Alan Garcia, former president of Peru, complained that the country is poor
despite its abundance of natural resources. According to the Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI), Peru ranges at position 77 out of 187 countries. The
HDI is an aggregated measure for the living conditions of a country with
respect to life expectancy, access to knowledge and a decent standard of liv-
ing. Alan Garcia identified political and cultural traits as the very source of
this deplorable economic and social situation, which he referred to as the dog-
in-the-manger-syndrome. The dog in the manger is a figure from a fable of the
18Scarcity rents can be skimmed off by suitable tariff systems, such as increasing block tariffs, see
Schwerhoff et al. (2019), more literature references will be given in Chap. 4.
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ancient storyteller Aesop. The beast lies in the manger full of straw and pre-
vents other animals to take the straw from themanger. The verymotive is a pure
grudge, as the straw is useless to the dog. Translated into the Peruvian political
environment, the dog can be seen as an analogy for poor peasants dwelling on
small plots in the countryside without any access to agricultural technology
and, at the same time, lacking the financial means to invest. In addition, prop-
erty rights are informal thus making investments insecure. Whenever modern
politicians tried to develop the traditional agriculture by consolidating the plots
into plains accessible to agricultural technology, local uproar emanated, often
well organized by local politicians. According to Alan Garcia, people were
caught in a vicious circle of poverty and an ideological superstructure that left
them in a habitual state of hostility toward modern development.
Therewere some attempts tomodernize the agricultural sector by promoting
privatization and land consolidation with the help of law amendments and even
new laws. In 2009, the Peruvian parliament passed a water bill that put much
emphasis on the efficient use ofwater. Thewater irrigation systemof traditional
agriculture was highly inefficient compared to modern technologies based on,
e.g., drip irrigation. Therefore, a development framework plan was established
up to attract large-scale agribusiness enterprises able to invest in efficiency-
enhancing technologies. But there has been political resistance against this
development agenda, which raises the question whether this opposition can
only be interpreted as driven by the grudge of the dog in the manger. We can
shed some light in this discussion with the help of our farmer model, thereby
discussing the interrelation between water efficiency and income distribution.
Let us assume that there aren equally sized lots of land i = {1, 2, . . . , n} that
are cropped in a traditional manner. The water productivity at is equal across
all lots (the subscript t refers to the traditional agricultural production). In
addition, labor required per lot is lti = (1/bt )yti , where bt is labor productivity
which is also equal across all lots. Each peasant gets the same amount of water
wt1 = wt2 · · · = wtn , where ∑ wti = W¯ . Thus wti = W¯/n, ∀i . Recall that
yti = at wti . Then, total labor required for the total agricultural product is
Lt =
∑
lti = (1/bt )
∑
yti = at
bt
W¯ (3.22)
where total output amounts to
Yt = at W¯ (3.23)
We assume that in the outset there is no unemployment, i.e., the required
amount of labor Lt equals the number of peasants or land laborers dwelling
on the site. Production and income per peasant (laborer) is
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Yt
Lt
= at W¯
Lt
= bt (3.24)
where the right-hand side follows from Eqs. (3.22) and (3.23), indicating that
peasants earn their productivity.
A big investment project is proposed covering all n sites. Water produc-
tivity will increase to am > at for all sites (The subscript m denotes mod-
ern agricultural technologies.). Consequently, output per site will increase to
ymi = amwmi . Since each lot is equally productive, the water is allocated in
equal portions, i.e.,wm1 = wm2 = · · · = wmn , resulting in ym = a2W¯/n. Total
agricultural output is Ym = am W¯ > Yt = at W¯ . The question remains whether
there is enough labor available to produce Ym . Assume that the new technology
makes labor also more productive due to the capital intensive cultivation of the
the land, such that
Lm = (1/bm)Ym = (am/bm)W¯ (3.25)
where bm > bt . Both coefficients of the modern technology are higher, leaving
the questionwhether the new technology is labor saving. Observations inmany
countries document that in the course of modernizing of the agricultural sector
migration into cities canbeobserved,which indicates that agricultural technical
progress is labor saving (Bhandari and Ghimire 2016). Therefore, we assume
that Lm < Lt .
It remains to analyze the total effect of technological progress in terms
of poverty alleviation. Does the real income of peasants increase or decrease
through modernizing agriculture?
Let us proceed with the analysis by introducing the investors: Profits of the
investors are given by
Π = [Ym − wL] = [bm L − wL] (3.26)
where w is the real wage. The labor demand function of the agro-business firm
can be derived by maximizing its profits with respect to L . Since the model is
linear, the demand function is a step function as depicted in the following figure
below. If bm ≥ w, i.e., if labor productivity is not less than the real wage w,
labor demand expands to Lm = (am/bm)W¯ , which is the labor requirement to
produce total output Ym , given a labor productivity of bm and water availability
W¯ . If the real wage exceeds bm , labor demand vanishes because the innovation
is not profitable. The labor supply function is represented by the kinked curve
in the following figure.
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If real wage is higher than s, which can be interpreted as the alternative real
income of the peasants leaving the countryside for employment opportunities
in the urban area, all peasants Lt want to stay employed in the agricultural
sector. If we let both curves intersect, the equilibrium will exactly be equal
to s, implying that the efficiency-enhancing technology leads to a drop in real
income for the peasants from bt to s. Then, indeed, efficiency and distributional
goals contradict.
But there are some other countervailing effects that might ease the situation
of land laborers. The increased production of agricultural output from Yt to Ym
may lead to a decrease in the price for these products, thus increasing the urban
realwage s. If the price decline is such that s > bt , the poverty of the peasants is
reduced. The occurrence of profits for agro-business firms leads to an increase
for real wage and hence to a welfare increase for the least advantaged. But even
if s falls short of bt it would be conceivable that poverty is reduced. If the poor
peasants became shareholders of the firm their welfare would increase above
bt . But this requires well-defined property rights allowing peasants to sell their
sites in exchange for those shares. If property rights are not well defined and
well protected by sustainable institutions, it may also happen that peasants are
simply expropriated (the blue intersection point in the figure). The dog in the
manger knows why he defies modernization.
In summary, the political discussion of modernizing traditional production
structures in the agriculture of developing countries cannot be based solely on
efficiency considerations. IWRM shall not neglect the redistributive effects of
efficiency-enhancing measures.
Sources: Cohen andWeitzman (1975), Boelens and Vos (2012), Bhandari and
Ghimire (2016)
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3.4 Eco-Hydrology and the Management of Water as a Public
Good
The water cycle provides not only water as a consumption good to consumers or
as a productive input to firms but it is also indispensable for environmental services
like the production of vapor that stabilizes the microclimate. Or take the ecological
system of water and forests as an example. Forests produce ecosystem services like
flood control, water filtration, or provision of habitats for various species, whereas
in turn forests need land and water. The water cycle is a fundamental part of the
whole eco-system. This ecological system consists of various natural cycles which
are interlinked.19 In addition to the hydrological cycle, we have the carbon-oxygen
cycle that consists of a photosynthesis part, in which carbon dioxide is converted
into oxygen, and the decomposition part, where organic molecules are separated
into carbon dioxide and water. There is also a nitrogen cycle that is crucial for
the growth and decay cycle of plants. On an ecological level, these cycles form the
nutrient cycles where all the different living systems take place. From amore holistic
IWRM viewpoint, these cycles are affected by the shaping of the local hydrological
cycle and the way land use is organized. Some scientists, therefore, claim that all
these interactions have to be included in a comprehensive policy approach.
A management system following this holistic integrated approach is called eco-
hydrology, a term introduced by Rodriguez-Iturbe (2000). It comprises the whole
climate-soil-vegetation system. Thus, landscape planning and the management of
water resources have to be closely linked. In this sense, IWRM goes far beyond the
efficient provision of water for the private consumption of households or firms. The
economic management of a river has not only to organize the abstraction of water but
also to secure the water provision for the local ecosystem services. These services
are sustained by assuring the viability of the various ecological cycles mentioned
above. Also, these services include also more visible services, e.g., the provision
of recreation in the form of, e.g., fishing, hiking, camping, or the mere presence of
nature as an acoustical and visual environment that is part of the cultural landscape.
Under this perspective, we note that IWRM is much more than only managing
some water flows for private use. From an economic perspective it turns out that
water management, which takes these eco-services into account, considers water
not only as a private but also as a public good. For instance, the stabilization of the
microclimate by the water cycle is an ecosystem service that affects all inhabitants
of a watershed (and beyond). In the following, we include this public good property
of water into our IWRM approach. To do so we utilize our hydro-economic model
introduced in Sect. 2.3.
Assume that there are two options for water management. Either water is
abstracted for private purposes or water is retained for the ecosystem. To keep the
19An instructive description of the main ecological interdependencies can be found in O’Callaghan
(1996).
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analysis simple, we assume that the value of ecosystem services can be captured
by a utility function Ui (E), i = {1, 2, . . . , n} that depends on these services. i is
the index of individual i and n is the size of the population living in the watershed.
E are the ecosystem services, i.e., the parameter contains the whole interdepen-
dency between the water cycle, the vegetation, and the geological structure of the
watershed.20 E depends not only on policy instruments of the IWRM but also on
other economic variables that influence the ecosystem shaping the landscape (e.g.,
soil sealing, agricultural vegetation, …). In the following, we focus solely on the
issue of allocating water to private purposes and to public services. We identify the
green water, i.e., the evapotranspiration of the vegetation, as a public good, because
all inhabitants are affected similarly by the vapor of green water. Thus, the utility
function for ecosystem services depends on the evapotranspiration, ET , as depicted
in Eq. (3.27).
Ui = Ui (ET ) = Ui (γ1S), i = {1, 2, . . . , n}, andU ′′ < 0 (3.27)
The benefit of private water consumption is represented by a benefit function, Bi ,21
that represents profits or benefit from water consumption
Bi = Bi (wi ), i = {1, 2, . . . , n} (3.28)
The hydrology can be captured by our linear dynamic mass equation
d S(t)
dt
= R + P − γ1S − γ2S −
n∑
i=1
wi (3.29)
To keep the optimization procedure simple, we confine ourselves to a steady-state
analysis, i.e., we assume that the local hydrological cycle is an equilibrium where
d S(t)/dt = 0. Solving for S, we get
S = R + P −
∑n
i=1 wi
γ1 + γ2 (3.30)
The equation shows that S depends on the water allocation to consumers, wi with
i = {1, 2, . . . , n}. To solve the IWRM problem, the definition of the social welfare
function is required and presented in Eq. (3.31).
SW F =
n∑
i=1
[Bi (wi ) + Ui (γ1S)] (3.31)
20E can also be conceived as a multidimensional vector containing an array of ecosystem services.
21Notice that the costs of water abstraction are included in the benefit function so as to save on
symbols.
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Fig. 3.5 Optimal allocation of water as a public good. Source own illustration
Themanagement task is tomaximize SWFwith respect towi taking into account that
private consumption reduces water available for the ecosystem (see Eq. (3.30)). It is
a straightforward exercise to derive the optimality conditions for each individual:
B ′i (wi ) =
γ1
∑n
i=1 U ′i (γ1S)
γ1 + γ2 , wi , i = {1, 2, . . . , n} (3.32)
where S is represented by Eq. (3.30). This set of equations reflects the Samuelson-
rule that specifies how the optimal amount of a public good should be determined.
Themain point is that private marginal benefit should be equal to the sum ofmarginal
benefits over all inhabitants, as one liter of private water consumption is associated
with costs that stem from the marginal loss of ecosystem services for all inhabitants.
Hence, both values must be optimally balanced. If we assume that all inhabitants
are identical with respect to their valuation functions we can condense the set of
equations into one figure. Notice that in this case Eq. (3.32) reduces to
B ′(w) = γ1nU
′(γ1S)
γ1 + γ2 (3.33)
where S is defined in Eq. (3.30) (Fig. 3.5).
The optimal water consumption is where bothmarginal valuation curves intersect.
Insertingw∗ into Eq. (3.30) yields the optimal stream of greenwater, ET , the optimal
evapotranspiration, which interacts with all the other natural cycle mentioned above.
As a result, a micro-climate is established that sustains environmental services lead-
ing to the well-being of the local human population. Depending on cultural traits
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and also on the population size, this intersection of marginal valuation curves can
change over time, i.e., w∗ can change and move to the right, for example. There is
a certain viable range of {ET , w}-combinations the water management can choose.
Landscapes can be shaped in many various ways depending on cultural traditions
and, of course, the biological needs of the society. However, there are boundaries.
Beyond these boundaries, irreversible changes in the ecology will take place. As a
result, by transgressing these ecological tipping points, the regional ecological sys-
tem might switch into a state hostile to human life, like a desert for instance. This
boundary is depicted in Fig. 3.5 aswΩ . If water abstraction is higher than this tipping
point, evapotranspiration decreases to an extent that triggers a complete change of
the microclimate. The ecological system turns into a semiarid or arid zone with all
the detrimental consequences for society.22
3.5 Water Allocation and the Human Right to Water
3.5.1 Millennium Goal 7 and Sustainable Development Goal 6:
Water
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health
Organization (WHO 2019), more than two billion people in the world did not have
access to safe drinking water, and another two billion people lacked access to basic
sanitation in 2019. In 2010, theUNGeneralAssembly declared the access towater, be
it as drinkingwater or amedium for sanitation andhygiene, as a human right. Together
with six additional goals, which range from halving the proportion of people living
in extreme poverty to reducing the under-five mortality rate by two-thirds between
1990 and 2015, the Millennium Goal 7 called to23
Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking
water and basic sanitation.
In 2015, these Millennium Development Goals were replaced by the Sustainable
Development Goals consisting of 17 goals ranging from poverty and hunger erad-
ication to strategies aiming at building peaceful and inclusive institutions. Goal 6
refers to clean water and sanitation, according to which universal access to safe and
affordable drinking water should be ensured by 2030—quite an ambitious goal in
the face of climate change leading to water scarcity, specifically in those areas of the
world with the poorest inhabitants.
22Of course, human can adapt to various climate systems. For instance, nomadic tribes have adapted
to arid or desert like conditions. But this implies a very low population density and also a low living
standard. We do not expand our policy discussion to include the choice of the population size.
23See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals; specifically, one finds annual summaries that report on
the progress made in the previous years.
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Table 3.3 Water requirements for survival
Type of need Quantity Comments
Survival (drinking and food) 2.5–3 lpd Depends on climate and individual
physiology
Basic hygiene practices 2–6 lpd Depends on social and cultural norms
Basic cooking needs 3–6 lpd Depends on food type, social and
cultural norms
Total 7.5–15
lpd
lpd: liters per day (per person)
Source Reed et al. (2011)
From the perspective of IWRM, the achievement of Goal 6 requires to tackle
the access problem and, at the same time, to protect the catchment areas against an
overutilization of water. Water scarcity translates into high water prices, which in
turn brings about an optimal allocation of water use. This approach will only result
in an optimal equilibrium if all market participants can afford the amount of water
to cover their basic needs for a secure conduct of life. There is a broad literature on
basic water needs, the lower range of which would be in the range of 15 liters per
day and capita (lpd) (Reed et al. 2011). This lifeline is subdivided into various need
types as displayed in Table3.3.
In addition to water, households need a certain daily endowment of calories and
nutrition as well. Therefore, poor households need a minimum income to survive in
order to finance expenses that allow them to buy the subsistence basket of basic goods,
containingwater, food (nutrition), housing, and shelter. But often poor households do
not earn enough money to secure this lifeline. It is rather obvious that price increases
can affect these households in a very detrimental way. We, therefore, cannot trust in
unregulated markets as institutions that secure efficiency. Classical welfare theory
assumes that a market participant can make a living based on her income. Hence, the
demand for goods is solely the expression of preferences following from taste and
predispositions. In the case of poor households, we cannot assume that their demand
for basic goods is the result of optimizing their demand according to these kinds of
preferences. Often, the demand for goods is nothing else than the result of poverty
management below the lifeline. The composition of food purchased is optimized
with respect to calorie content. Hence, in this case, revealed preferences are based
on survival strategies and not on taste.
This view coincides with social-psychological theories of need management. The
famousMaslowian need hierarchy describes the stratification of human needs whose
satisfaction is expressed in corresponding actions be it the demand for water and
nutrition or supply of labor. 24 At the bottom is the satisfaction of physiological
needs, followed by other needs such as security and social recognition. In our case,
24Abraham Maslow developed his concept of a need hierarchy in the 1940s, and there are a few
attempts to utilize his insights for a microeconomic theory of households, see Georgescu-Roegen
(1954) and Seeley (1992).
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the satisfaction of physiological needs is essential. Needs at this level are undoubtedly
legitimized by human rights. Ifmarkets do not guarantee their satisfaction thewelfare
theoretical criterion of efficiency or social optimality is irrelevant.
Take as an example the Pareto criterion economists often refer to: A reallocation
of goods is said to be socially preferable to a given distribution of goods if it increases
the welfare of one or more members of society without harming the well-being of
others. This approach might be suitable for a middle-class society but not for an
economy divided into poor people and members endowed with sufficient financial
means to not only satisfy basis needs but also to buy those products and services
which allow individual self-fulfillment at a higher level of the hierarchy of needs.
For instance, increasing the welfare of the latter group by allowing good exchange
between both classes does not increase social welfare. Here we want to refer to
the Rawlsian social welfare function introduced in Sect. 3.4, where social welfare
depends solely on the well-being of the poorest.
IWRM has to take into account this distinction between taste-driven consumer
choices and revealed purchase behavior resulting from survival strategies. In this
sense, poor households have to be included in the IWRMmodels that deliver alloca-
tion mechanisms that guarantee the subsistence level of drinking water, sanitation,
and other basic goods and services in line with the Sustainable Development Goals.
3.5.2 Water Management for the Very Poor
In the following,wewill dealwith awater allocationmodel under the assumption that
there are two categories of needs in theMaslowian hierarchy of households: physical
needs and more advanced wants satisfying cultural needs. Both of these needs can
be satisfied with the help of consumption goods. To keep the model simple, we
restrict it to two fundamental inputs: water and nutrition. Of course, nutrition itself
consists of various food products which we do not further subdivide. Let us begin
with a household that has sufficient means to satisfy the first category and is also
able to serve the satisfaction of cultural needs to a certain extent. The following
figure identifies this household with budget line II and the respective indifference
curve where the utility of the household is maximized (point O1). The corresponding
budget line constraint is (see Fig. 3.6):
pww + pnn ≤ y (3.34)
where w is water consumption and n nutrition.
Contrary to the standard household model, we distinguish between consumption
which satisfies the first layer of needs {ws, ns} and additional consumption which
serves the cultural needs, i.e.,
w = (ws + wa) and n = (ns + na) (3.35)
where wa and na is excess demand beyond the subsistence levels {ws, ns}, i.e., water
and nutrition intake to assure the satisfaction of physical needs. This excess demand
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Fig. 3.6 Risk management of the poor. Source own illustration
can bewater consumption for various other purposes than drinking, personal hygiene,
cooking and cleaning, for instance, bath taking, cultivating a gardenwith flowers, etc.
The same applies to nutrition. After having consumed the necessary calorie intake
to survive, the preparation of food is a cultural need, too.
The optimal point O1 can be derived with the help of the standard maximization
approach for households.
max
wa ,na
U (wa, na), s.t. pwwa + pnna ≤ y − pwws − pnns (3.36)
Figure3.6 also depicts two further scenarios, which refer to the case that the
households income does not suffice to cover the subsistence point S, i.e., the point
where both goods can be purchased in an amount that guarantees the full coverage
of the physical needs.25 These are the areas C1, C2, and C3.
Here, a survival strategy is required. Poor households try to maximize their life
expectancy or survival probability with the help of a household production function.
This production function transforms the inputs water and basic goods into a certain
health state, which can be expressed in, say, survival probability units. Similar to
ordinary indifference curves derived from standard utility functions, iso-health lines
can be defined with increasing survival probability to the northeast and decreasing
25Note that we can also assume that the full satisfaction of physical needs is an isoquant. This would
be the case when both goods are substitutable in a certain range. In the following, we keep the figure
simple by identifying this level solely with a point.
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life expectancy to the southwest. There are various possible shapes to draw these
iso-health lines. We assume for simplicity that these lines follow from a linear-
limitational interrelation. Let the corresponding survival function be
S(ws, ns) = min[aws, bns + g] (3.37)
where a, b, g > 0 are parameters determining the slope and the position of the expan-
sion path connecting all corner points for various iso-health lines. As water is more
important than nutrition to survive for a certain timewe have assumed that the expan-
sion path intersects the abscissa at a positive ws-value. The expansion path, i.e., the
line connecting all corner points of iso-health lines shows how households react opti-
mally if income decreases and/or relative prices change. Assume, for instance, that
the budget line (II) rotates to the southwest because the price of water has increased
(line Ia). Households try to maximize their health by maximizing S(ws, ns) subject
to their budget line Ia, i.e., y = pwws + pnns . The optimal need management then
leads to point O2. As the water price increases more and more, the optimal point
shifts to the southwest finally reaching the horizontal axis for budget line Ib. From
there, the optimum point moves along the horizontal axis and towards the origin, i.e.,
the household tries to use all its income for buying water (see point O3).
The specification of the survival function needs more empirical investigation.
Note, however, that the main point of this model does not rest on the precise struc-
ture of iso-health lines but on the viewpoint that the extremely poor can only choose
their water and basic food southwest of the point S. Whatever quantities ws and ns
are chosen by poor households, they cannot be interpreted as instruments used to
maximize well-being in the sense of an optimal management of tastes and prefer-
ences that are relevant for the upper layers of the Maslowian hierarchy. They simply
represent rational survival strategies.
3.5.3 A Water Market with Extremely Poor Households
Now we are able to construct the water demand curve of poor households beginning
from a price that leaves the consumption bundle in the area of needs and preferences
beyond pure survival. If pw increases, finally demandwill reachws . From there on the
water consumption decreases with increasing price ever further exhibiting an optimal
survival strategy (expansion path S − O2 − O3). The demand curve consisting of
the two parts is drawn in Fig. 3.7 from left to right. A demand curve of a second
household with a higher income is drawn from right to left. This household receives
such a high income that he does not get into the critical survival zone.
Supply costs are not included so as to keep the figure clearly laid out. We simply
assume that there is a certain amount of water (R) given. Hence, the equilibrium
water price pM equilibrating demand supply (point M) is a scarcity rent. In this
equilibrium point, demand and supply are equal. The water available is allocated
to both households according to their marginal willingness to pay (demand curves).
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Fig. 3.7 A water market with extremely poor households. Source own illustration
However, the equilibrium does not result in a social optimum.26 Obviously, the poor
household operates in the survival zone and, hence, the Sustainable Development
Goals are not satisfied. The market mechanism transfers too much burden to the poor
due to the scarcity of water.
There are various options to secure the lifeline of the poor. One option is to
introduce price discrimination. In Fig. 3.7, the high-income water demand is charged
with a higher price, pw1, and the poor households pay a lower price, pw2. This type
of price discrimination can be achieved, for example, by an increasing block tariff
structure which will be presented and analyzed in depth in Chap.4. Theoretically,
another option is to subsidize the poor directly. In this case, price discrimination can
be abandoned and a unique market price can prevail since poor households receive
26We know from the first welfare theorem that a market equilibrium is socially optimal or Pareto-
efficient. In the standard microeconomic model, the equilibrium of a market system guarantees that
the marginal rates of substitutions of all market participants are equalized. However, if some of
these participants are very poor, it follows that the marginal rate of substitution with respect to the
health production function would be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of households who
could afford a consumption bundle beyond the subsistence level. If we adhere to the Sustainable
Development Goals, we can not infer from this efficiency condition that the market allocation is
socially optimal simply by referring to the first welfare theorem.
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a lump sum transfer that lifts their income such that they can afford the subsistence
point S.
3.6 Water Recycling
3.6.1 Nomenclature of Water Recycling
Water scarcity, major driver for water reuse, has been called the challenge of the
twenty-first century (Miller 2006). Before we look more closely on the different
types of water reuse, let us define the terminology:
• Wastewater reclamation is the treatment of wastewater to secure its reuse.
• Water reuse is the use of that treated water for beneficial purposes like irrigation
in agriculture or flushing of toilets in households.
• Water recycling is water reuse where the treated water flows back into the same
unit that has released the wastewater. The reused water can be utilized for the
same purpose or for a purpose requiring a lower quality of water input. The
former means, e.g., the reuse of treated water for drinking water (see Box 3.4) the
latter refers for instance to the use of gray water for flushing toilets in households.
• Gray water is wastewater from household activities, like laundry washing or
bathing.
• In contrast, black water is water from flushing toilets or from kitchen sinks with
a high load of pathogens and organic content.
• Direct reuse implies that treated water is carried through pipes to its following
purpose, whereas indirect reuse joins nature up in-between.
• Treated water is returned into the surface or groundwater from where it is with-
drawn again.
• From a technical and economic viewpoint, a distinction between centralized and
decentralized water reclamation is crucial. The former refers to reuse devices on
the household or firm level, whereas the latter refers to infrastructural networks
connecting the various users.
Figure3.8 depicts the various flows of wastewater release, reclamation modes and
reuse for the residential and industrial sector. It shows that water reuse is also part
of the water cycle.
Box 3.4 Water recycling in Singapore
Singapore is a highly urbanized city-state. The city is characterized by a very
high population density. Hence, the water demand for this state can only be
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met by an area several times its size, if only conventional water resources
are used. For becoming more independent from water imports fromMalaysia,
Singapore enforces the development of innovative water technologies, e.g.,
desalination, but also recycling of water. Reclaimed water is an important
water source in Singapore which can be produced in an innovative way. Here,
the wastewater is treated using membrane filtration and reverse osmosis. The
generated freshwater, after all purification steps, meets the standards of potable
water. This procedure of water supply management became known under the
brand name NEWater. The predominant share of the reclaimed water is used in
the industry sector mainly for non-potable applications. But about 1 percent of
Singapore’s potable water requirement is covered with reclaimed water from
the NEWater project, too.
Source: Tortajada (2012)
IWRM requires to consider all available options for water recycling. The various
modes of reuse must be evaluated with respect to environmental repercussions and
with respect to economic criteria. Water recycling is indeed one measure to enhance
the efficiency of water use. On the other side, water reuse can also lead to environ-
mental damages. For instance, the recycling of irrigationwater into irrigation systems
might lead to the salinization of the soil, thereby decreasing its fertility drastically.
We will get to these kinds of quality problems in Sect. 3.10. The scheme in Fig. 3.8
depicts water reuse options in a rough manner. The civil engineering literature (such
as Asano 1998) enlists a variety of reuse categories:
Fig. 3.8 Water reuse. Source own illustration
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Fig. 3.9 A simple water recycling model. Source own illustration
• Agricultural irrigation is the largest use of reclaimed water in arid and semiarid
regions. For instance, Israel currently reusesmore than 65 percent of sewagewater
for irrigation (Friedler 2001).
• Landscape irrigation plays an important role in industrialized countries. It refers
to the irrigation of parks and other areas of recreational purposes.
• Groundwater recharge belongs to the indirect mode of recycling. This kind of
reuse is of high importance not only to increase the water supply but also to
stabilize aquifers specifically to avoid the intrusion of salt water.
• Non-potable urban reuses refer to water for fire protection, air conditioning and
toilet flushing (decentralized reuse).
• Last but not least wastewater can be purified such that it has a quality level of
potable water. This is literally water recycling. Often this kind of reuse is con-
nected with the strong resistance of people. Singapore is one exception where
wastewater is purified and recharged into the freshwater distribution system
(see Box 3.4).
3.6.2 Optimal Recycling
Water reuse, to whatever purpose, is part of IWRM. In its simplest form, water reuse
follows from an optimal allocation procedure which takes into account return flows.
Figure3.9 shows a simple scenario for two users.
User 1 uses water w1 from a river or lake and returns a portion h1w1. We assume
that the quality of the returned water is such that the body of water, e.g., a lake or
groundwater, maintains its environmental quality. The costs of necessary purification
treatments (WWT) are included in the benefit function of user 1. Water w1 used by
user 1 needs treatment (WT1) that is associated with costs, which are assumed to be
c per unit. User 2 is located at the same water reservoir. She uses return flows from
user 1, which is denoted by w12, and diverts w2 from the reservoir if she needs more
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than h1w1. Notice that water withdrawn by user 2, w2, also have to be treated at costs
c per unit of water. If user 2 does not use the whole amount of return flow from user
1 the residual, w1d , flows back into the water reservoir. To keep the model as simple
as possible, we assume that user 2 returns no water. The respective dynamic balance
for the water stock is
d S(t)
dt
= R − r − w1 + w1d − w2 (3.38)
Substituting the definition of the residual flow
w1d = h1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 (3.39)
into Eq. (3.38) yields
d S(t)
dt
= R − r − (1− h1)w1 − w12 − w2 (3.40)
The model allows for both direct and indirect reuse. Exclusive indirect reuse is
present if w12 = 0 is true, which implies that all return flows flow back into the
reservoir, i.e., w1d = h1w1. If treatment costs occur, indirect reuse will of course be
minimized because direct use avoids the additional treatment costs that accrue to w2.
In the following, we derive the optimal allocation within our hydro-economic
model. To concentrate on the allocational effects of the return flow, we disregard all
the issues raised in the previous sections, i.e., fairness considerations or issues of
poverty. We confine ourselves to the simple task of maximizing the aggregate benefit
of both users. Let us assume that user 2 is relatively big compared to user 1, i.e.,
B
′
1(w) < B
′
2(w). The optimization program is
max
w1,w2,w12
[B1(w1) + B2(w12 + w2) − c(w1 + w2)] (3.41)
subject to Eqs. (3.39) and (3.40). To keep the analysis simple, we disregard fixed
costs by assuming that these costs are covered by access fees.27 Also we assume that
water is not scarce28 which allows us to skip Eq. (3.40).
The KKT conditions are as follows:
B
′
1(w1) − c + λh1 = 0 (3.42)[
B
′
2(w12 + w2) − c
]
≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.43)
[
B
′
2(w12 + w2) − λ
]
≤ 0 ⊥ w12 ≥ 0 (3.44)
[w1d = h1w1 − w12] ≥ 0 ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (3.45)
27In Chap.4 we will analyze tariff systems that also cover fixed costs in depth.
28All the following results apply also to the case where water is scarce.
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Fig. 3.10 Optimal water recycling. Source own illustration
where λ is the Lagrangian to the constraint, which is given by Eq. (3.39). These
conditions apply under the assumption that w1 > 0 (else there would be no recycling
in this model). Therefore, Eq. (3.42) applies with strict equality.
Figure3.10 depicts the solutions for two cases. The first case (case I) refers to
high water treatment costs, the second to relatively low costs (case II). The figure is
drawn under the assumptions that the marginal benefits of both users are declining
linearily with respect to water use, i.e., “B
′
i (w) = ai − bi w, and that user 1 is “small”
in comparison to user 2, i.e., B
′
1(w) < B
′
2(w),∀w ≥ 0.
Before we take a closer look at these cases, let us first note that the waste of water,
i.e., w1d > 0, cannot be the result of the optimization program. It cannot be optimal
to return a portion of clarified water h1w1 into the reservoir and withdraw it later
with additional treatment costs.29
3.6.2.1 Case I
Here we assume that the processing costs are very high. In order to make the impor-
tance of water recycling particularly visible, we also assume that without a technical
29We can show this with the help of the KKT conditions. Assume, per contradiction, that w1d > 0
and, hence, λ = 0 by Eq. (3.45). From Eq. (3.44), we have B ′2(w12 + w2) ≤ 0 and, hence, w12 +
w2 > 0. Thus, we have from Eq. (3.43) B
′
2(w12 + w2) − c < 0 wherefore w2 = 0. Hence, to meet
Eq. (3.44) we havew12 > 0, and therefore by Eq. (3.44) B
′
2(w12) = 0. Since B
′
1(w) < B
′
2(w),∀w ≥
0weget the result thatw1 < w12.But this contradicts the constrainth1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 (seeEq. (3.39)).
Hence, λ > 0 and therefore w1d = 0.
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infrastructure for water reuse, i.e., if the used water of user 1 cannot be transferred
to user 2, none of the two users would take water from the reservoir. This case is
depicted in the figure by the fact that the marginal cost line lies above both marginal
benefits (cI > ai , i = 1, 2).
In case I, it follows from the optimality conditions that the optimal allocation is
characterized by the following compact rule (rule I)30:
B
′
1(w1) + h1B
′
2(h1w1) = cI (3.46)
The weighted aggregated marginal benefits should be equated to the marginal
treatment costs (see point I in Fig. 3.10). This equation is nothing else as the allocation
rule for a public good. The water use of user 1, w1, exhibits the characteristics of
a public good which serves twice as an input, the first time for user 1 and then the
second time for user 2 diminished by factor h1. Point I in Fig. 3.10 is identified by
equating the aggregated marginal benefits of both users of w1 to marginal treatment
costs.
3.6.2.2 Case II
If treatment costs are very low case II, which is represented by the two points II
in Fig. 3.10, applies. The corresponding optimal allocation rule is (rule II):
B
′
1(w1)
(1 − h1) = B
′
2(h1w1 + w2) = cI I (3.47)
User 1 diverts w1. She equates her marginal benefit to marginal treatment costs
related to the effective water use per liter, i.e., (1 − h1) (see the left one of the two
points II in Fig. 3.10). User 2 is allocated the return flow of h1w1 and supplements
her water consumption such that B ′2(h1w1 + w2) = cI I . Therefore, total water use
of user 2 is h1w1 + w2 (see the right one of the two points II in Fig. 3.10). This rule is
very well known from hydro-economic models that include return flows. Notice that
this rule only applies if marginal water treatment costs are relatively low. Otherwise
(case 1), we have to apply the rule for water as a public input (rule I).
Both rules are cost dependent special cases of the optimality conditions as derived
in Eqs. (3.42)–(3.45), which are the result of a hydro-economic model optimizing
aggregate benefits of both users.
3.6.3 Markets for Recycled Water
Let us take case II (low treatment costs) and assume that the institutional implemen-
tation of rule II should be accomplished by introducing a water market system, as
30This result can also be derived from the KKT conditions. We know that λ > 0 and that w2 = 0
(due to the high marginal treatment costs cI ). Hence, h1w1 = w12 > 0 and B ′2(w12) = λ > 0 by
Eq. (3.44). Therefore, we can substitute λ for B
′
2 in Eq. (3.42).
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Fig. 3.11 Water recycling in two water markets. Source own illustration
depicted in Fig. 3.11.31 Each user buys freshwater from the water treatment plants
for a uniform price, p1. In addition, there is a market for recycled water, in which
user 1 offers treated water whereas user 2 is on the demand side. The price in water
market 2 is such that supply is equal to demand.
Let us assume that both markets operate under perfect competition or, alterna-
tively, that a regulation authority sets prices close to a competitive market. Thus, both
water treatment plants will offer water for a price equal to the marginal treatment
costs, i.e., p1 = cI I .
User 1 buys water in market 1 and, at the same time, offers treated water in market
2 by solving the following optimization:
max
w1,w12
[B1(w1) + p2w12 − p1w1] s.t. h1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 (3.48)
Assuming that user 1 buys and sells water the KKT conditions are
B
′
1(w1) − p1 + λh1 = 0 (3.49)
p2 − λ = 0 (3.50)
Merging both KKT equations yields
B
′
1(w1) − p1 + p2h1 = 0 (3.51)
31Many economists are quite skeptical about allocation rules from complex models if they are taken
literally in the sense that they are prescriptions for the individual actors in the watershed. However,
the derivation of allocation rules only serves as a benchmark. Economists then ask under which
institutional provisions the actors would behave in such a way that these rules would be adopted.
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User 2 has the option to buy water in both markets, hence the corresponding
optimization program is
max
w2,w12
[B2(w2 + w12) − p2w12 − p1w1] (3.52)
We have assumed that p1 = cI I is so low that user 2 buys water in both markets
(w2 > 0 andw12 > 0). Then the optimal water demand in both markets follows the
rule:
B
′
2(w2 + w12) = p1 = p2 (3.53)
If prices were to differ, the user would only operate in one of the two markets. Thus,
in this scenario both prices are equal.
Both market participants set their marginal benefits equal to the respective prices.
In turn p1 is equal tomarginal costs. Ifweput together this informationby substituting
prices in Eq. (3.51) by Eq. (3.53) and bear in mind that h1w1 = w12 we get
B
′
1(w1)
(1 − h1) = B
′
2(h1w1 + w2) = cI I (3.54)
which is simply the optimality rule for case II (cf. Eq. (3.47)). The implementation of
twowater markets is able to replicate the optimal allocation derived in the framework
of a central planning approach.
With the same approach, we can show that the system of two markets would also
secure optimality in case I.32 This is interesting because user 2 should only buy
recycled water in market 2 and it is interesting because the sequential use of water
makes water almost a public good.33 It is a standard result from microeconomic
textbooks or introductions to public economics that the private provision of public
goods leads to a misallocation. Why not here? Users consume water one after the
other and two markets are implemented (instead of only one market). The treatment
plant sells water only to user 1 and user 1 sells to user 2. If then only the treatment
plant sells water in market 1 to both users then both users could not afford the
water in case I since B
′
i (wi ) < c
I (see Fig. 3.10). This market result is not optimal.
The reason is that we have one market missing. Inserting the second market allows
to implement the optimal allocation for public goods. This is due to the hydro-
technological situation implicitly endowing user 1 with property rights. He can sell
the water used and treated or let it return to the reservoir S. But he will sell the water
after usage to user 2. There will be a positive price less than marginal costs cI that
user 2 will accept.
32This case is covered in Exercise 3.4.
33If h1 = 1 then water is a complete public good.
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Box 3.5 Ecological Sanitation
Ecological Sanitation (EcoSan) is a concept standing for a potential change in
the paradigm of wastewater disposal. Wastewater has been regarded only as
a problem for a long time, because it involves hygienic hazards and contains
organic matter and eutrophying substances in the form of nitrogen and phos-
phorus. These substances cause problems in seas, lakes, and streams. Due to
inadequate sanitation, wastewater causes serious water-related issues in many
parts of the world (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa), as it has in the past on central
Europe (e.g., cholera epidemic in Hamburg in 1892 with 8,600 deaths). How-
ever, in the framework of EcoSan thewastewater is seen as a reusable substance
that contains valuable components, such as nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous),
sulfur, potassium, magnesium, and many trace elements essential for fertile
soils.
The main idea of the EcoSan concept is to close the nutrient loop between
sanitation and related sectors (e.g., agriculture) and hence it is quite more
than simply gray water reuse or rainwater use. Closing the loop enables the
recovery of organics, macro and micronutrients, water, and energy contained
in wastewater and organic waste and their subsequent productive reuse mainly
in agriculture, or for other reuse options. The main advantages are as follows
(Werner et al. 2009):
• Promotion of recycling by safe, hygienic recovery, and use of nutrients,
organics, water, and energy.
• Conservation of resources (lower water consumption, chemical fertilizer
substitution).
• Preference for modular, decentralized partial-flow systems for more appro-
priate cost-efficient solutions.
• Possibility to integrate on-plot systems into houses, increasing user comfort,
and security for women and girls.
• Contribution to the preservation of soil fertility.
• Promotion of a holistic, interdisciplinary approach (hygiene, water sup-
ply and sanitation, resource conservation, environmental protection, urban
planning, agriculture, irrigation, food security, small-business promotion).
This concept was applied in a number of pilot projects, for instance, in Lübeck-
Flintenbreite, Germany, for 350 inhabitants. The installed system comprises
a strict separation of blackwater (wastewater from the toilet), gray water and
stormwater. Blackwater together with organic waste should be treated anaero-
bically (producing biogas for energy and heat production) (Langergraber and
Muellegger 2005). Other exemplary early EcoSan pilot projects were imple-
mented by the “Svanholm Community” in Denmark, the Ecological Village
Björnsbyn in Sweden, Ås in Norway or the Solar-City Linz-Pichling in Austria
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(Fröhlich et al. 2003). In 2020, the start-up Finizio is planning to install a test
equipment in the (German) city of Eberswalde (https://finizio.de/produkte/).
Source: Fröhlich et al. (2003), Werner et al. (2009)
3.7 Water Allocation Along Rivers
3.7.1 Basic Model
A simple example of a river with two users is given in Fig. 3.12. The upstream user 1
and the downstream user 2 compete for the water resources and are able to generate
net benefits, designated by B1(w1) and B2(w2), depending on the diverted water
amounts, w1 and w2. Furthermore, the river is fed by two inflows from headwater
areas, that are located upstreamof the tapping points of user 1 and user 2, respectively.
These inflowing water quantities are denoted by R1 for user 1 and by R2 for user
2. The amount of water that leaves the addressed river system, i.e., the outflow, is
represented by variable r .
3.7.2 Two Cases of Upstream Behavior with Scarcity
Based on the IWRM approach, the objective to maximize net benefits in the total
river basin is formulated as presented in Eq. (3.55).
max{w1,w2,r}
[B1(w1) + B2(w2)] (3.55)
Any consumer can divert at most those quantities of water that are available at the
respective tapping point, thus the constraints are given by Eqs. (3.56) and (3.57)
w1 ≤ R1 (λ1) (3.56)
w2 ≤ (R1 − w1) + R2 (λ2) (3.57)
Of course, if a minimum outflow quantity (r0) of the addressed river system should
be guaranteed, it is important to consider the additional constraints in Eq. (3.58),
Fig. 3.12 Scheme of a
simple river example with 2
consumers. Source own
illustration
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which ensures that the realized outflow r is equal or higher the obligatory minimum
outflow r0. The realized outflow is the water amount which is left in the river by
both users. Therefore, it results from the difference between the headwater inflows
and the abstraction amounts which means that r = R1 + R2 − w1 − w2. Therefore,
we are able to formulate following condition for addressing the minimum outflow
quantity:
r0 ≤ R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 (λr ) (3.58)
Based on the model formulated here, which corresponds to a maximization problem
with the objective stated in Eq. (3.55) subject to the constraints defined in Eqs. (3.56)
to (3.58), the KKT conditions can be derived:
B ′1(w1) − λ1 − λ2 − λr ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.59)
B ′2(w2) − λ2 − λr ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.60)
R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.61)
R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.62)
R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 − r0 ≥ 0 ⊥ λr ≥ 0 (3.63)
It is likely that water will be diverted from the river as much as possible by the users,
so that all available resources in the river are abstracted completely. This means that
the outflow of the addressed river system, r , must not exceed the required outflow
level, r0, which implies r = r0. Furthermore, the usable amount of water, given by
R1 + R2 − r0, has to be diverted entirely, thus the equality R1 + R2 − r0 = w1 + w2
holds. Based on these relations, it follows from the KKT conditions, that
• if there exists a minimum outflow quantity (r0 > 0), the Eq. (3.63) is binding
which means that λr ≥ 0. However, Eq. (3.62) is certainly nonbinding and hence
λ2 = 0.
• if there exists no minimum outflow quantity (r0 = 0), it would not make sense to
set up the constraint (3.58) which implies that λr would not exist. This has to be
noticed when we set up the KKT conditions.34 Equation (3.62) is binding which
means that λ2 ≥ 0.
To conclude: if r0 > 0 it follows that λr ≥ 0 and λ2 = 0, while if r0 = 0 it follows
that λr does not exist and λ2 ≥ 0.
34In case that there exists no minimum outflow quantity from the addressed river section (r0 = 0)
we are able to formulate the following KKT conditions:
B ′1(w1) − λ1 − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.59)
B ′2(w2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.60)
R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.61)
R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.62)
.
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By addressing Eq. (3.60) it follows that
B ′2(w2) =
{
λ2 for: r0 = 0
λr for: r0 > 0
(3.64)
Therefore the formulated conditions reduce to Eqs. (3.65) and (3.66).35
B ′1(w1) − λ1 = B ′2(w2) (3.65)
R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.66)
Based on the formulas displayed in Eqs. (3.65) and (3.66), it is possible to define
optimality conditions for two different cases:
• Case 1: The upstream user diverts the whole amount of water available at his/her
tapping point, i.e., R1 = w1, and hence λ1 ≥ 0 and B ′1(w1) ≥ B ′2(w2).• Case 2: The upstream user does not divert the whole amount of water available at
his/her tapping point, but passes a limited amount to his/her adjacent downstream
user, i.e., R1 > w1 and therefore λ1 = 0 and B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2).
The optimal case depends mainly on the headwater inflows further upstream of the
the tapping points of the consumers. Figure3.13 displays two scenarios, I and I I ,
whereas both are subject to the same outflow requirements, such that r0 = r I0 = r I I0 ,
and they are restricted to the same amounts of useable water, i.e., R1 + R2 − r0 =
RI1 + RI2 − r I0 = RI I1 + RI I2 − r I I0 . The amounts of useable water are represented
by the lengths of the horizontal axes of both plots in Fig. 3.13. The diversions of
water by both users are illustrated by the arrows segmenting the horizontal axes,
respectively. The diversion of the upstream user w1 is illustrated from the left point
of origin of the diagram to the right, while in contrast the diversion of the downstream
user w2 is pictured from the right point of origin to the left.
Scenario I is characterized by the fact that the natural inflow before the upstream
user 1 is low and the natural inflow before the downstream user 2 is high. This
scenario is visualized in panel (a) of Fig. 3.13, where the inflow to user 1, RI1 , is
located to the left of the intersection between the marginal benefit functions B ′1(w1)
and B ′2(w2). Compared to scenario I , the opposite situation is defined in scenario I I
(see panel b) in Fig. 3.13.36 The headwater inflow before the upstream user, RI I1 , is
located to the right of the intersection point between the marginal benefit functions
B ′1(w1) and B ′2(w2) in the plot.
If the upstream user passed a limited amount of its inflows to the downstream
user in scenario I , the situation would correspond to case 2 where wI1 < R
I
1 . The
water allocation of the downstream user depends on the one of the upstream user and
35It is assumed that w1 > 0, w2 > 0.
36In scenario I I , the natural inflow before the upstream user 1 is high and the natural inflow before
the downstream user 2 is low.
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Fig. 3.13 Allocation of water in a river source under scarce conditions. Source own illustration
is subject to wI2 = RI1 + RI2 − wI1 − r I0 . Based on the optimality condition for that
case, marginal benefits of both users should be equal, i.e., B ′1(wI1) = B ′2(wI2). This
optimality condition cannot be fulfilled, because within the whole possible domain
of wI1 ∈
[
0; RI1
]
the marginal benefit of the upstream user always exceeds the one of
the downstream user, such that B ′1(wI1) > B ′2(wI2) = B ′2(RI1 + RI2 − wI1 − r I0 ).
Hence for scenario I , optimality can only be assured by case 1 in which the
upstream user fully diverts the available water at his/her tapping point, therefore the
optimal amount of water diverted by the upstream user is equal to the inflow to the
upstream player, wI
∗
1 = RI1 . In that case, the downstream user does not receive any
water inflows from the upstream user. It follows that user 2 can divert the difference
between the downstream headwater inflows and the necessary outflows, thus the
downstream user’s optimal amount of diverted water is defined by wI
∗
2 = RI2 − r I0 .
The required optimality condition of case 1 is fulfilled, because themarginal benefit of
user 1 exceeds the one of user 2 for this allocation regime, i.e., B ′1(RI1 ) > B ′2(wI
∗
2 ) =
B ′2(RI2 − r I0 ).
For scenario I , the inefficiency of case 2 compared to case 1 is also depicted on
the left-hand side of Fig. 3.13. Any consumption level of user 1 that is below the
level of available water, i.e. wI1 = wI , f1 < RI1 , would result in a higher consumption
of the downstream user 2 relative to the optimal case. The corresponding welfare
gains for user 2 are depicted by area B, while the corresponding welfare losses for
user 1 are represented by the areas A and B. Hence, a deviation from the optimal
water allocation would result in a loss of social welfare equal to area A.
In scenario I I (relative high upstream inflows R1), however, if the upstream user
1 diverts its total upstream headwater inflows (case 1), wI I1 = RI I1 , the resulting
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marginal benefit of the upstream user 1 falls below the one of the downstream user
2, i.e. B ′1(RI I1 ) < B ′2(wI I2 ) = B ′2(RI I2 − r I I0 ), which is illustrated on the right-hand
side of Fig. 3.13. This is a violation of the optimality condition, case 1 is, there-
fore, the nonoptimal case, while the optimal allocation can only be implemented
in case 2. To realize an optimal allocation in the river basin, the quantity of water
diverted by the upstream user 1, wI I1 = wI I
∗
1 , ensures that the marginal benefits of
the upstream and downstream user are equal, such that B ′1(wI I∗1 ) = B ′2(wI I∗2 ) =
B ′2(RI I1 + RI I2 − wI I∗1 − r I I0 ) holds. The optimal water diversion by the upstream
user, wI I∗1 , is identical to the one implied by the intersection point between the
two marginal benefit functions B ′1(w1) and B ′2(w2) in panel (b) of Fig. 3.13, and
the resulting optimal diversion by the downstream user 2 is characterized by
wI I∗2 = RI I1 + RI I2 − wI I∗1 − r I I0 . If the upstream user diverts smaller amounts than
optimal, where wI I1 = wI I , f1 < wI I∗1 , the downstream user can consume more water
than in the optimal case, thus wI I , f2 = RI I1 + RI I2 − wI I , f1 − r I I0 > wI I∗2 .
The correspondingwelfare effects are depictedon the right-handpanel inFig. 3.13,
while the welfare gains of downstream user 2, represented by area D, are much
smaller than the welfare losses upstream user 1 incurs, displayed by the areas C and
D. Hence there is a loss of social welfare equal to area C , if real upstream diversion
falls below the optimal upstream extraction.
Similarly, if the upstream user 1 diverts more quantities than optimal, i.e. wI I
∗
1 <
wI I1 = wI I ,m1 ≤ RI I1 , less amounts of water are available for the downstream user
2 compared to the optimal allocation regime, thus wI I ,m2 = RI I1 + RI I2 − wI I ,m1 −
r I I0 < w
I I ∗
2 . The corresponding welfare losses for the downstream user 2 cover the
areas E and F and thus outweight the corresponding welfare gains for the upstream
user 1, which cover the area F . This results in a loss of social welfare equal to area
E due to that kind of deviation from the optimal allocation regime.
3.7.3 Two Cases Without Scarcity in One Region
In the former analysis, water was assumed to be a scarce resource in a river basin
and the useable amounts were completely diverted by the users. With respect to the
allocation of thewater resources, a trade-off exists between the users. Themorewater
one user diverts, the less the other user is able to consume. This trade-off concerning
the water resource is not relevant for the downstream user whose water supply is non-
scarce/abundant, but if the useable amounts must not be entirely allocated among
the users, the inequality R1 + R2 − r0 ≥ w1 + w2 will be a relevant constraint to the
optimization problem. Therefore, the outflow from the river basin can exceed the
minimum outflow requirements, i.e., r ≥ r0. From the KKT conditions, displayed
in Eqs. (3.59) to (3.63), it follows that B ′2(w2) = λ2 = λr = 0 holds.37 This implies
for the optimal case that the downstream user has to consume at his/her saturation
37In case that there exists a minimum outflow (r0 > 0), Eqs. (3.61) and (3.62) are nonbinding and
hence λ2 = λr = 0. In case that there exists no minimum outflow (r0 = 0), we would not set up
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Fig.3.14 Allocation of water in a river source under non-scarce conditions. Source own illustration
level, which corresponds to the null of its marginal benefit function, i.e., B ′2(w2∗) =
0. The user 2 chooses its optimal diversion, w∗2, in such a way that its marginal
benefit becomes zero, i.e., B ′2(w∗2) = 0. For user 1, it is possible to derive algebraic
characterizations of the optimality conditions from the KKT conditions, which are
displayed in Eqs. (3.67) to (3.68).
B ′1(w1) = λ1 (3.67)
R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.68)
Similar to the situation with water scarcity, it is possible again to define optimality
conditions for two different cases:
• Case 1: The upstream user diverts the whole amount of water available at his/her
tapping point, i.e., R1 = w1, and hence λ1 ≥ 0 and B ′1(w1) ≥ 0.• Case 2: The upstream user does not divert the whole amount of water available
at its tapping point, but passes a limited amount to its adjacent downstream user,
i.e., R1 > w1, and therefore λ1 = 0 and B ′1(w1) = 0.
Which of the two cases is suitable to implement optimality depends on the scarcity
situation of the upstream user. Illustrative examples with two different scenarios are
the constraint (3.58) and hence λr and Eq. (3.62) would not exist. Eq. (3.61) would be nonbinding
and hence λ2 = 0.
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pictured in Fig. 3.14. In the plot for scenario I , depicted in panel (a) in Fig. 3.14, the
intersection between the upstream headwater inflows, RI1 , and the marginal benefit
function of the upstream user, B ′1(w1), is characterized by a positive marginal utility
for the upstream user. Hence water is scarce for the upstream user in case 1 I . If user
1 passes a limited quantity of water downstream, as in case 2, the possible domain
of consumption will be wI1 ∈ [0, RI1 ]. The marginal benefit function, B ′1(wI1), does
not become zero for any wI1 of the defined domain. Hence there is a violation of
the optimality condition for case 2 and it follows that case 1 should be the optimal
one. In case 1, the upstream headwater inflows are fully consumed, i.e., wI
∗
1 = RI1 .
The optimality condition of case 1 is fulfilled because the marginal benefit of the
upstream user is positive for this optimal consumption level, such that B ′1(RI1 ) ≥ 0.
In contrast to scenario I , water is not scarce for the upstream user 1 in scenario
I I , as displayed in panel (b) in Fig. 3.14, where the upstream headwater inflow, RI I1 ,
is located to the right of the saturation point characterized by B ′1(w1) = 0 in the plot.
If the upstream user 1 entirely diverted the upstream headwater inflows, as in case
1 with wI I1 = RI I1 , its marginal benefit would be negative, which would violate the
optimality condition of case 1. Limited quantities of upstream headwater inflows
should, therefore, be passed downstream, hence RI I1 > w
I I
1 as in case 2, and user 1
diverts the water quantities in such a way that its marginal benefit becomes zero. The
optimality condition of this case 2 is guaranteed to be satisfied due to the assumptions
made, hence the optimal consumption, wI I∗1 , is identical to the null of the marginal
benefit function, i.e., w1 such that B ′1(wI I
∗
1 ) = 0, which means that the user 1 diverts
the amount of water equal to its saturation point.
A loss of consumer surplus for upstream user 1 would result if the upstream user
deviated from the optimal amount to be diverted, so that wI , f1 < w
I ∗
1 as well as
wI I , f1 < w
I I ∗
1 . This loss is represented by the area A in Fig. 3.14. Similarly, a loss of
consumer surplus for downstream user 2, illustrated by the areas B and C , will also
occur if the diverted amount of user 2 falls below its saturation quantity. Both types
of deviations from the optimal allocation generate losses in social welfare.
Box 3.6 The downstream externalities of harvesting rainwater
Rainwater harvesting is a technique for providingwater that has beenused since
ancient times. For example, Roman cities were designed and built such that the
inhabitants could collect rainwater for drinking and domestic purposes. But
captured rainwater can also be used for irrigation in the agricultural sector or
in urban areas to provide water for the non-potable uses like a toilet flushing.
One distinct advantage of rainwater harvesting is that it can be shaped in
a decentralized manner, e.g., simple roof water collection systems. But also
bigger projects are conceivable. In the Global South, land surface catchment
systems are implemented in many rural areas. They can be used for irrigation
systems or simply as a method to recharge the local groundwater. Since the
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technique is rather simple, rainwater harvesting investments are an integral
part of rural development programs. All in all, it seems to be a highly efficient
method to provide people with more water without stressing the water cycle.
From a hydrological perspective, water harvesting is nothing else as reduc-
ing the water runoff in a catchment area. But there remains one problem: If
the runoff is reduced, water users downstream may suffer from less water.
Hence, there exists a downstream externality, which must be included in the
calculation of integrated water resource management. The optimal allocation
of water to the upstream users has to take into account the opportunity costs
that arise from the lower water availability of downstream users. This can eas-
ily be inferred from Eqs. (3.56) and (3.57). If precipitation is included in Ri ,
rainwater harvesting from upstream is equivalent to an increase of R1 and a
reduction of the same size of R2.
Sources: UNEP International Environmental Technology Centre (2002),
Boumaa et al. (2011)
3.8 Groundwater Management
3.8.1 A Simple Groundwater Model
Groundwater is a very important resource for covering water requirements in many
regions of the world. In locations with sparse surface water resources due to the
absenceof lakes and rivers, groundwater is the only available resource. In regionswith
little water availability, groundwater is often used for agricultural purposes, mainly
irrigation. The extraction of groundwater is an open-access problem, especially in
those areas where water is quite scarce. This problem may arise due to a lack of
institutions, a lack of non-enforceable water rights, a lack of legal allowance, or too
high transaction cost for assessing the aquifer regulation. This open-access problem
is characterized by
• Non-excludable access to the aquifer: The access to groundwater resources is
unregulated. Hence anyone can potentially extract groundwater from the aquifer.
• Rivaling for the water resource:Water volumes that are extracted by someone can
not be extracted or used by someone else.
There is a risk of overexploiting the groundwater resources because of the unlimited
access in this specific institutional setting. This issue is quite relevant in many parts
of the world, especially in regions where groundwater is the most important water
source and which are characterized by a low water availability rate per capita, dry
meteorological conditions like low precipitation rates combined with high potential
72 3 Integrated Water Resource Management: Principles and Applications
Fig. 3.15 Scheme of a simple groundwater model. Source own illustration
evaporation, and big water consumers in the basin, e.g., the agricultural sector. The
described open-access characteristics set incentives for overexploitation of ground-
water resources, which is demonstrated with the help of the following algebraic
model.
As depicted in Fig. 3.15, an aquifer with an exhaustible groundwater stock,
declared as S, is assumed. This stock is fed by a certain natural inflow, denoted by
R. Furthermore there is also a certain amount of water, represented by r , that leaves
the groundwater stock due to a natural flow processes. For reasons of simplification,
it is assumed that these natural flows are constant over time.
The aquifer is commonly used by n water extractors who may use the water for
covering their own demand or sell it to water consumers. For this analysis, it is
irrelevant whether an extractor sells or directly uses the water to satisfy their own
needs. The amount of groundwater extracted from the aquifer is represented by the
variable wi , where i is an element representing a specific groundwater extractor. The
total amount of water extracted from the aquifer within one time period is equivalent
to the sum of the amount extracted by each user:
W =
n∑
i=1
wi (3.69)
Under the assumption that all extractors exhibit identical properties, the equation
above simplifies to
W = n · wi (3.70)
The demand function aggregated for all consumers in the groundwater basin is given
by the demand function in Eq. (3.71)with the demand function parameters a, defining
the choke price, and b, determining the slope of the demand function.
P = a − b · W (3.71)
The extraction process ofwithdrawingwater volumes from the aquifer,wi , performed
by extractor i causes costs described by the following cost function:
C(wi , S) = (c − σ · S) · wi (3.72)
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Extraction costs are not only influenced by the extracted water volumes, wi , but also
by the size of the groundwater stock in the aquifer, S, because a smaller stock ofwater
is accompanied by a lower groundwater table, hence higher pumping heights are
observed resulting in highermonetary expenses for pumping. The scope of the impact
that awater stock’s size has on the extraction cost depends on a level parameter, named
σ , that is defined such that higher levels of σ yield higher extraction cost sensitivities
on the water stock S. Furthermore, there exists a cost function parameter, declared
as c, that represents the theoretical cost rate if groundwater resources in the aquifer
were completely exhausted.
Due to the previously explained similarity between the characteristics of ground-
water resources and of open-access goods, it is credible to assume a zero profit
condition for water extraction. This assumption seems to be quite plausible: As long
as positive profits can still be realized, each (potential) groundwater extractor, who
competes with other (potential) extractors for the limited and unregulated ground-
water resources, has an incentive to enter the market or to increase its extraction
volumes. Due to the increasing extracted water volumes (W ↑), the market price
for extracted groundwater would decrease (p ↓). Hence, the marginal utility for the
use of extracted groundwater decreases with increasing extraction amounts. Further-
more an increase in extraction costs can be also observed (C ↑), because it becomes
more expensive to extract groundwater given a decreasing groundwater table in the
aquifer. Consequently, the supplier is affected by falling profits if extraction amounts
rise. This process would continue until positive profits are not realizable on the mar-
ket, hence, under the previously stated assumptions, the price for water equals the
average extraction cost (zero profit condition), as displayed in Eqs. (3.73) and (3.74).
P = C(wi , S)
wi
(3.73)
⇒ a − b · W = c − σ · S (3.74)
Based on the approach explained above, the total water extraction from an aquifer
can be determined by Eq. (3.75):
W = a − c + σ · S
b
(3.75)
3.8.2 Dynamic Stock Balance for Groundwater
It is possible to set up the dynamic stock balance for the groundwater stock, which
arises from the physical paradigm that all water volumes have to be balanced (hydro-
logical cycle). This implies that inflows into the groundwater stock exceeding the
water amounts outflowing from the groundwater stock will cause the groundwater
table to rise, and vice versa. Consequently, the change in the groundwater stock S˙(t)
is equal to the difference between the in- and outflowingwater volumes of the aquifer.
Due to this relation, the groundwater stock in the aquifer can change over time and
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the parameter should be made time-dependent, such that S(t). Therefore, the amount
of water extracted can also change over time, as depicted in Eq. (3.75), and should
be written as W (t). The inflow into the groundwater stock is only determined by
the natural inflow, R, which is, for reasons of simplification, assumed to be constant
over time. The outflow from the groundwater stock contains two parts: On the one
hand, it is determined by the natural outflow, r , which occurs due to flow processes
and is assumed to be constant over time, and on the other hand it is also determined
by the aggregated amount of water extraction by humans, W (t). This results in the
following dynamic stock balance:
S˙(t) = (R − r) − W (t) (3.76)
Plugging Eq. (3.75) into Eq. (3.76) yields an algebraic expression of the dynamic
stock balance, denoted by S˙(t).
S˙(t) = (R − r) − a − c + σ · S(t)
b
(3.77)
The steady state is a specific situation in which the flows feeding and leaving the
groundwater stock are balanced, i.e., W (t) = R − r , and, therefore, the changes in
the groundwater stock amount to zero for all time periods, i.e., S˙(t) = 0, which is
also called the steady-state condition. Based on this assumption and Eq. (3.77), the
size of the water stock, S∗, which satisfies the steady-state condition, S˙(t) = 0, can
be identified (see Eq. (3.78)).
S˙(t) = (R − r) − a − c + σ · S(t)
b
(3.77)
⇒ 0 = (R − r) − a − c + σ · S(t)
b
⇒ S∗ = b · (R − r) − (a − c)
σ
(3.78)
A better understanding of the mechanism can be gained by formally proving the
stability of the steady-state situation. If there exist a stable steady state, the ground-
water stock, S(t), must converge against the steady-state stock, S∗, in the long run,
regardless of its deviation from the steady state, S(t) − S∗.38 Hence, Eq. (3.77) is
reformulated, which results in Eq. (3.79).
S˙(t) = (R − r) − a − c + σ · S(t)
b
(3.77)
38If the present level of groundwater stock is given by S0, the deviation from steady-state ground-
water stock is S0 − S∗.
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Fig. 3.16 Phase diagram of
the dynamic stock balance.
Source own illustration
⇒ S˙(t) =
(
−σ
b
)
·
[
a
σ
− c
σ
+ S(t) − b
σ
· (R − r)
]
⇒ S˙(t) =
(
−σ
b
)
·
[
S(t) + (a − c) − b · (R − r)
σ
]
(3.79)
By plugging Eq. (3.78) into Eq. (3.79), it is possible to derive a functional form of
the dynamic stock balance, in which the temporal changes of the groundwater stock,
S˙(t), depend on deviations from the steady-state groundwater stock, S(t) − S∗, such
that
⇒ S˙(t) =
(
−σ
b
)
· [S(t) − S∗] (3.80)
Based on Eq. (3.80), it can be proven that the steady state is a stable point to which
the groundwater stock converges over time, because
• If the groundwater stock is below the steady-state stock, which means alge-
braically
[
S(t) − S∗] < 0, the temporal change in the groundwater stock, S˙(t) >
0, is positive, hence the groundwater stock will increase over time.
• By contrast, if the groundwater stock exceeds the steady-state stock, i.e.,[
S(t) − S∗] > 0, the groundwater stock will decrease over time because the tem-
poral change in groundwater stock, S˙(t) < 0, is negative in this case.
By means of this stability analysis, it is possible to state that the groundwater stock,
S(t), converges to the steady-state stock, S∗, and therefore the latter can be described
as the long-term groundwater stock. The higher the deviation of the current stock
from its steady state, defined as
∣∣[S(t) − S∗]∣∣, the higher is the temporal change in
the groundwater stock,
∣∣S˙(t)
∣∣, which implies a faster convergence in direction of the
steady-state stock S∗.
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The phase diagram of the dynamic stock can be found in Fig. 3.16. To calculate
the steady-state stock, Eq. (3.78) is used as a starting point.
S∗ = b · (R − r) − (a − c)
σ
(3.78)
3.8.3 Hydrological and Ecologic Effects
After having studied the dynamic properties of the model, we would like to study the
hydrological and ecologic effects of the open- access groundwater economy. To this
end, we introduce a threshold value Ω . This threshold value represents the height of
the critical groundwater level. This results in two cases:
• If S∗ ≥ Ω ⇒ b · (R − r) − (a − c) > σΩ , the long-term water stock does
not fall below the threshold value. Overexploitation does not occur in the
addressed aquifer. The microclimate, the vegetation, and other hydrological func-
tions remain stable. Notice, that this case does not occur due to a common water
management oriented toward sustainability goals but simply because pumping
costs are high. The water cycle and the environment is protected by the low pro-
ductivity of the pumping technology.
• However, if S∗ < Ω ⇒ b · (R − r) − (a − c) < σΩ , the noncooperative use
of water would lead to a regional ecologic disaster. In the long run overdraft will
occur and, as a result, detrimental repercussions on regional climate, soil quality,
and the local hydrological cycle will set in. These effects may be irreversible in
nature. In ecology one speaks of hysteresis. Even if at a later stage common efforts
are made to reverse the destruction process, it may be too late, i.e., the original
environmental state can no longer be regained.
Themodel-based analysis conducted in this subsection allows us to draw conclusions
about scarcity issues, which can result from overexploitation of an aquifer whose
access is not regulated or limited. The overexploitation risk does not hinge on the
cost rate parameter, σ , that characterizes the impact of the size of the water stock
on the cost of extraction, but potential overexploitation relates to a multitude of
other parameters. In the simple toy model presented in this subsection, the risk of
overexploitation increaseswith the change of certain parameters as listed inTable3.4.
3.9 Water Transfer Between Watersheds
3.9.1 Inter-basin Water Transfer Schemes
Infrastructure-based water transfer is a common instrument of water supply side
management, which is applied in many regions of the world. The transfer is con-
ducted by means of a water supply network containing pipelines, pump stations,
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Table 3.4 Influence of certain parameters on risk of overexploitation
Parameter name Parameter symbol Effect on risk of
overexploitation
Water availability spent by the
nature
(R − r ) ⇑
Choke price of aggregated
water demand function
a ⇑
Steepness of aggregated water
demand function
b ⇓
Pumping cost rate from
theoretically empty aquifer
c ⇓
tanks, etc. It is possible to differentiate between intra-basin and inter-basin transfers,
or between intra-regional and interregional/international transfers if hydrological or
political boundaries are addressed, respectively.39 The water obtained by transfers
represents an additional source of water supply in the regions importing water. This
additional water source is often quite necessary in the region receiving water to close
the regional gap between the obtainable amount of water from local sources and the
local requirements for water supply. Climate change, which expresses itself through
decreasing water availability and increasing risk of drought, and increasing water
requirements, resulting from population and economic growth, may further exacer-
bate water scarcity in some regions of the world. Consequently, water transfers, as
a means for mitigating the adverse consequences of water shortage, will presum-
ably gain importance in the future. In some cases, water transfer may be a cheaper
source than alternative water supply management measures, e.g., reclaimed water or
desalination.
There are many large-scale water transfer schemes around the world, most of
them implemented in North America, Asia, and Australia. Important ones are, for
example, the California State Water Project, the Colorado River Aqueduct, the San
Juan-Charma Project (all in the US), the Lesotho Highland Water Project in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the National Water Carrier in Israel, the Telugu Ganga Project in
India, theSouth-NorthWaterTransfer Project inChina, or theGoldfieldWater Supply
Scheme in Australia.
Water transfers affect the local ecology, especially in the water- exporting region,
due to interference with the flow regime of the water body. Furthermore, there are
also some economic effects that impact water consumers and suppliers in water
importing and exporting regions. These economic consequences are explained in
this subsection with the help of a simple but illustrative model. Note that inter-
basin transfers are often criticized by environmental organizations because they may
39The boundaries of the water basin are determined by a river basin or an aquifer basin. Intra-
regional water transfers denote the transport within one region while interregional transfers refer to
transfers from one region to another. International transfers describe water transfers between two
states and, by definition, an international transfer is always an interregional transfer.
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deliver much less benefits and more harm than anticipated, which is illustrated by
the box in this subsection.
Box 3.7 Negative impacts of inter-basin water transfer
Inter-basinwater transfers have been criticized by environmental organizations
for several reasons. This is because, the development of inter-basin transfers
has the potential to disturb the water balance in both the donating and the
receiving region. In the past, certain inter-basin transfers have caused a dis-
proportionate amount of damage to freshwater ecosystems in relation to the
schemes’ benefits. Negative social as well as economic impacts, especially for
the donor basin, can also occur. Inter-basin transfers may not be the most cost-
effective way of meeting water demand in the receiving region. Furthermore,
inter-basin transfers do not encourage users in the receiving region to use the
water more effectively, to recycle wastewater or to develop new local water
sources for supply. According toWWF (2007), the following negative impacts
can be observed in certain cases of inter-basin water transfers:
• Demand management in recipient basin is not sufficiently considered in
preplanning for inter-basin transfer, leading to ongoing water waste.
• Inter-basin transfers can become drivers for unsustainable water use in
recipient’s basin-irrigation and urban water use, and create strong depen-
dence on inter-basin transfer in the recipient community.
• The proliferation of boreholes to access groundwater can lead to overex-
ploitation of this resource, too.
• Inter-basin transfers can become a catalyst for social conflict between donor
and recipient basins or with government
• Inter-basin transfers may not help the situation of the poor affected or dis-
placed by it.
• Governance arrangements for inter-basin transfers can be rather weak,
resulting in budget blow-out or corruption
Source:WWF (2007)
3.9.2 Transfer from Water-Rich to Water-Scarce Regions
Assume a situation with one water-rich region, denoted by region 1, where water
is available in abundant quantities, and one water scarce region, named region 2,
where water occurs only in small amounts. Moreover, it is assumed that benefit is
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maximized in both regions.40 A graphical depiction of this problem can be found
in Fig. 3.17.
In both regions, the local water producers extract a specific amount of water from
their regional territory, while these quantities are designated by the variables w1 and
w2. The extraction of those water volumes is associated with total extraction costs
of C1(w1) and C2(w2), respectively. To reduce shortage in the water-scarce region
2, region 1 exports water to the importing region 2, where the amount of transferred
water is represented by z.41 The transfer causes specific cost of γ monetary units
per transferred water volume unit, hence, the total transportation costs are γ · z.
The consumption level of region 1 and 2 are termed as wC1 and w
C
2 , respectively.
Extracted water volumes in region 1, which are not exported, are consumed in region
1, thuswC1 = (w1 − z), whereas consumption in the water-scarce region 2 equals the
amount of water extracted by the local producer and the imported volumes of water,
i.e., wC2 = (w2 + z). Hence, the consumption level in each region depends on the
extraction in the region and the water transfer, i.e., wC1 (w1, z) and w
C
2 (w2, z). The
corresponding benefits, which arise from water consumption in the regions 1 and 2,
are B1(wC1 (w1, z)) and B2(w
C
2 (w2, z)), respectively. Based on the IWRM approach,
the following objective function can be set up for the explained case:
max
w1,w2,z
B1(w
C
1 (w1, z)) + B2(wC2 (w2, z)) − C1(w1) − C2(w2) − γ · z (3.81)
The abstractable amounts in any region i ∈ {1, 2} are restricted by a regional-
specific amount of maximum sustainable water extraction, denoted by wSUSi and
defined in Eqs. (3.82) and (3.83), thatmay be determined according to locally varying
ecological conditions, e.g., recharge rates, local precipitation, etc.42
w1 ≤ wSUS1 (λ1) (3.82)
w2 ≤ wSUS2 (λ2) (3.83)
40The number of suppliers and consumers is irrelevant to this problem. A situation is assumed
where the benefit is maximized. This means, for instance, that a monopolist is not able to use its
market power to set the monopoly price for maximizing its producer surplus because of the local
price regulation.
41In line with the terminology used in this subsection, this situation is referred to as a water transfer
from region 1 to region 2.
42An extraction below the maximum sustainable extraction amount (wi ≤ wSUSi ) does not harm
environment and/or (future) society and hence fulfills the intra-generation and inter-generation
sustainability.
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The residual KKT conditions are represented by Eqs. (3.84) to (3.88):
B ′1(wC1 ) − C ′1(w1) − λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.84)
B ′2(wC2 ) − C ′2(w2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.85)
−B ′1(wC1 ) + B ′2(wC2 ) − γ ≤ 0 ⊥ z ≥ 0 (3.86)
wSUS1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.87)
wSUS2 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.88)
Ifwe assume thatwater scarcity is not present in thewater-exporting region, it follows
that w1 < wSUS1 and hence λ1 = 0 due to Eq. (3.87). But the producer(s) in region
2 extract the maximum sustainable amount, therefore w2 = wSUS2 and hence λ2 ≥ 0
because of Eq. (3.88).
Thus, the marginal benefit from consumption should equal the marginal cost of
production in the water exporting region, i.e., B ′1(wC1 ) = C ′1(w1), while the marginal
benefit of the water importing region exceeds the marginal cost of production by the
level of λ2, which is B ′2(wC2 ) = C ′2(w2) + λ2. This shadow price, λ2, constitutes the
additional social welfare in the water-scarce region 2 that would be generated if the
maximum extractable quantity of water, wSUS2 , increased by one measurement unit.
If a water transfer is not feasible and cannot (or is not) realized due to technical,
institutional, political, or other reasons, it is trivial to state that z = 0 and all the
regions act self-sufficiently. In this case of self-sufficiency, the consumed amount is
equal to the production level in the region, which means wC1 = w1 and wC2 = w2. We
already know that the production and consumption amounts in region 1, which are
depicted by wA1 in Fig. 3.17, result from the intersection of the marginal benefit and
marginal cost function, i.e., B ′1(w1) = C ′1(w1). However, in region 2, where water is
scarce by assumption, consumption quantities are equal to the maximum sustainable
extraction level of the region, w2 = wSUS2 .
If a transfer from the water-rich to the water-scarce region is realized, we assume
that z ≥ 0. The transfer level z should at least be large enough such that the marginal
benefit in the importing region 2 exceeds the marginal benefit in the exporting region
1 by the water transportation cost rate, i.e., B ′2(wC2 ) = B ′1(wC1 ) + γ . The optimal
regional volumes of water extraction and the optimal transfer are illustrated by w∗1,
wSUS2 and z
∗ in Fig. 3.17. The optimal consumption levels in the regions 1 and 2 are
therefore wC1 = w∗1 − z∗ and wC2 = wSUS2 + z∗, respectively, which are also illus-
trated in Fig. 3.17. In the following, we term the optimal consumption level in region
1 with w∗1 − z∗ and the optimal consumption level in region 2 with wSUS2 + z∗.
Compared to the result obtained for self-sufficiency, the existence of transfers
causes an increase of the water price in region 1 from B ′1(wA1 ) to B ′1(w∗1 − z∗), a
rise in the quantity of extracted water from wA1 to w
∗
1, and a decrease in the level of
consumed water from wA1 to w
∗
1 − z∗. Hence, the surplus of consumers in that region
is reduced by the area DH as a consequence of higher water prices and less water
consumption, whereas the producers’ profits rise by the area C DH , as illustrated in
Fig. 3.17. The loss of consumer surplus is compensated completely by an increase in
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Fig. 3.17 Transfer from Water-rich to water-scarce region. Source own illustration
producer surplus, and hence the area C outlines the additional social welfare gained
in the water exporting region due to the implementation of water transfers.
In reverse to the effects of water transfers occurring in the exporting region,
in which consumers lose and producers gain social welfare, in the water import-
ing region water transfers lead to a decrease in water prices from B ′2(wSUS2 ) to
B ′2(wSUS2 + z∗), and an increase in water consumption from wSUS2 to wSUS2 + z∗
compared to the case of self-sufficiency. Water extraction is not affected by trans-
fer as the maximum sustainable amount is already extracted under self-sufficiency.
Consequently, consumers gain due to lower prices and higher consumption levels,
and producers lose profits because they face lower prices. The graphical depiction
can be found in Fig. 3.17, where the gain of consumer surplus is illustrated by the
area L P , and the loss of producer profits is represented by the area L . Therefore, the
triangle P represents the overall gain in social welfare due to water transfers in the
water importing region. Furthermore, the generated revenues in the water importing
regions, represented by area Q, are used to cover the total transportation cost ofwater,
which is γ · z∗. The residual revenues from the water transfer, illustrated by areas
RST , are used to cover the production cost of transferred water, i.e., areas AB F ,
to compensate the loss of producer profits from selling water to the consumers in
region 1 in the self-sufficient case, which is area E , and to generate additional profits
from selling exported water at increased prices, i.e., B ′1(w∗1 − z∗) − B ′1(wA1 ), which
are areas C D. A summarizing overview of the impacts that an implementation of a
water transfer scheme has on social welfare in both regions is given in Table3.5.
3.9.3 Transfer Between Two Water-Scarce Regions
In contrast, if a situation was assumed where water resources are also quite limited
in the water exporting region the water extraction may equal the sustainable water
extraction rate,w1 = wSUS1 . Additionally, because of the scarcity in the water import-
ing region, the extraction rate in this region is equal to the sustainable extraction,
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Table 3.5 Distributional effects due to water transfers
Area in region 1
(exporting region)
Area in region 2
(importing region)
Consumer surplus Self-sufficient DG H K
Transfer G K L P
Change −DH +L P
Producer surplus Self-sufficient E I M N L
Transfer C DE H I M N
Change +C DH −L
Change of social welfare +C +P
Fig. 3.18 Water transfer between water-scarce regions. Source own illustration
w2 = wSUS2 , which is equal to the former explained case. Compared to the previously
explained scenario, the only alteration is the fact that the extraction amount in region
1 is restricted by the available water, i.e,. w1 = wSUS1 . Therefore, Eq. (3.87) is bind-
ing, this results in the fact that we assume λ1 ≥ 0. Because of Eq. (3.84), themarginal
benefit of consumption exceeds the marginal cost of water extraction in the water
exporting region 1, i.e., B ′1(wC1 ) = C ′1(w1) + λ1. The value of the shadow price λ1
shows the increase in benefits if sustainable extraction wSU S1 was to theoretically be
increased byone unit.All the previously described relations, B ′2(wC2 ) = C ′2(w2) + λ2
as well as B ′2(wC2 ) = B ′1(wC1 ) + γ , are still valid for this addressed scenario. Due to
the assumption that the amount extracted in the region is known, w1 = wSUS1 > 0
and w2 = wSUS2 > 0, the values of the variables λ1 and λ2 can be calculated with
Eqs. (3.84) and (3.85), respectively. Finally, the value of the optimal transfer z∗ can
be found from Eq. (3.86). Therefore, the consumption level in region 1 and 2 is
wC1 = wSUS1 − z∗ and wC2 = wSUS2 + z∗, respectively. The scenario, in which water
is scarce in both regions, is illustrated in Fig. 3.18.
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It becomes obvious that producer surplus, consumer surplus, costs, welfare gains,
etc. (for self-sufficiency and in the transfer case) are represented by the same areas as
under the former scenario, where water was a non-scarce resource in the exporting
region. Hence, distributional effects are similar for both explained scenarios in this
section and are summarized in Table3.5.
3.10 Water Quality Management
3.10.1 Water Pollution: An Unresolved Issue
Even in Europe, with its highly developed infrastructure, water pollution does prevail
to a reckoned extent. The Synthesis Report 2015 of the European Environmental
Agency adds the water quality issue to the list of environmental problems not yet
abolished:
Much cleaner than 25 years ago, many water bodies are still affected by pollutants and/or
altered habitats. In 2009, only 43% showed a good/high ecological status; the 10 points
expected increase for 2015 (53%) constitutes only a modest improvement in aquatic ecosys-
tem health.43
Good water quality refers not only to drinking water but also to water as a medium
for recreational purposes, like fishing or swimming, and as a habitat for a healthy
ecological system. There are many different sources of pollution affecting the water
body negatively, be it surface water or groundwater. The main polluters are the
industry, with its chemical pollutants and hazardous substances, the agricultural
sector, with its runoff of nutrients (carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus), the urban sector,
with households discharging mainly nutrients and fecal substances, as well as the
medical sector releasing pharmaceutical residues. All these substances pollute the
water through various chemical and biological chains and, as a result, deteriorate the
human livelihood.
The European Parliament has enacted various directives with the purpose of pro-
tecting water. Article 4 (b) of the Water Framework Directive states
Member States ensure, for surface water, the highest ecological and chemical status possible.
This goal shall be implemented with a regulation framework, which is established
in Article 8, according to which
43Synthesis Report “The European environment—state and outlook 2015”, see www.eea.europa.
eu/soer-2015/europe/freshwater.
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Member States shall ensure the establishment of programs for the monitoring of water status
in order to establish a coherent and comprehensive overview of water status within each river
basin district.
Achieving an effective water regulation is a complex task. While the regulation of
piped drinking water and of cleared water from waste water treatment plants is man-
ageable, other sources of water contamination are more difficult to regulate. Specif-
ically, agricultural non-point pollution is difficult to monitor almost by definition.
The sole introduction of water quality standards is not sufficient to secure the water
bodies, and therefore indirect methods of regulation must be applied. For instance,
regulation and monitoring of the use of various types of fertilizers and herbicides
has to be established.
Of course pursuance of these goals and the implementation of proper regulation
instruments entail costs. The EuropeanWater Framework Directive is rather explicit
with regard to these costs (Article 9):
Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services,
including environmental and resource costs.
Box 3.8 Important parameters for identifying water quality
There exist various biological and chemical parameters to evaluate the quality
of water and wastewater. For instance, the biological oxygen demand (BOD5)
or the chemical oxygen demand (COD) are important sum parameters corre-
sponding to the concentration of organic substances in a certain water sample.
Total organic carbon (TOC), dissolved organic carbon (DOC), and partic-
ulate organic carbon (POC) are further parameters for organic bound carbon,
which contains all organic substances. Nitrogen compounds are also impor-
tant parameters for the evaluation of water quality. Industrial and domestic
wastewater is characterized byhigh concentrations of reducednitrogen (ammo-
nium and ammonia, being NH4, and NH3, respectively). This form of nitrogen
demands oxygen and is toxic to many aquatic and nonaquatic living organ-
isms. The oxidation of reduced form nitrogen (ammonium and ammonia) is
termed nitrification which is an autonomous biochemical process and also a
treatment step in wastewater purification plants, where these reduced nitro-
gen compounds are oxidized to nitrite (NO2) firstly and afterward to nitrate
(NO3). Nitrite is usually an intermediate in the nitrification process, however,
it is a quite toxic substance. Nitrate is unwanted in potable water and it is
also a nutrient in water bodies that causes the growth of algae, which is called
eutrophication. This eutrophication can lead to the death of the aquatic livings
in water bodies, hence if the concentration of nitrogen is sufficiently high it
can be seen as a chronic toxic substance. Nitrate is usually emitted into water
bodies by the agricultural sector because of fertilization (Sundermann et al.
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2020). Nitrate can be degenerated into molecular nitrogen (N2) during the
denitrification process. Because of the harmful impact of nitrogen to water
bodies, the denitrification process step should also be part of treatment in an
adequate wastewater purification. Another nitrogen related sum parameter is
the Kjeldahl-nitrogen which states the amount of nitrogen bound in organic
substances plus ammonium. Like nitrogen, phosphorus is a nutrient that is
usually the limiting factor for the growth of algae (eutrophication) in water
bodies. In water, phosphorus occurs as ortho-phosphorus (salt of phosphoric
acid) or as component in a nucleic acid (DNA, RNA).
A very essential physical–chemical parameter for evaluating the quality of
water is the pH-value which impacts, for instance, the equilibrium of acids and
bases and other chemical reactions in the water. The sensitivity of change of
the pH-value, due to the addition of acids or bases, is represented by buffer
capacities which are also water quality parameters.
The water hardness is a further chemical parameter which is quite important
formany technical purposes and states the amount of dissolved calcium (Ca2+)
andmagnesium (Mg2+) ions in thewater. Hardness ofwater has to be increased
or decreased by specific technical processes, if the water is too soft or hard for
the specific purpose, respectively.
Oxygen that is dissolved inwater is themost important oxidizer for chemical
processes in the water resource and impacts the kinds and composition of the
aquatic livelihood. Further important physical water quality parameters are the
turbidity, the electric conductivity, the temperature, the density, the viscosity,
and sensory parameters (smell and flavor).
Microbiological parameters are very important indicators for pollution and
for identifying the risk of water-related disease from thewater source (hygienic
reasons). There is a high number of various pathogens, germs, salmonel-
lae, bacteria, etc., that can occur in water. Very important indicators for
human-based pollution of freshwater sources are, for instance, the number of
Escherichia coli, which is a bowel bacteria, and the number of enterococcus.
Source: Goncharuk (2014)
3.10.2 Water Quality Management
This section addresses the economic aspect of water quality. The water quality
standards can be achieved with the help of an ecological-economic management
approach. This requires deploying the tools of IWRM introduced in the preceding
sections. In the following, we will present a simple water management model that
includes some features of water quality regulation.
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Fig. 3.19 Quantity-quality cycle. Source own illustration
3.10.2.1A Model of Water Quality
Figure3.19 displays the relationship between quantitative water flows and the dis-
charge of pollutants. The disk depicts a water body, be it groundwater or a surface
water reservoir. This water body will be recharged by a flow, denoted by R, which
is assumed to consist only of clean water. The water body of volume V is of mixed
quality as it contains clearwater,W , and a pollutant, Q, i.e., V = Q + W .We assume
that the reservoir is of equal quality, i.e., that the pollutant is evenly mixed in the
water body, which is symbolized by the propeller. The water quality can be inversely
defined with the help of the concentration of pollutants, αQ .
αQ = Q
W + Q (3.89)
The whole economy living in the modeled watershed is regarded as a single user
that utilizes a specific water quantity, where the amount of water used is indicated
by w. This water is provided by a water treatment facility that takes the water from
the water body in order to clean and disinfect the water and convey it to the users as
drinking water. To keep the model simple, we do not capture the quantity balance
of this treatment unit, i.e., we do not determine the volume of pollutants removed
from the non-treated water. After usage, the water is discharged from the user as
wastewater containing a certain amount of pollutants. We assume that all water is
returned. The portion of pollutants is eˆw where eˆ is the concentration of the pollutant
in the wastewater. The wastewater is directed into a wastewater facility, where it is
treated and purified.
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The total volume of clarifiedwater is therefore (1 + e)w, where e, e ≤ eˆ is the pol-
lution concentration afterwastewater treatment. The residual, amounting to (eˆ − e)w,
is sewage sludge, which will be dumped into a landfill. Finally, Fig. 3.19 indicates
other modes of water use, namely, in-stream usage and other ecosystem services
that are not explicitly modeled. The water regulation takes place in the form of a
quality standard. The concentration of the pollutant shall not exceed a threshold, α¯Q ,
prescribed by a water authority.
αQ ≤ α¯Q (3.90)
The water quality of the reservoir depends not only on the performance of the
waste water treatment (WWT) plant but also on the ability of the water body to self-
purify, i.e., to dissolve the pollutants. This purification process is rather complex as it
hinges on the water body itself, on local climate conditions and on the environmental
surroundings. It is a natural process involving biological and chemical process that are
interdependent and very difficult to model due to their nonlinear interconnections.44
Here, it is sufficient to maintain the model linear just to get a basic understanding
of these interdependencies. However, care must be taken when balancing pollutants
and pure water.
Thewater leaving theWWTcan be decomposed into purewater and the amount of
pollutant which consists of45 e · w additional discharge of pollutant and the pollutant
already dissolved in the water at the time of abstraction, i.e., αQw, totaling an amount
of (e + αQ)w which is returned into reservoir where the pollutants are partially
neutralized. This process can be represented in a resorption function.46 We introduce
an resorption function
Q˙(t) = −π Q(t) + (e + αQ)w − αQr − αQ x = −π Q(t) + ew − αQr (3.91)
The volume of pollutant in the water reservoir increases by the discharge of
pollutants, ew + αQw, and decays with the rate π due to chemical and biological
purification processes. In addition, the portion αS of the total runoff r , which consists
of clean water and pollutants, decreases the stock of pollutants. In this simple model,
αQr is what hydrologists call advection, i.e., the transported mass of dissolved pol-
lutants that is carried through a water body. Finally, one has to subtract the pollutant
removed from the water body when the water of volume w is abstracted. This is the
last item on the right side of the middle term −αQw.
44An introduction into water quality modeling can be found in Loucks and van Beek (2005).
45Notice that the water withdrawn from the reservoir w is mixed consisting of αQw pollutant and
(1− αQ)w pure water. Thus, we can decompose exactly, what portion of the redirected water
is pure water and what pollutant, i.e. (1 + e)w = (1 + e)[αQw + (1− αQ)w]. Multiplying yields
αQw + eαQw + ew − eαQw + (1 − αQ)w. Thefirst four items belong to the discharge of pollutant,
reducing to (e + αQ)w, whereas the last term is the amount of pure water returned to the reservoir.
46A resorption function mathematically describes the self-purification capacity of a water body.
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Similarly, we can establish a dynamic relation for pure water
W˙ (t) = R − γ1W (t) + π Q(t) − (1− αQ)r − (1− αQ)w + (1− αQ)w (3.92)
The last two terms cancel each other. The first represents the removal of pure water,
the latter the redirection after the purification process of thewater used. The volumeof
cleanwater increaseswith recharge, R, and decreaseswith evapotranspiration.Notice
that the pollutant cannot evaporate by assumption. The absorption process decom-
poses the harmful pollutants to clean water. Thus, the balance equation includes this
process with the term π Q(t). Finally, the run off is also carrying away clean water.
Since the water body is assumed to be evenly mixed, this runoff can be captured by
(1− αQ)r .
3.10.2.2Policy Instruments
The analysis of the effects of various policy instruments to regulate the water qual-
ity requires dynamic optimization methods in order to satisfy the dynamic balance
equations. These methods allow to derive optimal time paths of the relevant vari-
ables of the IWRM approach. Starting from given values of Q and W in the first time
period, we can find optimal policy instruments, e.g., effluent charges or technology
standards for the WWT plant for each point in time. In the long run, these variables
would converge to constant values, which characterize the steady-state solution. For
an introductory textbook, it is sufficient to confine the analysis to the steady state.
Therefore, we assume that the hydrology of the watershed under consideration is in
equilibrium at the outset of the analysis. Thus, setting Q˙ and W˙ equal to zero yields
the equations
π Q = ex − α¯Qr (3.93)
γ1W = R + π Q − (1− α¯Q)r (3.94)
where the bar on α¯Q represents the quality standard for the water body imposed by
thewater authorities (see Eq. (3.89)). Thewater qualitymanagementmust assure that
the quality standard for the water body is held. This can be achieved by regulating
the clarified water (1+ e)w. From Eq. (3.89), it follows
W = 1− α¯Q
α¯Q
Q (3.95)
Inserting Eq. (3.95) into Eq. (3.94) yields
Q = α¯Q(R − (1 − α¯Q)r)
γ1(1 − α¯Q) − πα¯Q (3.96)
which inserted into Eq. (3.93) gives
ew ≤ Φ := α¯Q(π(R − r) + γ1(1− α¯Q)r)
(γ1(1− α¯Q) − α¯Qπ) (3.97)
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The left-hand side is the net pollutant load consisting of the pollutant load (e + α¯Q)w
leaving thewastewater treatment facilityminus the abstracted load α¯Qw thatmust not
exceed a limit valueΦ so as to secure the quality standard of thewater reservoir α¯Q .47
The determination of the limit value requires that the hydrological relationships are
known. Equation (3.97) gives the water withdrawal constraint for w that guarantees
that the quality standard of the water body is met.
3.10.3 Optimal Water Quality
3.10.3.1Model
The water quality management seeks to meet the given quality standard, α¯Q , in an
optimal way. Let us assume that the benefit of using water can be captured by the
usual benefit function, B(w), with the usual properties. To keep the model simple,
we neglect the water treatment assuming that the water quality of the reservoir is
potable. However, waste water treatment has to be taken into account.
The costs for waste water treatment are summarized in the following convex cost
function:
C = CW W T (w, e), Cw > 0, Ce < 0 (3.98)
Costs increase with the amount of waste water to be treated. On the contrary, if the
quality of cleared water released decreases, i.e., e increases, then costs decrease.
Having introduced all relevant elements the optimization program can be stated
max
w,e
[B(w) − C(w, e)] s.t. we ≤ Φ (3.99)
leading to the optimality conditions
Bw(w) − Cw(w, e) − λe =0 (3.100)
−Ce(x, e) − λx =0 (3.101)
Inserting Eq. (3.101) into Eq. (3.100) yields the equation
Bw(w) = Cw(w, e) − e
w
Ce(w, e) (3.102)
which can be utilized together with the constraint ew = Φ to determine the optimal
values {w∗, e∗}. Figure3.20 depicts the optimality condition given in Eq. (3.102).
47Notice that the denominator of the right-hand side must be positive. Otherwise, the steady-state
solution would be negative which makes no sense. It can be shown that the denominator is always
positive if the system of the two differential equations is stable. For the following analysis, these
details are not important.
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Fig. 3.20 Optimal water
quality. Source own
illustration
The N Bi -curves indicate thew − e-combination for constant benefit value, where
N B1 < N B2 < N B3 (iso-benefit-lines).48 The higher e for constant w, the lower
the costs and, hence, the higher are benefits. This monotonicity does not apply for w
because the benefit function is concave and the cost function is convexwith respect to
w. Thus for every e fixed there exists an optimal value wˆ(e) maximizing net benefit.
The line F OC − w shows these values. Graphically, these optimal values are at the
point where the iso-net-benefit lines have their minimum (points R, A and B for
example).
The black line shows Eq. (3.97), i.e., the water quality constraint. The optimal
value {w∗, e∗} can be found graphically: Increase net benefit as much as possible
without violating Eq. (3.97). Obviously, this is point O.
3.10.3.2Policy Instruments
The program defined by Eq. (3.99) is the reference point for the assessment of various
policy options. These options can be evaluated with respect to their efficacy, i.e., their
potential to secure water quality standards, and with respect to economic efficiency,
i.e., their potential to assure the water quality standards economically. Three policy
options are discussed, namely, technology standards, economic incentives, andwater
quality trading schemes.
To begin with the technology standard, the water authorities prescribe certain
technology standards related to the quality of purified waste water released to the
receiving waters. In our model, the clarified water (1+ e)w is returned into the water
body. The authority requires from the WWT plant to deploy technological measures
such that the pollutant per unit of water released does not exceed a concentration
48The quadratic form is due to the fact that both the benefit function and the cost function are
quadratic: B(w) = aw − (b/2)w2 and C(w, e) = mw2(E − e)2 where a, b, m, and E, E > eˆ, are
constants.
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of e¯. To guarantee an overall water quality of α¯Q , e¯ must be set such that w(e¯ +
α¯Q) = Φ (see Eq. (3.97)). This task requires a significant amount of information
because the authorities have to anticipate how much water will flow through the
water infrastructure given the technology standard.
The integrated water sector will maximize the net economic benefit for a given
standard e¯:
max
w
[B(w) − C(w, e¯)] (3.103)
The optimality condition is
Bw(w) = Cw(w, e¯) (3.104)
From Eq. (3.104) the water quantity, wˆ, can be derived as a function of e¯. The
water authority sets the standard such that wˆ(e¯)(e¯ + α¯Q) = Φ. Thus, the technology
standard approach is effective in that it secures the overall water quality standard
α¯Q . This is point R in Fig. 3.20. Here, the constraint (blue line) is satisfied and, at the
same time, net benefit is maximized. However, if we compare this point with point
O we see that that the allocation {wˆ(e¯), e¯} is not optimal. The ecological constraint
can also be met at O with higher net benefits. The concentration regulation leads to
more water withdrawal wˆ(e¯) > w∗ that is too clean e¯ < e∗.
A second management instrument is to employ economic incentive mechanisms.
One instrument that provokes reactions from economic agents are prices. In our
setting, effluent taxes serve as the price component. Let us return to the integrated
water sector consisting of the water treatment (WT) plant and WWT facility and
assume that the total load of pollutants, (e + α¯Q)w, will be taxed.
The following net benefit function will be optimized by the water sector:
max
w,e
[B(w) − C(w, e) − τwe] (3.105)
where τ is the net effluent charge.49 Contrary to the technology standard case, the
water sector can decide on both variables, w and e. The optimality conditions are
identical to those of the integrated water quality approach in Eq. (3.102) andwe = Φ
if the authority sets τ = λ. Then the values {w(τ ), e(τ )} maximizing Eq. (3.105)
are identical to the optimal solution {w∗, e∗}. Of course, the water authority has to
process huge amounts of information, rather similar to the technology standard case.
The authority must observe the pollutant loads released by the WWT facility and, at
the same time, the amount of pollutants withdrawn during water abstraction w.
But even if this information is available, the authority cannot fix the optimal
effluent charge without knowing the benefit function and the cost function. Thus, a
trial-and-error approach is required, such that the regulatory authority introduces an
49Recall that the net pollutant discharge is w(e + α¯Q) − α¯Q)w.
92 3 Integrated Water Resource Management: Principles and Applications
initial effluent charge based on the information available. If total effluents violate the
water quality constraint, the authority increases the charge and repeats this procedure
until the overall water quality standard is met. Obviously, this procedure cannot last
too long, because a prolonged adjustment time could lead to indirect hydrological
and ecological effects associated with severe damages to the environment.
There is also another caveat to mention. Our simple model does not take the very
complex diffusion process of pollutants into account. In reality, one has to tackle
with stochastic fluctuations and also with complex patterns of spatial distributions
of effluents. As a result, effluent charges have to be spatially differentiated and also
flexible in time. If this flexibility cannot be ensured a technology standard approach
might be more efficient than setting economic incentives.
Some of the problems encountered in the framework of an effluent charge can
be avoided with water quality trading schemes. Under this policy program, tradable
permits are issued to effluent chargers. These permits can be traded leading to a
market equilibrium. Effluent discharges are costly because they have to be covered
by the permits bought. As a result, the water sector behaves like in the case of an
effluent tax. However, the advantage of this policy framework could be that no inter-
active trial-and-error process takes place. The permit price adjusts to an equilibrium
value guaranteeing that the criteria of efficacy and efficiency are satisfied. But water
markets also have their specific problems. These will be addressed in Chap.5. One
of the few existing water quality trading schemes is described below.
Box 3.9 Water quality trading:The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme
The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (HRSTS) was introduced by the
Environmental ProtectionAgency ofNewSouthWales (NSW-EPA),Australia,
to regulate the salinity of theHunterRiver. First, itwas put in operation as a pilot
in 1995 and later in 2002 legally established by a regulation act of the NSW-
EPA. The Hunter River drains the largest catchment area in New South Wales.
Along the river, a string of heterogeneous industries are located. There is an
extensive agricultural sector consisting of wineries, dairy farming, vegetable
cultivation and cattle farming. In addition, theHunter valley counts over 20 coal
mines (most of which are surface mines) and three power stations. The salinity
of the river comes from natural sources like rocks and soil but also from the
economic activities. The river water abstracted by the mines is pumped out and
additionally charged with salt. Electricity generation needs water for cooling.
Thereby water evaporates leading to a high salt concentration in the remaining
water that is pumpedback into the river.An increased salinity leads to economic
and ecologic damages. Economic damages accrue to the agricultural sector as
the water cannot be used for irrigation if the salt concentration exceeds a
certain threshold. The ecologic damages were quite obvious. A too high salt
concentration has detrimental effects on the ecologic system of the river as a
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habitat for many species. As a result, there was significant conflict between
the various users of the river, specifically between the agricultural sector and
the mining operators.
After a long time of fruitless clashes of interests, the NSW Department of
Land and Water Conservation and the NSW-EPA introduced a system with
dynamic and tradeable discharge permits. In contrast to other permit systems
adopted in the context of global emissions, e.g., the EU-ETS, the system here
had to be adapted to the specific hydrology of a river. It is important to keep
the salinity of river under a threshold along its whole course. To do so, the
regulatory authorities divided the river into three sectors: the upper,middle, and
lower sector. For each sector, upper ceilings of salinity were determined. These
ceilings depend on the flow intensity of the river. If the river has a low flow,
no salt discharge is permitted. If the flow is high, then the permitted discharge
is increased; this depends on the specific hydrological properties of the river
sectors. The main goal of this spatially differentiated approach is to keep the
salt concentration along the whole river within justifiable boundaries. To make
the HRSTS work, a string of monitoring points along the river were deployed
so as to enforce the regulation of salt concentration. Following figure shows
how the concentration data is transformed to allowances for the dischargers.
Hunter river salinity trading scheme. Source NSW-EPA (2003)
The river is divided in floating blocks that move with the flow of the river
downstream. Each block is controlled with respect to its salinity which is
measured by the waters electrical conductivity (micro-siemens per cubic cen-
timeter). The allowed discharges per block are calculated on the basis of a
hydrological model such that the electrical conductivity does not exceed the
threshold value introduced by the authority. These allowed discharges vary
with the hydrological conditions, e.g., the flow intensity of the river in the dif-
ferent river sectors. The allowances are distributed to dischargers as “discharge
credits”. In total, there are 1000 discharge credits expressed as per mill. One
credit equals one per mill of the allowed discharge in a block.
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As an example take one of the blocks in above figure. Site A releases a
certain amount of salt (measured in tons). As the river flows the block moves
downstream and flows along site B which can also release a certain amount
of salt and so forth. After the last site, the block has resumed 1000 per mil
of the allowed discharge. What makes this scheme efficient is that the allotted
discharge credits can be traded. We could imagine that site A does not exploit
all of her credits but instead sells some of these to site B allowingB to discharge
more than what was allotted to her. This trade takes place as long as the
abatement costs of an additional ton of salt is lower at site A compared to
site B. It is less costly to avoid one ton of salt discharge at site A than at site B.
Hence, both sides can benefit from trade. The market equilibrium is reached
when the marginal abatement costs of both dischargers are equalized. From
an economic viewpoint, the market equilibrium sustains a discharge pattern
along the river that minimizes total abatement costs of all dischargers.
If we gather the experiences of the past years one can state that theHRSTS is
a success story. The average salinity of the Hunter river dropped considerably
and the former conflicts between the different economic sectors have been
solved within an effective institutional framework.
Sources: NSW-EPA (2003), Muschal (2006), Krogh et al. (2013)
3.11 Exercises
Exercise 3.1 Maximizing agricultural output with return flows
Assume a river basin with two riparians. If water management only looks after
efficiency in the sense of maximizing agricultural output in the entire basin, then the
more productive farmer should get all the water. However, this optimization rule is
not correct when the return flow occurs. Let’s assume the upstream farmer F1 is less
productive than the downstream farmer F2. However, a ratio of water diverted by F1
flows back in the water body and is afterward available for the downstream riparian
F2. How should the policymaker allocate the available water of the river?
Let us assume that the available water in the river which can be diverted is given
with W¯ = 100 units (m3, or liters, or hectoliters). The productivity of farmer F2 and
F1 is a1 = 0.75 and a2 = 1.0, respectively. The fraction of returned water of F1 is
h1 = 0.5 and that of F2 is zero (h2 = 0).
There are twomethods for finding the optimal allocation.Either the total amount of
water is allocated completely to the riparianwhich has the highest productivity related
to net abstraction, or an optimization problem is solved. We start with explaining
the first method. The parameters a1 and a2 represent the productivity per abstracted
3.11 Exercises 95
water, hence a1
(1−h1) and
a2
(1−h2) stand for the productivity per net-abstracted water.
50
By applying this approach
a1
(1 − h1) =
0.75
0.5
= 1.5, a2
(1− h2) =
1
1− 0 = 1 ⇒
a1
(1 − h1) >
a2
(1− h2)
we come to the solution that the upstream riparian F1 is most productive per one
unit net-abstracted water, because a1
(1−h1) >
a2
(1−h2) . Therefore, the upstream ripar-
ian should receive the total amount of available water which means, w1 = W¯ = 100.
Therefore, the agricultural output of riparian F1 is: a1 · w1 = 75. After the consump-
tion of F1, the return flow h1 · w1 = 50 flows back to the river and is available for the
downstream riparian F2. The downstream riparian diverts the amount of water which
is available at its abstraction point, hence:w2 = W¯ − w1 + h1 · w1 = 50. Therefore,
F2 is able to produce a2 · w2 = 50 agricultural products.
If the relations in a river basin are more sophisticated (e.g., more complex pro-
duction functions), the first methodmay not work and the secondmethod (solving an
optimization problem) has to be applied. The optimization problem for maximizing
the agricultural production in the basin has the following form:
max
w1,w2
[a1 · w1 + a2 · w2] , s.t. w1 ≤ W¯ , w2 ≤ W¯ − (1− h1) · w1 (3.106)
The objective is to maximize the agricultural production in the basin, while the
constraints limit the amount of water which can be diverted which is determined by
the available amount at the abstraction point of the riparian.Based on the optimization
problem, we can derive the Lagrangian:
L = [a1 · w1 + a2 · w2] + λ1 · [W¯ − w1] + λ2 · [W¯ − (1 − h1) · w1 − w2]
(3.107)
and the KKT conditions (see Appendix A):
a1 − λ1 − λ2 · (1 − h1) ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.108)
a2 − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.109)
W¯ − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.110)
W¯ − (1− h1) · w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.111)
50If the abstraction is represented by wi , the net abstraction is wi − hi · wi = (1 − hi ) · wi , where
hi stands for the return flow factor (share of diverted water which flows back to the water body after
consumption). Therefore, the net abstraction can be calculated by multiplying the term (1 − hi )
with the abstraction.
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Inserting the numerical values gives
0.75− λ1 − λ2 · (1 − 0.5) ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.112)
1− λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.113)
100 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.114)
100 − (1− 0.5) · w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.115)
From Eq. (3.113), we can infer that λ2 > 0, for meeting the condition 1− λ2 ≤ 0.
Hence, by Eq. (3.115), we can infer that F2 uses all residual water, which means
w2 = W¯ − (1− h1) · w1. Because of the fact that w2 > 0 and due to Eq. (3.113),
we know that 1 − λ2 = 0. Therefore, we can specify the level of λ2 = 1. Inserting
this numerical value into Eq. (3.112) yields 0.75− 0.5− λ1 ≤ 0, which means that
λ1 > 0. Hence, by Eq. (3.114) we can infer that F1 diverts all its available water,
w1 = W¯ = 100. Therefore, from Eq. (3.112) and the fact that w1 > 0, we know that
0.75− λ1 − 0.5 = 0, which means that λ1 = 0.25. Furthermore, by inserting the
facts that λ2 > 0 and w1 = W¯ = 100 in Eq. (3.115) it is possible to find w2 = 50.
Exercise 3.2 Water demand with subsistence levels (Stone-Geary Utility
Function)One way to introduce life lines into the theory of households is the Stone-
Geary utility function. The Stone-Geary utility function is often used in the empirical
investigation of water demand in developing and emerging countries where the life
line consumption plays a significant role. An example is given by Dharmaratna and
Harris (2012).
U (w, b) = (w − ws)α(b − bs)(1−α) (3.116)
where w is water and b is bread (nutrition), ws (bs) are the respective subsistence
levels.
The respective demand functions can be derived by the usual maximization
approach of a household utility function. The Lagrangian is
L = (w − ws)α(b − bs)(1−α) + μ[y − pww − pbb] (3.117)
Notice, that due to the properties of the Stone-Geary utility function w > ws and
b > bs . Thus, the KKT conditions reduce to
α(w − ws)α−1(b − bs)(1−α) − μpw) = 0 (3.118)
(1 − α)(w − ws)α(b − bs)(−α) − μpb = 0 (3.119)
[y − pww − pbb] ≥ 0 and [· · · ]μ = 0 (3.120)
By inspection of the first (or second) equation we see that μ > 0 and thus income is
completely exhausted. Dividing Eq. (3.118) by Eq. (3.119) leads to
α
1− α
b − bs
w − ws =
pw
pb
(3.121)
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The budget constraint can be rewritten as
pw(w − ws) + pb(b − bs) = y − pwws − pbbs (3.122)
Inserting Eq. (3.121) into the budget constraint yields the demand functions for w
and b, respectively. The demand function for w is
wˆ = ws + α ·
(
y − pwws − pbbs
pw
)
(3.123)
Specifically, the sensitivity with respect to a change of the water price is of interest.
Let us first calculate the revenue a water supplier can collect, i.e.,
R(pw) = pwwˆ = pwws + α(y − pwws − pbbs) (3.124)
Differentiating the revenue with respect to the water price yields
R′(pw) = (1 − α)ws (3.125)
Thus, a rising price always leads to an increased revenue. We know from basic
microeconomic calculations that a rising revenue comes from a water demand elas-
ticity less than unity. Hence, due to the subsistence level water demand is inelastic.
Moreover, we can derive that the price sensitivity of water demand increases with
income y and vice versa. This is intuitively clear. A rich household can escape a
price increase by simply reducing water demand and consuming other goods. A
poor household consumes water close to the subsistence level and, hence, cannot
escape the price increase by simply substituting other goods for water.
Exercise 3.3 What is rain from an economic point of view?
A feature of the hydrological cycle is that the water cyclically changes its aggregate
state: from blue water to green water and then back to blue water. We consider blue
water as a private good or as a common property. In both cases, consumption is rival.
But what about the rain? If blue water is rivaling in its use, what about the green
water, the water vapor and the rain? What is your reasoned opinion?
The answer can be given with the help of an example from the agricultural use
of rainfall. We look at farms in a region where it rains. The natural irrigation of
the agricultural crops is apparently non-rivaling. Of course, the rain strength does
not have to be uniformly distributed across the cultivation areas of farmers. What
is decisive is rather the following: What one farmer uses does not affect the others
consumption. In addition, it is difficult to exclude a farmer from the rain if he does
not want to pay for it. All in all, rain is a public good. If the observation period is
extended, this result may change. The rainwater, which does not enter the plants
on the field, evaporates partly and partly seeps into the groundwater. It can also be
carried away by rivers from the region to the seaside. When rain percolates after
its journey through the earth’s surface, it becomes groundwater and it changes its
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economic property. The public good becomes a commodity whose consumption is
rivaling. Now the question remains whether this water is a private good or a common
property good. The answer to this question depends on the possibility to exclude
those farmers from water use who are not willing to pay for it.
Exercise 3.4 The market for recycled water
In Sect. 3.6wehave discussed a systemof twowatermarkets (seeFig. 3.11). Inmarket
1 treated freshwater from a surface water body or from groundwater is traded, while
in market 2 recycled water which is properly treated is traded. Assuming two users
(user 1 and user 2) and that markets operate under perfect competition, we can show
that themarket allocation is identical to the optimal allocation derived fromEq. (3.41)
(see Sect. 3.6).51
In our numerical example, user 1 operates either in both markets or neither of
them as we will derive below. This user 1 is on the demand side in the freshwater
market (market 1), because this he/she aims to purchase freshwater at this market.
After the consumption of this freshwater, a certain share of user 1’s waste water
could be recycled and offered by user 1 at the market for recycled water (market
2). Therefore, user 1 is at the supply side in market 2. User 2 is at the demand side
of both markets, because this user is able to purchase freshwater in market 1 or to
purchase recycled water in market 2. We assume the following benefit functions:
B1(w) = a1 · w − 0.5 · b1 · w2, with a1 = 50, b1 = 1 (3.126)
B2(w) = a2 · w − 0.5 · b2 · w2, with a2 = 100, b2 = 1 (3.127)
with w representing the respective consumption level of each user. User 1 consumes
the amount purchased at the freshwater market (w1), while user 2 consumes the
amount which results from the sum of the water purchased at the freshwater market
(w2) and the purchased water from the market for recycled water (w12).
Let us assume that the price in market 1 is fixed by a regulatory authority and set
equal to marginal costs of water treatment, i.e., p1 = c = 80. We further assume for
simplicity that the recycling quota is h = 1, i.e., all water used by user 1 is recycled
and offered at the market for recycled water (market 2).
User 1 maximizes net benefits according to Eq. (3.48) whereas user 2 maximizes
net benefits defined in Eq. (3.52).52
To derive the demand curves of both users and the supply curve for treated waste
water of user 1, respectively, we specify the KKT conditions.
51
max
w1,w2,w12
[B1(w1) + B2(w12 + w2) − c(w1 + w2)] (3.41)
52User 1 buys water in market 1 and, at the same time, offers treated water in market 2 by solving
the following optimization:
max
w1,w12
[B1(w1) + p2w12 − p1w1] s.t. h1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 (3.48)
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For user 1, we have
a1 − b1w1 − p1 + λh1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.128)
p2 − λ ≤ 0 ⊥ w12 ≥ 0 (3.129)
h1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (3.130)
Inserting the given parameter values means
50 − w1 − 80 + λ ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.131)
p2 − λ ≤ 0 ⊥ w12 ≥ 0 (3.132)
w1 − w12 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (3.133)
From Eq. (3.131), we can infer that user 1 will not demand water in market 1
(freshwater market) without reselling it in market 2. This comes from the fact
that λ = 30 + w1 > 0 for realizing 50 − w1 − 80 + λ = 0 (see Eq. (3.131)). Due
to Eq. (3.133), the parameter λ only becomes positive, if w12 = w1.53 So we assume
that values are positive. Below we will see that this assumption is correct.
The KKTs of the optimization program of user 2 (see Eq. (3.52)) are
a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.134)
a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w12 ≥ 0 (3.135)
Inserting the given parameter values:
100 − (w2 + w12) − 80 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.136)
100 − (w2 + w12) − p2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w12 ≥ 0 (3.137)
These two equations differ only in the two prices. If p1 = p2 = 80, both markets
are equally good for user 2, which means that user 2 is indifferent in purchasing
water from market 1 or market 2. For different prices, we have following result54:
{
w2 = 0 and w12 > 0 for: p2 < p1 = 80
w2 > 0 and w12 = 0 for: p2 > p1 = 80
User 2 has the option to buy water in both markets, hence the corresponding optimization program
is
max
w2,w12
[B2(w2 + w12) − p2w12 − p1w1] (3.52).
53However, simply set w12 = 0 which implies λ = 0 by Eq. (3.133). Inserting the numerical values
leads to a strict inequality in Eq. (3.131) so w1 = 0.
54 If p2 < p1 it follows that [a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p2] > [a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p1]. If we set
[a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p2] = 0, we know that [a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p1] < 0. Hence, based on
Eqs. (3.134) and (3.135), we are able to derive that w2 = 0 and w12 > 0, respectively.
For the contrary case of p2 > p1 it follows that [a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p2] <
[a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p1]. If we set [a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p1] = 0, we therefore know that
[a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p2] < 0. Based on Eqs. (3.134) and (3.135), we are able to derive that
w2 > 0 and w12 = 0, respectively.
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Thus, if p2 > p1 there is no demand in market 2 and, hence, the market does not
exist. This means that under this condition user 1 cannot sell its treated waste water
and therefore withdraws from both markets for the given numerical values. If p2 =
p1 = c = 80 we know from Eq. (3.132) that λ = p2, and hence λ = p1. Inserting
this relation in Eq. (3.131) leads to the follwing result:
a1 − b1w1 = 0 ⇒ w1 = a1/b1 = 50 (3.138)
From Eq. (3.133), we know that w12 = w1 = 50.
For user 2 it follows from Eq. (3.136)
a2 − b2(w12 + w2) = p1 ⇒ w12 + w2 = a2 − p1
b2
50 + w2 = 100 − 80
(3.139)
which leads to w2 = −30. This is a contradiction with the specification w2 ≥ 0 (see
Eq. (3.136)).
Thus, for an equilibrium in bothmarkets wemust have p1 > p2, whichmeans that
the price for recycled water is lower than the price for freshwater. In the following,
we would like to calculate the price p2.
From Eq. (3.132), we know that λ = p2. Inserting this relation in Eq. (3.131), we
can derive the supply curve of user 1 in the market for recycled water:
a1 − b1w1 − p1 + p2h1 = 0 → h1w1 = h1(a1 − c + p2h1)
b1
(3.140)
FromEqs. (3.136) and (3.137), we already know for the case p1 > p2 thatw2 = 0
and w12 > 0. This means that user 2 purchases only recycled water from market 2
since it is cheaper than buying freshwater in market 1. The demand for recycled
water (w12) can be derived from Eq. (3.137):
a2 − b2(w2 + w12) − p2 = 0 → w12 = a2 − p2
b2
(3.141)
Please note, that the quantity supplied is equal to the quantity demanded, hence
h1 · w1 = w12. Equating supply (Eq. (3.140)) and demand (Eq. (3.141)) will yield
the equilibrium market price:
p2 = b1a2 − h1b2a1 + h1b2c
b1 + h21b2
(3.142)
If we insert the numerical values we get p2 = 65. Recycled water with a price of
p2 = 65 is, therefore, cheaper than freshwater which can be purchased for a price
of p1 = 80. From the supply function in Eq. (3.140) of user 1, we can calculate the
supply w12 = h1w1 = 35.
It remains to show that the market solution is identical to the optimal alloca-
tion of program (3.41). Simply insert the market solution h1w1 = w12 = 35 into
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Fig. 3.21 Scheme of a river
basin with 2 users. Source
own illustration
(Eq. (3.42))—Eq. (3.45) for the assumed numerical values.55 However, the require-
ment is to install a sufficient number of markets. In our case there must be two
markets, one for freshwater and one for recycled water. Of course, there are some
institutional intricacies. Usually piped water is offered by monopolies due to the cost
advantages of a single supplier. The first welfare theorem is only valid if markets
are fully competitive. Hence, to refer to the first welfare theorem is only legitimate
if a regulation authority is able to control the price setting of water suppliers such
that these prices are similar to those that result from a competitive market. We come
back to this exercise in Chap.4.
Exercise 3.5 Water allocation in a river
Assume there are two users who divert water from one river. The situation is illus-
trated by Fig. 3.21.
The marginal benefit function of the upstream user 1 is
B ′1(w1) = a1 − b1 · w1, with: a1 = 100, b1 = 1.5
while the one of the downstream user 2 is:
B ′2(w2) = a2 − b2 · w2, with: a2 = 60, b2 = 1
The variables w1 and w2 represent the consumption levels of user 1 and 2, respec-
tively. We also assume headwater inflows of R1 = 50 and R2 = 50. The goal is to
55The social planner maximizes the following objective function:
max
w1,w2,w12
[B1(w1) + B2(w12 + w2) − c(w1 + w2)] (3.41)
subject to: h1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 (3.39)
The following KKTs result from the social planner problem:
B
′
1(w1) − c + λh1 = 0 (3.42)
B
′
2(w12 + w2) − c ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.43)
B
′
2(w12 + w2) − λ ≤ 0 ⊥ w12 ≥ 0 (3.44)
h1w1 − w12 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (3.45)
.
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calculate the optimal water allocation between the users where we maximize the
benefit of the entire basin. The maximization goal is implemented by the objective
function of the following optimization problem:
max{w1,w2}
B1(w1) + B2(w2) (3.143)
s.t . w1 ≤ R1 (λ1) (3.144)
w2 ≤ R1 + R2 − w1 (λ2) (3.145)
The constraints of the optimization problem restrict the amount ofwaterwhich can be
extracted. The extractable amount is limited by thewater availability at the respective
extraction points.
The following Lagrangian function can be set up on the basis of the optimization
problem:
L = B1(w1) + B2(w2) + λ1 · [R1 − w1]+ λ2 · [R1 + R2 − w1 − w2] (3.146)
And therefore we can formulate the following KKT conditions:
∂L
∂w1
= B ′1(w1) − λ1 − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.147)
∂L
∂w2
= B ′2(w2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.148)
∂L
∂λ1
= R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.149)
∂L
∂λ2
= R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.150)
We assume that both users consume water, i.e., w1 ≥ 0 and w2 ≥ 0, and hence
∂L
∂w1
= B ′1(w1) − λ1 − λ2 = 0
∂L
∂w2
= B ′2(w2) − λ2 = 0
Furthermore we also suppose that water is scarce, which means that the available
water amount will be consumed by both users completely, i.e., R1 + R2 = w1 +
w2. This means that Eq. (3.150) is binding and therefore we assume that λ2 ≥ 0.
Regarding user 1, we can distinguish between two cases:
• User 1 extracts all its available water, i.e., w1 = R1. Therefore, we would assume
that λ1 ≥ 0 for this case because of Eq. (3.149). Hence, following optimality
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conditions result from the KKT conditions for this case:
w1 = R1 (3.151)
w2 = R2 (3.152)
λ2 = B ′2(w2) (3.153)
λ1 = B ′1(w1) − B ′2(w2) (3.154)
• User 1 leaves some amount of water in the river, i.e., w1 ≤ R1. Therefore, we
would suppose that λ1 = 0 because of Eq. (3.149). Hence, following optimality
conditions result from the KKT conditions for this case:
B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2) (3.155)
R1 + R2 = w1 + w2 (3.156)
w1 ≤ R1 (3.157)
λ2 = B ′2(w2) (3.158)
Suppose we assume the second case (in which user 1 leaves water in the river), due
to Eqs. (3.155) and (3.156) we can set up the system of equations:
B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2) → 100 − 1.5 · w1 = 60 − w2
R1 + R2 = w1 + w2 → 100 = w1 + w2
The solution is: w1 = 56 and w2 = 44.
We already know fromEq. (3.157) thatw1 ≤ R1. Herewe found the contradiction,
because the amount extracted by user 1 exceeds its available water which is R1 = 50.
Therefore, we cannot find the optimal solution on the base of this case 2.
Hence, we would like to check the first case where the upstream user extracts all
available water. The extracted amount therefore is: w1 = 50 and w2 = 50, because
of Eqs. (3.151) and (3.152). Hence, the marginal benefits are: B ′1(w1) = 25 and
B ′2(w2) = 10.Therefore, it becomes obvious that themarginal benefit of the upstream
user exceeds the one of the downstream, which in this case is required for optimality.
The levels of the dual variables areλ1 = B ′1(w1) − B ′2(w2) = 15andλ2 = B ′2(w2) =
10 (seeEqs. (3.153) and (3.154)),whichmeans that the dual variables are nonnegative
which is also required. Therefore, we can not find a contradiction, and hence this
case leads to an optimal solution.
Assume that we have a situation in which the downstream headwater inflow
decreases to the level of R2 = 25, due to for instance climate change, etc. If we
suppose that the first case—in which the upstream user abstracts the total amount
of available water—leads to the optimal solution as before, we find from the former
explained optimality conditions (Eqs. (3.151) to (3.153)) that:w1 = 50,w2 = 25 and
λ2 = B ′2(w2) = 35. When applying Eq. (3.154), we calculate that λ1 = B ′1(w1) −
B ′2(w2) = −10. Therefore, λ1 is negative which contradicts the condition λ1 ≥ 0
and hence this first case does not lead to the optimal solution.
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If we assume the second case where user 1 leaves water in the river, we solve the
allocation amounts by applying Eqs. (3.155) and (3.156):
B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2) → 100 − 1.5 · w1 = 60 − w2
R1 + R2 = w1 + w2 → 75 = w1 + w2
which is:w1 = 46 andw2 = 29. Because of Eq. (3.158), we find that λ2 = B ′2(w2) =
31 which is nonnegative, hence the condition λ2 ≥ 0 holds. Furthermore, we also
have to check Eq. (3.157) which is fulfilled because: w1 = 46 ≤ 50 = R1. Hence,
there exists no contradiction in this case, which means that this case leads to the
optimal solution.
Exercise 3.6 Water transfers
Assume a situation with two regions, one with plentiful precipitation and non-arid
conditions, while the second region is characterized by arid conditions. For prevent-
ing overexploitation in the arid region, the divertable water amounts are limited by
wSUS2 = 3. The renewed volumes of water resources in the non-arid region are very
high, which means that the amount of divertable water wSUS1 also becomes quite
high. Hence there is no scarcity in region 1. The demand function is equal in both
regions and given by
pi (w
C
i ) = B ′i (wCi ) = ai − bi · wCi with: ai = 33, bi = 1 i = {1, 2}
(3.159)
The variable wCi represents the amount of water consumed in the respective region.
The water extraction causes costs in the non-arid region in accordance with the
linear function:
C1(w1) = F1 + c1 · w1 with: F1 = 1, c1 = 2 (3.160)
To reduce scarcity in the arid region 2, water managers want to implement a water
transfer scheme for exporting water from region 1 to region 2. The amount of trans-
ferred water is represented by the variable z. The transportation costs depend on the
transferred amounts and are given by γ · z, with γ = 0.5.
In contrast to Sect. 3.9, the marginal extraction cost function only occurs in the
water-rich region 1 and has a horizontal shape (C ′1(w1) = c1 = 2). The following
objective function has to be maximized to find the optimal water extraction amounts,
the optimal water consumed as well as the optimal water transfer:
max{w1,w2,z}
B1(w
C
1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − C1(w1) − γ · z (3.161)
The amount of water consumed in the regions depends on the water extraction in the
respective region as well as the transferred water amount:
wC1 = w1 − z (3.162)
wC2 = w2 + z (3.163)
3.11 Exercises 105
Hence, we are able to substitute the variables wC1 and w
C
2 and can finally solve the
following optimization problem:
max{w1,w2,z}
B1(w1 − z) + B2(w2 + z) − C1(w1) − γ · z (3.164)
s.t . w1 ≤ wSUS1 (3.165)
w2 ≤ wSUS2 (3.166)
The corresponding Lagrangian function to the optimization problem is
L = B1(w1 − z) + B2(w2 + z) − C1(w1) − γ · z + λ1 ·
(
wSUS1 − w1
)
+ λ2 ·
(
wSUS2 − w2
)
(3.167)
Now the KKT conditions can be set up:
∂L
∂w1
= B ′1(w1 − z) − C ′1(w1) − λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.168)
∂L
∂w2
= B ′2(w2 + z) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.169)
∂L
∂z
= −B ′1(w1 − z) + B ′2(w2 + z) − γ ≤ 0 ⊥ z ≥ 0 (3.170)
∂L
∂λ1
= wSUS1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.171)
∂L
∂λ2
= wSUS2 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.172)
We can assume that water is plentiful in region 1, hence w1 < wSUS1 and because of
Eq. (3.171) we know that λ1 = 0. However water is scarce in region 2 which means
that water is extracted until its maximum possible limit (w2 = wSUS2 = 3) and hence
it follows that λ2 ≥ 0 due to Eq. (3.172). Furthermore, we assume that a transfer is
may be realized (z ≥ 0).
Addressing these assumptions, we can adjust the KKT conditions to Eqs. (3.168),
(3.169), and (3.170):
B ′1(w1 − z) = C ′1(w1) → 33− (w1 − z) = 2 · w1 (3.173)
λ2 = B ′2(wSUS2 + z) → λ2 = 33− (3 + z) (3.174)
B ′1(w1 − z) + γ = B ′2(wSUS2 + z) → 33− (w1 − z) = 33− (3+ z) + 0.5
(3.175)
The values of the three variables w1, z, λ2 can be solved with the three above
Eqs. (3.173), (3.174) as well as (3.175). Therefore we find the following solution:
w1 = 58.5, w2 = 3, z = 27.5, λ1 = 0, λ2 = 2.5.
A contradiction cannot be found in the solution, hence these are the optimal values.
If we change the assumptions such that water is not abundant in the water rich
region anymore, the extractable amount is limited by its maximum, for instance
106 3 Integrated Water Resource Management: Principles and Applications
Fig. 3.22 Scheme of a lake
with 3 users. Source own
illustration
wSUS1 = 8 for fulfilling sustainability requirements in the region. It is quite obvious
that the former assumption is not suitable for solving the problem, because the optimal
water extraction in the water-rich region (w1 = 58.5) would exceed the maximum
amount of water extractable in this region (wSUS1 = 8) and hence there would be a
violation of constraint (3.165) (wSUS1 ≥ w1).
Therefore, we assume an extraction at each region equal to the maximum level,
which means that w1 = wSUS1 = 8 as well as w2 = wSUS2 = 3. Hence λ1 ≥ 0 and
λ2 ≥ 0, because of equations (3.171) and (3.172), respectively. Similar to the assump-
tion before, a transfer may be realized (z ≥ 0). Entering the assumptions in the KKT
conditions Eqs. (3.168), (3.169), and (3.170), we obtain the following adjusted con-
ditions:
λ1 = B ′1(wSUS1 − z) − C ′1(wSUS1 ) → λ1 = 33− (8− z) = 2 · 8 (3.176)
λ2 = B ′2(wSUS2 + z) → λ2 = 33− (3 + z) (3.177)
B ′1(wSUS1 − z) + γ = B ′2(wSUS2 + z) → 33 − (8 − z) = 33− (3+ z) + 0.5
(3.178)
The unknown values of the three variables z, λ1, and λ2 can be calculated with the
above Eqs. (3.176), (3.177) and (3.178).
w1 = 8, w2 = 3, z = 2.25, λ1 = 25.25, and λ2 = 27.75.
A contradiction cannot be found in the solution, hence these are the optimal values.
Exercise 3.7 Rivalry of consumption in a lake basin
Suppose a lake (see Fig. 3.22) which is the only raw water source for three users,
i.e., i = {1, 2, 3}. The total amount of extractable water is determined by the natural
recharge rate of the sea and is given by R = 8.
The users 1,2, and 3 generate benefit from abstracting water from the lake related
to the following function:
Bi (wi ) = ai · wi − 0.5 · bi · (wi )2, with: a1 = 6, a2 = 7 a3 = 8, b1 = 1, b2 = 1.5, b3 = 0.5
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We assume that after the consumption of water, there is a return flow back into the
river. The return flow factor hi indicates the proportion of consumed water which
flows back to the lake. The level of the return flow from user i , which is hi · wi ,
impacts the net abstraction of this user. The net abstraction of one user results from
the difference between its abstraction (wi ) and its return flow back to the water
body (hi · wi ), e.g., wi − hi · wi which is, therefore, (1− hi ) · wi . Hence, while the
abstraction of user 1,2, and 3 are represented by the variables w1, w2 and w3, the
net abstraction of user 1, 2, and 3 are (1− h1) · w1, (1− h2) · w2 and (1 − h3) · w3,
respectively. We want to calculate the optimal water allocation to all users under the
two cases that
• the return flow factors are h1 = h2 = h3 = 1 (full return flows)
• the return flow factors are h1 = h2 = h3 = 0 (no return flows)
Regardless of the level of the return flows, we can set up the following optimization
problem for finding the optimal water allocation strategy in the basin:
max{w1,w2,w3}
[B1(w1) + B2(w2) + B3(w3)]
s.t . w1 ≤ R − (1− h2) · w2 − (1 − h3) · w3 (λ1)
w2 ≤ R − (1− h1) · w1 − (1 − h3) · w3 (λ2)
w3 ≤ R − (1 − h1) · w1 − (1 − h2) · w2 (λ3)
Due to the objective, we want to maximize the total benefit in the entire basin. The
constraints limit the extractable amount of water for each user. The extractable water
of a specific user is determined by the natural recharge rate R and the sum of the
net abstraction of the other users. Based on the optimization problem, the following
Lagrangian function can be set up:
L =B1(w1) + B2(w2) + B3(w3)
+ λ1 · [R − (1 − h2) · w2 − (1− h3) · w3 − w1]
+ λ2 · [R − (1− h1) · w1 − (1 − h3) · w3 − w2]
+ λ3 · [R − (1 − h1) · w1 − (1 − h2) · w2 − w3]
And hence, the following KKT conditions can be formulated:
B ′1(w1) − λ1 − (1− h1) · (λ2 + λ3) ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (3.179)
B ′2(w2) − λ2 − (1 − h2) · (λ1 + λ3) ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (3.180)
B ′3(w3) − λ3 − (1− h3) · (λ1 + λ2) ≤ 0 ⊥ w3 ≥ 0 (3.181)
R − (1− h2) · w2 − (1− h3) · w3 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (3.182)
R − (1− h1) · w1 − (1 − h3) · w3 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (3.183)
R − (1− h1) · w1 − (1 − h2) · w2 − w3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ3 ≥ 0 (3.184)
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Full return flows
In case of full return flows, which means that h1 = h2 = h3 = 1, the net abstraction
of water from the lake is zero. Therefore, the consumption is non-rivalrous. The
access to the lake is also non-excludable, hence the water in the lake could be classi-
fied as a public good. By inserting h1 = h2 = h3 = 1 in Eqs. (3.179) to (3.184), we
can find the following expressions:
B ′1(w1) − λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 R − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0
B ′2(w2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 R − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0
B ′3(w3) − λ3 ≤ 0 ⊥ w3 ≥ 0 R − w3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ3 ≥ 0
which can be generalized to the following form:
B ′i (wi ) − λi ≤ 0 ⊥ wi ≥ 0 R − wi ≥ 0 ⊥ λi ≥ 0 ∀i
We know that we have to assume wi ≥ 0.56 Therefore it follows, that:
λi = B ′i (wi ) R − wi ≥ 0 ⊥ λi ≥ 0 ∀i
Based on this, we can distinguish between two cases:
• The consumption is equal to the availablewaterwhich is determined by the natural
recharge rate R. Ifwi = R it becomes obvious that we have to assume that λi ≥ 0.
Therefore, it follows that B ′i (wi ) ≥ 0, which means that the marginal benefit have
to be nonnegative.
• Under the assumption that the constraint R − wi ≥ 0 is nonbinding it follows
that we have to assume that λi = 0. This means that we have a consumption level
where the marginal benefit is zero, i.e., B ′i (wi ) = 0.
User 1 and 2 consume at the level where their respective marginal benefit levels
are zero, hence w1 = 6 and w2 = 143 ≈ 4.667. However, user 3 abstracts the total
amount of available water, hence w3 = R = 8. The marginal benefit of user 3 is
B ′3(w3) = 4.57
56Assume that wi = 0, then the constraint R − wi ≥ 0 is certainly not binding and hence it follows
that λi = 0. Furthermore, we know from the assumptionwi = 0, that B ′i (wi ) − λi ≤ 0whichmeans
B ′i (wi ) ≤ λi and hence B ′i (wi ) ≤ 0. Therefore,we know that themarginal benefitwould be negative.
However, the marginal benefit for a consumption level of zero is nothing else than the choke price
of the demand function of user i . The choke price is generally positive. In this example, the choke
prices of user 1, 2, and 3 are a1 = 6, a2 = 7, and a3 = 8, respectively. Therefore, we found a
contradiction for the assumption wi = 0 and hence the assumption wi ≥ 0 is correct.
57Under the assumption that w1 = R = 8, the marginal benefit B ′1(w1) = −2 would be negative
which is a contradiction with the condition B ′1(w1) ≥ 0.
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The situation in the lake with full return flows is illustrated by Fig. 3.23. The zero
of the marginal benefit functions of user 1 and 2 are left from the water availability
level R = 8,whichmeans that there are no intersection points between thesemarginal
benefit functions and the water availability R = 8. Therefore the amount of water
consumed by user 1 and 2 are determined by their respective zero ofmarginal benefit,
i.e., B ′1(w1) = 0 and B ′2(w2) = 0, and based on this we are able to get w∗1 and w∗2.
Only the marginal benefit function of user 3 intersects the water availability R = 8,
hence w∗3 = R. This intersection point determines the marginal benefit level of user
3 which is B ′3(w3) = 4.
No return flows
In case of no return flows, which means that h1 = h2 = h3 = 0, the net abstraction
is equal to the abstraction. Therefore, the abstracted water amounts cannot be used
by another user. Hence, the consumption is rivalrous. The access to the lake is still
non-excludable as in the other case with full return flows. Therefore, the water in the
lake can be classified as a common good.
By insertingh1 = h2 = h3 = 0 inEq. (3.182) to (3.184),we canfind the following
expressions:
R − w1 − w2 − w3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0
R − w1 − w2 − w3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0
R − w1 − w2 − w3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ3 ≥ 0
Under the assumption that w2 = R = 8, the marginal benefit B ′2(w2) = −5 would be negative
which is a contradiction with the condition B ′2(w2) ≥ 0.
Under the assumption that the consumption of user 3 is determined by the zero of the marginal
benefit, i.e., B ′3(w3) = 0, it follows that w3 = 16. This is a contradiction to the condition w3 ≤ R,
with R = 8.
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which can be generalized in the following way:
R −
∑
i
[wi ] ≥ 0 ⊥ λ j ≥ 0 ∀ j
The term
∑
i [wi ] is nothing else than w1 + w2 + w3 and stands for the total con-
sumption level in the basin. From this general formulation, the following aspects
become obvious:
• if we assume that λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 and λ3 ≥ 0, all available water is consumed.
• if we assume that λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0, not all of the available water is consumed
in total in the basin. Hence, water is not scarce.
By inserting h1 = h2 = h3 = 0 inEqs. (3.179) to (3.181),we are able to formulate
B ′1(w1) − λ1 − λ2 − λ3 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0
B ′2(w2) − λ1 − λ2 − λ3 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0
B ′3(w3) − λ1 − λ2 − λ3 ≤ 0 ⊥ w3 ≥ 0
which is in a more general formulation:
B ′i (wi ) −
∑
j
[
λ j
] ≤ 0 ⊥ wi ≥ 0 ∀i
The term
∑
j
[
λ j
]
represents the sum of all dual variables, i.e., λ1 + λ2 + λ3. Based
on this formulation, we can distinguish between two cases:
• If we assume that a riparian has no consumption, i.e., wi = 0, we know that
B ′i (wi ) ≤
∑
j
[
λ j
]
, which means that the choke price of the user i falls below the
sum of the dual variables.
• If we assume a consumption for user i , i.e., wi ≥ 0, we know that B ′i (wi ) =∑
j
[
λ j
]
, which means that the marginal benefit of the user i is equal to the sum
of the dual variables.
Under the assumption that water is scarce (R = ∑i [wi ]), there may exist two
kinds of users. Users for which consumption is assumed (wk ≥ 0) are denoted by
k, while users for which consumption is not assumed (wm = 0) are denoted by m.
Ergo, one may state the following:
(
λ j
) : R =
∑
i
[wi ] ∀ j (3.185)
(wk) :
∑
j
[
λ j
] = B ′k(wk) ∀k (3.186)
(wm) : B ′m(wm) ≤
∑
j
[
λ j
] ∀m (3.187)
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It becomes apparent that all consuming users should have an equal level of marginal
benefit (see Eq. (3.186)). However, based on Eq. (3.187), the choke price of those
consumers who do not consume must fall below the marginal benefit level of the
consuming users.
This solution could be enforced, for instance, by pricing water. If water is priced,
the users will consume in such quantities, that their marginal benefit becomes equal
to the price level. Due to Eq. (3.186), we find out that the marginal benefit level of
every consuming user should be the same, hence there should exist just one market
price in the entire market. By pricing water, one could potentially exclude users from
consuming. Hence, if a pricing policy is enforceable, water would not be a common
good anymore, but a private good. If the market price for water exceeds the choke
price of a specific user, this user would not consume any water from the resource.
This is exactly the condition which is explained by Eq. (3.187).
There are twoways for finding the concrete solution of this optimization problem:
• Solving the system of equations
• Set the market demand function and find an intersection with water supply
Regarding the first approach, we may assume that all users consume and that
water is scarce, hence: w1 ≥ 0, w2 ≥ 0, w3 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 and λ3 ≥ 0. Based
on this, we can define the following system of equations:
B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2) = B ′3(w3) → 6− w1 = 7− 1.5 · w2 = 8− 0.5 · w3
w1 + w2 + w3 = R → w1 + w2 + w3 = 8
The solution is: w1 = 1011 ≈ 0.909, w2 = 4233 ≈ 1.272 and w3 = 6411 ≈ 5.818
The marginal benefits of the three users are: B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2) = B ′3(w3) = 5611 ≈
5.091.
For the second approach we have to define the marginal benefit (or demand func-
tion) of the entire basin which has to meet Eqs. (3.185) to (3.187). Please note, that
the demand function is nothing else than the marginal benefit function, hence:
B ′1(w1) = p(w1) = 6− w1 B ′2(w2) = p(w2) = 7− 1.5 · w2
B ′3(w3) = p(w3) = 8− 0.5 · w3
For finding the market demand function, we have to set up the inverse forms:
w1(p) = 6− p w2(p) = 14
3
− 2
3
· p w3(p) = 16− 2 · p
and sum up these inverse forms:
wM (p) = max {0, w1(p)} + max {0, w2(p)} +max {0, w3(p)}
We use the term max {0, wi (p)} in order to address the condition of nonnegativity
for wi . If the price p exceeds the choke price, the term max {0, wi (p)} = 0, while if
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the price p falls below the choke price, we get max {0, wi (p)} = wi . Therefore, we
are able to set up following distinction of cases:
wM (p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for p ≥ 8
w3(p) for 7 ≤ p < 8
w2(p) + w3(p) for 6 ≤ p < 7
w1(p) + w2(p) + w3(p) for 0 ≤ p < 6
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for p ≥ 8
16 − 2 · p for 7 ≤ p < 8
62
3 − 83 · p for 6 ≤ p < 7
80
3 − 113 · p for 0 ≤ p < 6
When setting this function equal to the water availability wM (p) = R = 8, we get a
price of p = 5611 ≈ 5.091.58 By inserting this price in the individual demand functions
we get:
w1 = 1011 ≈ 0.909, w2 = 4233 = 1.272 and w3 = 6411 = 5.818.
This situation in the lake with no return flows is illustrated by Fig. 3.24. The
market demand function can be set up by the summation of the marginal benefit
functions of the users 1, 2, and 3 in the horizontal direction. The intersection of
this market demand function with the water availability R = 8 determines the price
for water, i.e., p∗ = 5.818. Based on this market price and the respective marginal
benefit functions of the users, the social-optimal usage of each users, symbolized by
w∗1, w∗2 and w∗3, can be found.
3.12 Further Reading
In Sect. 3.1, we have already listed some literature sources on the IWRM. In addition,
there are a number of other papers on IWRMwhich are worth reading from different
58By setting equal: 8 = 803 − 113 · p, we get the price p = 5611 . The calculated price is within the
allowed range 0 ≤ p < 6. Hence, this price is the optimal solution.
Regarding the other case: 8 = 623 − 83 · p, we get the price of p = 383 ≈ 5.818 which is outside
the allowed range 6 ≤ p < 7.
For the case 8 = 16 − 2 · p, we find a price of p = 4 which is outside the allowed range 7 ≤
p < 8.
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perspectives: Hoekstra (1998) provides a comprehensive overview of the social per-
spectives of water allocation that goes beyond economic approaches. Grafton et al.
(2019) view the integrated water resource management from a governance perspec-
tive; a reform process called the Water Governance Reform Framework (WGRF) is
proposed.
Justice aspects are not included in many economic textbooks. Especially in the
case of water, we do not believe that we can limit ourselves to questions of efficient
allocation. Water is more than a private good. But which justice criteria should be
taken into account in the allocation anddistribution of resources? Johansson-Stenman
and Konow (2010) give a structured overview of the interdisciplinary literature. In
this context, the work of the philosopher John Rawls (1971) is particularly important
with respect to the allocation of goods; this is where the principle of difference,
which is based on the concept of moral arbitrariness, is developed and founded.
Sandel (2009) dedicates a separate chapter to Rawls in his work on justice. This
book takes particular account of social-philosophical approaches that are relevant to
economics. In the center of the chapter on Rawls are the four theories of distribution
justice: feudal system, free market with formal equality (libertarianism), free market
with fair equality (meritocratic), and Rawls’s difference principle (egalitarianism).
But how can a fair distribution of goods be determined? This is about the psycho-
logical and socio-philosophical foundation of the utility function. Roemer (1996)
examines the question of how utility (happiness) can be measured and whether and
how they can be compared between people. It takes into account the subtle question
of what the consequences are for a just allocation of goods when certain resources
are inalienable (e.g., talents).
Alan Garcia was a controversial president of Peru, ideologically very close to
neoliberalism. The fable of the dog in the manger and its connection with the rural
population was considered as polemical, as Boelens and Vos (2012) have reported.
However, it is worth the exact analysis of his arguments. It turns out that the question
of distributional impacts of productivity-enhancing investments depends not only on
the ownership structure but also on other income options of the rural population.
Here, our model uses essential elements from Cohen and Weitzman (1975), who
have studied the effects of the enclosure process in England of small landholdings
within common land into larger farms with private entitlements.
The human right to water is rarely addressed in the economic literature on water
allocation. At the very most, the requirement of access to water as a restriction is
included in the usual allocation models. Our approach explicitly includes the hierar-
chization of needs into the IWRM model, i.e., to place basic nutrition and water in
their life-sustaining function before other consumer goods. The notion of hierarchies
of needs goes back to the beginnings of utility theory: Georgescu-Roegen (1954) has
written an idea-historical outline in which the concept of the irreducibility of wants is
introduced as the foundation of the hierarchy of needs. Seeley (1992) extends utility
theory to the Maslow triangle. Hoekstra (1998) provides a comprehensive overview
of the social perspectives of water allocation that goes beyond economic approaches.
A classic contribution to water allocation along rivers is Ambec and Sprumont
(2002). However, not only efficiency aspects are important, but also distribution
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rules that can be applied to cooperation gains. Ambec et al. (2013) analyze different
distribution rules and examine themwith regard to their robustness if thewater supply
unexpectedly decreases. This problem is particularly virulent in international water
treaties and is addressed in Chap.6.
Not only surface waters but also groundwater reservoirs are overused worldwide.
The consequences are manifold. Koundouri (2004) gives an overview of how an eco-
nomic approach can reconcile the use and hydrological constraints. She also deals
with the difference between the use of groundwater as a common pool resource and
as a co-operatively managed resource. In addition, not only are groundwater reser-
voirs being overused, but the interdependence of groundwater and surface waters
caused by the infiltration processes means that the flow of rivers reaches ecologi-
cally critical limits. De Graaf et al. (2019) examine these relationships and conclude
that the negative ecological effects of groundwater abstraction occur long before
the reservoirs are overexploited. Jakeman et al. (2016) make a similar diagnosis
and advocate an integrated management approach. This implies “thinking beyond
the aquifer”. Surface waters and aquifers should be considered in an overarching
approach (conjunctive use). Pulido-Velazquez et al. (2016) develop complex hydro-
economic models that derive a sustainable and economically optimized conjunctive
use of surface and groundwater storage.
Simply pumping water from one catchment area to another can certainly not be
considered a result of integrated water management. A variety of ecological and
social effects must be taken into account. Gupta and van der Zaag (2008) develop a
system of criteria against which transfer projects should be evaluated. The different
effects at the donor and at the recipient catchment areas have to be distinguished.With
the help of this evaluation scheme, they examine transfer projects in India. Tian et al.
(2019) develop a complex hydro-economic model that not only assesses the hydro-
logical, ecological and social impacts of water transfer projects, but also determines
optimalwater allocations. The approach takes into account randomfluctuations in the
water supply and derives measurements for the reliability and resilience of transfer
networks.
Water quality problems are only marginally addressed in this textbook, though
they are of paramount importance for integrated water resource management. Olm-
stead (2009) gives a very instructive overview of the economic dimension of water
quality regulation and analyzes various policy instruments. The literature contains a
large number of articles dealing with various aspects of water quality. Zhu and van
Ierland (2012) develop a hydro-economic optimization model, in which both quan-
tity and quality problems are considered, Shortle (2013) reports on the experiences
with quality trading and D’Arcy and Frost (2001) deal with the problems of diffuse
pollutant inputs.
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3.13.1 The Dublin Principles
Four important guiding principles were determined during the International Confer-
ence on Environment andWater in Dublin in the year 1992with over 500 participants
representing 100 countries and 80 international and nongovernmental organizations
(Xie 2006). These principles are:
• PrincipleNo. 1 (“Ecological”): Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource,
essential to sustain life, development, and the environment. Since water sus-
tains both life and livelihoods, effective management of water resources demands
a holistic approach, linking social and economic development with the protection
of natural ecosystems. Effective management links land and water use across the
whole of a catchment area or groundwater aquifer.
• PrincipleNo. 2 (“Institutional”):Waterdevelopmentandmanagement should
be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners, and policy-
makers at all levels.The participatory approach involves raising awareness of the
importance of water among policy-makers and the general public. It means that
decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with full public consultation
and involvement of users in the planning and implementation of water projects.
• PrincipleNo. 3 (“Gender”):Womenplay a central part in the provision,man-
agement, and safeguarding of water. This pivotal role of women as providers
and users of water and guardians of the living environment has seldom been
reflected in institutional arrangements for the development and management of
water resources. Acceptance and implementation of this principle require positive
policies to address women’s specific needs and to equip and empower women to
participate at all levels in water resources programs, including decision-making
and implementation, in ways defined by them.
• Principle No. 4 (“Economic”):Water has an economic value in all its compet-
ing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.Within this principle,
it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings to have access to
clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the eco-
nomic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of
the resource.Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achiev-
ing efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection
of water resources.
3.13.2 Integration in IWRM
It is important to bridge components of the natural systems, like availability and
quality of resources, as well as characteristics of human systems, which are funda-
mentally determined by resource use, waste production, and resource pollution. The
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main aspects regarding natural system integration and human system integration are
listed in detail below (GWP 2000):
• Natural system integration
– Integration of freshwater management and coastal zone management:
Requirements of coastal zones have to be considered in upstream freshwater
management
– Integration of land and water management: Land use influences the dis-
tribution and quality of water. Furthermore, water is a key determinant of the
character of ecosystems.
– Distinction between “green water” and “blue water”:Water that is directly
used for biomass production and “lost” in evaporation is termed “green water”,
while “blue water” is the flowing water in surface and subsurface water bodies.
– Integration of surfacewater andgroundwatermanagement:An infiltration
of water from groundwater bodies to surface water bodies and vice versa can
occur.
– Integration of quantity and quality in water resources management:
Aspects of generating, abating, and disposing of waste products have to be
addressed.
– Integration of upstream and downstream water-related interests: Con-
flicts, interests, and trade-offs between upstream and downstream stakeholders
using water resources have to be identified and balanced out
• Human system integration
– Mainstreaming of water resources: The analysis of human activities have to
involve the understanding of natural systems, its capacity, vulnerability, and
limits.
– Cross-sectoral integration in national policy development: Water policy
must be integrated with economic policy. The economic and social policy
needs to take into account water resource implications.
– Macroeconomic effects of water developments:Water resource projects can
have macroeconomic impacts (e.g., employment).
– Basic principles for integrated policy-making:Assess macroeconomic con-
ditions of effects before realizing investment; weight expected (external) costs
with (external) benefits of a policy; awareness of trade-offs in short-term and
long-term
– Influencing economic sector decisions: Decisions impact water demands,
availability, and quality.
– Integration of all stakeholders in the planning and decision process:
Involvement of the stakeholders in the management and planning of water
resources to deal with conflicting interests between stakeholders.
– Integrating water and wastewater management: Water is a reusable
resource, hence wastewater flows can be a useful additional resource.
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3.13.3 Implementation of IWRM
Based on the GWP, the three main pillars for implementing IWRM in practice are
an enabling environment, institutional roles, and management instruments (GWP
(2004)):
• The enabling environment
1. Policies—setting goals for water use, protection, and conservation.
2. Legislative framework—the rules to follow to achieve policies and goals.
3. Financing and incentive structures—allocating financial resources to meet
water needs.
• Institutional roles
4. Creating an organizational framework—forms and functions.
5. Institutional capacity building—developing human resources.
• Management instruments
6. Water resources assessment—understanding resources and needs.
7. Plans for IWRM—combining development options, resource use, and human
interaction.
8. Demand management—using water more efficiently.
9. Social change instruments—encouraging a water-oriented civil society.
10. Conflict resolution—managing disputes, ensuring sharing of water.
11. Regulatory instruments—allocation and water use limits.
12. Economic instruments—using value and prices for efficiency and equity.
13. Information management and exchange—improving knowledge for better
water management.
For transferring the IWRM paradigm into practice, the GWP (2004) recommends
an IWRM planning cycle which is illustrated by Fig. 3.25.
The IWRM planning cycle contains the following elements (see GWP 2004):
• Establishing Status and Overall Goals: The urgent water resource issues seen in
a national context. Chart the progress toward a management framework in which
issues can be addressed and agreed, such that overall goals can be achieved. Check
if international agreements with the neighbors present potentials or constraints to
developing a feasible management framework.
• Build Commitment to Reform: The political will is a prerequisite for a well-
functioning IWRM framework. Building or consolidating a multi-stakeholder
dialogue ranks high on the list of priority actions. The dialogue needs to be based
on knowledge about thematter of subject and creating awareness is one of the tools
to establish this knowledge and to enable participation of the broader population.
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Fig. 3.25 IWRM planning cycle. Source GWP (2000)
• Analyze GAP: Given the present policy and legislation, the institutional situa-
tion, the capabilities and the overall goals; gaps in the IWRM framework can be
analyzed in the light of management functions required by the urgent issues.
• Prepare Strategy and Action Plan:Map the road toward completion of the frame-
work for water resource management and development as well as related infras-
tructural measures. A portfolio of actions will be among the outputs, which will
be set in the perspective of other national and international planning processes.
• Build Commitments to Actions: Adaptation of the action plan at highest political
levels is key to any progress; full stakeholder acceptance is essential for implemen-
tation. The long-term financial commitment is a prerequisite for taking planned
actions to implementation.
• Implement Frameworks: Taking plans into reality, the enabling environment, the
institutional roles, andmanagement instruments have to be implemented.Changes
have to be made in the present structure; building of capacity and capability also
taking into account necessary infrastructure development.
• Monitor and Evaluate Progress: Progress monitoring and evaluation of the pro-
cess inputs; Choosing proper descriptive indicators is essential to the value of the
monitoring.
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4WaterTariffs
4.1 Historical Review of theWater Pricing Debate
In the face of the deterioration of water availability in different regions of the
world, the discussion on the introduction of economic policy instruments has become
increasingly important (Hanemann 2004). The issue of adequate water supply for
all was first addressed at the UN Water Conference in Mar del Plata (Argentina) in
1977. This convention resulted in the United Nations’ commitment to a human right
to drinking water in a quantity and quality appropriate to basic needs. The confer-
ence elaborated an action plan which clarified the link between water management
measures and their socio-economic impact. This includes, among other things, the
demand to reflect economic costs through the water price. Furthermore, economic
incentives for an efficient and balanced use of water via the water price were declared
to be useful. However, therewere no explicit recommendations for the use of concrete
instruments.
Anothermilestone inwater policywas the 1992 InternationalConference onWater
and Environment in Dublin, Ireland. The conference culminated in the formulation
of the four important Dublin principles, which set out the conditions for sustainable
water resources management. Principle 4 declares the economic value of water.
Since water that was used for one process might be unsuitable to be used for other
processes, a competition between different forms of use arises. Hence, water should
be considered as an economic good, implying some form of cost coverage for water
supply. The Dublin Conference was instrumental in a substantive and institutional
reorientation of global water policy.
The outcome of the Dublin Conference formed the basis of Chap.18 (“Water
Management”) of the Agenda 21, adopted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Representatives from 178 countries took
part in the conference to discuss key environmental and development policy issues of
the twenty-first century. The cost recovery principle was anchored in Agenda 21 as
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a component of sustainable water resources management. In addition to production
costs, external environmental costs must also be taken into account.1
The Agenda therefore calls for tariff systems that take the actual costs of water
as well as the consumer’s assumed ability to pay into account. The inclusion of
social concerns in the pricing of water is therefore explicitly required. While the
Dublin Conference’s outcome essentially considered water to be an economic good,
Agenda 21 also considered water as a social good. These different views form the
basis for the subsequent discourse on water pricing policy. However, it can be noted
that the content of both the Dublin Principles and Agenda 21 strongly influenced
the subsequent water policy (Dinar et al. 2015). The European Water Framework
Directive provides an example of this.
The European Water Framework Directive, which was adopted in 2000, provides
the legal basis for securing water resources and ensuring sustainable development
within the European Union. The directive was adopted as a reaction to an increasing
disparity between the available water supply andwater demand. The principle of cost
recovery referred to in Article 9 is an important part of the directive. It aims to cover
the production costs, as well as the environmental and resource costs associated with
the use of water resources. Furthermore, under this directive, pricing policy must be
designed in a way that incentivizes an efficient water usage.
In the General Assembly of the United Nations on August 3, 2010, the members
decided that the right to clean drinking water and sanitation should be a human
right (United Nations 2010). This human right is in accordance with the content of
Agenda 21 and the Dublin Principles, as it does not require free water and sanitation.
It rather assures affordable access to adequate water and sanitation to satisfy the basic
needs. The resulting challenge is to determine the extent to which poorer sections of
the population can be involved in cost recovery to ensure the affordability of water
supplies.
4.2 Criteria forWater Tariffs
Water pricing policy can pursue multiple objectives, which are revenue sufficiency,
economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and social concerns, including
affordability and fairness considerations. Further important aspects of water pricing
policy, which are not addressed in detail in this section, are the public and political
acceptance as well as the simplicity and transparency of the water pricing policy
(Boland and Whittington 2000a). In the following section, we give a brief overview
of the four main goals that are also described as the sustainability dimensions of
water pricing policy (Massarutto 2007b).
1Chapter 18.16 of Agenda 21 reads: “A prerequisite for the sustainable management of water as a
scarce vulnerable resource is the obligation to acknowledge in all planning and development its full
costs”.
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4.2.1 Revenue Sufficiency
This goal is of special importance for the water suppliers because it relates to the
claim that a tariff system should cover all the incurred costs. If costs are not fully
covered, incoming cash flows are not sufficient to guarantee an effective and efficient
operation and management of the water supply system. Furthermore, the absence of
full cost recovery could result in a lack of financial resources, which would be nec-
essary to make sufficient investments in the water supply infrastructure. This leads,
in consequence, to a worse water supply service and hence an increasing dissatisfac-
tion, which is accompanied by a decreasing willingness to pay by consumers. Hence,
this goal is important for guaranteeing the long-term reproduction of the physical
assets. Not only the pricing level, but also the stability is a matter of the tariff-setting
process.
The full supply costs that have to be covered are those associated with providing
water services to users. This contains the following types of cost (OECD 2010):
• Operation and maintenance costs, resulting from the day-to-day operations of the
water supply system, such as electricity for pumping but also labor and repair
costs.
• Capital costs, covering both, investments in existing infrastructure as well as
capital for new investments, and servicing debt.
However, further cost components, such as opportunity cost and economic exter-
nalities, should also be addressed. In detail, these components include
• Opportunity cost that reflects the scarcity value of the water resource. They refer
to the cost of not serving the next possible user.
• Economic externalities, which are benefits and costs associated with water man-
agement. It is possible to distinguish between positive external benefits (e.g.,
groundwater recharge benefits from irrigation or water reuse) and negative exter-
nal costs (e.g., upstreamdiversion ofwater or the release of pollutants downstream
within an irrigation or urban water system).
The cost components are illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The sum of the full supply cost,
opportunity cost, and economic externalities is termed the full economic cost of the
water supply service (OECD 2010). Furthermore, the operation and management
of the water supply system could negatively impact the aquatic and non-aquatic
environment, for instance, an increased water shortage in the ecosystem due to an
over-exploitation of water resources. Those occurring negative externalities to the
environment have to be addressed as another important cost component. The sum
of the full economic cost and the environmental externalities forms the full cost of
water supply service (OECD 2010).
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Fig. 4.1 General principles for the costs of water. Source Rogers et al. (1998)
4.2.2 Economic Efficiency
Water pricing policy should be conceived in a way that water is allocated to those
users that benefit the most from receiving water resources. Hence, this goal implies
themaximization of the aggregated economic rents of all water consumers. If water is
allocated to users with lowmarginal benefits of water consumption, while other users
with higher marginal benefits are not supplied, the principle of economic efficiency
is violated. Furthermore, the pricing policy should disincentivize the wasteful usage
of economic resources, because marginal benefits exceed the marginal cost of each
unit consumed water.
4.2.3 Environmental Sustainability
The water resource in the environment is essential for the aquatic and non-aquatic
nature and provides important ecosystem services (e.g., fishery) for the human soci-
ety. As water resource conservation plays a crucial role in achieving environmental
sustainability, the pricing policy should set incentives to protect the water in the
nature. For example, over-exploitation from surface or subsurface water stocks has
to be avoided.
4.2.4 Social Concerns
Acceptable levels of the water supply service should be accessible and affordable to
all consumers, becausewater can be seen as a good of public interest. The focus of this
goal ismainly the protection of vulnerable groupswith low incomes. The reallocation
of costs across different groups through the tariff structure is an important means to
achieve this objective (OECD 2009).
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Fig. 4.2 Relation between goals of water pricing policy. Source Massarutto (2007a)
This means that, regardless of the budget, everybody should have access to the
subsistence level.WorldHealthOrganization (2012) states the short-term subsistence
level with 20 liter per capita and day. To evaluate the affordability of water supply,
defining service indicators (e.g., the relation between expenditures for the water
supply service and the overall budget) and determining threshold levels for these
indicators are common procedures. Usually, the expenditures for the water service
should not exceed three to five percent of the household income (OECD2010;Walker
2009).
These four goals of water policy are related to one another in different ways.
On the one hand, some goals can be achieved in accordance with another goal. For
instance, an increase in the volumetric price may not only lead to higher revenues
for the water supplier, which supports the revenue sufficiency goal, but it might
also result in less exploited water resources due to a reduced water demand, which
facilitates achieving the environmental sustainability goal.
On the other hand, one has to consider the trade-offs between the four objectives.
Figure4.2 illustrates these trade-offs. One important trade-off exists, for instance,
between the goals of revenue sufficiency and social concerns. If water access has
to be guaranteed to all consumers at low prices or maybe even for free in order
to meet the affordability requirement, the revenues generated by the water supplier
may not be sufficient to cover the full supply cost. Similarly, achieving the goal of
economic efficiency counteracts revenue sufficiency. A pricing policy relying on the
marginal cost usually constitutes the first best pricing policy because it maximizes
economic efficiency. However, due to the crucial importance of fixed cost in water
supply, average cost is higher thanmarginal cost, which is themain reasonwhywater
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supply is considered a natural monopoly in most cases. If the price is equal to the
marginal cost but lower than the average cost, the break-even is not reached and the
water supplier faces revenue deficits. There exist a variety of examples for further
trade-offs between the four main goals of water pricing policy.
4.3 Water Tariff Design
4.3.1 Tariff Structures
4.3.1.1 Overview
Various forms of water tariff systems are conceivable and implemented in practice.
These tariffs generate revenues for the water suppliers and can consist of various
components. The most important components applied in practice are (OECD 2010)
• A one-time connection fee, to gain access to the service.
• A recurrent fixed charge (sometimes known as a standing charge or flat fee) that
can be uniform across customers or linked to the customer’s characteristic (e.g.,
size of supply pipe, meter flow capacity, property value, or number of water-using
appliances).
• If a metering system is in place, a volumetric rate, which, when multiplied by
the volume of water consumed in a charging period, gives rise to the volumetric
charge for that period.
• In some circumstances, a minimum charge is paid for each period, regardless of
consumption.
Based on the composition of these four tariff components, various tariff struc-
tures can be implemented, which yield different expenditure functions, R(w), for
each tariff structure. The expenditure function describes the payments, symbolized
by R, of a water-consuming household to the water supplier depending on the con-
sumption level of the household, w.2 Based on the expenditure function, the average
expenditure function, AR(w), and themarginal expenditure function,MR(w), can be
derived. The average expenditures are the average payments of a household per unit of
water consumed (usually measured in cubic meter), while the marginal expenditure
represents the payments of the household for the consumption of one additional unit
(cubic meter) of water. The average and marginal expenditure function can be cal-
culated by the following algebraic relations: AR(w) = R(w)w and MR(w) = ∂R(w)∂w .
The most common tariff structures and their expenditure, average expenditure, and
marginal expenditure functions are listed in the following.
2The expenditure incurred by the household is equivalent to the revenue obtained by the water
supplier; hence, the expenditures are denoted by R.
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4.3.1.2 Flat Rates
If there is no water meter available to measure the water consumption, a flat rate
is usually the only feasible tariff structure. The customers pay a rate regardless of
their consumption. This rate can be uniform, or differentiated with respect to the
customer’s characteristics, e.g., the rateable value of the property being served. The
expenditure, average expenditure, and marginal expenditure functions are
R(w) = L
AR(w) = L
w
MR(w) = 0
where L represents the flat rate (lump sum).
4.3.1.3 Single Volumetric Rates
Asingle volume rate per consumed amount (e.g. cubicmeter) ofwater is charged. The
level of the volume rate does not change with consumption as it is independent of the
consumption level. In addition to this single volumetric rate, a recurrent fixed charge
(base price) might exist, which represents a payment to the water supplier regardless
of the customer’s water consumption level. The expenditure, average expenditure,
and marginal expenditure functions are
R(w) = L + p · Q
AR(w) = p + L
w
MR(w) = p
where L represents the base price and p stands for the volume price. The flat rate is
a special form of this kind of tariff with p = 0.
4.3.1.4 Block Rates
Zone Block Rates
The volumetric charge is adjusted step-wise with increasing volumes of water con-
sumed. In the case of increasing block rates, the volume rate rises with successively
higher consumption blocks; for decreasing block rates, volume rates decline with
higher consumption blocks. In addition, a recurrent fixed charge (base price) may
exist in this formof tariff structure. Furthermore, it is possible to differentiate between
zone tariffs and relay tariffs, while the former is the most commonly applied form of
block rates. Under a zone tariff, the consumers pay the volume price of the respec-
tive block for each unit (e.g., cubic meter) of the quantity consumed. Under a relay
tariff, the volume price of the highest consumption block has to be paid for the whole
quantity consumed.
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Given a block rate with N blocks in total, every block is separated by threshold
values, denoted byq1, q2, ..., qi , ..., qN , withq1 < q2 < ... < qi < ... < qN . The i th
block is defined within the range
[
qi−1, qi
]
and the volume price in this block is pi .
The relation p1 < p2 < ... < pi < ... < pN is valid for increasing block rates, while
the contrary situation with p1 > p2 > ... > pi > ... > pN occurs for decreasing
block rates.
Based on the presented general case with an arbitrary number of blocks, a tariff
with three blocks is specified by the two threshold consumption levels q1 and q2.
The first block is defined for the interval [0, q1] and the relevant volume price in this
first block is p1, while the second block which is defined within the range of both
threshold levels [q1, q2] is characterized by the volume price p2. Finally, the third
block is relevant for a consumption which exceeds the second threshold level. The
volume price of this third block is p3. Based on this specified tariff with three blocks
and an observed consumption level of w, the following total, average, and marginal
expenditure functions could be set up for a zone block tariff:
R(Q) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
L + p1 · Q for w ≤ q1
L + p1 · q1 + p2 · (w − q1) for q1 < w ≤ q2
L + p1 · q1 + p2 · (q2 − q1) + p3 · (w − q2) for w > q2
AR(w) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 + Lw for w ≤ q1
p2 + (p1−p2)·q1+Lw for q1 < w ≤ q2
p3 + (p1·q1+(p2−p3)·q2+Lw for w > q2
MR(Q) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 for w ≤ q1
p2 for q1 < w ≤ q2
p3 for w > q2
Relay Block Rates
The variable L represents the base price whose level is independent of the consump-
tion level in this presented example. Regardless of the total observed consumption
level w, the consumption within the first, second, and third blocks is priced with p1,
p2, and p3, respectively, for a zone block tariff. However, in contrast to a zone block
rate, a relay block rate is characterized by the fact that the entire consumption is
priced with p1 or p2 or p3 if the entire consumption level is within the first, w ≤ q1,
or second, w = [q1, q2], or third block, w > q2, respectively. Therefore, the expen-
diture for a relay block rate differs from the expenditure for a zone block rate, if
the total consumption level exceeds the first block. The total, average, and marginal
expenditure functions of a relay block rate with three blocks have the following form:
R(w) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
L + p1 · w for w ≤ q1
L + p2 · w for q1 < w ≤ q2
L + p3 · w for w > q2
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AR(w) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 + Lw for w ≤ q1
p2 + Lw for q1 < w ≤ q2
p3 + Lw for w > q2
MR(w) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 for w ≤ q1
p2 for q1 < w ≤ q2
p3 for w > q2
4.3.1.5 Adjusted Block Rates
This tariff structure is quite similar to block rates, but, in contrast to conventional
block rates, adjusted block rates feature volumetric rates or block sizes that are
adjusted depending on the consumer’s characteristics (e.g., income or household
size).
4.3.2 Price Discrimination
The distinction of consumer prices with respect to the individual consumer’s char-
acteristics is termed as price discrimination. Different forms of price discrimination
can be distinguished (Varian and Repcheck 2010).
4.3.2.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination
Under first-degree price discrimination, prices for each unit of a good are set such that
the price charged for each unit is equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay for that
unit. Therefore, the consumer’s surplus will be skimmed off fully by the producer.
This approach is also known as perfect price discrimination. Due to information
asymmetries between the players in the market (e.g., the supplier does not know the
willingness to pay of each consumer), perfect price discrimination is generally not
applicable in practice.
4.3.2.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
For second-degree price discrimination, the price depends on the bought amounts.
Block rates are a common example of this form of price discrimination, as the price
schedule involves different prices for different amounts of water sold.
Optional tariffs are another example of second-degree price discrimination. Here,
consumers can choose from different tariff options offered (e.g., tariff options that
differ in their single volumetric rates and fixed charges). The consumer’s decision
on the choice of tariff depends on the consumer’s consumption level. The lower
the consumption level, the higher the preference for choosing a tariff with a higher
volume rate and lower base price.
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4.3.2.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Different consumers are charged with different prices based on their individual char-
acteristics. This is a form of price discrimination commonly practiced for a multitude
of products and services, e.g., discounts for students or social welfare recipients. The
adjusted block rate is an application of this form of price discrimination. The price
adjustment should usually be determined in the way that poor households or espe-
cially large households receive a financial relief.
A further example of third-degree price discrimination is social tariffs, under
which low-income households get a discount on the volumetric rate or fixed charge
they have to pay. Therefore, they get a financial relief on their water bill, relative to
other non-low-income households.
4.3.2.4 Spatial/Regional Price Discrimination
Spatial price discrimination occurs when prices depend on the location of the con-
sumer. Under this form of price discrimination, the water supplier can establish
various price zones within its water supply area. Regional price discrimination is
applicable if the pricing regime is based on the cost-by-cause principle. A consumer
that is further away from the waterworks may cause higher water distribution net-
work cost than a consumer closer to the water treatment facility. Similarly, water
delivery to consumers located on a hill or on top of a mountain is accompanied by
higher pumping costs than the supply of consumers living in a valley. Therefore,
consumers which are located further away from the waterworks or that are located
on a mountain have to pay a higher volume price.
4.3.2.5 Temporal/Seasonal Price Discrimination
The price for water differs depending on the time point (or season) of consumption.
Based on this approach, seasonal pricing schemes can be implemented. Temporal
price discrimination can be useful due to a multitude of reasons, for instance, the
costs for water supply in summer months can be higher than in the winter months,
because of lower groundwater tables in summer. Another reason can be higher water
requirements in summermonths than in the residual year, especially in regions with a
high share of agricultural water demand. Capital-intensive pumping equipment may
be just exhausted in the summer periods, where irrigation is intensified due to the
growth of the agricultural plants. Therefore, if the tariff system based on the cost-
by-cause principle is implemented, the volume prices in the summer month would
be higher than in the residual months of the year.
4.3.3 Two-Part Tariff Versus One-Part Tariff
Single two-part tariffs are characterized by a single volumetric rate, i.e., the price
per volume of water consumed, and a recurrent fixed rate, which is independent of
the consumption level usually paid monthly or yearly. The single one-part tariff is a
special form of a single two-part tariff, because just one tariff component is relevant
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in this kind of tariff. Either the one-part tariff is characterized by a single volumetric
rate without a recurrent fixed rate (volumetric tariff) or by a recurrent fixed rate
without a volumetric price (flat rate).
4.3.3.1 Two-Part Tariff
Assume that a representative consumer group has to be served with water by a
supplier. The situation in themarket should be cleared, whichmeans that the volumes
demanded by the consumers equal the water volumes offered by the supplier. The
water supply to the consumer group causes costs, C(w), where w stands for the
level of consumption and supply. The average costs can be expressed as AC(w) =
C(w)
w and the marginal costs are MC(w) = C ′(w). We want to design a tariff that
maximizes the total surplus. The total surplus is equal to the difference between
the generated benefit due to consumption, B(w), and the costs for supplying the
consumer group, C(w).
From household theory, we know that the consumers want to maximize their
surplus, which is equivalent to the difference between the benefits from consumption
B(w) and the expenditures for water delivery which is p · w − L . Hence, a consumer
solves the following optimization problem:
max{w} [B(w) − p · w − L]
From the consumer’s perspective, water consumption, denoted by w, is the sole
decision variable. By solving this optimization problem, we get p = B ′(w); hence,
we can express water consumption in terms of volumetric prices, i.e., w(p). The
inverse form of w(p) which is p(w) is nothing else than the demand function which
is determined by the marginal benefit p(w) = B ′(w).
If we furthermore assume that in a water supply system, total surplus should be
maximized andwater delivery is not restricted by any capacity or scarcity constraints,
it is also possible to derive that the price is equal to the marginal cost level, p =
C ′(w). This results from the fact that in a situation where total surplus is maximized,
the demand function which is determined by the marginal benefit function should,
according to household theory, be equal to the marginal cost.
The water supplier should be profitable and should generate enough revenue to
cover its costs (financial sustainability goal of pricing policy). However, if we restrict
the supplier (e.g., by regulation) in the way that the supplier cannot make any profits,
the revenues must be equal to the total costs, which meansC(w) = L + p · w. Based
on this assumption, it is possible to find the optimal recurrent fixed charge, L∗:
L∗ = C(w∗) − p · w∗ (4.1)
Based on the optimal fixed charge inEq. (4.1), the average lump sumper consumed
quantity, denoted by AL∗, can be calculated as the difference between the average
costs and the price, as illustrated by Eq. (4.2).
AL∗ = L
∗
w∗
= C(w
∗) − p · w∗
w∗
= AC(w∗) − p (4.2)
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Water supply is usually a natural monopoly due to a high proportion of fixed
costs to total costs. Hence, the average cost function is decreasing at the optimal
consumption level w∗, i.e., AC ′(w∗) < 0. In this case, the marginal costs are below
the average cost level in the optimum, such that C ′(w∗) < AC(w∗) holds.3 Further-
more, we know that p = C ′(w∗), and hence p < AC(w∗). Therefore, it follows that
the average lump sum is positive, i.e., AL∗ > 0, which also means that the fixed
charge must be positive, i.e., L∗ > 0.4
4.3.3.2 One-Part Tariff with SingleVolumetric Rate
If, instead of a single two-part tariff, a single one-part tariff with just a volumetric rate
is implemented, the costs can only be covered by revenues from the single volumetric
price. As the water supplier is assumed to be regulated, the supplier should not make
any profits; hence, revenues should be equal to cost, which yields the following
condition:
C(w) = p · w (4.3)
From Eq. (4.3) follows that the volumetric price should cover the average cost:
p = C(w)
w
= AC(w) (4.4)
In the case of a single one-part tariff with just a volumetric rate, the consumer
solves the following optimization problem:
max{w} [B(w) − p · w] (4.5)
The solution is p = B ′(w). Because of this optimality condition, the price determines
the quantity level of consumption. The marginal benefit function B ′(w) is nothing
else than the demand function. Therefore, similar to the two-part tariff, the quantity
level wV is determined by the price pV , hence, wV (pV ).
pV = AC(wV ) = B ′(wV ) (4.6)
The optimal price and quantity, pV and wV , result from the intersection point of the
average cost function and the demand function.
3We know that AC(w) = C(w)w . Because of AC ′(w) < 0, it is possible to write AC ′(w) =
∂
C(w)
w
∂w <
0. Solving
∂
C(w)
w
∂w < 0, we get the following result:
C ′(w)·w−C(w)
w2
< 0. This is C
′(w)
w − C(w)w2 < 0 and
hence C ′(w) < C(w)w , which is C
′(w) < AC(w).
4L∗ = AL∗︸︷︷︸
>0
· w∗︸︷︷︸
≥0
> 0.
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Fig. 4.3 Universal service
provider: The basic setup.
Source own illustration
4.3.3.3 Flat Rate
However, if a flat rate is implemented, only the recurrent base price, L , has to be
paid for any amount of water consumption, as the volumetric price is zero, p = 0.
For this case, the consumers solve the following optimization problem:
max{w} [B(w) − L] (4.7)
the result of which is B ′(w) = 0. Therefore, the consumption level wL is deter-
mined by the maximum demand. Similar to the pricing regimes analyzed previously,
revenues should cover the cost, while profits should not be generated. Hence, the
revenues arising from the flat rate have to be set equal to the costs, which implies
LL = C(wL) (4.8)
Based on the fixed rate, the average fixed rate per amount of water consumed is
equal to the average cost level:
ALL = C(w
L)
wL
= AC(wL) (4.9)
4.3.4 Universal Service Provider
4.3.4.1 Two Consumer Groups
The universal service provider is a service operator that offers infrastructure ser-
vices such as water supply at uniform and affordable conditions. These principles
are enforced by appropriate price regulation, either by the provider being a public
enterprise or by a private operator being regulated by a price regulator. The concept
of a universal service provider is the most common form in practice, because price
discrimination based on the cost-by-cause principle is often not enforceable, whether
due to political, social, economical, or fairness reasons.5
Figure4.3 illustrates an exemplary situation of two consumer groups which are
served with water through one water supply system. Due to delivery and consump-
tion of water, w1 and w2, both consumer groups obtain benefits, which are rep-
resented by B1(w1) and B2(w2). The service provision to the consumers causes
costs: On the one hand, there are cost components that are caused by both consumer
5See the survey in Cremer et al. (2001).
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groups, e.g., treatment costs in the waterworks, which are symbolized by the vari-
ableC12(w12(w1,w2)). The variablew12 represents the total amount of the consumed
water level, hence:
w12(w1,w2) = w1 + w2 (4.10)
On the other hand, there are also cost components that are incurred by only one
consumer group. The specific cost of consumer group 1, C1(w1), depends solely on
the amount of water consumed by group 1. Similarly, the specific cost of consumer
group 2, C2(w2), depends only on the amount of water consumed by group 2. These
specific costswhich are caused by just one consumer group are, for instance, pumping
costs in the water networks.6 The optimization problem for maximizing total surplus
in the water supply area is
max{w1,w2}
[B1(w1) + B2(w2) − C1(w1) − C2(w2) − C12(w12(w1,w2))] (4.11)
The KKT conditions resulting from the optimization problem are
B ′1(w1) − C ′1(w1) − C ′12(w12) · w′12(w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (4.12)
B ′2(w2) − C ′2(w2) − C ′12(w12) · w′12(w2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (4.13)
It seems plausible to assume that both consumer groups consume positive amounts
of water, i.e., w1 ≥ 0 and w2 ≥ 0. Under this assumption, the following optimality
conditions can be formulated:
B ′1(w1) = C ′1(w1) + C ′12(w12) (4.14)
B ′2(w2) = C ′2(w2) + C ′12(w12) (4.15)
According to Eqs. (4.14) and (4.15), marginal benefit should equal marginal cost
for each consumer group; hence, the optimal consumption level can be derived from
the intersection point between the demand function and the marginal cost function
for each addressed consumer group. Hence, for the optimal solution, the consumer
groups have to pay different volumetric water prices if the marginal cost levels differ.
A situation in which the marginal cost levels do not change with the output level
(horizontal directed marginal costs functions) is depicted in Fig. 4.4. The component
C ′12(w12) is represented by the parameter c, which is, for instance, the cost rate for
the treatment of 1 unit of water. However, the specific marginal (pumping) costs for
serving consumer group 1 and 2 differ:C ′1(w1) < C ′2(w2). Therefore, the volumetric
6We assume that the consumer group 2 has a higher geodetic level than consumer group 1. Hence,
the pumping cost for serving consumer group 2 with one amount of water are higher than for the
serving of consumer group 1.
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Fig. 4.4 Universal service provider with two consumer groups. Source own illustration
water price for consumer group 1 is lower than the one for consumer group 2,
p∗1 < p∗2 , which means that a price discrimination has to be applied between the two
exemplary consumer groups. This can be realized by, for instance, a regional price
discrimination where two price zones are defined. The optimal consumption levels
of both consumer groups in Fig. 4.4 are represented by the variables w∗1 and w∗2.
4.3.4.2 Uniform Pricing
Suppose the water supplier is a universal service provider who offers water at a
uniform price to all consumers, then the price pu is set, which lies between the
optimal price levels under price discrimination, i.e., p∗1 < pu < p∗2 , as illustrated in
Fig. 4.4. Compared to the case of price discrimination, setting a uniformprice induces
a decrease in the consumption level of group 1 fromw∗1 towu1, while consumer group
2 experiences an increase in its consumption level from w∗2 to wu2. Under a uniform
price, the changes in prices and consumption levels relative to the optimal solution
result in consumer group 1 losing some of its surplus, which is represented by the
areas b + c in Fig. 4.4, while consumer group 2 gains additional surplus, depicted
by the areas g + h.
With respect to the supply side, the supplier may gain or lose by supplying groups
1 and 2. The price increase for group 1 impacts the producer surplus positively,
whereas the consumption level decrease influences the producer surplus negatively.
The area b, which is part of the consumer surplus under an optimal pricing regime,
becomes producer surplus under a uniform pricing policy due to the price increase
in group 1. In total, there is a loss of social welfare in supplying price zone 1 under
a uniform price, which is symbolized by the area c.
A similar analysis can be done for consumer group 2. Due to the decreased price
and increased consumption in group 2, the supplier’s loss in surplus amounts to the
areas g + h + m. Therefore, there is a loss of social welfare induced by setting a
uniform price in group 2, represented by aream. We conclude that a uniform pricing
policy leads to economic losses in accordancewith the areas c + m in thewholewater
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Table 4.1 Distributional effects due to optimal and uniform pricing
Group 1 Group 2
Consumer surplus (CS) Optimum a + b + c f
Uniform a f + g + h
Δ CS −b − c +g + h
Producer surplus (PS) Optimum − −
Uniform +b −g − h − m
Δ PS +b −g − h − m
Change social welfare −c −m
supply area compared to an optimal pricing policy. A more detailed overview of the
distributional effects under the two addressed pricing regimes is given in Table4.1.
Equity in pricing policy is often seen as fairer than (regional) price discrimination
based on the cost-by-cause principle in a water supply area. However, the gain of
fairness is associated with a loss of economic efficiency which is represented by the
areas c + m. This is a matter of fairness preference, or of inequity aversion, which
means how much loss of efficiency a society wants to accept in order to achieve a
fair water allocation.
4.3.5 Optional Tariffs
4.3.5.1 The Concept
If the water supplier offers optional tariffs, consumers have the possibility to choose
between various pricing options. The effectiveness of optional tariffs is explained
with the help of an example: Fig. 4.5 depicts three pricing options whose expenditure
functions depend on the level of consumption. Each of these pricing options contains
a recurrent fixed charge and a single volumetric charge. The first pricing option, T1,
is characterized by a relatively low fixed charge and a relatively high volumetric
charge, while the third pricing option, T3, contains a relatively high fixed charge and
a relatively low volumetric charge. Pricing option T2 is characterized by a relatively
moderate fixed charge and volumetric charge. If Li and pi stand for the fixed and
volumetric charge of the i th pricing option, respectively, it is possible to characterize
the optional tariff by (L1 < L2 < L3) ∧ (p1 > p2 > p3).
The consumers have the option to choose between pricing options T1, T2, and
T3, whereas the decision of the consumer depends on the consumption level. If the
consumer consumes less than w˜1, which means w ≤ w˜1, the consumer minimizes
its expenses by choosing option T1. Similarly, consumers who have a moderate
consumption within the range w˜1 ≤ w ≤ w˜2 choose pricing option T2 to minimize
the expenditures. Consumers with a consumption above w˜2, i.e., w ≥ w˜2, minimize
their expenditures by choosing price option T3. It becomes obvious that a higher
consumption level is associated with a higher preference to choose a tariff with lower
volumetric rate. This is the analogous logic to a volume discount, where the price
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Fig. 4.5 Concept of optional
tariffs. Source own
illustration
per unit also decreases with an increase in units bought. This volume discount rule
for an optional tariff can be formalized by the statement ∀m ∀n : (wm < wn) =⇒
(pm ≥ pn).7
This simple example shows that with increasing consumption the consumers
choose pricing options with higher fixed fees. This is a typical characteristic of
well-defined optional tariffs, which can be explained by the previously mentioned
volume discount rule. Under the assumption that the volumetric price of the mth
pricing option is greater than or equal to the one of the nth option, i.e., pm ≥ pn , the
following undesirable situations are possible:
• Oneormore pricing options have an absolute disadvantage compared to another/to
other pricing option(s). Pricing options with an absolute disadvantage are never
chosen and are, therefore, useless as an optional tariff.
• At least two pricing options are identical. If at least two options are identical, the
consumer is indifferent between choosing the respective options. Hence, at least
one option is useless in the optional tariff.
If one of these situations occurs, the optional tariff is not well defined. If the volu-
metric price of themth pricing option is higher than the one of the nth pricing option,
such that pm > pn , which means that the preference for choosing the mth pricing
option instead of the nth pricing option will increase with a decreasing consumption
level, the fixed charge of the mth pricing option has to be lower than the one of the
nth pricing option in a well-defined optional tariff. This can be described in a formal
way by the following statement: ∀m ∀n : (pm > pn) ⇐⇒ (Lm < Ln).
7If wn > wm , then pn ≤ pm .
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Fig. 4.6 Example with optional tariffs. Source own illustration
4.3.5.2 Effects on Consumers and Producers
Under the implementation of an optional tariff both, the consumer and the producer
can gain social welfare. This hypothesis can be fostered with the help of a simple
example illustrated in Fig. 4.6:Given there are two consumer groups i = {1, 2}whose
demand functions are known. Consumer group 1 has a lower demand than consumer
group 2 at every price level. In the initial situation, only one tariff T 0 = [L0, p0] is
offered by the water supplier. L0 and p0 stand for the fixed and volumetric charges
in the initial tariff, respectively. Based on this volumetric price, the consumer groups
1 and 2 consume the amounts of w1(p0) and w2(p0), respectively. The generated
consumer surplus for consumer group 1 is represented by the area a, while the one
for group 2 is given by areas a + b. The expenditures from the base price reduce the
consumer surplus by L0 for each consumer group. Therefore, the consumer surpluses
for groups 1 and 2 are represented by a − L0 and a + b − L0, respectively. Thewater
supplier generates a profit equal to the area 2 · (c + g) + d + h from the volumetric
charge plus 2 · L0 from the fixed charge to cover its fixed costs.8
Now,we assume that the water supplier offers an optional tariff in which the initial
pricing scheme T 0 = [L0, p0] is supplemented by an alternative pricing option T ∗ =[
L∗, p∗
]
, where L∗ and p∗ symbolize the fixed charge and the volumetric charge of
pricing option T ∗, respectively. We assume that p0 > p∗, and hence L0 < L∗, such
that the optional tariffs are well defined. Every consumer has the choice between
the pricing options T 0 and T ∗. If consumer group i = {1, 2} chooses option T 0, this
8The profit generated from the volumetric price paid by groups 1 and 2 is symbolized by the areas
c + g and c + d + g + h, respectively.
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group consumes the amountwi (p0) and receives the consumer surplusCS0i , while if
it opts for option T ∗, it consumeswi (p∗), which leads to a consumer surplus ofCS∗i .
The consumer group i = {1, 2} chooses the option that maximizes the consumer
surplus. We assume that CS01 > CS
∗
1 and CS
0
2 < CS
∗
2 . Hence, consumer group 1
will choose option T 0, while consumer group 2 decides for option T ∗, which is
the option with the lower volumetric and higher base price (volume discount rule).9
In the design of option T ∗, the water supplier anticipates the reaction of group 2.
Due to the reduction of the volumetric price by switching from T 0 to T ∗, revenues
from this charge will be lost, maximally amounting to (p0 − p∗) · w2(p0), which is
symbolized by the areas c + d + e. These revenue losses can be fully compensated
by a higher fixed charge in option T ∗, hence, L∗ = L0 + (p0 − p∗) · w2(p0).
If the optional tariff is offered, the situation does not change for the consumer
group 1, because they are still priced under T 0 and obtain a consumer surplus rep-
resented by the area a − L0. However, group 2 will switch from tariff T 0 to T ∗ and
increase consumption fromw2(p0) tow2(p∗). Therefore, the surplus increases by the
areas c + d + e + f . Furthermore, due to the change of pricing, expenditures from
the base price increase from L0 to L∗. These additional expenditures are represented
by the areas c + d + e.10 Hence, the consumer surplus increases by the area f to the
level a + b + f − L0 because of the introduction of the optional tariff. Therefore,
consumer group2benefits from the introductionof the optional tariff,while consumer
group 1 is not affected. Offering the optional tariff is also advantageous for the water
supplier, as its profits increase by s to the level 2 · (c + g) + d + e + h + r + k + s
plus 2 · L0.
Based on the example described above, we can conclude that the introduction
of optional tariffs can lead to a situation where nobody is worsened and specific
actors have an advantage compared to the initial situation without an optional tariff.
Tables4.2 and 4.3 give a detailed overview of the distributional effects for consumers
and the water suppliers under both addressed pricing regimes, respectively.
4.3.6 Seasonal Pricing
In the case that a seasonal pricing scheme is implemented, the price for water changes
with the time period of supply. For instance, the price in the summer month could be
higher than in the winter month.Wewould like to term the period where the price has
the highest level as peak period/peak season (e.g., summer), while the residual period
is termed as off-peak period/off-peak season. If we implement this form of temporal
price discrimination, the different price levels between the peak and off-peak seasons
can be based on various reasons, for instance,
9Assume that CS01 < CS
∗
1 . Because of the volume discount rule, it is certain that CS
0
2 < CS
∗
2 .
10L∗ = L0 + (p0 − p∗) · w2(p0) and hence L∗ − L0 = (p0 − p∗) · w2(p0). If there is a switch
from pricing T 0 to T ∗, the fixed charge increased from L0 to L∗, which is nothing else than L∗ −
L0 = (p0 − p∗) · w2(p0). The additional revenues from the fixed charge are (p0 − p∗) · w2(p0)
which is equal to the areas c + d + e.
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Table 4.2 Effects of surplus on consumer side due to the introduction of an optional tariff
Group 1 Group 2
Initial tariff Surplus from fixed
charge
−L0 −L0
Surplus from
volumetric charge
a a + b
Consumer surplus a − L0 a + b − L0
2 · a + b − 2 · L0
Optional tariff Surplus from fixed
charge
−L0 −c − d − e − L0
Surplus from
volumetric charge
a a + b + c + d + e +
f
Consumer surplus a − L0 a + b + f − L0
2 · a + b + f − 2 · L0
Change consumer surplus / + f
+ f
Table 4.3 Effects of surplus for water supplier due to the introduction of an optional tariff
Group 1 Group 2
Initial tariff Surplus from fixed
charge
L0 L0
Surplus from
volumetric charge
c + g c + d + e + g + h +
r + k
Profit margin c + g + L0 c + d + e + g + h +
r + k + L0
2 · (c + g) + d + e + h + r + k + 2 · L0
Optional tariff Surplus from fixed
charge
L0 c + d + e + L0
Surplus from
volumetric charge
c + g g + h + r + k + s
Profit margin c + g + L0 c + d + e + g + h +
r + k + s + L0
2 · (c + g) + d + e + h + r + k + s + 2 · L0
Change profit margin / +s
+s
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• Less water is available in the summer (peak season) than in the residual months
(off-peak season). The different prices between these time intervals result from
the different scarcity price levels.
• It is more expensive to deliver water in the summer (peak season) than in the resid-
ual months (off-peak season). Therefore, the marginal cost function in the peak
season is higher than in the off-peak season. This results in a higher equilibrium
price in the peak season compared to the off-peak season.
• The demand for water in the summer (peak season) is higher than in the residual
months (off-peak season), because in summer people are more thirsty, more water
is required for plants watering, more water is needed for filling pools, etc. There-
fore, the demand function of the peak season is higher than the one of the off-peak
season. This results in a higher equilibrium price in the peak season compared to
the off-peak season.
• The provision of capacity for delivering water is related to costs. The higher the
capacity, the higher the capacity costs. These capacity costs have to be covered by
the revenues from the water price. It is thinkable that the capacity is just financed
in the peak season. However, it is also possible that capacity is financed during
the peak and off-peak seasons. A temporal price discrimination scheme which
is based on the financing of capacity costs for water delivery infrastructure is
presented in the following model.
4.3.6.1 Temporal Price Discrimination for Financing Capacity Costs
Suppose the two time seasons 1 and 2 where we have the water consumption w1 and
w2, respectively. In both seasons, benefits are generated from the water consumption
related to the functions B1(w1) and B2(w2). We already know from household theory
that the demand function is determined by the marginal benefit function. Hence, the
demand function of season 1 is p1(w1), while the demand function for season 2 is
p2(w2). The demand in season 2 is higher than in season 1 if
• for every consumption level w: p2 > p1, the price level in season 2 is higher than
in season 1;
• for every price level p: w2 > w1, the consumption amount in season 2 is higher
than in season 1.
Under this assumption, we term the season 2 as peak season and the season 1 as the
off-peak season.
The supply of water is related to costs. On the one hand, we suppose the cost
rate c for delivering water. Hence, the annual costs for water delivery are therefore
represented by the term c · (w1 + w2). Furthermore, there also exist costs for the
provision of capacity in the supply system. This capacity (e.g., pumping capacity) is
needed for the delivery of water to the consumers. The capacity cost rate r represents
the cost for the provision of one unit of capacity. The capacity level is represented
by the variable k. Hence, the total annual capacity costs are therefore r · k.
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In the optimization, we want to calculate the optimal consumption and capacity
levels in the way that we maximize the total surplus of 1 year, which includes the
peak and off-peak seasons. The total surplus results from the difference of benefits
and costs:
max{w1,w2,k}
[B1(w1) + B2(w2) − c · (w1 + w2) − r · k]
s.t . w1 ≤ k (λ1)
w2 ≤ k (λ2)
Of course, the water delivery in both seasons is restricted by the chosen capacity
level. Based on the optimization problem, the Lagrangian function can be set up:
L = B1(w1) + B2(w2) − c · (w1 + w2) − r · k + λ1 · [k − w1] + λ2 · [k − w2]
and finally the KKT conditions can be formulated:
B ′1(w1) − c − λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (4.16)
B ′2(w2) − c − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (4.17)
λ1 + λ2 − r ≤ 0 ⊥ k ≥ 0 (4.18)
k − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (4.19)
k − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (4.20)
We assume that we have a consumption in both seasons, hence w1 ≥ 0 and w2 ≥ 0.
Because of Eqs. (4.19) and (4.20), it follows that we have to assume that k ≥ 0.
Therefore, we know from Eqs. (4.16)–(4.18) that
B ′1(w1) = c + λ1
B ′2(w2) = c + λ2
λ1 + λ2 = r
Regarding the conditions Eqs. (4.19) and (4.20), we have four possible options for
assumption:
• λ1 = λ2 = 0: The capacity is exploited neither in the off-peak nor in the peak
season;
• λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 = 0: The capacity is exploited just in the off-peak season;
• λ1 = 0, λ2 ≥ 0: The capacity is exploited just in the peak season;
• λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0: The capacity is exploited in the off-peak and peak seasons.
The assumption λ1 = λ2 = 0 can never lead to optimality, because of Eq. (4.18).
We know that λ1 + λ2 = r is not met, because λ1 + λ2 = 0, while capacity cost rate
r is positive, i.e., r > 0.
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The assumption λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 = 0 can also never lead to optimality. This seems to
be quite plausible, because under this assumption the capacity is only exploited in
the off-peak season. This means that in the peak season the consumption is lower
than in the off-peak season, even though the demand in the peak season is higher
than in the off-peak season. Therefore, this assumption intuitively does not make
much sense. However, there is also a mathematical way for finding a contradiction
under this assumption. From conditions Eqs. (4.19) and (4.20), we know thatw1 = k
and w2 ≤ k, respectively. Hence, w2 ≤ w1. From Eq. (4.18), it becomes obvious that
λ1 = r . Based onEq. (4.17),wefind that B ′2(w2) = c, while fromEq. (4.16) it follows
that B ′1(w1) = c + λ1, which is nothing else than B ′1(k) = c + r . Let us define the
variable η which gives the difference between the consumption level in the peak
season and the capacity, hence η = k − w2. Therefore,we know that k = η + w2. For
sure, we are able to reformulate B ′1(k) into the expression B ′1(η + w2). Furthermore,
we also know that the benefit functions are concave, which means for the benefit
function of user 1: B ′′1 (w) < 0. Due to this concavity condition we know that B ′1(η +
w2) < B ′1(w2). The marginal benefit in the off-peak season exceeds the one in the
peak season, c + r = B ′1(k) > B ′2(w2) = c. Combining the latter two relations, we
can formulate that B ′1(w2) > B ′1(η + w2) > B ′2(w2), and hence B ′1(w2) > B ′2(w2),
which is a contradiction to a former assumption. We suppose that season 1 is the off-
peak season with lower demand, while season 2 is the peak demand with higher
demand. Because of this relation we know that for every consumption level w:
B ′1(w) < B ′2(w), the marginal benefit of the peak season 2 exceeds the one of the
off-peak season 1, and therefore B ′1(w2) < B ′2(w2).
Under the assumption λ1 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0, the capacity is just exploited in the
peak season. Therefore, the consumption level in the peak season is higher than in
the off-peak season which seems to be quite plausible. Based on Eqs. (4.16)–(4.20),
we are able to set up the following optimality conditions for this case:
w2 = k (4.21)
w1 ≤ k (4.22)
λ2 = r (4.23)
B ′1(w1) = c (4.24)
B ′2(w2) = c + r (4.25)
The situation is illustrated in Fig. 4.7. The left figure illustrates the situation where
the made assumption λ1 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 leads to optimality. The optimal price and
consumption levels in the off-peak season result from the intersection between the
marginal benefit in season 1 and the cost rate for water delivering c, while the optimal
price and consumption levels in the peak season (summer) result from the marginal
benefit in season 2 and the sum of the cost rate for water delivering and the capacity
cost rate c + r .
The price in the peak season, which is equal to the marginal benefit B ′2(w2), is
bigger than in the off-peak season which is B ′1(w1), because of the capacity cost rate
r , which is only relevant in the peak season. Hence, the revenues for covering the
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Fig. 4.7 Illustration of optimal seasonal pricing. Source own illustration
capacity costs are only earned in the peak season. The capacity cost rate does not
impact the consumption level in the off-peak season, but the consumption level in the
peak season. Of course, the higher the capacity cost rate, the lower the consumption
in the off-peak season. If the capacity cost rate would be sufficiently high, the con-
sumption in the peak season could fall below the consumption level in the off-peak
season.
This situation is pictured in the right figure of Fig. 4.7. If we would set the price
in the off-peak and peak season equal to c and c + r , respectively, it results in a
consumption level w f1 in the off-peak season which exceeds the consumption level
w f2 in the peak season. If the consumption level in the off-peak season exceeds the
one of the peak season, we do not meet the condition Eq. (4.19), and hence, the other
plausible case (λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0) would lead to optimality.
The assumption λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 states that the capacity is exploited in both
seasons, in the peak and the off-peak seasons. The consumption levels in both seasons
are equal to the capacity. Based on Eqs. (4.16)–(4.18), we know that
λ1 + λ2 = r
B ′1(w1) = c + λ1
B ′2(w2) = c + λ2
which can be combined by summation of B ′1(w1) and B ′2(w2) to the following expres-
sion:
B ′1(w1) + B ′2(w2) = 2 · c + r
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Therefore, we can formulate the following optimality conditions:
w1 = w2 = k (4.26)
B ′1(w1) + B ′2(w2) = 2 · c + r (4.27)
λ1 = B ′1(w1) − c (4.28)
λ2 = B ′2(w2) − c (4.29)
Here, we have the same consumption levels in both seasons. Because the demand in
the peak season is higher than in the off-peak season, the price in the peak season
is certainly higher than in the off-peak season. However, the revenues for financing
the capacity costs are earned in both seasons.
The right figure of Fig. 4.7 pictures the situation for which the assumption λ1 ≥ 0
and λ2 ≥ 0 leads to optimality. The function B ′1(w1) + B ′2(w2) results from the
summation of the seasonal marginal benefit functions in vertical direction. The inter-
section point of the B ′1(w1) + B ′2(w2)-curve with 2 · c + r determines the optimal
capacity k∗ as well as the optimal consumption levelsw∗1 andw∗2 of both seasons. The
seasonal prices result from the consumption levels found. The respective marginal
benefit functions are illustrated in Fig. 4.7 by p∗1 and p∗2 for the off-peak and peak
seasons, respectively.
4.4 Increasing Block Tariffs
4.4.1 The Concept
The increasing block tariff (IBT) is an important tariff form which is quite often
implemented especially in developing countries. This tariff form is characterized by
a volumetric charge that increases with rising consumption level. In some cases, even
the level of the fixed charge depends on the consumption level. The characterization
of IBTs can be formalized by
wj > wi → p j ≥ pi (4.30)
If the j th consumption level is higher than the i th consumption level, the volumetric
price of the j th consumption level must not fall below the one of the i th consumption
level.
The popularity of this tariff form is attributed to the combination of some alleged
advantages. Regions in developing countries are often characterized by a high pro-
portion of poor population class with low income and low water availability leading
to water shortage. Therefore, addressing social concerns and environmental pro-
tection goals is important. A well-designed increasing block tariff can enforce a
simultaneous achievement of both goals. The first water volumes per household can
be provided at a low price, whichmakeswater affordable even for the poorest. Hence,
the implementation of a well-defined increasing block tariff may promote the access
to the public water supply for even those, with the lowest income. A secured access
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to water may lead to increased prosperity and well-being as well as the promotion
of public health especially for the poorest people (Boland and Whittington 2000b).
Starting from a low volume price for the first consumed water amounts, the
increasing block tariff is characterized by a rising volume price with increasing
water consumption. A sufficiently high volume price for a certain defined consump-
tion level sets an incentive for avoiding wasteful use and fosters the implementation
of water-saving technologies. Households equate their marginal willingness to pay to
the price valid in the block in which consumption falls. With increasing tariffs, water
consumption can be pushed back. Hence, the tariff system meets two objectives at
the same time: It prevents water wastage, thus helping to conserve resources and
guarantees access to water for the poor.
Figure4.8 displays the case of a two-block tariff where the price increase from the
first to the second block leads to an implicit cross-subsidization of the poor by the
middle class. We assume first that there are only two households: a poor household
and a household with a middle class income. The upper part of the figure shows two
blocks. The width of the first block from 0 to ws is equal to the subsistence level of
an average household. The corresponding water price is p1, where p1 is lower than
the marginal costs of water supply (c). Water consumption beyond the lifeline falls
into the second block. This demand is charged either by p2u or p2o. The demand for
water in the second block follows the price-quantity function p2(w2) for w2 ≥ ws .
While the poor household cannot afford to consume more water than the subsistence
minimum, themiddle-income household has sufficient income to consumemore than
the lifeline depending on the price in the second block.
Furthermore, we assume that the price in the second block is p2u . The expense
for the non-poor household is p1ws + p2u · (w2 − ws); the expenses for the poor
households are simply p1 · ws . Obviously, the first block generates a deficit of 2(c −
p1)ws (2 x Area Θ) which must be covered by the contribution margin in the second
block p2u(w2 − ws) (areaCM2u ). The contributionmargin is depicted on the vertical
axis of the lower half of the picture as a function of the water consumption in the
second block. As the price of block 2 is increased, the contribution margin (profits
in the second block) rises until it reaches a maximum. If the price increases further,
profits in the second block decrease until demand in the second block is chocked off.
The lines are drawn such that p2o and p2u generate the same amount of contribution
margin. In addition, these two prices are chosen such that the deficit from the first
block, 2Θ , is exactly covered.
It remains to choose one of the two price options in block 2. The municipality
can choose either a flat increase of the price from block 1 to block 2 or decide
to implement a strong uplift which seems more egalitarian. Figure4.8 shows that
the strive for a more egalitarian outcome does not improve the situation of the poor
household. The increase in the price of the second block from p2u to p2o does not lead
to a decrease of p1. Hence, if we follow the Pareto principle, we would choose the
price in the second block such that the consumer rent of themiddle class household is
maximized subject to economic viability, i.e., that no deficit occurs. This is achieved
if the water utility chooses p2u . If a community adheres strictly to Egalitarianism,
then p2o is chosen at the expense of efficiency. In this case, water consumption is far
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Fig. 4.8 Increasing
two-block tariff. Source own
illustration
less than the efficient level which is where the marginal willingness to pay is equal
to marginal cost c. Water pricing then becomes a political issue and depends on how
a society deals with justice and coherence issues.11
4.4.2 Potential Adverse Effects on the Poor
If a poor household consumes less water than richer households—which is quite
plausible, becausewater is a normal good and incomeelasticity forwater is positive—
the wealthier households are burdened with more costs than the poor households.
This promotes equity and the reduction of incomedisparities between the households.
Therefore, to conclude, the wealthier households would cross-subsidize the poorer
households, which can be considered as fair. However, notice that both prices p2u
and p2o lead to the same amount of cross-subsidization. Increasing the price of the
second block does not necessarily contribute to more cross-subsidization and, hence,
11There is a branch of cultural theories that explains the way of water management and, hence, of
water allocation rules with the help of cultural configurations. In some cultural environments, the
efficiency criterion in the sense economists use it (equalization of the marginal willingness to pay
across all members of a society) plays only a minor role, see Hoekstra (1998).
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Fig. 4.9 The relation between block prices. Source own illustration
a lower price of the first block. Figure4.9 shows that an exaggerated tariff progression
can be detrimental to the poor.
In Fig. 4.9, it is assumed that the price-quantity function is linear
p2(w2) = a − b(w2 − ws) for w2 ≥ ws (4.31)
The contribution margin of the second block is therefore
CM2(w2) = (p2(w2) − c))(w2 − ws) = (a − b(w2 − ws − c))(w2 − ws) for w2 ≥ ws
(4.32)
Braking even requires the water utility to set
2(c − p1)ws = CM2(w2) (4.33)
The contribution margin can also be expressed as a function of p2. Simply solve
Eq. (4.31) for w2 − ws which yields
w2 − ws = a − p2
b
(4.34)
Inserting into Eq. (4.32) yields
CM2(p2) = (p2 − c)(a − p2
b
) for c ≤ p2 ≤ a (4.35)
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Finally, inserting this expression into the break-even condition and solving for p1
gives
p1 = c − (p2 − c)(
a−p2
b )
2ws
(4.36)
This function is drawn in the left half of Fig. 4.9. We can observe that for the cases
p2 = c and p2 = a the price in the first block is p1 = c. For the open interval
c < p2 < a we have p1 < c. We observe also that the function defined in Eq. (4.36)
is not monotonous. For all p2 > p2C , an increase of p2 leads to an increase of p1,
i.e., strengthening the ascent of block prices goes to the detriment of the low-income
customers. The reason for this is the elasticity of demand in the second block. A price
increase leads to such a large reduction of demand in block 2 that the contribution
margin is declining and, hence, the cross-subsidization goes back.
Instead of looking at the exact progression of the tariff, a policy dedicated to
secure water access for the poor should make sure that the price of the first block
is as low as possible. This can be achieved by maximizing the contribution margin
in the second block. The lower half of Fig. 4.8 suggests how to choose this price
optimally. It corresponds to the Cournot point pC2 leading to the maximum cross-
subsidy CMC2 .
12
Another potential pitfall of IBTs is that poorer households may have a larger
size; thus, despite a lower per capita consumption, they could have a higher overall
consumption level per household, compared to a wealthier household. In that case,
the desired cross-subsidy mechanism for the support of poor households would not
work anymore. Since households with larger size have a higher consumption, those
families would therefore cross-subsidize households with a lower consumption level.
The consequence is that poorer families have to carry a heavier burden than wealthier
households which leads to the promotion of inequality.
4.4.3 Further Considerations
There are also some further issues regarding the conception of a well-defined
increasing block tariff, see Boland and Whittington (2000b) and Meran and von
Hirschhausen (2014):
• Setting the initial block:Because of political and other pressure, it is difficult for
water companies to limit the initial block. A large initial block directly benefits not
just the poor, but also the middle class and maybe even upper income households.
If the majority of private connections to public water supply is held by middle
and upper income households, these households receive the vast majority of water
sold at subsidized prices. International standards for basic water needs are usually
12An exercise at the end of the chapter deals with the Cournot point and shows how the result
depends on the demand elasticity.
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in the range of 25–30 l per capita per day. It can be observed thatmost cities deliver
households more water than the basic water need at the lowest price. Of course,
also the household size is relevant for the desired sizing of the initial block. The
higher the household size, the higher the required initial block size for purchasing
the basic water needs at the lowest price.
• Simplicity and transparency: Increasing block tariffs are neither simple nor
transparent. The more sophisticated the tariff structure, the harder to deduce the
average or marginal price that is actually paid for a certain amount of water. The
confusion about the marginal or average water price may lead to a restriction
of the signal effect function of the price, whereby the consumers concerned no
longer behave completely rational in accordance with expectations. Sophisticated
tariffs may also create customer relation problems, making it more difficult for
representatives of a water agency to explain bills. A tariff with a single volumetric
rate, independent from the consumption level, is simple, transparent, robust, and
easy to implement. This leads to consistent and understandable price signals.
• Shared connections: Increasing block rates are only implementable if customers
have a metered water connection to measure the consumption quantities. In many
cities of developing countries, the water meters are just available for the upper
and middle-income households. However, the poor obtain water from vendors
or shared connections. If several households share a metered water connection,
water use by the consumers is quickly pushed to the higher priced blocks. The
consequence may be that poor households pay a higher average price than the
rich who have a private metered connection.
• Reselling: If poor households do not have a private metered water connection, so
that an increasing block rate is not applicable for them, they can buy their water
from households (neighbors) who have a metered connection. If a household sells
water to other households, their water consumption is quickly pushed into the
higher priced blocks. There is a similar situation like with shared connections:
the more the water sold, the higher the average price. If this case occurs, the
household which resells the water can capture the benefits from the first block
and charge the resold water with a price that will recover the highest per unit
charge plus some markup for inconvenience of water selling.
4.5 Pricing in UnconnectedWater Markets
4.5.1 Stylized Facts
Despite some progress, there aremany areas in the world, specifically in sub-Saharan
Africa and South and South-East Asia, where the access to safe water and to adequate
sanitation is not given. Not only in rural areas where water connections are very
expensive due to the low settlement density, but also in urban regions with a growing
population living in informal settlements, the rate of connected households is low.
People in those areas have to rely on other sources for their water supply, such as
public or private taps, and water vendors selling water door to door as well as own
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wells. Furthermore, theremay be other available sources like leakages in water pipes,
harvested rainwater, and collected surface water. Hence, many people are dependent
on water of unsafe origins. Due to the poor water quality, diseases can spread easily,
worsening the living conditions of those affected. People are well aware of these
risks but they simply do not have the money (or the time) to secure themselves
access to clean freshwater. This seems to support the comprehensive expansion of
a water distribution infrastructure. Since investments in water distribution are very
expensive, financing in the context of a poor population becomes a major issue.
There are additional reasons why the settlements of the poor are often not con-
nected to a pipe-based water distribution system:
1. The lack of water infrastructure is attributed to staff incompetence and a lack of
motivation due to a salary system without incentive schemes. Also, water utilities
may lack the required skills.
2. There is a lack of political interest in the poor. The water supply is geared to the
needs of the middle class and upper income families.
3. But even if there is a political will to improve the water supply for the poor, there
are obstacles to extend pipe-borne services to low-income urban areas. Often,
the ownership of land and property is not well defined. In addition, utilities have
problems to collect revenue from metered customers and they cannot prevent
people from illegally tapping water.
4. There are also economic motives that prevent the extension of pipe-borne water
supply. Thewater supply systemconsists ofmany actorswith divergent objectives.
A close-meshed water distribution system can be against their interest.
In the following, we will describe a water distribution system in more detail that
is based on a decentralized supply mode.13 Figure4.10 depicts the different actors.
• At the beginning of the production and distribution chain is the water utility.
Utilities provide clean water through a pipe system to households. However,
many empirical studies on the water conditions in urban and peri-urban areas in
developing countries show that the connection rate is not very high. Households
of the middle and high income (in urban areas) are connected to the water utility
and the waste water treatment plant. Since the coverage of utility networks is
often limited, low-income groups regularly have to rely on various other service
supply systems.
• Taps and standpipes are connected to the pipes of the water utility. They are also
called “water kiosks” and are often run by private or public managers. Either these
managers are employed by the water utility or the kiosks are privately run. In this
case, the owner/manager has to pay a license fee to the utility. The contract may
include a lump sum fee as well as a volumetric part. These payments can also be
13We confine our analysis to the water supply system. A similar analysis can be done for the
sanitation system.
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Fig. 4.10 Decentralized water sector in urban and peri-urban areas. Source own illustration
formal or, specifically if the prices are publicly regulated, informal, i.e., they are
clandestine side payments. The manager, in turn, sells water to water vendors and
to households in the vicinity of the tap as well.
• Reselling from connected households: This activity can often be observed and can
be explained by the price spread between pipe-borne water and the water price
in the informal market. We know from Sect. 4.4 that increasing block tariffs may
be tailored in favor of the middle class offering water to a low price, sometimes
even below costs. In addition, blocks are structured such that households can draw
more water than needed without exhausting the block. Thus, there is scope for
profitable water trading. Household water connections are therefore similar to
private water kiosks.
• Water vendors: A main source of water for poor households is the services of
water vendors. There exist mainly two types of vendors: wholesale vendors, often
serving by truck, and distributing vendors that in turn sell water door to door. The
technology of these street peddlers is rather simple. They carry water in plastic
jerricans that are hauled by handcarts or bicycles. Capital costs of this mobile
vending system seem to be lower than the piped water supply, at least for short
and medium distances.
• Private wells and boreholes: In many urban and rural areas, households receive
water from private wells. These wells can either be historic or recently built.
This means that households resort to groundwater, which has decreasing quality
standards due to population growth. Households are aware of this relationship.
However, due to the high water price they cannot rely on any other water sources.
4.5 Pricing in Unconnected Water Markets 155
Fig. 4.11 Linear city. Source own illustration
4.5.2 Model
4.5.2.1 The Linear City
To analyze the characteristics of various modes of water supply, we utilize an eco-
nomic model one can find in spatial economics: the linear city. It is assumed that
all water customers are arranged along a line, the linear city, (Fig. 4.11). The cus-
tomer density is constant along the line (identical distribution). One customer lives
at each location, and each customer consumes exactly one unit of water, say 1 m3 per
month. The willingness to pay V (s) = a − bs of each customer is decreasing along
the linear city from the left to the right side. This property stems from the assumption
that income of households decreases from left to right. On the left, the high-income
households live followed by the middle class and finally the less fortunate, which
settle on the right side. This model structure makes the analysis transparent and
allows to identify the economic drivers that determine water prices along the linear
city (Fig. 4.11).14
Thewater utility is located to the left. It conveyswater to the connected households
up to sˆ. At sˆ the pipe-borne distribution ends with a kiosk or water taps that can be
accessed by customers without pipe connection to fetch water, or by mobile water
vendors. Water collecting customers are located in the interval [sˆ, s˙]. Customers to
the right of s˙ do not fetch water at the water kiosk because collection costs are too
high. Instead, they buy water from vendors operating between s˙ and s˜. The length
of the city is s¯. If s˜ < s¯, some customers remain without access to safe water and
they have to rely on other sources like wells or water abstraction from surface water.
This scenario contradicts the sustainable development goals, and the human right to
water, and must be prevented.15
Let us proceedbydefining the costs of the various actors of the linear city.Roughly,
the water utility incurs two cost components. The water supply costs depend on the
total amount of water provided. We assume that the water provision and the water
distribution exhibit constant returns to scale, i.e., the cost function is linear.16 This
applies also to the distribution costs, i.e., the costs of connecting households. Thus,
14This subsection is based on Meran et al. (2020).
15The simple model does not include other sources, e.g., water wells, boreholes, or the collection
of surface water. Also, we do not consider reselling from connected households and illegal tapping.
However, despite the simplicity we can derive some insightful results.
16See the literature at the end of this chapter. Our results also hold if water utilities exhibit a cost
structure that cannot be approximated by a linear function.
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the cost function of the water utility is
CWU =
∫ s˜
0
mds +
∫ sˆ
0
kds = ms˜ + ksˆ (4.37)
wherem are water treatment costs and k represents distribution costs per cubicmeter.
Collecting water is rather cumbersome. Often it is the women who fetch water with
the help of canisters. The costs relate not only to the purchase price, but also to the
lost time, which is missing for other productive activities. These opportunity costs
are taken into account in the cost function. For a single household located at s ∈ [sˆ, s˙]
to fetch 1 m3 of water per month costs δs, where δ indicates the opportunity costs
per distance walked, taking into account that the distance s has to be taken twice (to
the kiosk and back). Aggregating over all households yields total fetching costs
DF = δ
∫ s˙−sˆ
0
sds = δ
2
(s˙ − sˆ)2 (4.38)
Vendors’ costs are twofold. There is the time vendors lose when filling cans at the
kiosk and decanting for each household served. If we weigh this amount of time
with the income per hour attainable in other occupations (opportunity costs), we
can derive the first cost component which is symbolized by c2. Besides the costs
unrelated to distance, there are hauling costs which depend on the distance. It takes
a certain time to haul 1 m3 over, say, 100 meter and to return to the tap for the next
delivery. Let us assume that there are two customers in distance si from the tap and
to the left of s˙, i.e., they do not fetch water from the tap. Total hauling costs for the
vendor are c1(s1 + s2), where c1 is lost income per distance unit. This calculation
also takes into account that the vendor must undertake two trips per customer.17
Then, total vending costs for two customers are Cven = 2c2 + c1(s1 + s2).
In the model, we have to transpose the calculation into the continuous stretch.
Cven = c1
∫ s˜−sˆ
s˙−sˆ
sds + c2
∫ s˜−sˆ
s˙−sˆ
ds = c1
2
[
(s˜ − sˆ)2 − (s˙ − sˆ)2] + c2(s˜ − s˙)
(4.39)
The first item on the r.h.s. represents the aggregated hauling costs of all customers
served in the interval [s˙, s˜]. This term is quadratic since the aggregation takes place
over distances that increase successively. The second item is the purchasing and
selling costs which only depend on filling and decanting time and not on distance.
Hence, this part is linear.
17We assume that the vendor has a limited tank capacity so that he has to cover the distance to the
kiosk for each customer supplied. Alternatively, it is possible that two vendors supply one customer
each.
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Fig. 4.12 Optimal modal split. Source own illustration
4.5.2.2 The Optimal Modal Split
The optimal modal split can be derived with the help of the integrated water resource
management approach. How far should the pipe-borne water supply be extended,
how many customers should ideally fetch water from the tap, and what distance
should water vendors cover? The answer to these questions is the optimal modal
split which can be derived from the following maximization program:
max
{s˜,s˙,sˆ}
[
∫ s˜
0
V (s)ds − CWU − DF − Cven], s.t. sˆ ≤ s˙ ≤ s˜ (4.40)
Assuming that all instrument variables are strictly positive and that all stretches are
nonempty (sˆ < s˙ < s˜), the Kuhn–Tucker conditions18 are
a − bs˜ − m − c1(s˜ − sˆ) − c2 = 0 (4.41)
c1(s˙ − sˆ) + c2 − δ(s˙ − sˆ) = 0 (4.42)
−k + c1
[
(s˜ − sˆ) − (s˙ − sˆ)] + δ(s˙ − sˆ) = 0 (4.43)
From these three equations, we can derive the optimal extension of the pipe-borne
water supply, the optimal range of water fetchers, and the optimal operating area of
vendors. This is called the optimal modal split of water supply consisting of {sˆ, s˙, s˜}.
Figure4.12 depicts the optimal cost structure.
18The Kuhn–Tucker conditions are explained in Appendix A.
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From 0 to sˆ, households are connected to the pipe-borne water supply. At sˆ, the
water utility has installed a water kiosk where adjacent customers can fetch water.
Fetching water in the range of the first yards is cheaper than having customers served
by a vendor. This is due to the cost structure of both water supply modes. The vendor
incurs two time-related costs, filling water into jerrycans or in canisters at the tap and
at the selling point, whereas the collecting customers lose only one filling time. Of
course, the household has distance-related costs δ per distance unit that are higher
than the hauling costs c1 per distance unit and m3 of the vendor. Therefore, at s˙ the
water supply mode switches to the vendor system. Hauling water from sˆ and selling
it within the stretch [s˜ − s˙] is less costly than having customers in this interval collect
the water at the position of the tap sˆ . This can be inferred from Eq. (4.42), where
bothmarginal costs are set equal. In turn, the optimal range of connected households,
i.e., the line [0, sˆ], is determined by equalizing the respective marginal costs. Setting
Eq. (4.43) into Eq. (4.42) yields c1(s˜ − sˆ) + c2 + m = k + m. The optimal modal
split between the vendor’s water supply range and the extension of pipe-borne water
supply is determined by equalizing the respective marginal costs.
Once we have determined the optimal modal split, we can graphically represent
the optimal cost structure. Areas K and M in Fig. 4.12 represent the distribution
costs for connected households and costs of treating and providing the water to
all households from [0, s˜], respectively. The triangle D represents total collecting
costs of households in the line section [s˙ − sˆ]. Vendors’ costs consist of time-related
purchasing and selling costs C2 and distance depending hauling costs C1.
The integrated water resource management usually applies a planning approach
where economic rents are maximized taking into account technical constraints, e.g.,
hydrological laws. However, one must be careful when implementing this concept
in practice. Two points are of particular importance.
• The pure maximization of the economic rent does not take into account the indis-
pensable human right to water access. The result of Eq. (4.40) may lead to s˜ < s¯.
If customers are excluded from the water supply system, we have to correct the
optimization procedure by introducing the constraint s˜ ≥ s¯. Then, we end up with
a different optimal modal split that covers all customers in the linear city.19
• The planning approach sets water quantities and the line length of the various
service modes in the linear city. In reality, however, consumers and also ven-
dors are not quantity regulated, but only indirectly incentivized through prices.
Therefore, it has to be clarified, which prices in the various sections of the route
should be fixed or indirectly induced. The price determination in turn depends on
whether the vendors are employees of the water company or whether they operate
independently in a market. In the following subsection, we deal with this issue in
more detail.
19An annotated exercise at the end of this chapter will lead the reader to the results (Problem 4.3).
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4.5.2.3 Pricing and Regulation
Stylized Facts
In a decentralized water market consisting of collecting customers and vendors,
it is very difficult to regulate all prices directly. Moreover, regulating prices may
have repercussions on the market price at which vendors sell the water. Thus, to
provide water to the customers of the linear city, the water utility has to follow a
cautious regulation policy. In the context of our simple model, the water utility has
the following instruments available: The extent of householdwater connections sˆ, the
price of water at the tap point sˆ (we assume that the utility can differentiate between
usual customers and water vendors), and the water price for connected households.
The water price in the area where vendors operate cannot directly be regulated.
The water utility can try to influence the market outcome by setting a proper water
tap price. For this, the regulator has to take into account the degree of competition in
this market. There are many examples of highly cartelized water markets in urban,
peri-urban, and rural areas. These cartels can be very effective in preventing market
entry. Often, they operate beyond legal limits. In addition, both the kiosk manager
and the water utility may be part of cartels. However, there are also examples where
thewatermarket around taps and in the vending area is competitive. Box 4.1 provides
some empirical evidence.
Box 4.1 Small-scale water providers: Pioneers or predators?
In a study entitled “Small Scale Water Providers: Pioneers or Predators?”,
Degol Hailu and colleagues (Hailu et al. 2011) empirically examine whether
small-scale providers are an effective substitute for a missing pipe-borne water
provision for the unconnected population, as proponents claim, or are simply
predators, as the skeptics argue. The empirical investigation was conducted
in Kenya, in a survey of nine communities within Nairobi city. The crite-
ria for their choice are related to their settlement characteristics, i.e., urban
or peri-urban locations, where a piped water supply is conceivable and their
demographic characteristics. The survey sample comprised 576 households
and about 159 small-scale water providers interviewed.
The supply side was structured as follows:
Types of small-scale water providers
Type of provision Sample size Share (%)
Pushcart vendors 17 11
Tanker truck 15 09
Borehole 28 18
Tap water vendor 62 39
Water kiosk 37 23
Total 159 100
Source Hailu et al. (2011)
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The above table shows that the fixed-point water suppliers (tap water
vendors and water kiosks) make up 62 percent of total water supply. The
mobile suppliers (pushcart vendors and tanker tracks) make up 20 percent of
providers, receiving the water from Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Com-
pany (NCWCS). Pushcart vendors supply water by manual and donkey-pulled
pushcarts and obtain water mostly from boreholes, water kiosks, or through
an illegal connection to the piped network. Tanker trucks supply water in bulk
to end users who possess storage tanks. Some of these households resell the
water. Tanker trucks obtainwater either from private boreholes or directly from
the utility company. The remaining water supply comes from borehole water
vendors. This water is often unsafe regarding quality. However, the advantage
of vendors for households is that they lead to time savings. The opportunity
costs of time are very high for households.
Small-scale water providers are not price takers who take the water price
for given. Rather, they set the water price directly taking into account the price
behavior of competitors. The study also showed that pricing followed a cost
markup approach.
Mean water price across small-scale water providers
Type of provision Mean price Poverty premium
Pushcart vendor 12.15 30.28
Tanker truck 7.90 18.75
Borehole 6.11 14.28
Tap water vendor 3.18 6.95
Water kiosk 2.81 6.03
Source Hailu et al. (2011)
The above table shows that push car vendors charge on average the highest
water prices. If you put this price in relation to the water price for connected
households, you obtain the poverty premium, calculated as (pi/pNCWCS) − 1
where the index i refers to the types of small-scalewater providers andNCWCS
is the Nairobi water utility. The official rate NCWCS is Kshs 0.40 per 20 l
(1 e≈ 120Kshs). The poverty premium of push car vendors is 30, which
means that low-income households are paying 30 times as much as connected
households are being charged.
Competitive Versus Cartel Solution
We start with the assumption that the water market for vendors is fully competitive.
They offer water in the segment [s˙, s˜]. At each location along this segment, vendors
have the same costs to supply one m3 of water.20 Take two points in close vicinity, s1
and s2, where s1 < s2 (see Fig. 4.13, left half of the picture.). Costs per m3 of water
20Recall the assumption that at each point along the linear city customers want to buy one m3 of
water.
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Fig. 4.13 Competition versus cartel. Source own illustration
sold are
pv + c2 + c1s1 < pv + c2 + c1s2 (4.44)
where pv is the price for the vendor at the tap. If a seller at s2 wants to sell the water
for a price higher than these costs, lets say p2, either another seller occurs at the
same point undercutting this prices21 or she offers the water at point s1 where the
first seller does not operate. But if the price at s1 is such that p1 + δ(s2 − s1) < p2
the first seller would lose the demand at s2 because customers at s2 will move to s1
to buy the water from the vendor there. Due to the mobility of customers, all selling
points are in competition. It does not matter whether we have many or only two
vendors in each segment. The price competition drives all prices down until
p(s) = pv + c2 + c1s (4.45)
Hence, the price is depending on distance and follows the costs defined in Eq. (4.45).
Notice that the highest price is reached at p(s˜) = pv + c2 + c1s˜. Here, a customers
willingness to pay is equal to the price, i.e., V (s˜) = p(s˜). Beyond s˜, there is water
supply by vendors because price would be higher than the willingness to pay.
That the water prices correspond to costs per m3 follows from the assumed open-
ness of the water market which allows newcomers to enter the market. Openness is
not only due to the absence of legal constraints but also a matter of the very nature of
costs. If entry and exit are costless, markets are contestable. This is the case when no
costs are sunk for firms leaving the market, and no investment into specific capital
is necessary for entering the market.22 This is not always the case in unconnected
21Competition in prices is called Bertrand competition.
22The concept of contestability was introduced and elaborated by Baumol (1982).
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water markets served by vendors. Vendor’s investment exhibits a certain degree of
specificity (jerry cans, hand trolley with a tank mounted on it, etc.).
However, if a sunk cost structure is more or less absent, the number of firms
operating in the market is not of importance. Low prices are simply the result of
the competition of potential newcomers. If an incumbent charges higher prices than
marginal costs (see Eq. (4.45)), newcomers immediately invade the market at s driv-
ing down the vending price until the equilibrium is reached. Since incumbent vendors
anticipate the potential threat by newcomers, they keep their prices equal or close
to marginal costs. Thus, even if there are only few vendors serving customers, the
pressure of potential competition drives the price down to marginal costs.
The water prices customers and vendors have to pay at the kiosk are still left to
be fixed. After the implementation of the optimal water supply infrastructure, i.e.,
setting the optimal sˆ, the policy-maker has to assure that the division of collecting
and vending zones follows the optimal pattern. In other words, she has to determine
the optimal s˙. This must be achieved indirectly by fixing the water price at the kiosk.
Unconnected households decide either to buywater fromwater taps or to purchase
it from water vendors. The marginal customer is indifferent between both options,
i.e.,
pcol + δ(s˙ − sˆ) = p(s˙) = pv + c2 + c1(s˙ − sˆ) (4.46)
where pcol (pv) is the water price charged to the collecting customer (vendor). From
Eq. (4.42), optimality of s˙ requires that pcol = pv, i.e., a price discrimination policy
between water collectors and vendors would be non-optimal. Finally, we can deter-
mine the level of the tap water price. From Eq. (4.41), it follows that the marginal
willingness to pay must be equal to the marginal costs c1s˜ + c2 + m. The water
price vendors charge at s˜ is p(s˜) = c1(s˜ − sˆ) + c2 + pv. Hence, the optimal tap
water price is pcol = pv = m.
Finally, we have to examine the economic viability of the price system. Total costs
of the water utility including transport and distribution costs should be covered by
the revenue raised. Cost coverage is defined as
pch sˆ − ksˆ − ms˜ + pv(s˜ − sˆ) (4.47)
where pch is the water price for connected households, which can be rewritten as
pch sˆ − ksˆ − msˆ − m(s˜ − sˆ) + pv(s˜ − sˆ) = pchsˆ − ksˆ − msˆ (4.48)
since pv = m. Setting pch = k + m leads to cost coverage of the water utility. Notice
that pch > pv, i.e., water for connected households ismore expensive than for collec-
tors at the tap. This might lead to trade between the kiosk manager and the adjacent
connected households.
So far we have assumed that the market for water vending is competitive. There
is a growing literature from scientists, development workers, and journalists about
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the role of small-scale private water providers in non-competitive markets.23 Propo-
nents of the mobile and decentralized supply of water see vendors as pioneers and
entrepreneurs that supply water to those, who otherwise would never have access to
a reliable water source, even though they charge prices, well above costs. However,
skeptics see the vendors solely as predators, who exploit the poor by charging high
prices for water of poor quality.
Regulatory Options
Anyway, it is to be expected that water provision via a decentralized infrastructure of
kiosks and mobile vendors will keep on persisting in the future. This leaves us with
the following question: How can one force cartelized vendors to supply the poor at
an affordable price? There are two approaches to reduce the negative economic and
social effects of water supply cartels. The decision on which of the two should be
adopted depends on the authority’s compliance-monitoring capacity.
The first approach simply consists of introducing a zonal price cap for water
vendors. The price24 p¯(s) per, say, liter is optimally set, such that
p¯(s) = pv + c2 + c1(s − sˆ), for s ≥ s˙ > sˆ (4.49)
If the vendors’ cartel complies with the regulated price, the optimal modal split is
replicated and customers are not exploited. Of course, this type of regulation is only
enforceable if the authorities are capable to monitor the price of vendors. How can
it be determined whether the supplier does not charge a too high price if customers
complain? One way could be to issue water coupons that people can buy for p¯(s)
at an issuing office of the water authority.25 They can buy as many as they want.
Vendors have to accept these coupons in exchange for water. The collected coupons
can be redeemed at the same public authority office for the same price. Of course, this
mechanism only works if the cartel is not able to force further receipts in addition
to the coupons. This would be the case if the cartel could charge an effectively
higher price than the coupon price for the water. If the public institutions are not able
to prevent the abuse of this system, price regulation is undermined and the water
customers pay a water price that an unregulated monopolist would demand.
Thus, to guarantee access to water for an affordable price, the regulation approach
should rely much more on economic incentives instead of direct price regulation,
which cannot be enforced if the necessary institutional capacity does not exist. The
economic incentives must be set such that the desired regulatory effect on water
prices is self-enforcing. Low prices for poor customers must be in the interest of
cartelized vendors. This is a second more promising approach.
To develop an incentive scheme, we first have to ask what prices prevail in a
cartelized vendor market. Cartelized vendors behave like a monopoly. They fix the
23See Hailu et al. (2011) and the further readings at the end of this chapter.
24As the linear city model is continuous with respect to the distance s, zonal pricing is expressed
by a continuous price function.
25The coupon can also be bought from authorized shops located along the stretch of the linear city.
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prices along the segment beginning from s˙ to the end of their area of operation. We
have assumed in our simple model that each household along the linear supply line
demands 1m3 of water. The maximum price they are willing to pay is
pmax (s) = pcol + δ(s − sˆ), for s ≥ s˙ > sˆ (4.50)
This case is depicted in the right section of Fig. 4.13. The profit depends on the supply
distance:
∫ sc−sˆ
s˙−sˆ
[pcol + δs − pv − c2 − c1s]ds (4.51)
where sc is the stretch the cartel is willing to supply. This distance can be derived
from the maximizing behavior of the cartel. The cartel maximizes Eq. (4.51) with
respect to {s˙, sc} subject to the constraint
V (sc) = a − bsc ≥ pcol + δ(sc − sˆ) (4.52)
The charged price cannot be higher than the willingness to pay. The KKT conditions
are
−δ(s˙ − sˆ) + c2 + c1(s˙ − sˆ) ≤ 0 ⊥ s˙ ≥ 0 (4.53)
δ(sc − sˆ) − c2 − c1(sc − sˆ) − λ(b + δ) ≤ 0 ⊥ sc ≥ 0 (4.54)
where λ is the Lagrangian to the constraint.26
The picture in the right half of Fig. 4.13 shows the solutions to Eqs. (4.53) and
(4.54). s˙ is chosen such that it equates the costs of water fetching to the costs of
supplying customers by vending. The distance of supply sc is chosen such that the
marginal willingness to pay is equal to the price pmax (sc) charged by the cartel (See
point Ac). In sum, the cartel will earn profits indicated as gray triangle in Fig. 4.13.
Thewater utility can try to reduce the cartel’s prices pmax (s) by reducing the price
pcol , forwhich it sellswater at the kiosk to households.However, thiswould lead to an
inefficient cost structure. Decreasing thewater price for collecting households (and at
the same time leaving the purchasing price for vendors constant) leads to a reduction
of consumer surplus exploitation, but at the same time results in an inefficient supply
structure because the collecting segment is too large while the vending area is too
narrow. Of course, it is an effective policy with regard to customer protection, but as
we have argued an inefficient solution.
An alternative indirect mechanism is to subsidize customers in the vending area
such that the effective marginal willingness to pay increases. This subsidy depends
on the location of customers, i.e., it is a zonal subsidy27:
tLM (s) = (δ − c1)(s − sˆ) − c2, for s ≥ s˙ > sˆ (4.55)
26Notice that λ > 0, otherwise Eqs. (4.53) and (4.54) are identical leading to sc = s˙. But this would
imply that the monopolized vendor (cartel of vendors) does not sell water.
27This subsidy system is based on a regulatory mechanism proposed by Loeb and Magat (1979) to
regulate monopolies.
4.5 Pricing in Unconnected Water Markets 165
Hence, the effective marginal willingness to pay is V (s) + tLM (s) (see the orange
line in Fig. 4.13). This line rotates around the point R until it intersects with pv +
δ(s − sˆ) at At . This subsidy driven increase in the willingness to pay expands the
vending segment to s˜, i.e., brings the vending area back to its efficient extent.
What changes in comparison to the water market without subsidies? First, the
modal split is efficient, i.e., water is supplied up to s˜, and, second, consumers are
protected by the subsidy introduced, i.e., they effectively pay a water price under full
competition. This can be seen by the following calculation utilized by Eqs. (4.50)
and (4.55):
pmax (s) − tLM (s) = pcol + δ(s − sˆ) − (δ − c1)(s − sˆ) + c2 = pcol + c1)(s − sˆ) + c2 (4.56)
where pcol = pv = m. This elegant mechanism comes at a price. The solution is
rather expensive and, from a political standpoint, provocative. Customers must be
subsidized and, at the same time, the cartel reaps a monopoly rent. Further, the issue
of financing the subsidy remains.
4.6 Water Scarcity: Prices Versus Rationing
4.6.1 Options to Deal with Scarcity
The importance of water demand management increases in times of water scarcity.
There are now many examples of how demand-side management can be designed.
For example, California has developed numerous conservation strategies to reduce
water demand, inter alia by utilizing pricing schemes, subsidies for water-efficient
equipment, educational measures, water rationing, andwater trading. Similarly, Aus-
tralia has taken measures to cope with severe drought by developing a mix of water
instruments to reduce effective demand for water. For instance, the Cairnes regional
council has launched a campaign to use water wisely (information on water-saving
behavior for households) in addition to mandatory restrictions (regulated sprinkling
times).28 In this section, we analyze the characteristics of water demand manage-
ment based on prices vis a vis a non-price approach. The results of this comparison
depend strongly on the evaluation criteria applied. In principle, the allocation of
scarce water should comply with various criteria. The literature mentions efficiency,
justice, technical feasibility, political enforceability, and environmental sustainabil-
ity. The importance of each criterion depends on the situation under consideration.
If, for example, water scarcity leads to a pronounced plight of the population, the
criterion of just allocation of water is of greater importance than allocative efficiency,
i.e., an allocation according to the marginal willingness to pay.
28http://www.cairns.qld.gov.au/water-waste-roads/water/save-water.
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4.6.2 Rationing
We know from war periods that the distribution of basic goods is often done through
food stamps that cannot be transferred. This applies also to other emergency situa-
tions, e.g., water scarcity, where personal rationing is often viewed as a just alloca-
tion procedure. There are also other forms of rationing: In many poor urban areas in
developing countries, water supply to households is rationed by interruption. Often,
households receive water only for about 1–2 h per day. This can be understood as
a non-price demand management approach sometimes deliberately chosen by local
authorities to meet fairness criteria; sometimes, it is the result of aging network pipes
and weak institutional management structures. In the following, we will introduce
various water rationing methods in practice and compare them with a price-based
water demand management approach.
Rationing can take up various forms29:
• Rationing by fixed allotment: The scarce resource is distributed in fixed quantities
to individuals or households depending on the household size. These allotments
can vary seasonally depending on the scarcity situation. Also, the portions allotted
can vary with respect to membership to specific economic sectors, e.g., indus-
try, commerce, or the public area (school, etc.). It is important to differentiate
the allotments with regard to their transferability. There exist various designs:
allotments without transferability, allotments with transferability under regulated
prices, and allotments completely tradeable in a free market. We will analyze
these specifications below.
• Proportional allotments: Water use rights are allotted in proportion to water usage
prior to the rationing. Thismethod is easy to implement because it does not require
lots of information on the characteristics of the user. Thewater utility simply needs
a record of the historic water use profile to determine the allotment. Despite the
relatively small amount of information required, this method suffers from some
implementation problems. First, it is very difficult to allot water use rights to
newcomers without a historic record; second, the reliance on historic water use
may discourage water conservation. If water users know that the historic water
use is utilized to build the distribution key for water use rights, users they will
behave strategically by deliberately wasting water.
• Water rationing by increasing block tariffs: We have already analyzed increasing
block tariffs. Block prices are only valid within the boundaries of a block. If a
household wants to consume more water than allowed for the given block price,
it exceeds the upper boundary and pays the higher prices of the following block.
In this sense, increasing block tariffs also exhibit a rationing property.
• A more differentiated version of this approach is water budgets as applied in the
USA. Each household gets a monthly water budget assigned, which is based on
several characteristics, including the number of residents in the home, or the usage
29We follow Lund and Reed (1995) and also Olmstead and Stavins (2009b).
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Fig. 4.14 Pricing versus
rationing. Source own
illustration
type, e.g., indoor water use, garden sprinkling, etc. The effective price depends on
the percentage utilization of the allocated water budget. If the household exceeds
its water budget, the respective price increases.
• Water can also be rationed with respect to the type of water use, e.g., car washing,
garden watering or luxurious applications like a fountain, etc. In times of severe
drought, the municipality simply forbids certain types of water use which are in
the higher part of the need hierarchy.
• Rationing by outage: Thismethod is often applied in developing countries because
it needs no institutional body that gathers and calculates the necessary informa-
tion from the customers. Either water is provided only few hours a day or the
water pressure is reduced. There is almost no differentiation among households
except, perhaps, by rotating the outage geographically among districts allowing
differentiated service times.
4.6.3 Comparison
In many cases, water scarcity can be managed by a deliberate pricing policy. If
water gets scarce, simply increase the water price and the water allocation will take
place in an efficient manner. Or one simply introduces a market where water can be
traded without any regulation. Conversely, water rationing leads to welfare losses
because the water is not allocated according to the marginal willingness to pay of
customers.30 But, as mentioned above, efficiency is only one of many criteria that
have to be taken into account to find an allocation which is capable of approval by
residents. Figure4.14 shows the constellation for two users.
30There are empirical studies estimating the exact amount of welfare losses. See, e.g., Grafton and
Ward (2008).
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Let us begin with the assumption that there are no water treatment costs. The
sustainable water availability is given by W¯ which is the width of the diagram.
From left to right, the water allocation of user 1 can be read up and for user 2
from right to left. If water is allocated within an unregulated market allocation, the
result is {w∗1,w∗2}. The respective equilibrium price is p∗. We know from Chap.3
that {w∗1,w∗2} is optimal in the sense that this allocation maximizes the aggregated
benefits of both users. Note that the positive water price mirrors solely the scarcity
of water, whereas water treatment and distribution costs are not yet considered.
However, this allocation could be regarded as unjust. In a situation of scarcity, the
willingness to accept inequality is reduced. As an alternative, rationing could be
implemented. In this figure, we assume that both users get the same amount of
water, i.e., rationing by fixed allotment. If these allotments are not transferable, the
final allocation is {w¯1, w¯2}. From a traditional welfare theoretical point of view, this
allotment is connected to welfare losses (gray triangle).
Some rationing schemes are combined with tradability either under regulated
prices or with completely free pricing. The figure depicts two cases of price reg-
ulation. If water rations are transferable and the regulated price is p¯I , we can see
immediately that no trade will occur. The price is too low for user 2 to sell some
of his water allotments to user 1. If the regulated price is p¯I I , restricted trade takes
place leading to the allocation {wI I1 ,wI I2 }. Only if the price is completely free, we
reach the optimal allocation {w∗1,w∗2}. The key difference between the pure market
solution and the rationing scheme with transferability is
1. that the scarcity rent accrues to the customers. This is also the case if water treat-
ment costs are taken into account. Let the horizontal line p¯I represent marginal
treatment costs and charge customers with a uniform tariff in the amount of
marginal costs and distribute water coupons31 according to the water allotment.
Customers pay the tariff and get credits (debits) depending on whether they use
less (more) water than their allotments. The coupon price emerges on the trading
floor for scarce water. In Fig. 4.14, the scarcity rent, i.e., the trading price for water
coupons, is equal to p∗ − p¯I . Since coupons have been distributed, the scarcity
rents remain with the user, for user 1 (p∗ − p¯I )w∗1 and for user 2 (p∗ − p¯I )w∗2;
2. that efficiency and equity are no longer in a tight trade-off relationship. If water
rights are equitably distributed, trading leads to higher total welfare without harm-
ing the principle of fairness,32 at least at the first glance. The final judgment
depends on how fairness is defined. Do we refer to the distribution of resources,
in our case water, or dowe refer to the result of the allotment in terms of utility that
accrues to customers? In the following, we take a closer look at this distinction.
31This proposal was made by Collinge (1994). Of course, these coupons need not be physically
distributed to customers. They can be handled electronically on the individual account of customers.
32See the discussion about the various fairness criteria in Chap. 3.
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Fig. 4.15 Equality: welfare
or resources. Source own
illustration
4.6.4 Discussion
In the philosophical and in the economic literature, one can find a discussion of what
is the right “equalisandum” of just distribution.33 Do we want fairness through the
equal distribution of resources, or does fairness refer to welfare equality? The issue
can best be described with the help of Fig. 4.15.
Consider two farmers producing crop that needs water. From left to right, the
marginal profit function of farmer 1 is depicted (B ′1(w)) and, vice versa, from right
to left marginal profits of the second farmer (B ′2(w)). Obviously, farmer 1 is more
productive than farmer 2. With the same amount of water, farmer 1 makes more
profit than farmer 2. Since water is scarce, the question of how water should be
allocated arises. If one follows the usual welfaristic approach, the allocation of point
E is optimal maximizing aggregated profits leading to B1(w∗1) > B2(w∗2). But if
only fairness considerations matter, aggregate profits are irrelevant as a criterion of
fairness. If one adheres to the principle of equality of resource distribution, each
farmer gets half of it. But what if the equality of profits (welfare) counts? Then,
the water allocation must be asymmetric in favor of farmer 2 who is less productive
compared to farmer 1. The line named “Equal welfare” exactly depicts the resource
allocation where both profits are equal. But why should profits be equal? Because it
is just that both individuals bear the burden of water scarcity equally. Therefore, trade
of water after allotment of water rights is often not allowed, because it can dilute
fairness, even if we would observe a Pareto improvement in the case of allotment
trade. This is the reason why water allotment is sometimes not transferable.34
But why does the lower productivity of farmer 2 entitle him to receivemorewater?
Much depends on the causes of the lower productivity. If farmer 2 is poor without
33Roemer (1996) provides a thorough analysis.
34In Exercise 4.5, the reader finds an analysis of the question if the efficiency criterion is always in
conflict with the principle of fairness.
170 4 Water Tariffs
access to the capital market to finance a modern technology and farmer 1 has the
opportunity to invest in water-saving production methods, then the uneven allocation
of water might be justified. But what if farmer 2 is simply lazy or ignorant? In this
case, the water allocation according to equal profits is not fair. Thus, it depends
much on the water user’s responsibility. If farmer 2 is not accountable for his low
productivity, the fair water allocation might follow the principle of equalization of
profits (or utility). If society believes in individual responsibilities, then the fair
distribution will relate more to the resource side.
Box 4.2 The water-wise rules
Manymunicipalities inAustralia have implemented so-calledwater-wise rules.
These ruleswhich are in fact regulations are aimed to savewater in the everyday
life of households. For instance, SidneyWater prescribes that households must
use hoses fitted with a trigger nozzle, sprinklers, and irrigation systems when
irrigating the garden. The irrigation time is restricted from 4 pm until 10 am.
Breaching this rule can lead to a fine of 220 $ for households. This regulation is
a typical non-price approach and can be considered as a soft form of rationing.
It prescribes a technological standard. Its very aim is to savewater by increasing
the efficiencyofwater use. Trigger nozzles slowdown thewater current through
the hose. Per time unit less water gets distributed into the garden. As a result,
there is nowastedwater in the form of ponds evaporating into the air or runoffs.
The water from the hose gets to the roots of the plants, with less unproductive
water loss.
However, one has to be careful when implementing this kind of water-
saving technology. Often the water-saving effects have been smaller than
expected. The reason for that lies in behavioral changes that partially off-
set the efficiency effect of the water-saving device. The implicit water price
decreases with improved water efficiency. This leads to the so-called rebound
effect which is also very well known from energy consumption. To explain
this effect, we apply a very simple microeconomic model.
Households derive utility from a blossoming garden. Let us assume that
the extent and the intensity of the vegetation depend positively on the amount
of irrigated water (of course, we exclude over-irrigation). In turn, the quality
of the vegetation, its beauty, and its range creates benefit to households. If we
take into account this interrelation, we express the benefit as a function of the
effective water we used, i.e., the water that reaches the vegetation. The relation
between water from the tapw and effective water use depends on the efficiency
of the irrigation technology. We have
we = w (4.57)
where  is the technological productivity. If  = 1, there is no water loss. In
the simplest case, households maximize their benefit with regard to the amount
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of water used for irrigation.
max
w
B(w) − pw or max
we
B(we) − pwe/ (4.58)
where p is the water price and p is the effective price, i.e., the price per liter
water reaching the plants. The optimality condition is
B ′(we) = p/ ⇒ wˆe() (4.59)
where wˆe() is the effective water use. A rising  leads to more consumption
of water due to the decrease of the effective water price. This is the so-called
rebound effect.
On the other side, the increased water efficiency lessens the water use
which can be derived from Eq. (4.57). Both effects then determine the water
consumption w.
dw
d
=
dwˆw()
d  − wˆe()
2
(4.60)
The first term on the right-hand side is the rebound effect, the second term is
the counter-directed efficiency effect. That is the reason why the water-saving
effect of increased water productivity is less than the calculated efficiency
effect.
There are other examples where the rebound effect appears. Households
with low-flow showerheads take longer showers. The “double flush” was
observed when households installed low-flow toilets.
Source: Olmstead and Stavins (2009b), www.sydneywater.com.au
4.7 Exercises
Exercise 4.1 Designing an increasing two-block tariff
Increasing block tariffs are designed to allow poor income groups to access water.
Often, the price of the first block is below marginal cost so as to render the access
possible to even the poorest households. As a consequence, the upper income groups
have to provide the necessary cross-subsidies to let the water utility break-even.
There are four poor households and one householdwith sufficient income to consume
water beyond the lifeline. The demand of the wealthy household can be captured by
the price-quantity function p2(w2) = 12 − (w2 − ws) where ws = 10 is the lifeline.
The task of water utility management is to secure the access to water for the poor
by minimizing the water price in the first block and to assure at the same time that
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no deficit occurs. Let us assume that fix costs are F = 20. Marginal costs are set at
c = 2.
First, the utility maximizes the contribution marginCM2 in the second block. The
contribution margin is defined as
CM2(w2) = (p2(w2) − c)(w2 − ws) = (12 − (w2 − ws) − c)(w2 − ws) (4.61)
To maximize CM2(w2), we have to set the first derivation equal to zero and solve
for w2.
12 − 2(w2 − ws) = c ⇒ w∗2 = 15 (4.62)
Reinserting the result into the price function yields p∗2 = 7. The maximum surplus
which can be extracted in block 2 is therefore CM∗2 = CM2(w∗2) = (7 − 2)(15 −
10) = 25.
To calculate the price of the first block , we have to ensure that the surplus of the
second block covers the deficits of the first, that is to say
(4 + 1)(c − p1) + F = CM∗2 ⇒ p∗1 = c −
(F − CM∗2 )
(4 + 1) (4.63)
Inserting the numerical values yields p∗1 = 1.
Exercise 4.2 Universal service provider
In many countries, the universal service obligation requires water utilities to provide
water to spatially distinct customer groups at the same tariff. The tariff design does
not reflect the differing connection costs of customers. Assume that marginal costs
of supplying consumer group 1 are 2 e per m3, and the marginal costs of water
provision to group 2 are 4 e per m3. To keep the calculations simple, assume that
both groups have the same size n = 1 and that their marginal willingness to pay is
identical, i.e., p(w) = a − bw, where a = 10 and b = 0.5. Furthermore, we assume
that fixed costs can be covered by a uniform and constant access fee. Thus, it remains
to fix the volumetric part of the tariff. If we follow the welfare-oriented approach
of IWRM, we maximize the aggregated willingness to pay to determine the optimal
allocation. This is a straightforward exercise requiring to set themarginal willingness
to pay equal to marginal costs.
a − bw1 = c1 ⇒ w1 = 16 (4.64)
and
a − bw2 = c2 ⇒ w2 = 12 (4.65)
Hence, setting zonal prices such that p1 = c1 = 2 and p2 = c2 = 4willmaximize
total economic rent. However, this is in contrast to the principle of universal service
obligation that requires an equal treatment of both groups. Thus, we have to find the
cost covering volumetric price, i.e., the price that covers all operating costs (fixed
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costs are covered by the access fee). This price can be calculated by deriving the
marginal willingness to pay from the demand functions wˆi (p) = (a − p)/b, i =
{1, 2}. Cost coverage requires
(p − c1)wˆ1(p) + (p − c2)wˆ2(p) = (2p − c1 − c2)wˆ2(p) = 0 (4.66)
which yields p = 3.Each group is charged 3e perm3 wherebygroup1 (2) paysmore
(less) than their marginal costs. Hence, group 2 is cross-subsidized by group 1. From
a welfare theoretical viewpoint, this price is suboptimal. If one places emphasis on
equal treatment of customers and if no other redistributing instruments are available,
the implementation of the universal service obligation principle has its price in the
form of welfare losses.
Exercise 4.3 Optimal modal split
Imagine a villagewith residents living along a straight road that runs fromwestwhere
high- andmiddle-income people live to east where poor people live. In thewest, there
is a water utility, which processes water and distributes it to the inhabitants through
an underground pipeline. However, the waterworks are still in an investment phase,
and it is necessary to consider how many households are to be provided with a water
connection and how many households are to be supplied by water kiosks and mobile
water sellers. Residents are distributed evenly along the main road. The length of
the road (linear city) where households dwell is s¯ = 200 length units, say, measured
in 100 m. Water consumption per household is assumed to be 1 m3/month. The
willingness to pay for water depends in our example solely on income. We assume
that water demand is completely price inelastic. The income distribution is reflected
in the geography (west: upper incomes, east: lower incomes). The willingness to
pay for water is geographically distributed according to the function V (s) = a − bs,
where a= 50 and b= 0.25. Let us assume that treatment cost per m3 water is m= 0.5
and distribution cost for connected households is k = 16 per length unit. Collecting
costs refer to time costs and are δ = 1.5 per length unit. Vendors’ costs consist of
purchasing/selling costs c2 = 4 per m3 and hauling costs c1 = 0.5 per length unit.
The first task is to derive the optimal modal split as specified in Eq. (4.40). If
you insert the numerical values of the parameters and solve the equation system
Eqs. (4.41)–(4.43), you get the optimal values {s˜ = 134, s˙ = 114, sˆ = 110}. From
these values, we can derive the length of the collecting segment, i.e., s˙ − sˆ = 4 and
the vending area s˜ − s˙ = 20. The pure economic approach based on the marginal
willingness to pay leads to an under-supply of the village. Households along the
stretch of 200 − 134 = 66 length units are not provided with water from the utility
and have to take care of themselves.
Ifwe follow theSocialDevelopmentGoal 6, and its aim to give access to safewater
sources for everybody, the water infrastructure has to be enlarged. From Eq. (4.42),
it follows that s˙ − sˆ = c2/(δ − c1) = 4, i.e., the collecting area is independent of the
total length of the village. To calculate the length of the segment where households
are connected, we take Eq. (4.43) and substitute for s˜ the total stretch of the village,
i.e., 200. Solving the equation yields sˆ = 176. Since s˙ − sˆ = 4 we have in this case
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s˙ = 180. Thus, the vendor stretch s¯ − s˙ is still 20. What we see is that the full
coverage of water supply was solely achieved by enlarging the area of connected
households.
What happens when vendors are cartelized and act like a monopolist? We have
shown that in this case water prices in the vending area s ≥ s˙ > sˆ follow exactly
the marginal collecting costs, i.e., pc = m + δ(s − sˆ). The cartel will equate the
willingness to pay of the marginal customer at sc with the collecting costs, i.e.,
V (s)a − bs = m + δ(s − sˆ) which yields sc = 122.571 which is less than the opti-
mal value s˜ = 134 (see point Ac in Fig. 4.13).
The subsidy that makes sc = s˜ can be calculated from Eq. (4.55): Inserting the
given numerical values of all parameters yields tLM = (s − sˆ) − 4.
Exercise 4.4 Seasonal pricing
Suppose there are two time periods 1 and 2 where we have the water consumption
w1 and w2, respectively. Period 1 is the winter period (off-peak period), while period
2 is the summer period (peak period). The demand functions (which are equal to the
marginal benefit functions) in both periods are
p1(w1) = 110 − w1 p2(w2) = 150 − w2
The cost rate for the delivery of one amount of water is given with c = 10, while the
cost rate for the provision of one unit of capacity is r = 20. In the optimization, we
want to calculate the optimal consumption and capacity levels in the way that we
maximize the total surplus of 1 year, which includes the peak and off-peak period:
max{w1,w2,k}
[B1(w1) + B2(w2) − c · (w1 + w2) − r · k]
s.t . w1 ≤ k (λ1)
w2 ≤ k (λ2)
Of course, the water delivery in both periods is restricted by the chosen capacity
level which is addressed in the constraints of the optimization problem. Based on
the optimization problem, the Lagrangian function can be set up:
L = B1(w1) + B2(w2) − c · (w1 + w2) − r · k + λ1 · [k − w1] + λ2 · [k − w2]
and finally the KKT conditions can be formulated:
B ′1(w1) − c − λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0 (4.16)
B ′2(w2) − c − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0 (4.17)
λ1 + λ2 − r ≤ 0 ⊥ k ≥ 0 (4.18)
k − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (4.19)
k − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (4.20)
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We suppose that capacity is only exploited in the summer month; hence, we have to
assume w1 ≥ 0, w2 ≥ 0, k ≥ 0, λ1 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. Therefore, we can calculate
(k) : λ2 = r = 20
(w1) : B ′1(w1) = c → 110 − w1 = 10 → w1 = 100
(w2) : B ′2(w2) = c + r → 150 − w2 = 30 → w2 = 120
(λ2) : k = w2 = 120
The solution does not violate the constraint Eq. (4.19), which states that w1 ≤ k
(hence: 100 ≤ 120). Therefore, we found no contradiction in the KKT conditions
and this case leads to optimality. The prices in the winter/(off-peak) period (p1) and
summer/(peak) period (p2) are
p1 = B ′1(w1) = c = 10 p2 = B ′2(w2) = c + r = 30
For this case, the capacity is completely financed by the revenues from the summer
month (peak period).
Suppose now that the capacity cost rate increases to the level of r = 50. Having
the same assumption as before, w1 ≥ 0, w2 ≥ 0, k ≥ 0, λ1 = 0 and λ2 ≥ 0, where
we suppose that capacity is only exploited in the peak period, we get the following
results:
(k) : λ2 = r = 50
(w1) : B ′1(w1) = c → 110 − w1 = 10 → w1 = 100
(w2) : B ′2(w2) = c + r → 150 − w2 = 60 → w2 = 90
(λ2) : k = w2 = 90
The change of the capacity cost rate does not impact the consumption level in the
winter period (w1 = 100). However, due to the increase of the capacity cost rate,
the consumption in the summer period decreases to the level of w2 = 90. Therefore,
we do not meet the constraint Eq. (4.19), which states that w1 ≤ k, because the
consumption level in the winter period (w1 = 100) is higher than the chosen capacity
level (k = 90). Due to the contradiction, this case does not lead to optimality.
Therefore, we suppose that capacity is exploited during the entire year. Hence, we
assume thatw1 ≥ 0,w2 ≥ 0, k ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, and λ2 ≥ 0. Because of this assumption,
we are able to set up the following system of equations based on the KKT conditions:
(λ1) ∧ (λ2) : w1 = w2 = k
(w1) ∧ (w2) : B ′1(k) + B ′2(k) = 2 · c + r → 110 − k + 150 − k = 2 · 10 + 50
The solution is w1 = w2 = k = 95. The value of the dual variables λ1 and λ2 can be
calculated from constraint Eqs. (4.16) and (4.17):
(w1) : λ1 = B ′1(w1) − c = 110 − 95 − 10 = 5
(w2) : λ2 = B ′2(w2) − c = 150 − 95 − 10 = 45
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The dual variables are non-negative, hence, we do not find a contradiction and this
case leads to optimality. The price in the winter/(off-peak) period, which is p1, is
lower than in the summer/(peak) period, being p2:
p1 = B ′1(w1) = c + λ1 = 15 p2 = B ′2(w2) = c + λ2 = 55
Therefore, the capacity is financed by 90% during the summer period, because λ2r =
45
50 = 0.9, while the capacity is also financed by 10% during the winter period,
because λ1r = 550 = 0.1.
Exercise 4.5 Proportional water right allotments
The allotment of tradable water rights may be a promising instrument to reconcile
efficiency and fairness. Let us assume that the entitlements to water use are reduced
in a proportional way along with increased water scarcity. In this exercise, we want
to analyze how the proportional allotment is able to fulfill the criteria of efficiency
and fairness. Let us assume that there are twowater users, say, firms.Marginal profits
are
B ′i = ai − biwi , a1 = 40, a2 = 20, b1 = b2 = 1 (4.67)
If water is abundant and there are no treatment costs of water, firms set marginal
profits equal to zero which leads to
wˆ1 = a1/b1 = 40 and wˆ2 = a2/b2 = 20 (4.68)
What are the profits? The calculation needs the profit function which can be achieved
by integrating the marginal profit function with respect to w.
Bi =
∫ wi
0
[ai − biυ]dυ = wi (a − (bi/2)wi ) (4.69)
Inserting the calculated water usage yields profits B1 = 800 and B2 = 200. The
profit of firm 1 is four times as high as that of firm 2.
In the course of increasing water scarcity firms total water use of 40 + 20 =
60 cannot be covered any more. Instead there is only water available of a total of
W¯ = 30, i.e., half of the former total use. Water entitlements w¯i will be allotted
proportionally35:
w¯i = wˆi
wˆ1 + wˆ2 W¯ = wˆi
W¯
wˆ1 + wˆ2 =
1
2
wˆi (4.70)
35Notice that W¯ = (1/2)(wˆ1 + wˆ2).
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Utilizing Eq. (4.68) yields w¯1 = 20 and w¯2 = 10. If these allotments are not trad-
able, the resulting profits can be calculated by halving the former water use, and
inserting the results into the profit function Eq. (4.69) which yields B¯1 = 600 and
B¯2 = 150. The distributional effects of the proportional allotment can be captured
by the profit ratio B¯1/B¯2 = 4. Hence, water rationing has not changed the profit dis-
tribution, according to the proportionality rule. However, the water allocation is not
optimal if one takes the efficiency criterion into account. Hence, we maximize total
profits under the constraint that total water use does not exceed the sustainability
constraint W¯ = 30.
max
w1,w2
[B1(w1) + B2(w2)], s.t. w1 + w2 ≤ W¯ (4.71)
The first-order conditions require w∗i to be set in a way that B ′1 = B ′2 while meeting
the sustainability constraint. Inserting all relevant values leads to the solution w∗1 =
25 and w∗2 = 5. We see immediately that these values differ from the proportional
allotments w¯1 = 20 and w¯2 = 10.
The efficient solution can be implemented by introducing a market for water
entitlements. Themarket equilibrium is characterized by an excess demand for water
by firm 1 of w∗1 − w¯1 = 25 − 20. Firm 2 is net seller of entitlements w¯2 − w∗2− =
10 − 5. The equilibrium price can be calculated by inserting w∗1 into the marginal
profit function of firm 1, i.e.,
p∗ = B ′1(w∗1) = a1 − b1w∗1 = 15 (4.72)
To calculate net profits, we insert the market solution into the profit functions and
deduct the net demand for water
Bni = w∗i (a − (bi/2)w∗i ) − p∗(w∗i − w¯i ) (4.73)
which yields Bn1 = 612.5 and Bn2 = 162.5 . If we compare these values with profits
under the rationing system without trading, we see that both profits have risen. This
is not surprising, because trade is voluntary and therefore only takes place when both
parties are better off after a trade. By close inspection, we also see that the profit of the
small firm 1 has risen stronger than that of the bigger firm 2. The profit ratio is now
Bn1 /B
n
2 ≈ 3.8. Hence, in our example, the enhancement of efficiency by allowing
to trade water allotments leads to a profit distribution in favor of the smaller firm.
Obviously, the principle of efficiency and the principle of justice need not always be
in conflict. In addition, the introduction of trade fulfillsRawls’ principle of difference:
The worst placed user improves her situation under the observed regime.
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4.8 Further Reading
Water is a multidimensional resource that not only serves as a private good. Hane-
mann (2004) gives an instructive historical outline of the economic dimension of
water, taking into account not only efficiency aspects but also the primary supply
based on human rights. The design of tariffs for water services (drinking water, san-
itation) should take into account various criteria. Boland and Whittington (2000a)
andMassarutto (2007b) present the various criteria and evaluate different tariff struc-
tures on the basis of these criteria. In particular, IBTs are taken into account (see also
OECD 2010; Walker 2009). Rogers et al. (1998) review the tariff building criteria
underlying the DublinWater Principles. Designed as practical guides, OECD (2009)
and OECD (2010) provide a problem-oriented introduction and an overview of the
financing of water infrastructures with special attention to tariff policy. Not only
internal costs but also social costs of water supply (environmental costs, etc.) are
taken into account.
There are a number of tariff structures that are used in the supply of infrastructure
goods (water, energy, transportation). The basic analysis techniques of the effects of
tariff variants are introduced in the microeconomic textbook of Varian and Repcheck
(2010). But there are not only economic aspects to be considered. We often observe
political and legal requirements, which have to be taken into account in the tariff
structure, particularly in the case of network services. Cremer et al. (2001) analyze
the universal service provider which is subject to the universal service obligation,
i.e., the provision to serve all customers at affordable (and equal) rates.
IBTs are widespread in the water sector, especially in Asia. There is a large
number of studies on how these tariffs work, some more practical, others more
theoretical, among the latter Boland andWhittington (2000a, b),Whittington (2003),
Dahan and Nisan (2007), and Monteiro and Rosetta-Palma (2011). Meran and von
Hirschhausen (2017) develop a microeconomic model with social preferences where
a strong inequity aversion leads to IBTs as tariff system.
Unconnected water markets play a major role in developing countries. There
are many case studies investigating the precise institutional, cultural, and political
characteristics. A comprehensive study is Kjellén and McGranahan (2006), which
examines thewater supply inDar es Salaam, Tanzania, Hailu et al. (2011) forNigeria,
Kenya, and for Cochabamba, Bolivia, Wutich et al. (2016). An analytical economic
analysis of rent extracting behavior is given by Lovei and Whittington (1991). Bau-
mol (1982) analyzes cost structures that allow for competitive behavior of suppliers
even if only few actors operate in the market.
Rationing is often used in the case of water scarcity. Lund and Reed (1995) and
Olmstead and Stavins (2009a) provide an overview of the different types and an
economic assessment. An analysis that takes into account aspects of equity and
efficiency in times of severe scarcity (e.g., war times) is Tobin (1970).
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Table 4.4 Tariff structures for water supply and sanitation and policy objectives: a synthesis based
on OECD (2010)
Tariff structure Examples Ecological
sustainability
Economic
efficiency
Financial
sustainability
Equity/affordability
Uniform flat
fee
Sub-areas of
two water
supply
companies in
the United
Kingdom. Still
used by many
sampled
non-OECD
utilities
Very poor. No
incentives to
water saving
nor to other
aspects of
sustainable
water use
Poor for
drinking water
(no linkage
between fee
structure and
behavior that
may help
minimize
investment).
OK for
water-borne
sanitation
(costs do not
depend on
water
consumption)
Potentially
OK, but
commitment
to cost
recovery is
what really
matters. Avoid
political
determination
of fees
Very regressive
(unless properly
integrated with
other elements of
a social security
system)
Non-uniform
flat rate linked
with specific
aspects of
households,
e.g., (i)
property value
or other
income proxy,
(ii) dwelling
characteristics
linked with
water use
Still used by
70% of UK
households,
common in the
former Soviet
Union
Poor if linked
with income-
related
variable. Good
if linked with
dwelling
characteristics
linked with
water use
(e.g., use of
water
recycling
devices) or
with specific
behavior that
wants to be
encouraged
(e.g.,
rainwater
harvesting)
As above As above,
provided that
total revenues
are guaranteed
Potentially good
effects, provided
that criteria used
correspond to
personal wealth.
Regressive
otherwise (unless
properly
integrated with
other elements of
a social security
system)
(continued)
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Table 4.4 (continued)
Tariff structure Examples Ecological
sustainability
Economic
efficiency
Financial
sustainability
Equity/affordability
Uniform
volumetric
rate + 0 fixed
charge
Still present in
numerous
OECD
countries.
Most recurrent
in sample of
non-OECD
utilities
As above;
higher, since 0
fixed charge
means a larger
marginal rate
(for the same
revenue levels)
Efficient if
water is scarce
or
infrastructure
nearing
capacity (i.e.,
if there is
rivalry in
consumption)
or if variable
costs are high
compared to
fixed costs.
Not very
efficient if
otherwise it
would
discourage
users but this
would reduce
societal
benefits.
Inefficiency
depends on
demand
elasticity (the
lower the
elasticity, the
lower the
inefficiency)
Good potential
for financial
recovery. Can
have
(temporary)
negative
impact on
revenue in
case of a
sudden move
from flat
charges due to
impact on
demand (e.g.,
Berlin
experience)
Depends on
income elasticity.
If this is low, it
can hit large poor
households hard
Uniform
volumetric
rate + fixed
charge > 0
Classic, e.g.,
Germany
(structure
enshrined in
law)
High,
depending on
the marginal
rate (impact
on demand
only if it is
high enough)
+ individual
metering
Optimal
provided the
following
applies:
volumetric
rate = SRMC
(short-run
marginal cost)
and fixed
charge = lump
sum.
Particularly
suited in case
SRMC is
constant (e.g.,
electricity)
As above Depends on size
of fixed charge,
but tends to be
regressive (not so
only if marginal
cost is high and
income elasticity
is high which is
rare). Size of fixed
charge can be
differentiated
based on income
(continued)
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Table 4.4 (continued)
Tariff structure Examples Ecological
sustainability
Economic
efficiency
Financial
sustainability
Equity/affordability
Uniform
volumetric
rate + rebate
(fixed charge
< 0)
No known
application.
May have
been applied
in
municipalities
in the United
States
As above.
Highest if
rebates take
into account
specific
circumstances
(e.g., use of
water
recycling
devices, drip
irrigation or
water-saving
sprinklers in
gardens) or
with specific
behavior that
wants to be
encouraged
(e.g.,
rainwater
harvesting, use
of less
pollutant
detergents)
As above. In
turn, could be
efficient in
combination
with a positive
fixed fee (idea:
r = SRMC;
fixed cost
redistributed
including a
rebate for the
poor)
As above Progressive and
useful for
reducing impact
on poor. But only
if rebate is
targeted;
otherwise,
distributive effect
depending on
income elasticity,
just like with IBTs
Traditional
IBT (both
block widths
and prices
fixed) + fixed
charge
Italy.
Increasing
number of
developing
countries
Highest,
provided that
metering is
individual and
marginal rates
in the upper
blocks are
high
Potentially the
best solution
provided r =
SRMC and
fixed charge =
lump sum.
Particularly
suited in case
SRMC is
increasing
(e.g., costly
extra supply to
be purchased)
As above Can be very
regressive if: (i)
low demand
elasticity to
income; (ii)
resulting average
tariff is below cost
recovery levels
and this
discourages
extension of
network; (iii)
many households
sharing the same
tap
(continued)
182 4 Water Tariffs
Table 4.4 (continued)
Tariff structure Examples Ecological
sustainability
Economic
efficiency
Financial
sustainability
Equity/affordability
IBT + fixed
charge + exact
occupancy
amendment
Flanders,
Brussels
Malta, some
communes in
Luxembourg
As above, but
reduced
incentives for
large families
Depends on
how closely
the resulting
average
volumetric
charge reflects
SRMC. Rest
as above
As above Reduces impact
on large families
(best if
accompanied by
reduction of leaks
and improved
efficiency of
appliances).
Depends on
correlation of size
and income of
households.
Problem (ii) above
remains
IBT + fixed
charge +
low-income
households
may apply for
extension
Proposed
Social Tariff
Plan in
Portugal
As above, but
reduced
incentives for
low-income
households
that apply for
extension of
blocks
Good for
reducing
demand in
peak periods
and
optimizing
capacity use
Uncertainty
about number
of households
applying (may
be reduced
over time)
Successful, if all
eligible claim and
block width reflect
consumption
patterns of the
poor. Problem (ii)
above remains
IBT + fixed
charge + larger
households
(e.g., N = 4)
may apply for
extension
Some Spanish
cities. Greek
DEYA, cities.
Proposed
option in
Portugal
As above, but
reduced
incentives for
large families
that apply for
extension of
blocks
Depends on
whether there
is a fixed
charge or not
As above Depends on
correlation of size
and income of
households.
Problem (ii) above
remains
IBT + fixed
charge +
targeted
subsidies to
low income
Chile Highest,
provided that
metering is
individual and
marginal rates
in the upper
blocks are
high
As above As above Depends on the
capacity to target
the poor. Problem
(ii) above remains
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5WaterMarkets
5.1 Institutional,Hydrological and Infrastructural
Preconditions
5.1.1 Design ofWater Markets
5.1.1.1 Design Options
Water markets are one possible institutional option to deal with water management.
Currently, a few formal water markets are established in countries where water is
scarce and governmental organization is fairly effective. The enforcement of basic
laws and rules is essential for an effectively working formal water market, because
they are needed for the registration of water rights and to specify conditions for the
trading of water and water rights. Hirshleifer et al. (1969) illustrate in their reference,
how water laws can promote or hinder the implementation of water markets. They
focus their analysis on the riparian and appropriation rights regime in the United
States.1
There exist a number of legal preconditions for the promotion of water markets.
Based on Endo et al. (2018), these are
1Under the riparian water rights regime, the water is allocated among those who possess land
along the water body. All landowners whose properties adjoin a water body have the right to
make reasonable use of the water source as it flows through or over their properties. However, the
appropriation water rights regime originated in California, during the time of Gold Rush (Grompe
and Hansjürgens 2012). The idea of this right regime is that the first person who takes the water
for beneficial use is allowed to continue the water usage of this quantity for that purpose. We can
differ between the senior and junior water rights, with senior rights being emitted earlier than junior
rights. The water is first allocated to the senior rights owner and afterward to the junior rights owner.
© The Author(s) 2021
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• the existence of laws and rules that allow the reallocation of water (see Grafton
et al. 2012)
• the separation of water rights and landownership; (see Chong and Sunding (2006)
as well as Grafton et al. (2012))
• rules for the case that water rights are non-used. Here the non-used water rights
should not be canceled.
• the predictability of the available water before the irrigation periods
• public control of groundwater pumping throughout the jurisdiction
For the implementation of formal water markets the establishment of water rights
are quite essential. Regarding these water rights, a number of characteristics—such
as the duration, the conditions for renewing and restrictions for tradingwater rights—
have to be determined by rules and laws:
• On the one hand, there is the duration of a water right and on the other hand,
there are the conditions for renewing an expired right. These two characteristics
determine the value of the water right and also affect the level of infrastructure
investments in the water supply system. The higher the duration and the higher
the assurance for renewing an expired water right, the higher is the incentive for
investments in water (delivery) infrastructure.
• It has to be determined which party is allowed to buy a water right. It has also to
be clarified whether the buyer is able to use the water in just a certain location and
for just selected purposes. Furthermore, the feasibility of water rights’ divisibility
has to be specified, which means whether it is possible to sell just a selected
proportion of the owned water right.
• It has to be specified whether a water allocation under an entitlement must be
used. This may oblige a water right owner to use it for a specified time. Also, the
consequences of non-using water entitlements have to be clarified. The allocated
amount not used during a specified time period could either be extinguished, or
may be used in later periods. The more the non-usage of water entitlements is
penalized, the less is the incentive to save water for dry years.
Organizations and institutional arrangements such as water user organizations, water
courts or even state courts are also important to resolve conflicts either between
various water right holders or between water right holders and third parties. Here,
third parties are those who may be (negatively) affected by the water trade. The
best-known water markets which currently exist are in the western USA, Australia,
and Chile. Evidence is mixed thus far, but one may expect that due to climate change
and the resulting increase in water shortages in these countries, water markets may
become more important in the future (Easter and Huang 2014b). Endo et al. (2018)
analyze the countries regarding their applicability of water markets on the base of
their water current laws.
Apart from the formalwatermarkets, there also exist informal ones.Watermarkets
are operated at a local level, for instance allowing neighboring farmers to trade water.
For example, these forms of markets may make groundwater available for those
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farmers who cannot afford the installation of their own wells. Usually, the rules at
this type of market are informal and there is no requirement for large investments in
management and infrastructure capacities. Furthermore, rent-seeking issues, as well
as high transaction cost, may lead to the emergence of informal markets instead of
formal ones (Easter and Huang 2014b).
In addition to the distinction between formal and informal water markets, it is
also possible to differentiate between markets for water rights and markets for water.
Property rights are transferred to a newuser (buyer) in amarket forwater rights, while
in markets for water (which are also termed as leasing markets), water is transferred
to the buyer and the seller retains the ownership of the asset (water right) (Goemans
and Pritchett 2014).
5.1.1.2 Permanent Transfers:Water Right Markets
The transaction in water rights markets could either be a direct or an indirect transfer
of water rights’ ownership. Direct transfer means that the ownership of water rights
moves during the transaction from the seller to the buyer so that the buyer obtains
the right to divert water. Indirect transactions occur when a water user buys shares
of a ditch company to gain water resources and the ditch company retains the right
to divert. These transactions are governed by the ditch companies bylaws (Goemans
and Pritchett 2014). Direct transfer of ownership becomes more complex when the
location of diversion is changed or if the water is used in a different way after the
transaction.
The direct transfer may involve two steps for the buyer: the purchase of the water
right and the change of use. There is no fixed order in this two step-process which
means that the right can be changed before selling, or the right can be sold first.
Furthermore, the change in use may occur at a much later date than the selling date.
This becomes especially relevant for municipal water providers which expect a high
growth of water demand for the future, and thus buy water rights for covering future
water demand. In the interim, the municipal water provider leases the rights back to
the original water right owner (Howitt and Hansen 2005). For approving the change
in use by the state administrative, in some markets it has to be demonstrated that no
right owner is adversely affected by the change of use, which means that the quantity
of available water must not decrease for other right owners.
5.1.1.3 Temporary Transfers: Leasing ofWater Rights
For a temporary transfer of rights, the seller leases the water right to another user,
but retains the ownership of the water right for future use. There exist three types of
leasing water rights: water banks, single-/multi-year leases, and interruptible water
supply agreements.
Water banks reallocate water on a short-term basis. They are quite often formed to
fulfill a specific need, for instance, maintaining water supply during drought periods,
ensuring an instream flow for habitats, or augmenting flows for future use. The
water bank serves as a facilitator of exchange by matching buyers and sellers. It
is a clearinghouse for transactions and it provides services to realize transactions
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which include the determination of the type of water right and the adherence to
the regulation regime. By depositing rights into the bank, potential sellers make
them available for potential buyers. The water banks differ in various categories (see
Goemans and Pritchett 2014):
• the organization of the agency: it could be an organization of the federal agency,
the state government, special districts or interested parties.
• the determination of prices: water banks may post a fixed price or use options to
determine a market clearing price.
• contract types: there exist supplier contracts (that are used to organize specific
entitlements in a bank), storage contracts (allowing the deposit of water in a
physical storage), and contingent claim contracts (which permit the buyer to use
water from the bank under specific circumstances such as a drought period).
While water banks are organizations where many buyers and sellers are able to
exchange water rights, water leases are bilateral agreements between individuals in
which the water right owner agrees to lease a specific amount of water. The bilateral
negotiations make it possible to customize the contract. Typical contract stipulations
include the contract term, the pricing policy (determining fixed and volume prices
per unit), as well as the integration of a leaseback option, which means that the lessor
has the first right to use the water if it is not needed by the lessee. A special type
of water leases are the interruptible supply agreements which last for a multitude of
years, but where water delivery is just made when it is needed. The interruptability
could be realized by, for instance, an option agreement in which the lessee pays
a baseline fee for the option to use a water right. This option does not need to be
exercised each year. If the option is not exercised the lessor has the first right to
use the water, while for the contrary case that the option is used the lessee pays an
additional, pre-negotiated fee to exercise the option and get the water right for the
year. Therefore, the lessor receives a secure revenue stream from the lessee, while
the lessee in return receives the guarantee that there will be additional water supply
when needed at a pre-negotiated price (Goemans and Pritchett 2014).
5.1.1.4 Limitations ofWater Markets
Just as any other markets, real-world water markets are no perfect representations
of theory. Rather, they are subject to transaction costs and issues of implementation
(Western Governor Association 2012). Transaction costs include the search costs of
a willing buyer/seller, negotiations, navigating institutional requirements (permits,
water courts proceedings), and the physical expense for collecting, storing and treat-
ing ofwater (McCann andEaster 2004; Furubotn andRichter 2005). High transaction
costs can reduce the frequency of water transfers, make it difficult to match water
supplies to changing use and to limit the participants in the market. In empirical
studies, transaction costs range from 3 to 70% in water markets (Garrick et al. 2013).
The level of these costs mainly depends on various physical and institutional factors.
A detailed overview regarding these factors is provided by McCann and Garrick
(2014).
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5.1.2 Transaction Costs and Institutional Factors
5.1.2.1 Physical Factors
Physical, biological, and technical factors which are subsumed under the term phys-
ical factors are important drivers for transaction and transformation costs. These
physical factors are
• Scale: Quantity and quality issues may have to be addressed on the watershed
location which means that the geographical scale of intervention is needed for
resolvingwatermarket issues. This involves, for instance, the transfer of pollutants
in space. If the water market issue is linked with the geographical scale, more
coordination is required which results in higher transaction costs.
• Time lags: Time lag between a measurement and its impact, for instance, a lag
between improvedmanagement and noticeable improvements in thewatermarket.
• Magnitude of changes: The higher the changes in water quality standards or
water consumption levels, the higher the resistance against the new policy if the
change is related to an economic loss for stakeholders.
• Heterogeneity:Property rights aremore difficult to establish if the property rights
are poorly specified and fail to account for different sources of water and their
hydrological interactions (Young and McColl 2009).
• External effects: Downstream water rights are often dependent on the return
flows of upstream users. A reallocation at the upstream may affect the return
flow, and therefore, lead to third-party effects for downstream water right owners.
• Excludability: Excluding people from consumption of a non-excludable good
(e.g., groundwater) requires strict monitoring and enforcement.
• Measurability/Observability: Measurability and observability impact the cost
for monitoring and enforcement, and determine which kind of policy is feasible.
• Economics of scope: Market design becomes more complex in a setting with
multiple outputs, e.g., the multi-purpose design of infrastructure to optimize irri-
gation, flood control, hydropower, urban water use, etc.
• Number of agents: Transaction cost increases with the number of agents that
are involved (Cacho et al. 2013). Water banks and water trading registry systems
standardize policy and procedures to reduce transaction costs even for a large
number of buyers and sellers.
• Uncertainty: Time lags, natural variability in space and time, biological diver-
sity, heterogeneity of agents, etc., impact uncertainty. Higher uncertainty leads to
incomplete contracts, and thus, increasing ex-post transaction costs (Williamson
1985).
• Asset specificity: Asset specificity refers to a situation in which a resource is
unique to a transaction partner and cannot be easily redeployed for transactions
with other partners. The design and scale of water infrastructure, as well as the
heterogeneity of water rights, contribute to asset specificity and complex institu-
tional arrangements.
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5.1.2.2 Institutional Factors
Some institutional factors that affect transaction and transformation costs are
• Culture:Culture affects the socialization of people, their fundamental values, the
level of trust within the society, notions of fairness, interest in common goods,
etc. (Schmid 2004; Vatn 2005). Concerns of irrigation communities regarding the
long-term effects of water trades on their economic and cultural viability have
slowed down the emergence of spot markets (Howitt 2014; Bjornlund et al. 2014;
Hearne and Donoso 2014).
• Institutional environment: The institutional environment consists of constitu-
tions, legal systems, laws, and policies (Williamson 2000). Especially constitu-
tional provisions related to water are quite difficult to change. This could result
in a fragmented institutional framework limiting water trade (Bjornlund 2004).
The legal system and the courts also affect transaction costs. The less effective
the legal system is able to enforce contracts, the higher are transactions costs. The
existence of conflict resolution mechanisms in water markets can avoid costly
and cumbersome administrative hearings and court cases, see Ostrom (1990).
• Physical versus administrative boundaries: Administrative boundaries that do
not coincidewith environmental areas of interestmake cooperation difficult (Perry
and Easter 2004). Coordination costs rise with the number of agents involved in
specific transactions (Laurenceau 2012).
• Lobbying: Transaction costs at the enactment stage may be higher than transac-
tion costs to implement a policy (Krutilla et al. 2011).
• Property Rights:The exchange of property rights implies transaction costs.With
changing technology and changes of preferences, the transaction cots of exchang-
ing property rights is likely to increase (Demsetz 1967; Garrick et al. 2013; Crase
et al. 2013). Also agents who do not have property rights may incur costs to
change the property rights structure (Bromley 1992; Stavins 1995). Furthermore,
if governments create new rights, transaction costs are incurred to allocate those
rights (Krutilla et al. 2011).
• Market structure: A monopsony market structure may facilitate bargaining,
while bilateral monopoly can impede it (McCann and Garrick 2014).
• Sequencing and timing: The implementation of a draconian policy may cause
more transaction and transformation costs than a policy which is less restrictive
(McCann and Garrick 2014). Transaction costs of multiple policies are incurred
if it is required that a policy is changed subsequently. For supporting water trade,
for instance Garrick et al. (2013), note the importance of multiphase sequencing
of institutional transformation. This involves three phases: market emergence,
market strengthening, and adjustment.
• Intermediaries: The use of intermediaries (e.g., brokers) may reduce transaction
costs, especially for infrequent transactions that require specific knowledge (see
Coggan et al. (2010)). For instance, water banks provide a clearinghouse function
to decrease transaction costs of administrative reviews or price discovery for
buyers and sellers.
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Fig. 5.1 A simple river basin
model. Source own
illustration
5.2 AWater Market Model
5.2.1 Water Markets and Return Flows
With the help of a water market model, we now derive the problems of implementing
water markets. As a normative starting point we use the approach of the optimal
allocation of water along a river as presented in Sect. 3.7. Figure5.1 depicts a simple
hydrological scenario.
In the river basin dealt with here, there is an inflow R and a prescribed runoff
r .2 There are three users, say farmers, who want to irrigate their plantations located
along the river. Farmers 1 and 2 are located upstream. Farmer 3 is situated further
below. Here we also take into account the return flows that occur in agriculture. For
simplification, it is assumed that only farmer 1 has return flows.3 The water diversion
of farmer 2 and 3 is, therefore, identical to theirwater consumption. Regarding farmer
1 we have to distinguish between water diversion and water consumption. Diversion
is captured by the variable w1 and water consumption is (1 − h1)w1. The fraction
h1w1 returns to the river and is available for farmer 3. The reference point for an
assessment is the water allocation that follows from an integrated water resource
management approach. Here, we limit ourselves to the criterion of efficiency on the
implicit assumption that distribution issues are solved by parallel transfer payments.
max
wi
[B1(w1) + B2(w2) + B3(w3)] (5.1)
2In the following, wewill assume that r = 0 for simplicity. All results also apply to themore general
and realistic case of r > 0.
3Our results are also valid for the more general case where all three farmers have return flows.
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under the constraints
w1 + w2 ≤ R − r (5.2)
w3 ≤ R − r − w1 − w2 + h1w1 (5.3)
Assuming that all farmers get a portion of the sustainable amount of available water
which is R − r , we derive the following optimality conditions
B
′
1(w1) − λ1 − λ2(1 − h1) = 0 (5.4)
B
′
2(w2) − λ1 − λ2 = 0 (5.5)
B
′
3(w3) − λ2 = 0 (5.6)
From Sect. 3.7 we know that we have to distinguish two cases of optimal water
allocation that depend on the farmers’ marginal benefit functions and on the extent
of water scarcity: In the first case, all available water is used up by farmer 1 and 2.4
In the second case a portion of water flows to farmer 3, so that this amount and the
return flow h1w1 is available to farmer 3. In this second case we have λ1 = 0 and
the optimality conditions condense to
B
′
1(w1)
(1 − h1) = B
′
2(w2) (5.7)
B
′
2(w2) = B
′
3(w3) (5.8)
w3 = R − r − w1 − w2 + h1w1 (5.9)
The water allocation equates the marginal benefits of water consumption, taking
farmer 1’s return flows into account. The return flows increase the water productivity.
Therefore, farmer 1 is assigned more of the water than in the case of no return flows.
In order to examine the problems of implementing water markets as a means
of optimal water allocation in the presence of return flows, we focus on the sec-
ond scenario, where Eq. (5.2) is not binding. To further simplify the algebra, we
assume simple numerical values. For the marginal benefit of water we assume
B
′
i (w) = a − bw = 300 − w, i.e., all farmers are identical. Further: h1 = 0.5, R
= 300 and r = 0. Inserting these parameter values into Eqs. (5.7)–(5.9) yields the
optimal water allocation5: {w∗1 = 200, w∗2 = 100, w∗3 = 100}. Farmer 1 gets twice
as much as farmer 2, so the available water R is completely allocated to them. Farmer
3 receives farmer 1’s return flow. Note that the optimal allocation does not violate
the constraint Eq. (5.2).
4This implies that constraint Eq. (5.2) is binding and hence, λ1 > 0.
5The exact calculation is presented in Exercise 5.1 in Sect. 5.4.
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Now we introduce a water market in which water withdrawals are traded. The
property rights to water are distributed in such a way that they protect the river basin.
This implies that totalwater rights do not exceed R + h1w1.Whatever the distribution
of water rights between farmers, in sum they must comply to this constraint to ensure
hydrological sustainability. The exact key of the distribution of water rights follows
fairness criteria or is historically given.
Each farmer maximizes the net benefit
max
wi
[Bi (wi ) − q(wi − Ti )] ⇒ B ′i (wi ) = q (5.10)
where q is the price of, say, one m3 of water diverted and Ti are the water rights
assigned. Solving this optimization program with respect to wi yields the individual
market demand of farmer i. Taking our example we have
a − bwi = q ⇒ wˆi (q) = a − q
b
= 300 − q (5.11)
It should be noted here that we assume a competitive market in which there is no
strategic behavior. No market participant can manipulate the price of water. We,
therefore, rule out collusion, monopolistic or oligopolistic behavior.
Total demand is Wˆ = ∑3i=1 wˆi . The equilibrium price q∗ can be calculated by
equating total demand with the given supply R − r + h1w1. The market auctioneer
has a difficult task to solve: He must not only determine the equilibrium price, but
he also has to calculate the effective water supply at each price. This presupposes
that he can compute the return flows of farmer 1 which is only possible if a reliable
water accounting system of the river basin exists. In the following, we will assume
that he is able to do so.
Since all demand functions are identical, all farmers buy the same amount of
water, i.e., Wˆ = 3(a − q)/b. The equilibriumprice can be calculated from themarket
clearing condition
3
[
a − q
b
]
= R + h1
[
a − q
b
]
⇒ q∗ =
[
a − bR
3 − h1
]
(5.12)
Inserting the numerical values yields q∗ = 180. If q∗ is inserted in the demand
functions, we obtain the market allocation {wˆ1 = 120, wˆ2 = 120, wˆ3 = 120}. If one
compares the market allocation with our reference allocation, one sees that the intro-
duction of the market leads to a suboptimal water allocation. The water market
allocates too little water to farmer 1. This is because farmer 1 does not base her
demand decision on net water flows. The market refers to water diversion, not water
consumption. This result is well-known in water economics and various institutional
designs have been proposed to remedy this market failure. One of these proposals
suggests to introduce a water market where water consumption is traded, not water
diversion. Of course, if water trading is based on water consumption the return flows
must be observable. In addition to thewater accounting system, a hydrological model
must be implemented to predict the price sensitivity of return flows.
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Let us assume that this informational requirement is fulfilled. Then, our model
has to be changed slightly. Farmers 2 and 3 behave as before because their water
diversion is not related to return flows. Farmer 1’s water demand is dependent on his
water consumption. He only pays for water consumption (1 − h1)w1. Hence
max
w1
[B1(w1) − q(1 − h1)w1 + qTi ] ⇒ B ′1(w1) = q(1 − h1) (5.13)
From Eq. (5.13), we can calculate the water demand of farmer 1
wˆ1(q) = a − q(1 − h1)
b
= 300 − 0.5q (5.14)
The water demand of farmer 2 and 3 remains the same. Thus, the equilibrium
price of the water market follows from equating total demand to supply
(1 − h1)wˆ1(q) + wˆ2(q) + wˆ3(q) = R − r ⇒ a − q(1 − h1)
b
+ 2
(
a − q
b
)
= R − r
(5.15)
Inserting the numerical values yields q∗ = 200. Reinserting q∗ into the respective
demand functions leads to thefinalmarket inducedwater allocation {wˆ1 = 200, wˆ2 =
100, wˆ3 = 100}. This allocation is identical to the optimal allocation derived from
our IWRM approach.
5.2.2 Water Markets and Instream Constraints
Even if there were no return flows, the optimal allocation is not necessarily ensured
by a single water market covering the river basin. This is the case when instream
flows have to be taken into account. For various reasons a minimum of running water
along the course of a river is necessary. Examples are ecological reasons, recreation
of the local population, navigability, or yet other reasons. These instream flows
are called environmental flows. Our model captures this inflow instream constraint
by requiring that in the first flow section a flow rate v¯1 must not be undercut. For
the second section a lower limit of v¯2 applies accordingly.6 Thus, the hydrological
constraints from Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) have to be changed to7
w1 + w2 ≤ R − v¯1 (5.16)
w3 ≤ R − w1 − w2 − v¯2 (5.17)
6Notice, that wemust have v¯1 > v¯2. Otherwise, upstream farmers cannot divert water from the river.
7Again, we assume as before that r = 0.
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5.2.2.1 Insufficiency of a Single Market
For simplicity, let us assume that farmers are identical. In addition, we assume that
the first stretch of the river is regulated, i.e., there is a minimum river flow needed,
say, v¯1 = 150. For the second river section we assume, that v¯2 = 0, i.e., farmer 3 can
use up all water available.
First, we calculate the optimal water allocations using the maximization pro-
gram (5.1) under the new hydrological constraints. The optimal conditions consist
of Eqs. (5.4)–(5.6) for h1 = 0, Eqs. (5.16) and (5.17). From these conditions we
can infer that the first constraint must be binding, i.e., for λ1 > 0 this constraint
was not binding and, hence, λ1 = 0 the optimality conditions (5.4)–(5.6) would
imply that w∗1 = w∗2 = w∗3 = R/3. But this violates constraint (5.16) since w∗1 =
w∗2 = (2/3)R = 200 > R − v¯1 = 150. Therefore, the constraint (5.16) is binding
and w∗1 + w∗2 = R − v¯1. Since both water allotments for farmer 1 and farmer 2
must be equal (see Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5)) we have w∗1 = w∗2 = (R − v¯1)/2 = 75. From
Eq. (5.17) follows w∗3 = R − w∗1 − w∗2 = 150. The environmental instream regula-
tion brings an advantage for farmer 3.
We now show that this allocation cannot be achieved with a single water market
for the entire catchment area, although there are no return flows. If a single market is
implemented, a single water price exists equilibrating total demand with supply. To
secure the instream constraint in the first stretch of the river total supply is equal to
R − v¯1 we have wˆ1 = wˆ2 = wˆ3 = (R − v¯1)/3 = 150/3 = 50. This allocation does
not correspond to the optimal solution. If instead total inflow R is offered, the market
allocation for each farmer amounts to R/3 = 100. Again, this violates the hydro-
logical constraints, since wˆ1 + wˆ2 = 200 > R − v¯1 = 150. Hence, a single market
cannot provide the optimal solution.
5.2.2.2 A System of Local Markets
Therefore, a system of local markets must be introduced. We establish two markets,
one for the water of the upstream section and one for the downstream section of the
river. The upstream market extends from the inflow to before the lower withdrawal
point of farmer 3. The lower market encompasses the flow from this withdrawal
point to the end of the river. The upper stretch is regulated by the instream constraint
v¯1, the lower section has no regulation (for simplicity). Before trade takes place, the
public water authority assigns locational property rights of water withdrawal to the
farmers. Upstream property rights are in total (R − v¯1), guaranteeing the ecological
solidity of the upper stretch. These rights are distributed to the farmers according to
a given key, which we will not discuss further. Justice aspects, power structures or
historically given rights can play a role here. These rights can be utilized to divert
water or to sell the rights in the market. The same applies to the downstream water
market. Here, total property rights cover the remaining water v¯1. In contrast to the
upper market, there are some constraints on the part of farmer 1 and 2. Both can sell
their downstream property rights, but they cannot use these rights to buy water due
to the unidirectionality of the river flow.
We are now in a position to determine the demand and supply behavior of farmers
in both markets. For farmer 1 and 2 we have the following net benefit functions:
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max
wi ,wi,1
[Bi (wi ) − q1(wi1 − ti1) + q2ti2] s.t. wi ≤ wi,1 (5.18)
where wi is water consumption and wi1 is the use of water rights of farmer i in market
1. The difference (wi1 − ti1) indicates the net position of farmer i. If it is positive
(negative) she sells (buys) water rights in market 1. ti1 and ti2 are the respective
water rights in both markets assigned to farmer i. Since both farmers cannot buy
water rights to use for water consumption from market 2, they only have the option
to sell their rights ti2. Thus, we have included the revenue from these sales in the
net benefit function. The demand function for each farmer follows from maximizing
Eq. (5.18) with respect to {wi , wi,1} subject to the constraint that water diversion
cannot be more than water rights used. From the optimality conditions
B
′
i (wi ) − λ = 0 (5.19)
−q1 + λ = 0 (5.20)
we can calculate the demand functions for the assumed specification of B
′
i = a − bwi
which yields
wˆi (p1) = a − q1
b
= 300 − q1, i = {1, 2} (5.21)
Determining farmer 3’s demand behavior is somewhat more comprehensive
because farmer 3 is a buyer of water rights in both markets. She maximizes
[B3(w3) − q1(w31 − t31) − q2(w32 − t32)], s.t. w3 ≤ w31 + w32 (5.22)
with respect to {w3, w31, w32} where w3, j are water rights demanded and utilized in
market j and t31 and t32 are water rights assigned in market 1 and 2 before trade
takes place. Thus, we have the following assignments of water rights for all farmers
and both markets.
t11 + t21 + t31 = (R − v¯1) and t12 + t22 + t32 = v¯1 (5.23)
We assume that farmer 3 consumes water as well, i.e., w3 > 0, and that he buys
water rights from the second market, i.e., w32 > 0 but not from the first market.8 The
optimality conditions are
B
′
i (wi ) − λ = 0 (5.24)
−q1 + λ ≤ 0 (5.25)
−q2 + λ = 0 (5.26)
If the overall market equilibrium leads to water prices such that q1 > q2, then farmer
3 does not buy in the first market (Eq. (5.25) applies with strict inequality). The
scenario is shown in Fig. 5.2.
8Subsequently, we will show why this scenario takes place with the assumed numerical values.
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Fig. 5.2 Equilibrium of locational water markets. Source own illustration
Total water demand in the upper market is equal to wˆ11(q1) + wˆ21(q1) since
farmer 3 does not participate in this market, i.e., w31 = 0. This demand is equal to
total water available in this stretch of the river, i.e., R − v¯1 = 150. The resulting
equilibrium price is q1 = 225.9
Similarly, the equilibrium of the second water market can be determined, i.e.,
wˆ32(q2) = t12 + t22 + t32 = v¯1. The resulting water price q2 is lower than q1.10 One
can see that our assumption has proven to be correct. If we insert the numerical
values into the demand functions we get wˆ11 = wˆ21 = (R − v¯1) = 150/2 = 75 and
wˆ32 = v¯1 = 150, which is identical to the optimal water allocation. Hence, to achieve
the optimal allocation two separate markets are required.
One can see that the implementation of water markets has to be done with caution.
If return flows or ecological concerns have to be taken into account, it is not enough to
simply set up a water market for a catchment area. Rather, an institutionally complex
system of interdependent markets must be established.
9Inserting the numerical values into the market equilibrium equation 2(a − q1)/b = R − v¯1 gives
2(300 − q1) = 150.
10The equilibrium price can be derived from the equilibrium condition in market 2 (a − q2)/b = v¯1
which yields q2 = 150.
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Box 5.1Water recovery management in the Murray–Darling Basin MDB
Australia is among the first countries that have implemented water mar-
kets. In particular, the Murray–Darling Basin (MDB) has been regulated by
market-oriented instruments, i.e., a cap-and-trade approach, in recent decades.
This experiment is assessed very differently in the literature, and it has been
criticized, amongst others, as piracy, organized theft of water, and misman-
agement. The background to this debate is the history of water reforms in the
MDBover the last 50 years, which became necessary due to increasing drought
and severe ecological damages. The Federal Government seized power under
the Water Act 2007 which, in 2012, led to a ten-year basin plan specifying so-
called sustainable diversion limits (SDLs). These were based on hydrological
and ecological limits. The water level of a river should not fall below 2/3 of its
natural height. The necessary restriction of water abstraction, however, would
have led to a substantial loss of income for the agricultural sector and would
have encountered much resistance. The government, therefore, decided to buy
back water entitlements and grant subsidies for technical measures to increase
irrigation efficiency: 2.5 bn. dollars were earmarked for the purchase of the
water entitlements and 3.5 bn. dollars. dollars for the subsidy measures.
Critics considered the unilateral granting of water rights to agribusiness as
theft. There were also other remarks:
• The implementation of the water plan was intransparent. The responsibil-
ities were unclear. This led to a high loss of confidence in government
action.
• There was a serious lack of monitoring of water consumption. The National
Water Commission, which was responsible for the monitoring, fulfilled the
implementation requirements only partly. Just about 70% of water con-
sumption has been metered. One of the reasons for this is that return flows
are difficult to calculate.
• Subsidies for the upgrade of the irrigation infrastructure have been rather
inefficient. This is not astonishing. We know from the analysis of the
rebound effect that price-oriented instruments (water price) can be more
efficient than fostering water saving indirectly by subsidy schemes.
The example of theMurray River shows how difficult it is to implement a man-
agement model in practice which is functional from a theoretical point of view.
Sources: Grafton and Wheeler (2018), Grafton et al. (2019)
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5.3 Water Entitlements andWater Allocations
Asmentioned above, some jurisdictions such as Australia and California, have estab-
lishedwatermarkets based on a cap-and-trade system. In a case inAustralia, thewater
in a catchment area is divided into a consumptive pool andwater for the environment.
The latter is water which must not be withdrawn from the water cycle. The consump-
tive pool instead defines the water that can be privately owned. A single share of this
consumptive pool is called water access entitlement. It is a perpetual or ongoing
entitlement to exclusive access to the water of the respective catchment area. Notice,
however, that this entitlement is defined in nominal volumes and does not imply a
perpetual allocation of water of this amount. The actual volume of water allocated
to an entitlement depends on the scarcity of available water in a given season. The
level of water allocation thus depends on the seasonal conditions of the water cycle.
As a rule, due to increasing water scarcity, the total of all annual allocations is now
likely to be below 100% of the consumptive pool.
Water users can use different instruments to cover their water use. They can
directly use the water assigned to their entitlements (water allocations), they can buy
additional water allocations or sell part or all of their allocations. Or they buy or sell
entitlements. Water rights are more long-term in nature. They entitle their holders
in each period (season) to a certain allocation of water. Water rights represent an
asset, such as shares in a company. Trading of entitlements is, therefore, also called
permanent trading. Thus, it is not surprising that empirical studies of the water
market have identified a distinct dependence of the entitlement price on interest
rates. Also, the price for water entitlements is higher than the price for short-term
water allocations because entitlements do not expire (although their actual water
claims are subject to seasonal fluctuations).
In the following, we will analyze the relationship between the market for enti-
tlements and the market for allocations in more detail. Since water entitlements are
assets with long-lasting validity, the interrelations should be examined in a dynamic
model context. However, we can also investigate the essential peculiarities in a sim-
ple, quasi-dynamic model.11
Let us introduce a representative water user. She derives benefit (or profits) from
the seasonal water use. At the same time she has to decide how much water to use
and how to handle her long-term entitlements, as well as her seasonal allocations.
This can be summarized in the following approach:
max
wt ,N
T∑
t=0
β t {E[B(wt ) − p˜t (wt − α˜t N )]} − q N (5.27)
11Meant by this is a model which, although it has a multi-period planning horizon, does not apply
dynamic optimization methods. The optimal demand for water allocations is determined for each
period, while the demand for water rights is determined only at the beginning of the planning period
(period 0).
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where E[..] is the expectation operator. wt are the seasonal water allocations of the
water user, p˜t is the price for allocated water in period t , N are the water entitlements
that are bought at the beginning of the planning process in period 0. α˜t N are the
water allocations allotted in each period to the owner of entitlements. This portion
is stochastic due to the seasonal weather conditions and their repercussions on the
water cycle. If we define ¯¯W as the total entitlements, i.e., the size of the consumptive
pool, we can define
α˜t = W˜t¯¯W
(5.28)
where W˜t is total water available in period t . Finally, we have the discount rate
β = 1/(1 + r), where r is the interest rate. Discounting takes place because the
water rights can be claimed in all periods.
The water user, e.g., a farmer, in the catchment area that is covered by the market
system first chooses the water allocations per season she wants to buy. This leads to
the usual optimality condition
B
′
(wt ) = p˜t (5.29)
From this equation, the allocation demand w˜t = wt ( p˜t ) for each period can be
derived. In our simple model, this demand does not depend on the decision with
respect to water entitlements.12 The decision on water consumption is independent
of the ownership of water rights. If she needs more water than assigned to her by
water allocations α˜t N , she buys additional water. In the reversed case, she sells part
of her water allocations. The question remains as to how many water entitlements
should be bought or sold. We have taken the long-term nature of this decision into
account in our model by making this decision ex ante, i.e., before the realization of
the actual water allocations are known. If we derive Eq. (5.27), with respect to N ,
we obtain
Π E[ p˜t α˜t ] − q (5.30)
where Π = ((1 + r)T − 1)/(r(1 + r)T ).13 We see that the objective function is lin-
ear in N. This is because the participant in the water market only looks at average
values. She does not assess the risk herself. Whether the volatility of allocations and
prices is high or low is irrelevant for the valuation of water rights. In reality, the risk
should play a role in the decision to buy or sell water entitlements, but to keep the
calculations simple, we ignore it here.
If a market equilibrium exists, Eq. (5.30) must be equal to zero. Otherwise, the
market participants could materialize arbitrage gains. Profits are made by either
12We have assumed that the water user is risk neutral, i.e., she does not care about the riskiness of
her decision.
13On average, each period produces the same profit. This makes it possible to write the discounting
formula more compactly. The derivation can be found in any introductory textbook on financial
economics
∑T
t=0 β t = ((1 + r)T − 1)/(r(1 + r)T ). This expression is greater than 1 for all t > 1.
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selling and buying back, or purchasing and reselling entitlements. Thus, utilizing
Eq. (5.28) leads to
Π [ p˜t α˜t ] − q = 0 ⇒ B E[ p˜t W˜t ]¯¯W
= q (5.31)
For the economic interpretation it is instructive to rewrite this equation. In doing so,
we make use of a simple factorization of covariances14
Π
[
p¯
W¯
¯¯W
+ cov( p˜, W˜ )¯¯W
]
= q (5.32)
Equation (5.32) summarizes the essential relationships between the two markets
in a compact way
• If one recalls the definition of Π , one sees that the relationship between the two
prices depends on the interest rate r. Since p¯, W¯ , and the covariance are determined
solely in the market for allocations, i.e., are exogenous to the entitlement market,
the interest rate affects q alone. Assume that the planning horizon is infinite, then
Π = 1/r . It is intuitive that with rising r the price q decreases and vice versa. This
is exactly what empirical studies have shown and it is rather plausible. We know
that this inverse relationship is observable in the stock market. High interest rates
decrease the value of shares and vice versa.
• When comparing the time series of both prices, it becomes evident that q is greater
than p. This is because thewater entitlements are assets, while thewater allocation
is only valid for one period.
• Without discounting, the average allocation price p¯ would be higher than q . This
can be seen from the expression in square brackets in Eq. (5.32). First of all, W¯/ ¯¯W
is less than 1 because the average seasonal allocation is less than the consumption
pool. Also, the covariance is negative because the price and the seasonal supply
of allocations are negatively related. If the allocation is high, the price is low and
vice versa. Therefore, for B=1 it holds that p¯ > q . That is plausible. The average
supply ofwater allocations is less than the amount ofwater entitlements (W¯ < ¯¯W ).
On average, water rights cannot be converted 100% into water allocations due to
water scarcity.
• It is also interesting to note that the price difference between q and p¯ decreases
with increasing variability (covariance) in the allocation market because the vari-
ability leads to a devaluation of water entitlements. This is not due to the valuation
of the risk (we have assumed risk neutrality), but due to the fact that with higher
volatility of W˜ the ownership of water rights must be worthless. If the negative
14The covariance of two stochastic variables x˜ and y˜ is defined as cov(x˜, y˜) = E[(x˜ − x¯)(y˜ − y¯)]
where x¯ = E[x˜] and y¯ = E[y˜] are the respective means. Multiplying yields cov(x˜, y˜) = E[x˜ y˜] −
x¯ y¯.
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correlation between the water allocations and prices increases in absolute value,
an increase in allocations (α˜) is countervailed by a sharp price decrease ( p˜) and
vice versa.
5.4 Exercises
Exercise 5.1 Optimal water allocation for the simple river basin model
We have chosen parameter values such that the unidirectionality of the river does not
play a role, i.e., the allocation ofwater to farmer 1 and2 is not constrained byEq. (5.2).
Thus, we can take the optimality conditions Eqs. (5.7)–(5.9) to calculate the optimal
values and check whether they violate the constraint (5.2). Inserting B
′
i = 300 − wi
and the numerical values R = 300 and h = 0.5 it follows from Eq. (5.7) that
(300 − w1)/(1 − 0.5) = 300 − w2 (5.33)
From Eq. (5.8), we have w2 = w3 such that Eq. (5.9), can be written as
2w2 = 300 − (1 − 0.5)w1 (5.34)
From Eqs. (5.33) and (5.34), it follows that {w∗1 = 200, w∗2 = 100}. If we insert these
values in Eq. (5.2) we have w∗1 + w∗2 = 300 ≤ R = 300. The optimal values do not
violate the constraint. Hence, our assumption that λ1 = 0 was plausible. Finally, we
can calculate the optimal allocation for farmer 3 which is simply the return flow
0.5w∗1 = 100.
Exercise 5.2 NGO intervention in the water market
There are some initiatives in the European carbon market to buy up C O2 certificates
and then cancel their validity. Of course, this strategy assumes that NGOs are allowed
to participate in trading or have an accredited trader who makes purchases on their
behalf in the market. We want to transfer this idea to a water market. We assume
that a water market has been implemented in a water catchment area. The water
authorities provide a fixed amount of water rights for purchase (water supply) that
can be bought by the local economy (farmers, industry,municipalities). Themembers
of a local NGO find that too many water rights have been emitted and decide to buy
and cancel water rights on the basis of donations in the market.
Wewant to derive thewater demand of the local economy from the usual approach
of benefit maximization.
max
w
[B(w) − pw] ⇒ B ′(w) = p (5.35)
As in Sect. 5.3, we assume a quadratic benefit function. The demand function is,
therefore, linear (see Eq. (5.11)).
w = (a − p)/b (5.36)
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From the NGO’s point of view, the assessment of water use leads to environmental
damage, which can be expressed by a damage function. From the NGO’s point of
view, the damage lies in the fact that the abstraction of water for economic and
consumption purposes damages the local ecosystem. We summarize this assessment
by a quadratic damage function, from which the demand for water rights can also be
derived. We assume that the purchases are covered by donations.
min
v
[(D/2)(W¯ − v)2 + pv] ⇒ D(W¯ − v) = p (5.37)
where D > 0 is a constant, W¯ the amount of water entitlements issued by the local
water authority and v the water demand of the NGO. From Eq. (5.37), the water
demand function of the NGO follows:
v = W¯ − p/D (5.38)
Adding both demand functions to total demand and equating to the regulated water
supply allows the calculation of the equilibrium price
a − p
b
+ [W¯ − p/D] = W¯ ⇒ p∗ = Da
(D + b) (5.39)
The intervention of NGOs in the water market apparently leads to the fact that the
water price is independent of the regulated supply of water rights. The NGOs react
to every change in the water supply with compensatory purchases. This can be seen
from Eq. (5.38). Thus, if NGOs are allowed access to the water market, they take
over the political control of the water supply displacing the local authorities. This
may be a problem from a democratic point of view. However, note that our model’s
result is only valid as long as the financing of the purchases is secured by donations.
If their budgets are limited, the effective purchases might be less than v.
Exercise 5.3 Markets for entitlements and allocations
This problem is about calculating the prices for the market for water entitlements and
for themarket for water allocations.We assume that two identical farmers have water
rights corresponding to the full amount of the water pool, say ¯¯W = 60. The benefit
function of both farmers is identical and quadratic, so the first derivative is linear,
B
′
i (wi ) = a − bwi , whereby by assumption a = 615 and b = 1. From Eq. (5.29), the
demand function follows
w( p˜) = 615 − p˜ (5.40)
The equilibriumprice can be determined by setting total demand equal to the seasonal
water supply W˜
2w( p˜) = 2(615 − p˜) = W˜ ⇒ p˜ = 615 − 1
2
W˜ (5.41)
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The average price is calculated by taking the expectation of both sides, yielding
p¯ = E[ p˜] = 615 − 1
2
W¯ (5.42)
where W¯ = E[W˜ ]. Let us assume that W˜ is independent and identically distributed,
i.e., the probability density is identical for all W˜ and independent across all periods
supported by a finite interval I = [0, ¯¯W ], where ¯¯W = 60. From statistics textbooks
we know
W¯ =
¯¯W
2
and Var[W˜ ] =
¯¯W 2
12
(5.43)
where V ar [W˜ ] is the variance of the periodical water supply. Due to our assumption,
the mean water allocation to both farmers is half of total entitlements leading to
α¯ = (1/2) (See Eq. (5.28)).
Now we are able to calculate the average price for water allocations. From
Eq. (5.42), it follows
p¯ = 615 − W¯
2
= 615 −
¯¯W
4
= 615 − 15 = 600 (5.44)
In order to calculate the price for water rights, we have to determine the covariance
in Eq. (5.32). Utilizing Eqs. (5.41) and (5.42), we have
cov[ p˜, W˜ ] = E
[(
615 − W˜
2
− 615 + W¯
2
)
(W˜ − W¯ )
]
= −1
2
E[(W˜ − W¯ )2] = −1
2
Var[W˜ ]
(5.45)
Inserting the numerical values yields cov[ p˜, W˜ ] = −(1/2)602/12 = −3600/24 =
−150.
Assuming that the horizon T is infinite, we know that Π = 1/r . Taking r = 0.1
it is straightforward to calculate the entitlement price q . Simply insert the numerical
values in Eq. (5.32). This yields
q = (1/0.1)[(1/2) p¯ − 150] = 10(600 × (1/2) − 150) = 1500. (5.46)
Due to the discount factor and the infinite planning horizon the price for water
entitlements is much higher than the price for the seasonal water allocations.
5.5 Further Reading
The economic analysis of water markets started quite early at a time when water
allocation did not follow economic criteria but was determined solely by ownership
structures. Certainly, the increasing scarcity of water in many regions of the world
has led to an increased focus on economic efficiency criteria in water allocation.
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Olmstead and Stavins (2009) provides an overview in which the welfare effects
of price-oriented allocations are compared to those of quantity allocations based
on rights. The functioning of water markets is subject to certain conditions, which
Endo et al. (2018) further specify. In establishing these conditions, they examine
in which countries of the world markets could be introduced in principle. Some
examples are presented in the volume (Easter and Huang 2014a). Australia provides
the first experience with water markets, and Turral et al. (2005) and Grafton and
Wheeler (2018) provide an overview about the evolution of the case of the Murray–
DarlingBasin. They also analyze the effects of a policymix (watermarket, subsidies).
Grafton and Wheeler (2018) and Grafton et al. (2019) examine further management
approaches in Mexico, Tanzania, USA, and Vietnam.
In water markets, specific hydrological relationships must be taken into account.
Griffin and Hsu (1993) have examined these interrelationships in detail within the
framework of amarketmodel. Return flows, in particular, are taken into account here.
Ansink and Houba (2012) deal with competition problems. How do water markets
allocate scarce water when the water supply along a river is monopolized? Finally,
Wheeler et al. (2008) empirically investigate the determinants that explain the price
difference between water allocations and water entitlements.
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6TransboundaryWater ResourceManagement
6.1 Water Rivalry,Agreements, and InternationalWater Rights
There are 276 international river basins worldwide which stretch over two or more
countries (De Stefano et al. 2012). About 40% of the world population lives in
international river basins (Water 2008). A major issue in transboundary rivers arises
when claims for water exceed the available water quantity. Therefore, rules and legal
paradigms are required to prevent tensions between competing consumers.
There exist two extreme legal paradigms:
• First is the principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS). Every state has
the right to abstract and use the water in the basin on the basis of a souvereign
decision of the state within its territory. This approach favors the upstream country
which is able to fully cover its claims as long as enough water is available in the
river.
• Second, the principle of Absolute Territorial Integrity (ATI) concerns the alloca-
tion of water between two states which are ordered sequentially along the course
of the river. In that case, the downstream country must not be negatively affected
by the upstream actor. For scarce water resources in the river, a diversion of
water by the upstream state may increase the shortage and, therefore, shrinks the
availability of water for the downstream country. Thus, a negative impact would
occur for the downstream state and hence the diversion of water by the upstream
state would not be allowed under the ATI principle. The ATI principle, therefore,
favors, if any, the downstream state.
Currently, these two extreme approaches are diametral to each other and are com-
monly rejected in international water policy. Therefore, the “Territorial Integration of
All Basin States” (TIBS) as well as the approach of Limited Territorial Sovereignty
(LTS) are compromises between the conflicting ATS and ATI principle.
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• The TIBS principle states that the water in the river is a common resource and any
riparian has the right to divert an appropriate share regardless of its river position
and its river inflow contribution.
• The LTS principle enables each riparian to use the water while any other riparian
is not harmed by the usage. Due to its flexibility and its room for interpretation,
this LTS principle is widely accepted in international water policy (Moes 2013).
International laws for allocatingwater of transboundary sourcesmainly developed
in the second half of the twentieth century. These range from a multitude of bilateral
contracts to a number of UN conventions which are valid at a global scale. In this
textbook, we focus on the development of the most important conventions.1 These
contain the
• Helsinki Rules on the Use of International Rivers agreed upon in 1966;
• UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes (1997);
• Berlin Rules on Water Resources from the year 2004.
The Helsinki rules were agreed upon at the 52nd Conference of the International
LawAssociation (ILA) in August 1966, and they regulate the usage of transboundary
rivers and their connected groundwaters. The Helsinki Rules consist of a total of
37 articles which are split into six chapters (International Law Association 1966).
Articles 4 and 5 are most relevant for transboundary river management. Article 4
entitles any riparian to a reasonable and equitable share in the use of water,2 while
Article 5 defines the criteria to estimate this reasonable and equitable share of water
usage. These criteria are, for instance, the geography and hydrology of the basin,
past utilization, economic and social needs, and comparative costs of an alternative.3
The Helsinki Rules were a quite important inspiration for the UN Convention on the
1For a more detailed overview of the rules, we recommend, for instance, Van Puymbroeck (2003).
2Article 4 of Helsinki Rules: “Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and
equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.”
3Article 5 of Helsinki Rules:
1. What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article 4 is to be determined in
the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
2. Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to
(a) the geography of the basin, including, in particular, the extent of the drainage area in the
territory of each basin State; (b) the hydrology of the basin, including, in particular, the contri-
bution of water by each basin State; (c) the climate affecting the basin; (d) the past utilization of
the waters of the basin, including, in particular, existing utilization; (e) the economic and social
needs of each basin State; (f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin
State; (g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs
of each basin State; (h) the availability of other resources; (i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste
in the utilization of waters of the basin; (j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of
the co-basin States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and (k) the degree to which the
needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.
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Protection and Use of TransboundaryWatercourses and International Lakes in 1997,
and were superseded by the Berlin Rules on Water Resources in the year 2004.
On May 21, 1997, the General Assembly of the UN passed the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which is also known as the UN
Watercourses Convention.4 Until the present, it is the only treaty under international
law with global validation which rules the non-navigational usage of international
water sources including both surface and groundwater (Wehling 2018). It mainly
aims to further the optimal and sustainable usage as well as to ensure the develop-
ment and conservation of internationalwater sources (Salman 2007). Because of their
wide acceptance, the former explained principle of Limited Territorial Sovereignty
(LTS) is incorporated in the convention. Based on Article 5, the water utilization
has to be equitable and reasonable. The factors for such an equitable and reason-
able usage are listed in Article 6 of the convention. These factors are, for instance,
natural characteristics such as geographical and hydrological conditions, social and
economic needs as well as the population dependent on the watercourse. Further-
more, the following articles oblige the riparian states to take appropriate measures to
prevent significant harm to other watercourse states, to cooperate with each other on
the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith, as
well as to a regular exchange of available data and information on the condition of
the watercourse (e.g., hydrological, meteorological, and water quality conditions).
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources—which replaced the Helsinki Rules—
were passed at the 71st Conference of the International Law Association (ILA),
August 21, 2004. While the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention established the
right for each riparian state to a reasonable and equitable share, the Berlin Rules
emphasize the obligation to manage the shared watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner (Salman 2007). The term manage is specified in Article 3 (14) of
theBerlinRules and contains the development, use, protection, allocation, regulation,
and control of the waters. In contrast to the former principles, the Berlin rules are
not only valid for international watercourses, but also relevant for national water
sources. Furthermore, the Berlin Rules have downgraded the principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization and have equated this principle with the obligation of not
causing significant harm to other riparians (Salman 2007; Bourne 2004).
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with
that of other relevant factors. In determiningwhat is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant
factors are to be considered together and a conclusion is reached on the basis of the whole.
4This convention entered into force when the minimum quorum for ratification was reached on
August 17, 2014, after Vietnam signed the ratification document as the 35th state.
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6.2 Benefit Sharing BetweenTwo Riparians
6.2.1 Principles of Benefit Sharing
In Sect. 3.7, we have analyzed the IWRM approach for water allocation along rivers
in which the generated benefit in the entire basin was maximized. However, this
analysis ignores the fact that generated benefits could be arbitrarily assigned between
the riparians by realizing side payments between the riparians. This question about
an efficient and incentive-compatible assignment of the basin’s benefit is the main
focus of the benefit sharing problem.5
In this section, we focus on the case with just two riparians at an international
water body. This is quite common, as themajority of international rivers are shared by
just two riparian states (De Stefano et al. 2012). There exist two possible cooperation
scenarios in such a basin:
• Either the riparians act unilaterally in a noncooperative way where they maximize
their individual benefit from water usage,
• or they form a joint arrangement where they act in a cooperative manner which
means that both riparians consume the water in such a way that the common
benefit in the entire basin is maximized.6
If both states act in a noncooperative manner, country 1 diverts the amount wNC1
and generates the benefit B1(wNC1 ), while country 2 receives the water amount w
NC
2
and generates the benefit B2(wNC2 ). Thus, the benefit generated in the entire basin is
B1(wNC1 ) + B2(wNC2 ).
However, if both riparians make an agreement where they act and share the water
in a cooperative manner, we assume that states 1 and 2 receive the water amount wC1
and wC2 , respectively. The resulting benefit in the entire basin is B1(w
C
1 ) + B2(wC2 ).
The cooperation gain Δ is the additionally generated benefit in the entire basin
compared to the noncooperation scenario (see (6.1)):
Δ = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − B1(wNC1 ) − B2(wNC2 ) (6.1)
From an economic perspective, there is only an incentive for forming a joint arrange-
ment if the cooperation gain is positive (Δ > 0), which means
B1(w
C
1 ) + B2(wC2 ) > B1(wNC1 ) + B2(wNC2 ) (6.2)
The generated benefit from consumption B1(wC1 ) and B2(w
C
2 ) results from the opti-
mal water allocation in the joint arrangement. However, the assignment of benefit to
5In this context, incentive compatible means that each riparian has an incentive for realizing the
social-optimal solution.
6A joint arrangement is only achievable if both riparians are willing to form a joint arrangement
where they cooperate. However otherwise, if one or both riparians do not want to form a joint
arrangement, both riparians act unilaterally in a noncooperative way.
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the riparians is the focus of benefit sharing problems. The benefit of each riparian is
not only affected by the benefit from consumption, but also by side payments paid
or received.7
The benefit of the riparians 1 and 2 in a joint arrangementwhich are represented by
the variables x1 and x2 results, therefore, from the benefit of consumption (B1(wC1 )
and B2(wC2 )) and the level of the side payments, with sp1,2 representing the side
payments made by riparian 1, while sp2,1 stands for the side payments made by
riparian 2:
x1 = B1(wC1 ) + sp2,1 − sp1,2
x2 = B2(wC2 ) + sp1,2 − sp2,1
(6.3)
Of course the assignment of benefits to the riparians has to be equal to the generated
benefit in the joint arrangement which is represented as (6.4)
x1 + x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) (6.4)
A solution in which the sum of the assigned benefits exceeds the total generated
benefits in the joint arrangement (x1 + x2 > B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 )) is not realizable
and would therefore violate the feasibility condition. However, the contrary case
in which the sum of assigned benefits falls below the total generated benefits (x1 +
x2 < B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 )) is Pareto-inefficient andwould therefore violate thePareto-
efficiency condition. The determination of the assigned benefits to the riparians in a
joint arrangement is the main focus of the benefit sharing problem.
If we assume that side payments are made by just one riparian, it is possible
to derive from Eq. (6.3) that riparian 1 has to make side payments if its assigned
benefit x1 falls below its benefit from consumption B1(wC1 ), while similarly, riparian
2 has to make side payments if its assigned benefit x2 falls below its benefit from
consumption B2(wC2 ). The level of the side payments results from the difference
between the assigned benefits (x1 and x2) and the benefit from consumption (B1(wC1 )
and B2(wC2 )) (see Eq.6.5).
If: x1 < B1(w
C
1 ) ⇔ x2 > B2(wC2 ) then: sp1,2 = B1(wC1 ) − x1 = x2 − B2(wC2 )
If: x1 > B1(w
C
1 ) ⇔ x2 < B2(wC2 ) then: sp2,1 = x1 − B1(wC1 ) = B2(wC2 ) − x2
(6.5)
In a cooperative arrangement, the riparians have to receive at least the benefit
which they would have gained if they acted unilaterally. This requirement is also
known as individual rationality, which has the following algebraic formulation:
x1 ≥ B1(wNC1 )
x2 ≥ B2(wNC2 )
(6.6)
7Side payments are payment transactions between the riparians; the side payment is beneficial for
the receiving riparian, while it is a financial burden for the paying one.
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A riparian whose individual rationality condition is not met has an incentive to leave
the joint arrangement and act in a noncooperative way.
Hence, due to the feasibility and Pareto-optimality conditions (see Eq. (6.4)) as
well as the individual rationality condition (see Eq. (6.6)), sharing of the cooperation
gain Δ is the main focus of the benefit sharing problem with two riparians.
6.2.2 UID,DID and the Shapley Solution
There are two extreme solutions for assigning the cooperation gain to the riparians,
either the first or the second riparian receives the entire cooperation gain. Assuming
riparian 1 is the upstream and riparian 2 is the downstream riparian, it is possible to
distinguish between two extreme scenarios regarding the allocation of the coopera-
tion gain:
• Upstream incremental distribution (UID): When applying the UID approach,
the cooperation gain is completely assigned to the upstream riparian 1, while the
downstream riparian 2 just gets enough benefit to meet its individual rationality
condition:
xU I D1 = B1(wNC1 ) + Δ
xU I D2 = B2(wNC2 )
(6.7)
If we assume that either riparian 1 makes side payments (sp1,2 > 0 ∧ sp2,1 = 0)
which is the case if xU I D1 < B1(w
C
1 ) or riparian 2 makes side payments (sp2,1 >
0 ∧ sp1,2 = 0) which is the case if xU I D2 < B2(wC1 ), it is possible to determine
the level of side payments:
sp1,2 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
B1(wC1 ) − B1(wNC1 ) − Δ = B2(wNC2 ) − B2(wC2 ) if: xU I D1 < B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xU I D2 > B2(wC2 )
0 if: xU I D1 ≥ B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xU I D2 ≤ B2(wC2 )
p2,1 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
B1(wNC1 ) + Δ − B1(wC1 ) = B2(wC2 ) − B2(wNC2 ) if: xU I D1 > B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xU I D2 < B2(wC2 )
0 if: xU I D1 ≤ B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xU I D2 ≥ B2(wC2 )
(6.8)
• Downstream incremental distribution (DID): In the DID approach, the cooper-
ation gain Δ is completely assigned to the downstream riparian 2. The upstream
riparian 1 receives benefit, such that its individual rationality condition is fulfilled.
xDI D1 = B1(wNC1 )
xDI D2 = B2(wNC2 ) + Δ
(6.9)
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Hence, the following side payments result:
p1,2 =
{
B1(w
C
1 ) − B1(wNC1 ) = B2(wNC2 ) + Δ − B2(wC2 ) if: xDI D1 < B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xDI D2 > B2(wC2 )
0 if: xDI D1 ≥ B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xDI D2 ≤ B2(wC2 )
p2,1 =
{
B1(w
NC
1 ) − B1(wC1 ) = B2(wC2 ) − B2(wNC2 ) − Δ if: xDI D1 > B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xDI D2 < B2(wC2 )
0 if: xDI D1 ≤ B1(wC1 ) ⇔ xDI D2 ≥ B2(wC2 )
(6.10)
Based on these two extreme cases, it is possible to find all possible realizations
for x1 and x2 for the benefit sharing problem based on the linear combination of the
extreme scenarios (see Eq.6.11):
x1 = β · xU I D1 + (1 − β) · xDI D1 ⇔ x1 = B1(wNC1 ) + β · Δ
x2 = β · xU I D2 + (1 − β) · xDI D2 ⇔ x2 = B2(wNC2 ) + (1 − β) · Δ
with: 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
(6.11)
The value of parameter β is defined within the range [0, 1]. It becomes obvious from
Eq.6.11 that we get the UID or DID solution if β is set equal to 0 or 1, respectively.
The higher the value of β, the more advantageous the benefit sharing solution for the
upstream user 1, while the profit for the downstream user 2 raises with a decreasing
value of β.
A further specific case is the determination of β with β = 0.5 which means
that each riparian receives half of the cooperation gain. This solution results from
applying the Shapley value approach for the case with two riparians (Shapley 1953).
Therefore, this could be termed the Shapley solution. The Shapley solutions for x SH1
and x SH2 are
x SH1 = B1(wNC1 ) + 0.5 · Δ
x SH2 = B2(wNC2 ) + 0.5 · Δ
(6.12)
For this Shapley solution, the following side payments result on the basis of Eqs. 6.5
and 6.12:
sp1,2 =
{
B1(w
C
1 ) − B1(wNC1 ) − 0.5 · Δ = B2(wNC2 ) + 0.5 · Δ − B2(wC2 ) if: x SH1 < B1(wC1 ) ⇔ x SH2 > B2(wC2 )
0 if: x SH1 ≥ B1(wC1 ) ⇔ x SH2 ≤ B2(wC2 )
sp2,1 =
{
B1(w
NC
1 ) − B1(wC1 ) + 0.5 · Δ = B2(wC2 ) − B2(wNC2 ) − 0.5 · Δ if: x SH1 > B1(wC1 ) ⇔ x SH2 < B2(wC2 )
0 if: x SH1 ≤ B1(wC1 ) ⇔ x SH2 ≥ B2(wC2 )
(6.13)
The benefit sharing problem in a basin with two riparians is also illustrated by
Fig. 6.1. We draw riparian 1’s assigned benefit (x1) on the horizontal axis (abscissa),
while the benefit of riparian 2 is illustrated on the vertical axis (ordinate). The benefits
of the riparians 1 and 2 when acting unilaterally in a noncooperative way (B1(wNC1 )
and B2(wNC2 )) are pictured in this graph by the vertical and horizontal functions,
respectively. In this diagram, these two functions have the algebraic expression: x1 =
B1(wNC1 ) and x2 = B2(wNC2 ). The benefit generated in the basin when both riparians
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Fig. 6.1 Benefit sharing in a basin with two riparians. Source own illustration
form a joint arrangement is illustrated by the monotonous-decreasing diagonal line.
In this diagram, the function has the algebraic expression: x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) −
x1 due to Eq.6.4. This means the higher the assignment of benefits to riparian 1, the
lower the assignment to riparian 2 and vice versa. For meeting the feasibility and
Pareto-efficiency conditions, the benefit sharing solution has to be located on the
function.8
The function x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − x1 intersects with the horizontal and
vertical axes at the level B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ). These points can be interpreted as
the full assignment of the basin’s benefit to just one riparian. Of course, these
two benefit sharing solutions would meet the feasibility and Pareto-efficiency con-
ditions, but would fail the individual rationality condition which states that the
assignment of benefits to each riparian must be as high as the benefit the riparians
would generate if they acted unilaterally in a noncooperative manner, which means
x1 ≥ B1(wNC1 ) and x2 ≥ B2(wNC2 ) (see Eq.6.6). Therefore, for meeting the individ-
ual rationality condition, the UID solution with x1 = xU I D1 = B1(wNC1 ) + Δ and
x2 = xU I D2 = B2(wNC2 ) limits the assigned benefit to the upstream riparian 1 to the
maximum level B1(wNC1 ) + Δ, while theDID solutionwith x1 = xDI D1 = B1(wNC1 )
and x2 = xDI D2 = B2(wNC2 ) + Δ determines the maximum possible assigned ben-
efit for riparian 2 to the level B2(wNC2 ) + Δ. Therefore, the solutions which are on
8A solution which is located in between the area which is spanned by the axis and the function
x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − x1 would fail the Pareto-efficiency condition, because fewer benefits are
allocated than generated, while a solution beyond the function x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − x1 would
fail the feasibility condition, because more benefits are allocated to the riparians than generated.
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the function x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − x1 and which are in between the UID and
DID solution, which means B1(wNC1 ) ≤ x1 ≤ B1(wNC1 ) + Δ and B2(wNC2 ) ≤ x2 ≤
B2(wNC2 ) + Δ, form the set of solutions for the benefit sharing problem with two
riparians.
A specific focal point solution of this benefit sharing problem is the Shapley solu-
tion with x1 = x SH1 = B1(wNC1 ) + 0.5 · Δ and x2 = x SH2 = B2(wNC2 ) + 0.5 · Δ.
This solution could be found in Fig. 6.1 at the intersection point between the
monotonous-decreasing diagonal function x2 = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − x1 and the
45◦-degree line whose origin is at the intersection of the vertical and horizontal
lines that represent the benefit for noncooperative acting riparians x1 = B1(wNC1 )
and x2 = B2(wNC1 ).
6.3 Benefit Sharing Between More ThanTwo Riparians
In this section, we focus on methods to allocate the generated benefits in a basin with
more than two riparians.9
6.3.1 Model of a River Basin
6.3.1.1 Superadditivity Condition
If the solution of the allocation problem is beneficial for all riparians, they have
an incentive to form a cooperation scheme where they decide together about water
management plans, water allocation strategies, and the allotment of benefits. An
important condition for forming joint arrangements is the superadditivity of benefits
which can be expressed by the following relation:
V (S) + V (T ) ≤ V (S ∪ T ) with: S ∩ T = ∅ (6.14)
The sets S and T stand for coalitions where participants, which are represented by
elements of these sets, act in a cooperative manner. The sets could contain just one
element or a multitude of elements. If the set S or T contains just one element,
the corresponding riparian is not participating in a joint arrangement and, therefore,
acts unilaterally in a noncooperative manner. However, if there are a multitude of
elements in the set, the corresponding riparians act together in a sub-coalition. For
the analysis of superadditivity, one riparian cannot be part of both sets S and T , hence
S ∩ T = ∅. In the case of a grand coalition, all riparians act in one joint arrangement,
whichmeans that the union set S ∪ T would contain all riparians.10 The V (...) stands
for the benefit which can be generated in the respective coalition, therefore, it is the
9The chapter-annex (Sect. 6.9) provides a full account to the mathematical derivations.
10The grand coalition cannot be represented by S or T , while a unilaterally acting player can not
be represented by S ∪ T . Sub-coalitions can be represented by S, T as well as by S ∪ T .
218 6 TransboundaryWater Resource Management
value of the coalition. The superadditivity condition (6.14) states that the value of a
joint arrangement between the sub-coalitions S and T must be at least as high as the
sum of values of arrangements S and T .
If the superadditivity condition is fulfilled, the additional benefit due to the joining
of S and T to a mutual arrangement can be expressed by the following equation:
V (S ∪ T ) − V (S) − V (T ) (6.15)
If the superadditivity condition holds for all cooperation arrangements, the highest
benefits for the entire basin can be generated by forming the grand coalition.11
Finally, for finding adequate solutions for sharing the benefit between the riparians
of a coalition, methods from cooperative game theory can be applied.12
6.3.1.2 General Procedure for Solving a Benefit Sharing Problem
For solving the benefit sharing problemwithin a river basin, the first step is to set up a
model of the river containing the riparians, their benefit and cost functions as well as
the main hydrological conditions such as natural external inflows into the river and
the flow direction. Afterwards, various options for cooperation in the river basin are
addressed. Every riparian has the option either to cooperate and form an arrangement
with other riparians, or not to cooperate and act unilaterally. Therefore, it is usually
possible to form either one joint arrangement (grand coalition), or to arrange different
forms of sub-coalitions between selected riparians. Further, it is also possible that
no arrangement occurs in the basin, so that every riparian acts unilaterally. These
different options of cooperation are quantified by calculating the joint benefit within
the cooperation arrangement and by finding the individual benefit of each unilaterally
acting riparian for any cooperation scenario. Finally, it is important to find a way
to allocate the benefit generated in a joint arrangement between the participating
riparians.
For this benefit sharing issue, various techniques from cooperative game theory
can be applied. In this context, we focus on the concept of the core which gives a set
of possible solutions to the question of how to share the benefit of a joint arrange-
ment between its member riparians. Based on this, the bargaining power of each
riparian can be found. While the core gives a set of possible solutions, there also
11In this textbook, we focus on sharing benefits. However, if there is a cost game (e.g., realizing
a dam project under different coalition scenarios), the subadditivity condition has to be fulfilled
which can be expressed by the following formulation:
C(S) + C(T ) ≥ C(S ∪ T ) with: S ∩ T = ∅
The C(...) represents the cost for the related coalition. The subadditivity condition means that the
cost under a cooperative arrangement between coalition S and T must not exceed the sum of costs if
coalition S and T act separately. If this subadditivity condition is fulfilled for all coalition scenarios,
the lowest cost is caused by forming the grand coalition.
12In contrast to the concepts of noncooperative game theorywhich aremore popular in the economic
literature, interaction and payments between the relevant actors are possible in cooperative game
theory.
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Fig. 6.2 Network of a
hypothetical river basin.
Source own illustration
exist focal point solution concepts for calculating concrete results for sharing the
benefit: We focus on the concept of the Shapley value, the Nash-Harsanyi solution,
and the nucleolus. The Shapley value allocates the benefits according to the strength
of each player in the joint arrangement, while the Nash-Harsanyi solution maximizes
the additional utility from cooperation in a joint arrangement compared to the non-
cooperative case for each riparian. The nucleolus is a procedure for minimizing the
maximum objection against the benefit sharing solution. Finally, parameters indicat-
ing the acceptability of a benefit sharing solution can be calculated. Nonacceptance
of a solution results if one riparian views its payoff as unfair against the payoff of
other players in the coalition. The higher the nonacceptance, the higher the risk that
the unsatisfied player will leave the coalition.
The procedure which was explained for the general case above is now applied to a
hypothetical river basin whose water is shared by three riparians. We assume a river
basin (see Fig. 6.2) which consists of upstream, midstream, and downstream ripari-
ans, represented by index i with i = {1, 2, 3}. The river is fed by an inflow upstream
of the first user; there are no other external inflows. By consuming thewater, the ripar-
ians generate benefits. Assuming a constant marginal benefit, the benefit increases
linearly with increasing consumption. If the available water amounts are consumed
completely by the upstream or midstream or downstream user, the generated benefit
is α or β or γ , respectively. Furthermore, we suppose the relation α < β < γ , which
means that the upstream riparian is the least productive one while the downstream
user is the most productive one. Backflows to the river after withdrawing and con-
suming do not occur for this hypothetical case, hence the consumption of water is
completely rivalrous. Furthermore, there are no limitations regarding the access to
and extraction of water.
Options of Cooperation
For the hypothetical river network, there are different options of cooperation:
• All riparians act unilaterally which means that an arrangement in the river basin
does not exist. The set which states the occurring coalition is, therefore, an empty
set, ∅. The unilateral acting of riparians is stated with sets which just contain one
element. This means if riparians 1, 2, and 3 act unilaterally, this is stated by the
formulation {1}, {2}, and {3}, respectively.
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Table 6.1 Generated benefits for different cooperation scenarios
Coalition Benefit for ...
Non-cooperating Coalition Entire
Basin
{1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
∅ α 0 0 – – – - α
{1, 2} – – 0 β – – – β
{1, 3} – 0 – – α – – α
{2, 3} α – – – – 0 – α
{1, 2, 3} – – – – – – γ γ
• Two of three actors cooperate with each other. Hence, the following arrangements
between the riparians are possible: {1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 3}. The residual riparian
that is not a member of the coalition acts unilaterally.
• All actors cooperate in one joint arrangement and thus form a grand coalition,
which is symbolized by {1, 2, 3}.
Value of Coalitions
For the different options of cooperations, different levels of generated benefits can
be found which are summarized in Table6.1.
If no arrangement is formed between the riparians, the available water is com-
pletely consumed by the upstream user who is able to generate a benefit α. Further,
downstream users do not receive any amount of water from the river and therefore
cannot generate any benefit. The same water consumption pattern in the basin is also
observable, if the mid- and downstream riparians form a coalition {2, 3} without the
upstream user.13 However, if the up- and downstream users arrange a cooperation
without themidstream riparian, {1, 3}, there seems to be an incentive for the upstream
one to leave water in the river, because the downstream riparian could generate the
highest benefit for the coalition. However, the intermediatemidstream riparianwould
seize the full amount of water, which is also known as leakage. (Ansink et al. 2012)
This reaction of the midstream is anticipated by the upstream, hence the upstream
would withdraw the total amount of water to maximize the benefit for the formed
coalition. The generated benefit for the coalition would be α, while the midstream
does not receive any amount of water.
If all the riparians form a joint cooperative arrangement, {1, 2, 3}, the upstream
and midstream leave the total amount of water in the river, hence the downstream
user is the only one who uses the water and is able to generate a benefit of γ for the
grand coalition.
13This means that for the coalition {2, 3}, the same situation occurs as for the case that all riparians
act unilaterally. The total amount of water is consumed by the upstream user who generates a benefit
of α. The coalition of the mid- and downstream users {2, 3} does not receive any amount of water
and gets a benefit of 0.
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Superadditivity Conditions
For the presented case, the superadditivity condition holds for all cooperation sce-
narios:
V ({1})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
+ V ({2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({1, 2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β
→ α ≤ β 
V ({1})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
+ V ({3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({1, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
→ α ≤ α 
V ({2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ V ({3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
→ 0 ≤ 0 
V ({1})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
+ V ({2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ V ({3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({1, 2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γ
→ α ≤ γ 
V ({1, 2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β
+ V ({3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({1, 2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γ
→ β ≤ γ 
V ({1, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
+ V ({2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({1, 2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γ
→ α ≤ γ 
V ({1})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α
+ V ({2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ V ({1, 2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γ
→ α ≤ γ 
Due to this fulfillment of the superadditivity condition, the grand coalition is the
best option in order to maximize the total benefit in the entire basin. The result is
also visible from the rightmost column of Table 6.1, which illustrates the aggregated
benefit in the river basin for all possible cooperation scenarios.
Sharing the Benefits
After forming the grand coalition, the generated benefit with the level of γ has
to be shared between all riparians. For this bargaining problem, different methods
from cooperative game theory are available such as the core or various focal point
solutions, for instance, the Shapley value, the Nash-Harsanyi solution as well as
the nucleolus. For this analysis, the sets I , S, and G are defined. I contains as set
elements those riparians which act unilaterally in a noncooperative way. Therefore,
the value of the characteristic function for the set I , being V (I ), is based either on the
benefits for the non-cooperating case in the entire river basin (see line ∅ of Tables6.1
and 6.2) or on the minimum benefit which is gained under all coalition scenarios in
which the relevant riparian is not a member (see Table 6.2).
Regardless of the applied approach, both procedures result in the same solution for
this example. In the unilateral acting case, riparian 1 generates a benefit of α, while
riparians 2 and 3 are not able to divert any water amounts and generate, therefore,
a benefit of 0. The set S represents all possible sub-coalitions, which means that
a cooperative scheme is formed between 2 or more riparians but does not contain
all riparians of the basin. For the presented example, the three tuples {1, 2}, {1, 3},
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Table 6.2 Generated benefits of unilaterally acting riparians for different cooperation scenarios
Coalition Benefit for ...
Non-cooperating
{1} {2} {3}
∅ α 0 0
{1, 2} – – 0
{1, 3} – 0 –
{2, 3} α – –
MINIMUM α 0 0
Table 6.3 Value of cooperations
V (I ) V (S) V (G)
V ({1}) V ({2}) V ({3}) V ({1, 2}) V ({1, 3}) V ({2, 3}) V ({1, 2, 3})
α 0 0 β α 0 γ
and {2, 3} form the set S. However, the set G stands for the grand coalition, which
means that all riparians of the basin form a coalition. For the presented example,
the riparians 1, 2, and 3 would form a common cooperative scheme, hence the tuple
{1, 2, 3} is element of the set G. The characteristic functions of the cooperation
scenarios, V (I ), V (S), and V (G), are based on the analysis concluded in Table 6.1
and are listed in Table6.3.
The grand coalition is the optimal coalition due to the fulfillment of the super-
additivity condition. Therefore, we assume that a grand coalition is formed and the
basin’s benefit of γ has to be shared between the riparians. The payoff (or imputa-
tion)14 that each riparian i receives is symbolized by the variable xi in the following.
All the variables xi develop the vector x , which contains for the presented example:
x =
⎛
⎝
x1
x2
x3
⎞
⎠. The determination of x is the main focus of the benefit sharing problem.
6.3.2 Benefit Sharing in the Grand Coalition: Four Approaches
6.3.2.1 The Core
The core is a set of payoffs which meets the four following conditions (Gillies 1959):
• Feasibility: Only benefits which are received can be allocated, which means∑
i [xi ] ≤ V (G).
14The term imputation is used as a synonym of the term payoff.
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• Pareto-efficiency:Nobody’s payoff can be improvedwithoutworsening the payoff
of another riparian. Therefore, there must not be an under-allocation of the gained
benefits to the riparians,
∑
i [xi ] ≥ V (G).• Combining the feasibility and Pareto-efficiency conditions leads to the require-
ment that the allocated benefits are equal to the generated benefits,
∑
i [xi ] =
V (G).
• Individual rationality: Each riparian rejects a payoff which is below its benefit
when acting in a noncooperative way. Hence, xi ≥ V (I ). If this condition does
not hold, the riparian would have an incentive to leave the grand coalition and to
act unilaterally.
• Group rationality: Each sub-coalition of the grand coalition rejects a payoff which
is below the benefit which is gained when the riparians act in a sub-coalition.
Hence,
∑
i∈S [xi ] ≥ V (S). If this condition is not met, the relevant riparians i ∈ S
would have an incentive to leave the grand coalition and form the sub-coalition
S.
Based on the presented example, it can be indicated whether the core is empty and
has no solution (Z < 0), or there is only one solution (Z = 0) or there is a multitude
of solutions (Z > 0) by solving the following optimization problem:
max [Z = V ({1, 2, 3}) − [x1 + x2 + x3]]
x1 ≥ V ({1}) , x2 ≥ V ({2}) , x3 ≥ V ({3})
[x1 + x2] ≥ V ({1, 2}) , [x1 + x3] ≥ V ({1, 3}) , [x2 + x3] ≥ V ({2, 3})
which is equivalent to the following formulation:
max
[
Z = γ − [x1 + x2 + x3]
]
x1 ≥ α , x2 ≥ 0 , x3 ≥ 0
[x1 + x2] ≥ β , [x1 + x3] ≥ α , [x2 + x3] ≥ 0
Here, it is possible to calculate Z = γ − β > 0, hence, there are various payoff
combinations which fulfill the conditions of the core.
Based on the core, the range of payoffs for each riparian can be indicated. There
exists a lower bound and an upper bound for each riparian in the core:
• The riparian does not have an incentive to stay in the coalition until its payoff
falls below the lower bound.
• However, if the payoff of an riparian exceeds its upper bound, another riparian
certainly has an incentive to leave the coalition.
The lower and upper bounds of each player can be derived by solving the following
optimization problems:
Lower Bound or Upper Bound of riparian i :
min [xi ] or max [xi ]
s.t . [x1 + x2 + x3] = V ({1, 2, 3})
x1 ≥ V ({1}) , x2 ≥ V ({2}) , x3 ≥ V ({3})
[x1 + x2] ≥ V ({1, 2}) , [x1 + x3] ≥ V ({1, 3}) , [x2 + x3] ≥ V ({2, 3})
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Table 6.4 Lower and upper bounds of payments which are in the core
Riparian Lower bound Upper bound
Upstream riparian (User 1) α γ
Midstream riparian (User 2) 0 γ − α
Downstream riparian (User 3) 0 γ − β
which is, for the presented river basin example, equivalent to the following formu-
lation:
Lower Bound of riparian i : Upper Bound of riparian i :
min [xi ] max [xi ]
s.t . [x1 + x2 + x3] = γ s.t . [x1 + x2 + x3] = γ
x1 ≥ α , x2 ≥ 0 , x3 ≥ 0 x1 ≥ α , x2 ≥ 0 , x3 ≥ 0
[x1 + x2] ≥ β , [x1 + x3] ≥ α , [x2 + x3] ≥ 0 [x1 + x2] ≥ β , [x1 + x3] ≥ α , [x2 + x3] ≥ 0
The objective contains the payment of the considered riparian i , which has to be
minimized or maximized for finding the lower or upper bound of the core, respec-
tively. The constraints of the optimization problem contain the conditions that have
to be fullfilled for a payoff to be in the core:
• Feasibility and pareto-efficiency, [x1 + x2 + x3] = γ ;
• individual rationality, x1 ≥ α , x2 ≥ 0 , x3 ≥ 0;
• and group rationality, [x1 + x2] ≥ β , [x1 + x3] ≥ α , [x2 + x3] ≥ 0.
For the presented example, the lower and upper bounds of payments are listed in
Table 6.4.
The lower bound of the riparians is determined by their individual rationalities.
Therefore, the upstream user has to receive at least a payment of α, while the lower
bounds of the mid- and downstream users are determined at the value 0.
Regarding the upper bound of payments, the upstreamuser could postulate a claim
for the total generated benefits γ , because all constellations without the upstream
user generate a benefit of zero,
xCore1 = min [γ − V ({2})︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
, γ − V ({3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
, γ − V ({2, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
] = γ .
However, due to the fact that the upstream user must receive at least a payment
of α, the midstream user could get a maximal payment of γ − α,
xCore2 = min [γ − V ({1})︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
, γ − V ({3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
, γ − V ({1, 3})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
] = γ − α .
The downstream riparian cannot claimmore than γ − β, because of the threat that
the up- and midstream riparians can form a sub-coalition {1, 2} where they would
generate a benefit of β,
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xCore3 = min [γ − V ({1})︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
, γ − V ({2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
, γ − V ({1, 2})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
] = γ − β .
To sum up, the concept of the core gives a set of possible payments, which
meets the feasibility, Pareto-efficiency, individual and group rationality conditions.
By considering these conditions, a proposed payment which is in the core provides
an incentive for each riparian to join the grand coalition. However, the core may be
impractical in practice, because of the large amounts of possible solutions. There-
fore, it might be advantagous to use focal point solution concepts for calculating a
concrete payment vector x .
6.3.2.2 The ShapleyValue
The Shapley Value which is based on Shapley (1953) shares the benefits in terms of
the incremental value of the respective player for the coalition. The solution can be
calculated using Eq.6.16:
xi =
∑
I : i ∈ I ∨
S : i ∈ S ∨
G
[
(#G − #I SG)! · (#I SG − 1)!
#G! · [V (...) − V (... − i)]
]
(6.16)
The #I SG sign in Eq. (6.16) represents the number of riparians which form a coali-
tion. These coalition scenarios can be
• unilaterally acting riparians, represented by set I with I = {{1} ; {2} ; {3} };
• sub-coalitions, represented by set S with S = {{1, 2} ; {1, 3} ; {2, 3} };
• the grand coalition, which is represented by set G with S = {{1, 2, 3}}.
We already discussed that the set I stands for unilaterally acting riparians which
act in a noncooperative way. Therefore, the set I contains the tuples: {1}, {2}, and
{3}. There is just one element in these tuples, hence, #I SG = 1 for these types
of coalition scenario. The set S stands for the sub-coalitions which represent all
coalitions between the riparians except the grand coalition. Therefore, the tuples
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 3} form the set S. It is obvious that there are two riparians which
form a sub-coalition, hence, #I SG = 2 for all sub-coalition-constellations. In case
of a grand coalitionG, all riparians of the basin form a common cooperation scheme,
which means that the tuple {1, 2, 3} is an element of set G. This coalition includes
three riparians, hence #I SG = 3. Furthermore, the parameter #G also represents the
number of riparians in the grand coalition, hence #G = 3.
Due to the formulation
∑
I : i ∈ I ∨
S : i ∈ S ∨
G
[...] in Eq. (6.16), only those coalitions are
addressed in which riparian i is a member. These involve the unilateral action situ-
ation for riparian i (i ∈ I ), appropriated sub-coalitions (i ∈ S) as well as the grand
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coalition (G). Therefore, the following constellations are relevant for solving the
Shapley solution of the riparians:
• Riparian 1: {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}
• Riparian 2: {2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}
• Riparian 3: {3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}
The term
(#G − #I SG)! · (#I SG − 1)!
#G! in Eq. (6.16) is a weighting factor which
comes frommathematical permutation, based on the normative assumption that every
player in the coalitions is randomly ordered, with every ordering equally possible
(Wu and Whittington 2006).
The term V (...) in Eq. (6.16) represents the generated benefit for the addressed
coalition, while V (... − i) symbolizes the benefit of the coalition which is formed on
the basis of the addressed coalition without the riparian i . Therefore, the difference
V (...) − V (... − i) could be interpreted as the incremental benefit of riparian i for
the coalition.
The application of Eq.6.16 for the presented simple example is concluded in Table
6.5. Because of the three users (upstream, midstream, and downstream), it becomes
obvious that #G = 3. Regarding riparian 1, there is the realization probability of 13
each that this riparian acts unilaterally or works in a grand coalition. Furthermore,
there exists the realization probability of 16 each that riparian 1 forms a sub-coalition
either just with riparian 2 or 3 (see column (IV) of Table 6.5). If we observe the
cooperation scenarios {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {1, 2, 3}, the benefits α, β, α, and γ
could be generated in the coalition scenarios, respectively (see column (V) of Table
6.5). A coalitionwithout the unilaterally acting riparian 1, does not exist and therefore
generates a benefit of 0. The coalitions {1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {1, 2, 3} without riparian
1 result in the coalition constellations {2}, {3}, and {2, 3} (see column (VI) of Table
6.5) which are each characterized by the generated benefit of 0 (see column (VII) of
Table 6.5). Hence, the incremental benefit of riparian 1 for the coalitions {1}, {1, 2},
{1, 3}, and {1, 2, 3} is α, β, α, and γ , respectively, which can also be found as the
difference between the columns (V) and (VII) of Table 6.5 (see column (VIII) of
Table 6.5). The incremental benefit of riparian 1 for each coalition scenario has to
be multiplied with the realization probability of each coalition scenario, which can
be found by the product of columns (IV) and (VIII) in Table 6.5 (see column (IX) in
Table 6.5). By summing up all these weighted incremental benefits of riparian 1, we
get the Shapley solution of riparian 1 which is 3·α+β+2·γ6 .
This procedure could be applied for riparians 2 and 3, analogously.
Therefore, it is possible to formulate the following payment vector as the focal
point solution for the bargaining problem:
x SH = (x SH1 x SH2 x SH3
) =
(
3·α+β+2·γ
6
β+2·γ−3·α
6
γ−β
3
)
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It becomes obvious that
x SH1 > x
SH
2 > x
SH
3
which means that the upstream riparian 1 receives the highest benefits, while the
downstream riparian receives the lowest payoffs, which is reasoned by the hydrolog-
ical power of the respective riparians. Themore upstream the riparian is located in the
basin, the earlier the riparian is able to abstract (or control the water amounts), which
makes an upstream riparian more (hydrological) powerful than the downstream one.
For instance, a coalition with just riparians 2 and 3 generates a benefit of 0. When
riparian 1 joins this arrangement, which means that the grand coalition would be
formed, it would generate the benefit of γ . Therefore, the incremental benefit of
riparian 1 for this coalition is γ . The upstream riparian receives a higher proportion
of the generated benefit than the downstream riparian.
6.3.2.3 The Nash-Harsanyi Solution
The Nash-Harsanyi solution maximizes the product of assigned benefits in excess
to the benefits generated in the noncooperative case (Harsanyi 1958). Furthermore,
the feasibility, Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and group rationality are also
addressed, hence it is guaranteed that the solution is within the core. Therefore, the
following general optimization problem can be formulated for finding the Nash-
Harsanyi solution:
max
[
∏
i
(xi − V (I ))
]
s.t .
∑
i
[xi ] = V (G) (Feasibility and Pareto-Efficiency)
xi ≥ V (I ) ∀I (Individual rationality)
∑
i∈S
[xi ] ≥ V (S) ∀S (Group rationality)
which is for the presented river basin example:
max [(x1 − α) · x2 · x3]
s.t . [x1 + x2 + x3] = γ (Feasibility and Pareto-efficiency)
x1 ≥ α , x2 ≥ 0 , x3 ≥ 0 (Individual rationality)
x1 + x2 ≥ β , x1 + x3 ≥ α , x2 + x3 ≥ 0 (Group rationality)
When applying this solution procedure for the presented river basin example, the
following optimality conditions can be found:
x2 · x3 = (x1 − α) · x3 = (x1 − α) · x2
x1 + x2 + x3 = γ
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Table 6.6 Additional benefits for Nash-Harsanyi solution in the Grand Coalition for the simple
river basin example
Upstream riparian
(User 1)
Midstream riparian
(User 2)
Downstream riparian
(User 3)
Nash-Harsanyi
solution
1
3 · (2 · α + γ ) 13 · (γ − α) 13 · (γ − α)
Benefit for
noncooperative acting
α 0 0
Additional benefits in
grand coalition
1
3 · (γ − α) 13 · (γ − α) 13 · (γ − α)
The equation x2 · x3 = (x1 − α) · x3 = (x1 − α) · x2 can be reformulated to the fol-
lowing expression:
x1 − α = x2 = x3
which is nothing else than
x1 − V ({1}) = x2 − V ({2}) = x3 − V ({3})
Hence, the assigned benefit in excess of the respective noncooperative benefit is equal
for each riparian, which is a typical characteristic of the Nash-Harsanyi solution.
This characteristic results mainly from the objective function of the Nash-Harsanyi
optimization problem.
The concrete Nash-Harsanyi solution of the presented river example is
xNH = (xNH1 xNH2 xNH3
) = ( 13 · (2 · α + γ ) 13 · (γ − α) 13 · (γ − α)
)
Therefore, the additional benefit in the grand coalition compared to the noncoopera-
tive case is the same for every player 13 · (γ − α), which is also illustrated by Table
6.6.
For the unilateral acting case, the upstream riparian generates the highest benefit
with the level α, while the mid- and downstream ones do not receive any water and
therefore generate a benefit of 0. Hence, when applying the Nash-Harsanyi solution,
the upstream riparian receives the highest payoffs while the mid- and downstream
users receive equal payoffs:
xNH1 > x
NH
2 = xNH3
The total benefit in the basin when all riparians act unilaterally is α, because
V ({1}) + V ({2}) + V ({3}) = α, while the basin’s benefit in case of a grand coali-
tion is γ , because V ({1, 2, 3}) = γ . Therefore, the term γ − α can be interpreted as
the cooperation gain in the basin. The Nash-Harsanyi solution shares this coopera-
tion gain equally among the riparians, hence each riparian obtains the benefit
γ − α
3
in excess to those benefits the riparian would generate when acting unilaterally.
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Table 6.7 Objection against the Shapley solution in the Grand Coalition
{1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
Benefit of
Coalition
α 0 0 β α 0
Payoff in
{1, 2, 3}
based on
Shapley
solution
3·α+β+2·γ
6
β+2·γ−3·α
6
γ−β
3
β+2·γ
3
3·α−β+4·γ
6
4·γ−3·α−β
6
Objections
of coalition
against
Shapley
solution
3·α−β−2·γ
6
3·α−β−2·γ
6
β−γ
3
2·β−2·γ
3
3·α+β−4·γ
6
3·α+β−4·γ
6
6.3.2.4 The Nucleolus
The main goal of the nucleolus is to find a solution in which the maximum objection
against a benefit sharing solution is minimized. This concept was first presented by
Schmeidler (1969). The objection of a coalition against a benefit sharing solution
results from the difference between the generated benefit of this coalition (if it was
formed in the basin) and the payoff for this coalition due to the benefit sharing
solution.15
For instance, the objections of the various cooperation constellations against the
Shapley solution in the grand coalition are illustrated in Table 6.7.
The maximum objection against the Shapley solution is therefore
max
[
3 · α − β − 2 · γ
6
; β − γ
3
; 2 · β − 2 · γ
3
; 3 · α + β − 4 · γ
6
]
= β − γ
3
For minimizing the maximum objection under the consideration of the feasibility,
Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and group rationality conditions, the follow-
ing general optimization problems have to be solved to find the nucleolus solution
(see Wang et al. (2003)):
15For the presented river basin example, the objections of the coalition constellations are
• Objection of riparian 1, {1} : V ({1}) − x1
• Objection of riparian 2, {2} : V ({2}) − x2
• Objection of riparian 3, {3} : V ({3}) − x3
• Objection of coalition {1, 2} : V ({1, 2}) − x1 − x2
• Objection of coalition {1, 3} : V ({1, 3}) − x1 − x3
• Objection of coalition {2, 3} : V ({2, 3}) − x2 − x3
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min [e]
s.t .
∑
i
[xi ] = V (G) (Feasibility and Pareto-efficiency)
e + xi ≥ V (I ) ∀I (Individual rationality)
e +
∑
i∈S
[xi ] ≥ V (S) ∀S (Group rationality)
which for the presented river basin example is equivalent to the following formula-
tion:
min [e]
s.t . [x1 + x2 + x3] = γ (Feasibility and Pareto-efficiency)
e + x1 ≥ α , e + x2 ≥ 0 , e + x3 ≥ 0 (Individual rationality)
e + [x1 + x2] ≥ β , e + [x1 + x3] ≥ α , e + [x2 + x3] ≥ 0 (Group rationality)
The maximum objection against a benefit sharing solution is represented by the vari-
able e. This variable e is a free variable, therefore, it is defined within the domain
[−∞,∞]. If the variable e becomes zero or negative, the individual and group ratio-
nality conditions are certainly fulfilled. However, regardless of the value of variable
e, the feasibility and Pareto-efficiency conditions are always met. The objective of
the optimization problem sets the goal to minimize the value of e, which means that
the maximum objection against the benefit sharing solution has to be minimized. As
we already discussed, this is the main motivation of the nucleolus solution concept.
The value of the variable e can not be set arbitrarily low, because the lowest possi-
ble value of e is restricted by the individual and group rationality conditions. If the
superadditivity condition is met, the variable e takes a positive value. Therefore, the
individual and group rationality conditions are fulfilled.
When applying the optimization problem to identify the nucleolus solution, we
have to differentiate between two cases of parameter specifications α, β, and γ :
• Case 1: We specify β and γ such that β ≤ γ3 . However, if in contrast β > γ3 ,
this case is also relevant for the specification 3·β−γ2 ≤ α. Therefore, the compact
description of this case is (β ≤ γ3 ) ∨ (( γ3 < β) ∧ ( 3·β−γ2 ≤ α)).• Case 2: This case becomes relevant when α, β, and γ are specified such that
case 1 does not fit. Therefore, we know that γ3 < β. Furthermore, we also know
that α < 3·β−γ2 . Hence, the compact description of this case is (
γ
3 < β) ∧ (α <
3·β−γ
2 ).
The optimality conditions which result from the application of the optimization
problem are
For case 1: e = α − x1 = −x2 = −x3
For case 2: e = β − x1 − x2 = −x3
For cases 1 and 2: x1 + x2 + x3 = γ
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Table 6.8 Objection against the nucleolus solution in the Grand Coalition (for case 1)
{1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
Benefit of
Coalition
α 0 0 β α 0
Payoff in
coalitions
based on
nucleolus
solution
2·α+γ
3
γ−α
3
γ−α
3
α+2·γ
3
α+2·γ
3
2·γ−2·α
3
Objections
against
nucleolus
solution
α−γ
3
α−γ
3
α−γ
3
3·β−α−2·γ
3
2·α−2·γ
3
2·α−2·γ
3
For case 1, it follows from the optimality conditions that the unilaterally acting
riparians, denoted by {1}, {2} and {3}, state the maximum objections against the
proposed nucleolus solution. Therefore, the level of the variable e which stands for
the maximum objection is limited in its lowest value by the individual rationality
conditions. The nucleolus solution for this case is
xnuc,1 =
(
xnuc,11 x
nuc,1
2 x
nuc,1
3
)
=
(
2·α+γ
3
γ−α
3
γ−α
3
)
This solution is equal to the Nash-Harsanyi solution. This means that the equal shar-
ing of cooperation gains between the riparians (which is done by the Nash-Harsanyi
solution) minimizes the maximum objections which are stated by the unilaterally
acting riparians. The objections under this case 1 are listed in detail in Table 6.8.
The maximum objection under this case 1 is
e = max
[
α − γ
3
; 3 · β − α − 2 · γ
3
; 2 · α − 2 · γ
3
]
= α − γ
3
which is stated by the unilaterally acting riparians 1, 2, and 3. Of course, this maxi-
mum objection determines the value of the variable e.
Under case 2, the sub-coalition between the riparians 1 and 2, denoted by {1, 2}
and the unilaterally acting riparian 3, represented by {3}, state themaximumobjection
against the nucleolus solution which becomes apparent by the relevant optimality
conditions. Therefore, the level of the variable e is limited in its lowest value by
the group rationality of coalition {1, 2} as well as by the individual rationality of
riparian 3.
Based on the assumption under this case 2 (e = β − x1 − x2 = −x3) as well as
the formerly presented optimality conditions, the following relations are valid:
e = β − x1 − x2 = −x3
x1 + x2 + x3 = γ
e + x1 ≥ α, e + x2 ≥ 0, e + x1 + x3 ≥ α, e + x2 + x3 ≥ 0
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When solving this problem, we can find an explicit solution for x3, which is
xnuc,23 =
γ − β
2
Furthermore, we find that the sub-coalition containing riparians 1 and 2 has to receive
a payoff in the level:
xnuc,21 + xnuc,22 =
β + γ
2
However, there is no concrete solution regarding the assignment of benefits to ripar-
ians 1 and 2. However, for meeting the optimality conditions, we know that the
solutions of x1 and x2 have to be in the following intervals:
xnuc,21 =
[
xnuc,2,min1 , x
nuc,2,max
1
]
=
[
2 · α − β + γ
2
, β
]
xnuc,22 =
[
xnuc,2,min2 , x
nuc,2,max
2
]
=
[
γ − β
2
, β − α
]
Of course, we would like to have a focal point solution, which means that we want
to find an explicit assignment of payoffs for riparians 1 and 2.
A possible opportunity for assigning the payoffs is just to apply the nucleolus
procedure for the sub-coalition {1, 2}.16
In Exercise 6.2,we present the solution steps of the nucleolus procedure for a basin
with 2 riparians in detail. Every riparian has to receive the benefit it would get when
acting unilaterally (individual rationality condition). On top of that, the riparians get
a share of the cooperation gain, which results from the difference between the payoffs
the sub-coalitionwould receive in the nucleolus solution , which is 0.5 · (β + γ ), and
the sum of the benefits the riparians would receive when acting unilaterally which is
16The optimization problem for finding the nucleolus solution of the sub-coalition {1, 2} is
min{e,x1,x2}
[e]
s.t . x1 + x2 = 0.5 · (β + γ )
e + x1 ≥ α
e + x2 ≥ 0
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Table 6.9 Objection against the nucleolus solution (case 2)
{1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
Benefit of
Coalition
α 0 0 β α 0
Payoff
based on
nucleolus
solution
2·α+β+γ
4
β+γ−2·α
4
γ−β
2
β+γ
2
2·α−β+2·γ
4
3·γ−2·α−β
4
Objections
of coalition
against
nucleolus
solution
2·α−β−γ
4
2·α−β−γ
4
β−γ
2
β−γ
2
2·α+β−2·γ
4
2·α+β−3·γ
4
α. When applying the nucleolus procedure in a coalition or basin with 2 riparians,
we have to share the cooperation gain equally between the riparians.17
Therefore, we can set the following payoffs for the riparians 1 and 2:
xnuc,21 =
2 · α + β + γ
4
xnuc,22 =
β + γ − 2 · α
4
Hence, the nucleolus solution for this case is
xnuc,2 =
(
xnuc,21 x
nuc,2
2 x
nuc,2
3
)
=
(
2·α+β+γ
4
β+γ−2·α
4
γ−β
2
)
The objections under case 2 are listed in detail in Table 6.9.
The maximum objection is:
e = max
[
2 · α − β − γ
4
; β − γ
2
; 2 · α + β − 2 · γ
4
; 2 · α + β − 3 · γ
4
]
= β − γ
2
17In case of unilateral acting, riparians 1 and 2 generate a benefit of α, i.e., V ({1}) + V ({2}) = α.
The sub-coalition between riparians 1 and 2 should receive a benefit of 0.5 · (β + γ ) in the
nucleolus solution, i.e., xnuc,21 + xnuc,22 = 0.5 · (β + γ ). Therefore, the cooperation gain is
Δ = xnuc,21 + xnuc,22 − V ({1}) − V ({2}) = 0.5 · (β + γ ) − α
Half of the cooperation gain is 0.5 · Δ = 0.25 · (β + γ ) − 0.5 · α. Therefore, the riparians receive
the following benefits:
xnuc,21 = V ({1}) + 0.5 · Δ = α + 0.25 · (β + γ ) − 0.5 · α = 0.5 · α + 0.25 · (β + γ )
xnuc,22 = V ({2}) + 0.5 · Δ = 0.25 · (β + γ ) − 0.5 · α = 0.25 · (β + γ ) − 0.5 · α
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The maximum objection e = β−γ2 is stated by the unilaterally acting riparian 3 and
the sub-coalition between riparians 1 and 2.
Because of the hydrological power in the river basin, which results in the highest
payoff for riparian 1 due to its position in the river basin, and the fact that the sub-
coalition {1, 2} states the maximum objection, the payoff for riparian 2 exceeds the
one of riparian 3, hence
xnuc,21 > x
nuc,2
2 > x
nuc,2
3
Box 6.1 Benefit sharing in the Nile river basin
With a total length of 6700 km, theNile is the longest river in theworld; its basin
stretches over 11 countries: Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda,
Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic Congo, and Eritrea.
Similar to other international rivers (such as Euphrates and Tigris, Syr Darya,
AmuDarya, andGanges), there is a gap between thewater quantity available in
the basin and the water quantity claimed by the riparians. (Wu andWhittington
2006) Therefore, the riparians compete for the scarce water sources in the river.
Wu andWhittington (2006) state awater defecit of about 50 billion cubicmeter
per year in the basin. Egypt which is the most downstream country in the basin
contributes essentially nothing to the flow of the Nile, however, it currently
consumes more than 80% of the Nile water due to its political and military
power in the region (Wu and Whittington 2006). Ethiopia which is located in
the upstream of the basin contributes over 85% of the water flow. It claims
significantly more water resources than its current consumption for realizing
its dam and irrigation project which became necessary to meet the needs of an
increasing population.
There exist a number of Nile river models in the scientific literature which
are explained in detail by, for instance, Nigatu and Dinar (2011). The Nile
Economic Optimization Model (NEOM, see Wu (2000)) is a basin-wide eco-
nomic optimization model which quantifies the economic benefits from water
usage. Wu and Whittington (2006) use the NEOM to study conflict incentive-
compatible resolution strategies based on various cooperation scenarios in
the basin. Block and Strzepek (2010) set up the Investment Model for Plan-
ning Ethiopian Nile Development (IMPEND) which focuses on the impact of
dams constructed for irrigation and hydropower purposes. The model which is
applied by Nigatu and Dinar (2011) as well as by Dinar and Nigatu (2013) is
based on the NEOM model and takes into account additional features such as
the resource degradation, various climate change scenarios, and the possibility
of introducing basin-wide water trade. It just focuses on the basin of the Blue
Nile which involves the countries Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.
236 6 TransboundaryWater Resource Management
Dinar and Nigatu (2013) distinguish different scenarios of allocation
between the riparians in the Blue Nile. The scenario WRA-I, which allocates
12.2, 22.0, and 65.8%, respectively, to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, is based
on the notion of Egypt’s long-term use pattern. The scenario WRA-II, which
allocates 38.4, 14.1, and 47.5% to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, respectively, is
based on the notion of equitable access as reflected in the UN Water conven-
tion from 1997. The generated benefit for the different allocation scenarios are
listed in the following table, with ETH, SDN, and EGY representing Ethiopia,
Sudan, and Egypt, respectively. In cases of cooperation, the allocated water
amounts are traded to another country of the cooperation scheme if increasing
benefits result from this transfer. Therefore, the highest basin’s benefit is gener-
ated for all allocation scenarios in the cooperation arrangement which involves
all three riparians. The highest basin’s benefit with 9.21 is generated under the
allocation scenario WRA-II, followed by the allocation scenario WRA-I with
8.77.
Benefits under different allocation and cooperation scenarios. Source
Dinar andNigatu (2013)
Allocation Unilateral Acting Sub-Coalitions Grand Coalition
Scenario ETH SDN EGY ETH+SDN ETH+EGY SDN+EGY ETH+SDN+EGY
WRA-I 1.29 2.62 4.83 3.94 5.71 7.55 8.77
WRA-II 2.21 2.56 3.91 4.62 6.60 6.80 9.21
Assuming the three riparians form a joint arrangement, we focus on the ques-
tion of how to allocate the common benefit to the individual riparians. This
means that for the scenarios WRA-I and WRA-II, the basin’s benefits of 8.77
and 9.21, respectively, have to be allocated to the riparians. The incremental
benefit for any riparian results from the difference between its received benefit
in the joint arrangement and the benefitwhich the riparianwould generatewhen
acting unilaterally. Applying the Nash-Harsanyi solution, the benefits are allo-
cated in a way that the incremental benefits become equal for all riparians. For
the scenarioWRA-I, the benefits when acting unilaterally for Ethiopia, Sudan,
and Egypt are 1.29, 2.62, and 4.83, respectively, which results in the basin’s
benefit of 8.74. The basin’s benefit in the joint arrangement is 8.77, hence
when applying the Nash-Harsanyi solution, the incremental benefit of every
riparian becomes 0.01, because 8.77−8.743 = 0.01. This means that Ethiopia,
Sudan, and Egypt are assigned a benefit of 1.30, 2.63, and 4.84, respectively,
for the Nash-Harsanyi solution. For scenarioWRA-II, acting unilaterally holds
benefits of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, respectively, which results in a basin’s
benefit of 8.68. The basin’s benefit in the joint arrangement is 9.21. Hence, the
incremental benefit of each riparian amounts to about 0.18 ( 9.21−8.683 ≈ 0.18)
when applying the Nash-Harsanyi solution. Hence Ethopia, Sudan and Egypt
receive a benefit of 2.39, 2.74 and 4.08, respectively. The Shapley and Nash-
Harsanyi solution for the Benefit Sharing problem of the Blue Nile basin is
illustrated in the following table.
6.3 Benefit Sharing Between More Than Two Riparians 237
Shapley and Nash-Harsanyi solution under different allocation scenarios
Allocation Shapley Nash-Harsanyi
Scenario ETH SDN EGY ETH SDN EGY
WRA-I 1.20 2.79 4.78 1.30 2.63 4.84
WRA-II 2.33 2.61 4.27 2.39 2.74 4.08
Regardless of the allocation scenario, the upstream riparianEthiopia prefers the
Nash-Harsanyi to the Shapley solution, because 1.3 > 1.2 and 2.39 > 2.33.
For the allocation scenario WRA-I, Sudan and Egypt prefer the Shapley
(2.79 > 2.63) and Nash-Harsanyi solution (4.84 > 4.78), respectively, while
for the other allocation scenario WRA-II, the contrary situation becomes
obvious because Sudan and Egypt prefer the Nash-Harsanyi (2.74 > 2.61)
and Shapley solution (4.27 > 4.08), respectively. The Shapley solution of the
allocation scenario WRA-I is not in the core, because the assigned benefits to
Ethiopia and Egypt with 1.20 and 4.78, respectively, are lower than the benefits
Ethiopia and Egypt would generate under unilateral acting which are 1.29
and 4.83, respectively (see Table 6.10). Therefore, the Shapley solution for
the allocation scenario WRA-I violates the individual rationality of Ethiopia
and Egypt. However, the Shapley solution of the allocation scenario WRA-II
is within the core. The Nash-Harsanyi solution is also in the core for both the
scenarios WRA-I and WRA-II.
Source Dinar and Nigatu (2013)
6.3.3 Concluding Remarks on the Benefit Sharing Problem
The benefit sharing problem focuses on the question of how to assign benefits to
riparians which are generated in a joint arrangement. The assigned benefit in this
context is termed as payoff or imputation. The first important concept is the core
which contains all payoffs which meet the feasibility, Pareto-efficiency, individual
and group rationality conditions. Due to the feasibility and Pareto-efficiency con-
ditions, the generated benefit in the joint arrangement has to be assigned to the
riparians of this arrangement in total. The individual rationality condition means
that any riparian of the joint arrangement has to receive at least as much payoffs
as it would generate when acting unilaterally in a noncooperative way. However,
the group rationality condition means that a coalition which could be formed by
a subset of riparians acting cooperatively in the joint arrangement must receive at
least as much benefits in the joint arrangement as it would generate if the respec-
tive coalition was formed in the basin. Usually, either the core is empty—which
means that it is not incentive-compatible to form this joint arrangement—or there
are a multitude of payoffs in the core. Therefore, we discussed the lower and upper
bounds of the core for each riparian. The lower bound of each riparian is the mini-
mum payment the respective riparian has to receive to have an economic incentive to
join the cooperative arrangement, while the upper bound is the maximum payment
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Table 6.10 Payoffs for riparians regarding the presented focal point solution concepts
Rriparian 1 Riparian 2 Riparian 3
Shapley solution 16 · (3 · α + β + 2 · γ ) 16 · (β + 2 · γ − 3 · α) 13 · (γ − β)
Nash-Harsanyi
solution
1
3 · (2 · α + γ ) 13 · (γ − α) 13 · (γ − α)
Nucleolus (case 2) 14 · (2 · α + β + γ ) 14 · (β + γ − 2 · α) 12 · (γ − β)
the respective riparian would get without setting an incentive for another riparian to
leave the cooperative arrangement.
Furthermore, we also discussed some focal point solution concepts which state
concrete solutions (a specific payment for each riparian): The Shapley value may
be in the core, while the Nash-Harsanyi and nucleolus solutions are certainly in the
core when the superadditivity condition is fulfilled. The Shapley value assigns the
benefits depending on the (weighted) incremental benefit of the respective riparian for
the coalitions. Particularly powerful riparians, e.g., those riparians that are located
upstream in the river basin and, therefore, have hydrological power, benefit from
this concept. The more the benefit in a coalition increases due to the joining of
the respective riparian in this coalition—which is nothing else than the incremental
benefit of the respective riparian for the coalition—the higher the proportion of
benefits of the joint arrangement that goes to this respective riparian. However, the
Nash-Harsanyi and nucleolus solutions do not focus as much on the power situation
of a riparian, but more on aspects of justice. TheNash-Harsanyi solution allocates the
benefits to the riparians in a way that the assigned benefit in excess to the respective
noncooperative benefit is equal for each riparian. This means that the cooperation
gain is shared equally between the riparians. The nucleolus is a solution concept
in which the maximum objection against a payment solution is minimized. The
objection of a coalition against a benefit sharing solution results from the difference
between the generated benefit of this coalition (if it was formed in the basin) and the
payoff for this coalition due to the benefit sharing solution.
For the presented river basin example, the realized benefit sharing solutions are
illustrated in Table 6.10. Please note that we differentiate between two cases of
parameter specification regarding α, β, and γ . The nucleolus and Nash-Harsanyi
solutions just differ for the second case. For the first case, the nucleolus solution and
Nash-Harsanyi solutions are the same.
The upstream riparian prefers the Shapley solution, because due to its upstream
position (hydrological power) it generates high incremental benefit for the possible
coalitions. For example, a coalition with just riparians 2 and 3 generates a benefit of
0. If riparian 1 joined this arrangement, it would generate the benefit of γ . Hence, the
incremental benefit of riparian 1 for this coalition is γ . This relation illustrates why
riparian 1 gets such a high proportion of benefit when applying the Shapley value.
Case 1: x SH1 > x1
NH Case 2: x SH1 > x
nuc,2
1 > x
NH
1
6.3 Benefit Sharing Between More Than Two Riparians 239
Themidstream riparian also prefers the Shapley solution, because theNash-Harsanyi
solution and nucleolus solution are based on the low benefit level of 0, if this riparian
acted unilaterally.
Case 1: x SH2 > x
NH
2 Case 2: x
SH
2 > x
nuc,2
2 > x
NH
2
The downstream riparian has the lowest hydrological power due to its position in
the basin. Because of its limited hydrological power, the riparian has the highest
aversion against the Shapley solution, while it prefers the Nash-Harsanyi solution:
Case 1: xNH3 > x
SH
3 Case 2: x
NH
3 > x
nuc,2
3 > x
SH
3
In the grand coalition, the benefit of the entire basin which is γ is generated by the
water consumption of the downstream riparian. The less productive riparians 1 and
2 leave the water in the river, hence, they generate no benefit in the grand coalition.
However, they have to receive payoffs for all presented benefit sharing solutions.
Therefore, riparian 3 has to make side payments:
Side payments made by riparian 3 = γ − x3
which means for the focal point solution concepts:
Side payments made by riparian 3 =
{
β+2·γ
3 Shapley solution
α+2·γ
3 Nash-Harsanyi and nucleolus solutions
Riparians 1 and 2 receive the following side payments from riparian 3 in the level
of their respective benefit sharing solution:
Side payments received by riparian 1 = x1
Side payments received by riparian 2 = x2
6.4 Bankruptcy Rules forWater Allocation
6.4.1 Principles of Bankruptcy Rules
The last two sections were based on the construction of monetary or utility-measured
characteristic functions of cooperative game theory. Now, we turn to the so-called
bankruptcy methods that distribute scarce water quantities directly to riparian states
without calculating the economic value they create. Thus, the distributandum is not
the monetary benefit, but the water itself. These methods have been developed in
a completely different context: If a firm goes bankrupt, how should the residual
liquidated wealth be distributed among its creditors? There is a plethora of rules
240 6 TransboundaryWater Resource Management
and principles on how to allocate the insolvency assets to the creditors.18 Should
the residual assets be divided, for example, proportionally or equally? Suppose the
first creditor lent 200 e to the company, a second 100 e. However, the remaining
goodwill is only 200 e, so not all claims are covered. If we apply the proportional
rule, then the first creditor receives two-thirds of the residual value, i.e., 133e, while
the second creditor receives only one third, i.e., 67 e. It is also possible to allocate
equal shares to both creditors, in which case both would receive 100 e. Hence, it
is necessary to develop bankruptcy rules according to which the residual value is
distributed.
These methods have been applied to transboundary water issues as well, both
theoretically and empirically (Box 6.2). The application of the bankruptcy rules
is based on the Principle of the Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS)
as explained in Sect. 6.1. The whole catchment area is collectively owned by the
riparian countries. If water becomes scarce, the allocation should not be based on
the geographical position of these countries. Their claims are equally legitimate and
are the sole information that will be taken into account within the allocation process.
On the one hand, it is advantageous that we do not need any complex models
that reflect the link between water usage and economic welfare. It is all about water
quantities that are measurable. On the other hand, by restricting water distribution
alone, we give up the possibility of combined contracts in which other goods and
services are specified in addition to water, which makes trade possible. As will be
shown subsequently, one has to be careful when transferring these rules from the
context of credit markets to water issues, because the very nature of claims in both
sectors is rather different.
Suppose a set of N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} countries share a water resource R. Their
claims can be summarized by a claim vector c = [c1 c2 . . . cn
]
. Water is scarce,
hence, we assume that
n∑
i=1
ci > R (6.17)
Bankruptcy rules specify the allocation of R to the countries by a sharing rule
function x(R, c), where x is an n-dimensional vector. There is a variety of properties
that are met by different distribution rules to varying degrees. These properties refer
to consistency criteria that follow the principle of rationality and to normative criteria
that take fairness considerations into account.
Basic properties are the following requirements that represent plausibility:
1. Feasibility: The implementation of bankruptcy rules must be feasible, i.e., the
sum of water allotments required by the rules should not exceed the amount of
18A concise survey is Thomson (2002).
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water available, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
xi (R, c) ≤ R (6.18)
2. Efficiency: Efficiency excludes waste. There is no water loss, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
xi (R, c) = R (6.19)
3. Claim boundedness: Claim boundedness is not only a basic property that relates
to plausibility but also to fairness considerations. The water allotment of a rule
shall never exceed the claim stated, i.e.,
x(R, c) ≤ c (6.20)
A rationing scheme would be considered very unfair if it were to allocate more
water than the claim of the respective riparian state.
There are additional, more specific properties to make a bankruptcy rule consider-
able for implementation. These rules refer to fairness considerations, and what the
Helsinki Rules (Article 4) call “a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial
uses of the waters of an international drainage basin”.
4. Consistency: Consistency refers not only to rationality but also to fairness. Awater
allocation which is considered as fair for all countries in a water treaty remains
fair also if a subgroup shares the water allotted to them. Formally,
for all S ⊂ N xi (R, c) = xi
⎛
⎝R −
∑
i∈(N/S)
xi , cS
⎞
⎠ (6.21)
where cS is the vector of claims of the countries in S.
5. Equal Treatment of Equals: This condition is central to a fair water allocation.
The same claims should lead to the same water allocation. Formally,
for all i, j ∈ N if ci = c j ⇒ xi (R, c) = x j (R, c) (6.22)
6. Order Preservation: Fairness also requires that those countries claiming more
water receive more water under the sharing rule.
for all i, j ∈ N if ci ≥ c j ⇒ xi (R, c) ≥ x j (R, c) (6.23)
Of course, this requirement presumes that claims are legitimate and justifiable.
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7. Regressivity: If a certain degree of inequity aversion prevails, regression may be
required:
for all i, j ∈ N if ci ≥ c j ⇒ xi (R, c)
ci
≤ x j (R, c)
c j
(6.24)
In other words, the relative fulfillment of the claims decreases with the amount
of the claims. Whether this criterion makes sense depends heavily on the nature
of the claims.
8. Claim monotonicity: Division rules should not be static. This means that they
should not only refer to actual values of claims and water quantities but also
be flexible with regard to changes in framework conditions. Fairness must also
apply to changed input data. It is fair to say that the allocation of water resources
increases for those riparian states whose justified claims increase. Formally,
for all i, j ∈ N if c′i ≥ ci ⇒ xi (R, c′i , c−i ) ≥ xi (R, c) (6.25)
where c−i = [c1, c2, ci−1, ci+1, cn].
9. Resource monotonicity: The supply of water varies heavily depending on weather
and climate conditions. The distribution rules must be fair for all possible water
scarcity scenarios. Resource monotonicity is considered as fair. If there is less
(more) water, every riparian state should get less (more):
if R′ ≥ R ⇒ x(R′, c) ≥ x(R, c) (6.26)
6.4.2 Hydrologically Unconstrained Allocation Rules
The fulfillment of the individual properties defined above does not determine a unique
allocation. In the literature, it is rather the case that different rules, seen as reasonable
and fair, are proposed. The application of these rules leads to different allocations. In
the following, we will present the most important ones, examine their properties and
their practical applicability. We assume that the rules can be implemented hydrolog-
ically, i.e., the calculated allocations can also be physically transferred to the water
users. This is the unconstrained case.19
Proportional Rule
Let us start with themost widely known and used rule. This rule is alreadymentioned
inAristotle’sNikomachian ethics.20 The rule divides the availablewater in proportion
to the claims, i.e.,
x Pi =
ci
∑n
j=1 c j
R, i = {1, 2, . . . , n} (6.27)
19The constrained cases refer to river basins where the unidirectionality of the water flow may lead
to the case that the calculated allocations cannot be physically realized. See the next subsection.
20Nikomachian ethics, book V. See the explanation in Young (1994), p. 64 ff.
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This rule is self-evident and fulfills, it seems, the sense of justice at once. This is cer-
tainly due to the principle of accountability21 that underlies this rule. Subsequently,
we will compare this rule with other rules for different types of claims.
Adjusted Proportional Rule
This rule puts more weight to those countries with higher claims. It is derived in a
two-step procedure. First, the so-called minimum rights have to be determined as
mi = max
⎡
⎣0, R −
∑
j =i
c j
⎤
⎦ , i = {1, 2, . . . , n} (6.28)
Minimum rights refer to the water allocation which is not contested. All j = i con-
cede this residual to i . It is simply the water that is left after serving the claims of all
the other water users.22 After the minimum rights have been distributed, the second
step follows:
x APi = mi +
ci − mi
∑n
j=1(c j − m j )
⎛
⎝R −
n∑
j=1
m j
⎞
⎠ , i = {1, 2, . . . , n} (6.29)
Here, the water division consists of the minimum rights plus the proportional portion
of the residual water supply, whichwill be left after deduction of theminimum rights.
The proportionality factor is formed with the help of the claims adjusted for the
minimum rights. One should be careful with the concept of minimum rights. This is
not a minimal provision of water in terms of human rights for water. It refers only
to the amount of water the other competitors would leave without the request for
negotiation.
Constrained Equal Award (CEA)
The CEA rule sets the water allocation in a very egalitarian way. Each country
receives the same portion of available water regardless of its claims. Claims only
play a role insofar as the equal shares apportioned may be higher than these. In this
case, only the claims will be covered.
Formally,
xCE Ai = min[E, ci ] where
n∑
i=1
min[E, ci ] = R (6.30)
where E is the equal share provided E is less than both claims.
Constrained Equal Loss (CEL)
Instead of focussing on the distribution of the water, it is also possible to turn the
observation around and look at the distribution of thewater loss defined as the number
21See Sect. 3.3.
22Of course, if the residual R − ∑ j =i c j were negative, then the other claims are not met because
negative minimum rights are excluded. That is reasonable and therefore acceptable.
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Fig. 6.3 Bankruptcy rules.
Source own illustration
of claims not fulfilled, i.e., the allocation of the total loss
∑
ci − R . The CEL rule
is defined as follows:
xCE Ai = max[0, ci − E] where
n∑
i=1
max[0, ci − E] = R (6.31)
where E is the equal share of loss.
All the rules introduced do satisfy the properties with the exception of regressiv-
ity.23
Which rule is fair now?Aswewill see, this question cannot generally be answered,
but depends on the circumstances24. By circumstances, we understand the object of
allocation, in this casewater, and the type and degree of legitimacy of claims.With the
help of an example, we will discuss the appropriateness of sharing rules depending
on the type of legitimacy of claims. At first, however, we want to look at a numerical
example in order to examine the distributional effects of the four rules. Assume
the following numerical values: R = 200, c1 = 180, and c2 = 120. Straightforward
application of the rules allows to calculate the corresponding allocations and to insert
the numerical values in Fig. 6.3.25
The budget line x2 = R − x1 represents all possible water distributions. The
claims are plotted with a vertical and a horizontal line. Due to the scarcity of water,
its intersection lies north-east of the budget line. The allocation according to the
23For the case of two countries, the proof is left to the reader; for the n-country case, the proof is
more extensive, see, e.g., Thomson (2002).
24There are interesting studieswhich empirically determine the assessment of fairness of bankruptcy
rules within the framework of experiments, see, e.g., Gaechter and Riedl (2006)
25Details can be found in Exercise 6.3.
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proportional rule is the intersection of the budget line with the line connecting the
origin with the claim point A, the slope of which is c2/c1 (see Fig. 6.3). Similarly,
the CEA rule can be identified by the intersection of a line with a slope of 1 that
starts from the origin. The available water is shared in half. This is due to this numer-
ical example where the water allocation according to this rule falls short of both
claims. The CEL rule is constructed by running a 45◦-line from point A to the bud-
get line. This line implements the requirement that the loss should be apportioned on
a fifty-fifty base between the two countries. In the two country case, this allocation is
identical to the adjusted proportionality rule. Here, we start from the minimal right
point {m1,m2} with a line of 45◦ degrees.
What we can see from this figure is that there is an ordering of rules with respect to
the degree of equality. The CEA rule distributes the available water equally. Only if
claims are fully covered, the rule deviates from the equal share principle (see pointA).
The proportional rule prefers the country with the higher claims somewhat whereas
the CEL rule and the adjusted proportionality rule favor countries with higher claims.
But what is just, the complete equality of water allocations or the equality of the
individual water losses suffered, measured by the degree of regressivity xi/ci? It
turns out that only the proportional rule weakly satisfies this property in general,
i.e., the ratio is constant with respect to different values of R. The CEA rule exhibits
progressivity, i.e., the percentage of fulfilled claims rises with the number of claims
and the CEL rule is undetermined. Progressivity and degressivity depend on the
amount ofwater supplied. However, the question remains as towhether the allocation
should be made more evenly distributed or whether the claims should be taken into
account in the allocation. This question depends on the very nature of these claims
or on the attributes claimants have. The following scenarios show that a sharing rule
should only be decided upon once the legitimacy of claims has been clarified.
Scenario I
There are two countries with different population sizes. Country 1 (L1) is large
compared to country 2 (L2), i.e., n1 is larger than n2, where ni is the population size.
The (culturally determined) subsistence level of water per person is υ. We assume
that this subsistence level is the same in both countries. The claims are therefore
ci = υni , i = {1, 2} (6.32)
We assume that the water available is less than the aggregated claims, i.e., c1 + c2 >
R. Applying the proportionality rule immediately results in xi = (ni/(n1 + n2))R.
Dividing the allocation by the respective population size yields the water allocation
per capita, which is equal in both countries:
x1
n1
= R
(n1 + n2) =
x2
n2
(6.33)
Of course, due to water scarcity, this allocation is less than υ.
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For water allocation under the CEA rule, we have to differentiate between two
cases because of the claim boundedness: If R/2 < c2, i.e., the water allocation is
less than the lesser claim, both countries receive the same amount of water R/2. It
follows that the water allocation per capita in L1 is lower than in L2. In other words,
the more populous country gets less water per capita than the country with a smaller
population. This result follows also for the case that R/2 > c2. In this case, people
from L2 receive c2/n2 = (υn2)/n2 (see Eq. (6.32)). Because water is scarce, i.e.,
c1 + c2 > R, per capita allocation in L1 is less than υ.
Both claims arewell-founded, as they are derived frompeople’s elementary needs.
They should, therefore, not be called into question when drawing up awater contract.
Fundamental needs should bemet as good as possible. Themore fundamental a need,
the greater the role of equality that applies here to people, not countries. Therefore,
the P rule is likely to be preferred to the CEA rule, because it is not acceptable that
the more populous country has a lower per capita water supply due to the basic need
property of water.
Scenario II
Let us resume the water allocation problem within the same mathematical structure,
but with a different economic context. Again, there are two countries L1 and L2. Both
countries have the same national product y and the same population size. However,
the water consumption of the first country is higher than that of the second country,
because L1 is more inefficient than L2, which leads to different water claims:
ci = i y, i = {1, 2} (6.34)
where i is the water intensity per unit of social product of the respective country.
Since L1 is less efficient than L2, we have 1 > 2. Again, we assume water scarcity,
which makes it necessary to apply a bankruptcy rule. Applying the P rule leads to
x1 = (1/(1 + 2))R and x2 = (2/(1 + 2))R (6.35)
Hence, the inefficient country L1 gets more water than country 2. Dividing xi by i
yields the national product under rationing, i.e.,
x1
1
= (1/(1 + 2))R = x2
2
(6.36)
Both countries end up with less affluence. However, the P rule allocates the water
such that both countries bear the scarcity equally.
Again, if we apply the CEA rule, we have to distinguish between two cases: In
the first case, i.e., R/2 < c2, both countries are allocated the same amount of R/2.
This implies that L2 can sustain a larger national product than L1:
x2
2
= R
22
>
R
21
= x1
1
(6.37)
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The same result occurs if R/2 > c2. In this case, the water allocation to L2
is c2 = y2. Hence, L2 can sustain the social product of y. This implies that the
affluence in L1 decreases due to water scarcity, i.e., the social product is less than y:
R − c2
1
<
c1
1
= y (6.38)
since R − c2 < c1.
Is it fair that the efficient country can maintain its standard of living, while L1,
due to its inefficient water economy, has to accept a loss of welfare if the CEA
rule is applied? Or should the proportional rule be applied, which will lead to an
equal decrease in GDP in both countries? In contrast to scenario I, this might require
more inquiries about the reasons for the different water efficiencies. Are countries
accountable for that, or do these different efficiencies reflect geological properties
countries cannot influence? In the latter case, they are not responsible in the sense of
the principle of moral arbitrariness (as introduced in Sect. 3.3) and they should bear
the scarcity equally. If the different water intensities are rooted in mismanagement,
then the principle of accountability will apply with the consequence that the CEA
rule is to be applied.
A comparison of both scenarios shows that bankruptcy rules should be weighted
carefully before being adopted. Beyond the question of which rule has to be applied,
the nature of the claims must also be examined. Are those derived from existential
needs or are they economic wants? In analogy to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs26, we
can put the claims in a prioritized order. This naturally means that the introduced
water allocation rules have to be adapted to these hierarchies of needs. Let us go
back to our numerical example and assume that the claims can be subdivided into
basic needs and secondary needs. Let us assume that L1 is a developed country with
a relatively small population (n1 = 4) while L2 is a developing country with a large
population (n2 = 10). The subsistence minimum of water per capita is ws = 10.
Claims are the sum of basis needs and secondary wants. For L1, we have
c1 = 180 = c11 + c21 = wsn1 + c21 = 40 + 140 (6.39)
and for L2:
c2 = 120 = c12 + c22 = wsn2 + c22 = 100 + 20 (6.40)
Wefirst look at the undifferentiatedwater allocation to the twocountries (seeFig. 6.3).
The numerical values are given in Table 6.11 for each country and for the three
distribution rules considered.27 The quantities of water per capita are calculated for
each rule: These values differ considerably between the different rules. For the P rule
and CEL rule, the water allocation per capita is below the subsistence minimum ws .
26See Sect. 3.5 for Maslow’s hierarchy.
27Notice, that in the two country case, the water allocation under the AP-rule is identical to the
allocation under the CEL rule.
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Table 6.11 Non-differentiated water allocation
P Rule CEA Rule CEL Rule
Countries x Pi x
P
i /ni x
CE A
i x
CE A
i /ni x
CEL
i x
CEL
i /ni
L1 120 30 100 25 130 32.5
L2 80 8 100 10 70 7
Table 6.12 Differentiated water allocation
P Rule CEA Rule CEL Rule
Countries x Pi x
P
i /ni x
CE A
i x
CE A
i /ni x
CEL
i x
CEL
i /ni
L1 92.5 23.125 80 20 100 25
L2 107.5 10.75 120 12 100 10
Needs of different priority make the direct application of bankruptcy rules to the
aggregated claims questionable. Basic needs should definitely be met.28 Thus, we
should adopt a sequential approach. First, water should be distributed according to
basic needs {c11, c12}. After that, the residual water R − c11 − c12 should be allocated
taking into account the secondary claims {c21, c22}. The water allocation rule is then
xi (R − c11 − c12, {c21, c22}). Total water assignments are
c11 + x1(R − c11 − c12, {c21, c22}) and c12 + x2(R − c11 − c12, {c21, c22}) (6.41)
In Table 6.12, we have calculated these allocations for the three rules.
The sequential treatment of the requirements leads to the fact that the subsistence
level is also fulfilled for the more populated country. The remaining water is then
distributed to the two countries on the basis of the remaining entitlements, without
taking into account the population figures. As shown in Table 6.11 and in Fig. 6.3,
the CEA- and CEL rule take greater account of the asymmetry of claims than the P
rule.
6.4.3 Sequential Allocation Rules
If we want to apply bankruptcy rules to a river system, its specific hydrological
characteristicsmust be taken into account. The unmodified application of bankruptcy
rules could lead to the fact that the resultingwater allocations are not feasible. Imagine
L1 is upstream, L2 downstream. The river system is characterized by a relatively low
inflow in L1 and a big inflow in L2. A direct application of the CEA rule, for example,
could lead to an equal distribution of the available water, i.e., the sum of all water
28Of course, if the sum of basic needs exceeds the water quantity available, we can apply the rules
directly taking the basic needs as claims.
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Table 6.13 Claims and inflows along a river
Countries Inflows Claims Rule-based
allocation
Downstream
availability
Downstream
excess claims
L1 R1 = 100 c1 = 180 x1 E1 = R1 cd1 = (c2 −
R2) = 20
L2 R2 = 100 c2 = 120 x2 E2 = R2 +
(R1 − x1)
cd2 = 0
Sum 200 300 200 – –
inflows. This would not be possible considering the geographical position of the two
countries and the low inflow in L1. For this constrained case, a sequential sharing rule
has been proposed.29 This bankruptcy rule takes the hierarchical order of countries
and the unidirectionality of the river into account. As before, the sum of claims
c1 + c2 is higher that the sum of inflows R1 + R2. However, due to the specific
geography of the river, the feasibility of a water allocation must also be ensured. For
this purpose, we define total available water in the two territories:
E1 = R1, E2 = R2 + (R1 − x1) (6.42)
where xi is the water allocation (per country) according to a sharing rule to be
specified. Equation (6.42) shows the typical water availability structure of a river
depending on the position of the countries. Finally, to apply the bankruptcy rules to
a river system, we have to define the downstream excess claims
cd1 = (c2 − R2), cd2 = 0 (6.43)
Equation (6.43) is of crucial importance for the sharing rules. Downstream coun-
try’s claims are adjusted by its inflow R2. The very reason for this approach is the
insight that R2 is always with country two due to the unidirectional flow of the river.
Starting with the water allocation for L1, we have to compare the available water
forL1with the excess claimsofL2. In the following table, all the relevant variables are
summarized. In addition to the numerical values in the example above,we have added
numerical values for the inflows R1 and R2, so we can calculate the water allocations
proposed by the sequential sharing rules. Table 6.13 lists all relevant parameters to
apply bankruptcy rules. In the following, we will consider the sequential variants of
the P rule, the CEA rule, and the CEL rule. Let us start with the P rule.
P Rule
In the first step, the water allocation for L1 is calculated, as shown in the first row
of Table 6.14. x S−P1 is a fraction λ1 of the claim c1. The amount of water remaining
is the same fraction of the residual net claims of L2, the downstream excess claims.
The proportionality factor λ1 is simply the ratio between the availability of water
29See Ansink and Weikard (2012).
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Table 6.14 The sequential proportionality rule
Countries Rule-based water
allocation to Li
Rule-based downstream
allocation
Proportionality factor
L1 x S−P1 = λ1c1
x S−P1 = 0.5 · 180 = 90
x S−Pcd1 = λ1cd1= 0.5 · 20 = 10
λ1 = E1/(c1 + cd1)
= 100/(180 + 20) = 0.5
L2 x S−P2 = E2 =
R2 + (R1 − x S−P1 )
x S−P2 =
100 + (100 − 90) = 110
x S−Pcd12 = 0 ——
Table 6.15 The sequential CEA Rule
Countries Rule-based water
allocation to Li
Rule-based downstream
allocation
Award calculation
L1 x S−CE A1 = Min[c1, λ1]
x S−CE A1 = 80
x S−CE Acd1 = Min[cd1, λ1]
x S−CE Acd1 = 20
x S−CE A1 + x S−CE Acd1 =
E1
Min[180, λ1] +
Min[20, λ1] = 100
→ λ1 = 80
L2 x S−CE A2 = E2= 100 + (100 − 80) =
120
x S−CE Acd2 = 0 —-
and the sum of claims c1 + cd1. After having determined the water allocation for
L1, we go one step downstream and determine the water allocation for L2. In our
simple two country case, we only have to allocate the remaining water supply E2.
CEA Rule
The water shares that follow from the CEA rule are also calculated in a sequential
way. Again, we begin with the upstream country L1. We start in the first line (L1) of
Table 6.15 and split the available water R1 to L1 and L2 downstream according to
the CEA rule. The upper bounds (see the principle of claim boundedness Eq. (6.20))
are the claims c1 and the excess claims of the downstream country cd1. For the
given numerical values, it follows that L1 receives 80 and the downstream country
20. We proceed to the second country L2 and calculate the residual water available,
E2 = R2 + (R1 − x S−CE A1 )which yields 120. Finally,we have to calculate thewater
allocation sequentially for the CEL rule.
CEL Rule
Again, we begin with the first row for country L1 (Table 6.16), and calculate λ1.
First, we assume that there exists an equal share of loss. This is not feasible, because
under this assumption the second term of the right-hand side would get negative.
Hence, we assume that this term is nil which yields that λ1 = 80. Having calculated
x S−CEL1 , we can compute x
S−CEL
2 = E2.
Discussion
The sequential sharing rules are somewhat exhaustive with regard to the calculation
effort even if there are only two riparian countries. However, their logic is clear. The
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Table 6.16 The sequential CEL Rule
Countries Rule-based water
allocation to Li
Rule-based downstream
allocation
Loss calculation
L1 x S−CEL1 =
Max[0, c1 − λ1]
x S−CEL1 = 100
x S−CELcd1 =
Max[0, cd1 − λ1]
x S−CELcd1 = 20
x S−CEL1 + x S−CELcd1 = E1
Max[0, 180 − λ1]+
Max[0, 20 − λ1] = 100
→ λ1 = 80
L2 x S−CEL2 = E2= 100 + (100 − 100) =
100
x S−CELcd2 = 0 —-
calculation begins upstream and first divides the available water on the basis of the
existing claims between the first country and the remaining countries. If the water
allocation for L1 is calculated, the calculation moves downstream and the remaining
water is allocated to L2. The reason for the sequential approach is justified by the
unidirectionality of the river system flow. However, one must be careful with the
direct application of the sequential sharing rules, whenever water is to be distributed
along a river.
Figure 6.4 shows thewater allocation calculated in the last three tables graphically
and compares it with the actual application of pure bankruptcy rules. The figure
displays the water allocation from the bankruptcy rules {P,CE A,CEL} depicted
in Fig. 6.3. The P rule and theCEL rule are not feasible since these rules allocatemore
water to L1 than available by R1. The river structure is depicted by the blue dotted
water budget line with its kink at {R1, R2}. Feasible water allocations are only those
along the blue dotted budget line. The sequential rules are by construction feasible.
The P Rule (see Table 6.14) allocates the water on the basis of proportional shares.
The proportional distribution is calculated with respect to inflow R1. In addition,30
country 2 also receives inflow R2, which for hydrological reasons cannot be split
between L1 and L2.
One has to be careful: The fact that the algorithm of the sequential sharing rule
takes the hydrology of a river into account does not imply that these rules should
always be applied for river basins. This is a normative decision. The consideration
of the flow direction has the consequence that the claims from upstream are no
longer considered in the calculation of the water allocation downstream. This follows
from the construction of downstream excess claims (see, e.g., Table 6.14). Thus
the calculated water allocations are compatible with hydrology, but at the expense
of the lower weighting of upstream claims. The modification of the bankruptcy
rules for unidirectional running waters is therefore not only of a technical nature,
but also involves a normative adjustment. Thus, the decision as to which of the
two sets of rules, the direct or the sequential, is to be applied remains not only a
30The line from {0, R2} to the point S-P and {c1, c2} can be constructed from the L1-row
in Table6.14. Since, x S−P1 = λ1c1 = R1[c1/(c1 + (c2 − R2))] and x S−P2 − R2 = R1 − x S−P1 =
R2 + R1((c2 − R2)((c1 + (c2 − R2)) we can calculate (x S−P2 − R2)/x S−P1 = (c2 − R2)/c1.
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Fig. 6.4 Bankruptcy rules
and sequential sharing rules.
Source own illustration
technical-hydrological one, but also a normative one. Table 6.14 clearly shows that
the sequentiality favors the downstream country.
If the application of this sequential rule is perceived as unfair, one can return to the
direct rule. Since it cannot be implemented in our example, a second best option is
available, namely to come as close as possible to the desired allocation. This alloca-
tion is {x1 = R1, x2 = R2}. In Fig. 6.4, we see that this second best option is closest
to the P rule and the CEL rule. At the same time, it is the water allocation according to
the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS). Both riparian countries make
full use of the water that originates in their territory. Notice, however, that this result
is not based on the principle of sovereignty, but on fairness considerations.
The normative problem of the sequential rule is even clearer in Fig. 6.5. Here, we
have chosen numerical values of the relevant variables such that both sets of sharing
rules, the direct ones and the sequential ones, are hydrologically feasible.31
In this scenario, the choice of allocation only depends on normative criteria.
The hydrology does not constrain the choice. The sequential sharing rules favor the
downstream country with exception of the sequential CEL rule. In our two country
example, both CEL rules, together with the direct CEA rule, lead to the same water
allocation. This is due to the assumption that both countries have the same claims.
The sequential versions of the P- and CEA rule do not satisfy the principle of Equal
Treatment of Equals.32 Thus, whenever the hydrology allows the direct application
of bankruptcy rules, the application of the sequential rules cannot be justified. But
even if the direct rules cannot be applied for hydrological reasons, the sequential
rules cannot be applied automatically. It may turn out that second-best solutions are
preferred for reasons of fairness, as shown above.
31The numerical values are {R = 180, c1 = 160, c2 = 160, R1 = 120, R2 = 60}.
32See the above-introduced properties. If c1 = c2 then x1 = x2. However, this might not be possible
due to the hydrological conditions.
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Source own illustration
The discussion shows that we have to be careful when applying bankruptcy rules.
The mere application of mathematical rules does not solve the sharing problem.
These methodological tools are helpful but cannot substitute the intrinsic fairness
problems of sharing scarce water resources. If the distribution rules are discussed
in principle, the geographical position of the countries poses a principle problem.
Geography could be regarded asmorally arbitrary.33 This implies that the actual order
along the rivermust not result in any disadvantages for the individual countries. If this
argument is valid, it ismight be necessary to talk about the legitimacy of claims before
applying a rule of division. Moreover, if moral arbitrariness is the basis of the TIBS
principle, we might end up with the insight that water treaties have to be constructed
in a more complex way. The pure allocation of water might not suffice to compensate
for geographical disadvantages. This leads back to our discussion of welfare-based
approaches which allow for side payments and other in-kind compensations. Of
course, with this step we have to face all the problems discussed in Sect. 6.3.
Box 6.2 Applying water bankruptcy rules to the Euphrates River
The Euphrates flows through three countries: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Together
with the Tigris, it forms the water catchment area, which has been known as
Mesopotamia ever since. From its springs in Turkey to the Persian Gulf, the
Euphrates River stretches over a length of 2,786 km. The average annual water
flow is 25 billionm3 serving 23 million people in the transboundary catchment
area. The water use in all three riparian countries relates mainly to irrigation
33See the fairness principles in Sect. 3.3.
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(70%), hydropower, and drinking water supply. Data records of the past 70
years indicate a negative trend of water availability measured as a decrease
in mean annual flows. The need for sustainable water treaties is, therefore,
becoming increasingly important. Currently, there are two bilateral accords
in force: an agreement between Syria and Turkey specifying the minimum
average flow at the Syrian-Turkish border and another treaty between Iraq and
Syria determining the water allocation of Euphrates water between these two
countries.
The linear arrangement of neighboring states and the simple geography of
tributaries make the Euphrates a good example of the sequential sharing rule.
The following map shows the geographical structure. The main water inflow is
provided from Turkey. In Syria, there are three tributaries contributing water to
the Euphrates (the Sajur, the Balikh, and the Khabur). Iraq does not contribute
to the watercourse.
The following table summarizes all necessary information to apply the sharing
allocation rules.
Claims and contributions
Riparian Claim Claim Contribution Contribution
Countries (MCM/year) % (MCM/year) %
Turkey 14,000 25.6 31,580 88.8
Syria 12,600 23 4000 11.2
Iraq 28,100 51.4 0 0
While water inflows are well measurable, the determination of the claims
requires an estimate of the water demand components from the various eco-
nomic sectors of the riparian countries. There are several studies in the litera-
ture, the results of which are gathered by Jarkeh et al. (2016) and then entered
into the table as a best guess. The application of the sequential sharing rule
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yields the following water allocation for the three countries (as a percentage
of the claims).
Sequential sharing rule. Source Jarkeh et al. (2016)
Riparian Sequential sharing rule
P Rule CEA Rule CEL Rule
Turkey 62 100 32
Syria 66 86 62
Iraq 66 38 83
It is interesting to see that the percentage satisfaction is almost the same
for all three countries in the case of the sequential P rule, despite Iraq’s
lack of inflow and its high claims. The application of the CEA rule leads
to a complete coverage of Turkish water demand, while Iraq only receives
about 40% of its claims. The CEL rule would yield exactly the opposite: Iraq
achieves the highest fulfillment of claims while Turkey is allowed to use only
extremely little water, 70% of its claims would not be covered. The remaining
water is to cross the Turkish border for the benefit of downstream states. The
question remains as to whether this water allocation has any chance of being
implemented...
Sources UN-ESCWA and BGR (2013), Jarkeh et al. (2016)
6.5 FlexibleWater Sharing
If one examines the emergence of water agreements between riparian states on an
international water body, it becomes apparent that it often takes years to reach a
successful conclusion. The Indus Waters Treaty, for instance, took over 6 years of
bargaining until it was concluded with the assistance of theWorld Bank. Agreements
are rather difficult to alter in response to unexpected changes of underlying hydro-
climatological conditions. Specifically, if the volume and the pattern of the regional
water inflow into an international catchment area changes, conflicts may occur. This
instability is the result of the inflexibility of water agreements. New hydrological
framework conditions are difficult to be taken into account in the treaties. Com-
pliance with a treaty on the basis of outdated framework conditions can lead to a
situation inwhich the conflict ismore advantageous for some partner states than com-
pliance with the treaty concluded. In the following, we will, therefore, investigate
how different contract types can influence the behavior of the contracting parties in
the event of unexpected changes in the hydrological conditions. We limit ourselves
to investigating the case of decreasing water inflows into an international river.
Contract Types
Roughly, we can distinguish between three contract types:
• Complete contingent contracts: This complex type of contract would be the best
answer to the variability of the water supply. For every conceivable hydrological
and climatological scenario, the water quantities are allocated ex ante, possibly
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with corresponding non-water transfers. However, the amount of information
required is very high. The concept of complex contingent contracts actually leaves
out the problem of unexpected events. Thus, we subsequently only focus on the
following two contract types.
• Fixed flow allocation: This type of water sharing rule is most common. A fixed
amount of water for the downstream country is stipulated. In the following anal-
ysis, we assume that this fixed amount is accompanied by a non-water transfer
from the downstream country to the upstream one.
• Proportional allocations: The water allocation follows a percentage rule. The
downstreamcountry is entitled to a certain percentageof thewater supply available
upstream. Again, we combine this type of agreement with a non-water transfer
which is also proportional to the water received.
To analyze these two contract forms, we take up our example of a river with two
riparian countries from Sect. 6.2. Upstream is labeled 1 and downstream is denoted
by 2. In the following, we assume that the river is fed only by water upstream. There
is no downstream tributary (i.e., R2 = 0). The optimal allocation then can be derived
from the following maximization program.
max
w1,w2
B1(w1) + B2(w2) w1 + w1 ≤ R1 (6.44)
Let the water supply be scarce. Then, the optimal fixed water supply for downstream
w∗2 satisfies the following condition
B
′
1(R1 − w2) = B
′
2(w2) (6.45)
Similarly, the proportional sharing rule can be fixed. The allotted amount of water
downstream is expressed as percentage α∗ of the total water available:
w∗2 = (1 − α∗)R1 w∗1 = R1 − w∗2 = α∗R1 (6.46)
Thus if the water supply is constant, both allocations are identical. However, if
the water supply R1 decreases unexpectedly, the effects on both contract types are
rather different. To show this, we first have to determine the non-water transfers in
both contracts, the level of which depends on the bargaining power of both riparian
countries. Of course, whatever the amount of money (or other non-water transfer
vehicles) will be, the solution must lie in the core as defined in Sect. 6.2:
B1(w1) + T ≥ B1(R1) and B2(w2) − T ≥ 0 (6.47)
where T is the non-water transfer. In the case of a fixed flow agreement, T is also a
fixed amount. In the case of a proportional allocation of the water supply, T varies
with the amount of water transferred from upstream to downstream whereby the
price of water t is fixed.
T (r) = t(1 − α)r (6.48)
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where r ≤ R1 is the actualwater supply and t is thefixedwater price.Theproportional
water agreement makes the non-water transfer contingent on the actual amount of
water delivered to the downstream country. The fixed water price is calculated as
t = T
R1(1 − α∗) (6.49)
that is, t are the average payments per amount of water delivered to the downstream
riparian at the time of the conclusion of the contract, i.e., when r = R1. Inserting
Eq. (6.49) into Eq. (6.48) yields
T (r) = r
R1
T (6.50)
Robustness to Changing Hydrological Conditions
Now, the question needs to be answered on how the two types of contracts perform
if, let’s say as a result of climate change, the water inflow unexpectedly decreases.
Three criteria are important here: efficiency, robustness, and fairness. Before the
unexpected water reduction, both contracts are efficient and fair by construction.
The sum of the benefits is maximized, both parties have agreed to the contract by
appropriate choice of a transfer T in the core and the resulting distribution of the
benefits is considered fair.
What happens now, if the water supply decreases, that is r < R1? In both types
of contracts, the quantities of water allocated differ from the quantities originally
negotiated, with the result that the efficiency properties change. This also applies
to the distribution of benefits. Further, it is unclear whether the two parties have an
incentive to complywith the contract, i.e., how robust the contract is. In the following,
we focus on this issue.
Let us assume that the water supply of the river r is falling, i.e., r < R1. In the case
of a fixed contract, the stipulated water allocation at the outset is w∗2 (R1 − w∗2) for
downstream (upstream). Let us assume that the fixed non-water transfer is calculated
such that both countries are better off than in the case of no agreement, i.e.:
B1(R1 − w∗2) + T ∗ > B2(R1) and B2(w∗2) − T ∗ > 0 (6.51)
For example, we could calculate T ∗ such that total welfare of both riparian countries
is distributed according to the Shapley values.34 In this case,
T ∗ = 1
2
[
B2(w
∗
2) − B1(R1 − w∗2) + B1(R1)
]
(6.52)
Now, let us analyze the robustness of this contract with the help of a numerical exam-
ple: B
′
i = a − bwi , a = 100, b = 1, and R1 = 100. Let’s start with the upstream
country. The country will stick to the contract as long as it is better off than in the
34See Sect. 6.2 and Exercise 6.4.
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Fig. 6.6 Robustness of a
fixed contract. Source own
illustration
stand-alone case. This can be observed in Fig. 6.6. The blue line shows the welfare
(utility) in the stand-alone case, i.e., in the case of conflict. In this case, country 2 does
not receive water from country 1. The upstream country uses the whole water supply
R1. Of course, it does not receive any transfer because the downstream country has
stopped to pay due to the breach of contract. The black line represents total utility for
the case that the upstream country complies with the contract. It delivers the fixed
amount of water w∗2 and receives in exchange T ∗. As the water supply is decreasing,
the water available for upstream decreases because the downstream country receives
the fixed amount ofwater. There is a critical threshold rˆ , the intersection of both lines,
where it does not pay for the upstream country to comply any more with the contract
if r continues to drop. The length of the range R1 − rˆ indicates the robustness of this
type of contract.
Let us turn to the proportional contract. At the outset, i.e., r = R1, the agreement
provides that downstreamcountry receivesw∗2 which can be expressed as a proportion
of R1 (see Eq. (6.46)). The amount of non-water transfer to the upstream country
depends on the actual amount of water delivered downstream whereas the price is
fixed according to Eq. (6.48). Thus, the countries’ benefits including transfers are
B1(α
∗r) + t(1 − α)r and B2((1 − α∗)r) − t(1 − α)r (6.53)
Figure 6.7 shows the stand-alone benefit of upstream as a function of the variable
water supply r (blue line) again. The black line depicts benefits plus transfers under
thefixed agreement and the gray line is net benefits of upstreamunder the proportional
contract. The black and gray lines begin at r = R1 at the same point “coop”where the
difference to point “conflict” indicates the benefit increase for upstream to conclude
a contract with downstream. However, this difference shrinks as r decreases. Then,
comparing the intersections of both benefit lines of the two contract forms with the
benefit lines in the conflict case (blue line) shows that the proportional contract is
more robust than the contract with fixed quantities.
Durability of Agreements
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Fig. 6.7 Comparing fixed
and proportional contracts.
Source own illustration
The robustness of a water agreement depends on the flexibility of its construction.
But the flexible design is not sufficient for the durability of an agreement:
• Water agreements are more viable if the participating countries share the risk
associated with unexpected water shortage. A proportional contract provides a
rule to share the risk. A fixed water agreement shifts the risk to the upstream
country. Its only incentive to complywith the agreement is the anticipated threat of
downstream to cancel the non-water transfer if no water is delivered. The stability
of a water agreement depends on the flexibility of its items stipulated, specifically,
the transfers agreed upon. If these non-water transfers are to be provided on a
periodical basis, downstream can cancel its payment in reaction to a breach of
contract by upstream. Here again, the fixed term agreement is less flexible than the
proportional rule. If upstream does not deliver the amount of water agreed upon,
downstream stops the payments. In contrast, the proportional contract allows (a
bit) more flexibility. Less water delivered by upstream leads only to less payment
from downstream according to the internal water price stipulated.
• The analysis so far assumes that the contract parties assess the advantage of the
agreement by comparing the outcome under compliancewith the stand-alone ben-
efits. As long as the contract leads tomore utility compared to the conflict situation
(breach of contract), the terms and conditions agreed uponwill be respected.How-
ever, whether to comply with the contract under a shrinking water supply might
not be the only consideration of the parties. Even if the benefits under a contract
are higher than in the conflict case (breach of contract), the distribution of benefits
changes with less water supply. If the resulting benefit distribution is considered
unfair, the contract might be broken even if the resulting conflict situation wors-
ens the economic situation of one or both parties. We know from experimental
economics that people do not only look at their benefits but also at the relative
position, i.e., the distribution of benefits.35
35The ultimatum game has shown this with astonishing evidence, see, e.g., Thaler (1988).
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• Even if a certain degree of flexibility is built into the treaty, there may be rene-
gotiation because the countries are not satisfied with the scheduled outcome of
the agreement when the supply of water has declined. Then it is important that
the institutional framework of the treaty is operational. Regular contacts between
representatives of the two countries create a basis of trust which makes successful
renegotiation likely.
6.6 An Institutional Perspective onTransboundaryWater
Agreements
6.6.1 An Institutional Approach
In the previous sections, we have investigated designs to divide a transboundary
water resource among riparians. It is evident that the solutions, such as the Shap-
ley value, will not be translated into a real-world treaty as such. An institutional
economic approach suggests that real-world transboundary management would not
follow such a technocratic top-down approach. The study of the theoretical prin-
ciples of water allocation, however, allows to clarify which division rules can be
qualified as fair in principle and worthy of approval. These concepts are deeply con-
nected with the fundamental principles of justice and ethics and have also shaped
international water law. They certainly belong to what institutional economics calls
the institutional environment, traditions, and informal institutional framework condi-
tions shaped by cultural configurations (Ostrom 1990; North 1990). For example, the
ancient Talmud’s garment rule already contains a simple version of the constrained
equal awards rule.
The two approaches presented here, benefit sharing and bankruptcy rules, differ
with regard to the weighting of two traditions of thought in social philosophy and
political theory. The concept of the core and Shapley value can be assigned to the
concept of the social contract as the constitution of cooperation. Rational people
come together and agree to divide the advantages of cooperation in a fair and accept-
able way.36 The underlying fairness concept of the Shapley value is certainly the
accountability principle.37 The Shapley value is calculated on the basis of the aver-
age marginal productive contributions of the individual partners to the overall result.
Those who do not contribute to the cooperation receive nothing. The consideration
of individual productivity also leads to the fact that the allocation is acceptable. In
36Remember that α < β < γ where the latter number is the outcome with cooperation.
37See Sect. 3.3.
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this way, the Shapley value combines the concept of fairness (accountability) with
the concept of rationality as exploiting mutual cooperation advantages.
The nucleolus is close to the concept of the “veil of ignorance” by John Rawls.38
This approach implies that the allocation of resources should follow those who are
most disadvantaged. The nucleolus first determines all “disappointments” that follow
from a proposed allocation and selects the largest one. Then, in an iterative procedure,
a new proposal is put forward with the aim of reducing the largest disappointment.
This leads to disappointments of other sub-coalitions. Thus, the search process is
continued until the maximum disappointment has been minimized. This approach is
also in the tradition of the social contract: it is fair (in the sense of Rawls) and worthy
of acceptance, i.e., it lies in the core and puts all partners in a better position.
However, these approaches have their limits in practice. They abstract from too
many complex relationships that have to be considered if one wants to successfully
conclude water contracts. To begin with, the contracting parties are not simply indi-
viduals, but state entities which themselves consist of a number of social groups with
differing interests. We, therefore, consider the game theoretical allocation rules as
an element of a comprehensive holistic approach to understand the development of
international water treaties. Institutional economics39 allows this broad perspective
to be built up scientifically. Here, we distinguish between institutional environment
(blue area in Fig. 6.8) and institutional arrangements (yellow bottom area).
The fundamental considerations of justice and its game theory specifications cer-
tainly belong to the first area together with culturally determined concepts of justice,
religious belief systems, and grown principles of law, written and unwritten. In
contrast, the institutional arrangements are the structure within which the members
of a society act politically and carry out economic transactions (production, con-
sumption). These structures have grown historically, a development process that is
not solely the result of planning, but is often predetermined by the past. Historians
speak here of path dependencies or lock-in effects. Socio-technical structures often
exhibit an inertia that resembles a lock-in, such as an energy system based on fossil
resources that does not change to a system of renewable energy production without
deliberate energy policy measures. Similar retarding forces of grown institutional
structures inhibit the further development of spatially bound infrastructures, such as
waterways. Changed geographical settlement structures, for example, require new
waterways instead of simply preserving the historic ones.40 The interaction between
environment (vegetation, landscape, terrestrial eco-system) and man-made infras-
38This is the concept underlying the social welfare function: If no one knew in advance how he
would fare on earth because he had no prior information about it (veil of ignorance), he would argue
in favor of improving the situation of the worst off in the world. In the context of the nucleolus, the
worst off is the one who is most disappointed with respect to the difference of the utility apportioned
to him in the grand coalition and the welfare level he can achieve by himself.
39Saleth and Dinar (2004) explain the importance of the institutional economics approach to under-
stand the water sector.
40See Willems and Busscher (2019) for an analysis of the Dutch national waterways.
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Fig. 6.8 The institutional embeddedness. Source own illustration
tructure determines the political level in which social and economic developments
are embedded. Interventions in the water cycle can lead to ecological effects that
extend beyond the boundaries of the local infrastructure. It is then not enough to
assess infrastructure investments at the lower local political levels, but also higher
levels must be involved in the decision-making process. This is entirely in the spirit
of integrated water resource management, linked to the principle of subsidiarity. The
integrative approach does not only refer to the geographical dimension, but also to
the water users and indirect users of the water cycle. The latter are, for example,
farmers who not only use water directly (irrigation), but also depend on a function-
ing ecosystem to ensure soil fertility. An inclusive approach to water management
should be pursued at national level. All stakeholders should be taken into account in
the sustainable shaping of the water cycle.
The problem of incomplete inclusion of all social groups in water management is
not only due to an asymmetry of political power. Even if access to co-determination
is guaranteed constitutionally and politically, it depends on the executive implemen-
tation of water policy plans. The level of governance is thus addressed. The effec-
tiveness and functioning of water management institutions depend on an adequate
design that takes into account the political environment, the inclusion of stakeholders
and the incentives of employees at different levels of the institution.
6.6.2 Principles for Effective Institutional Development
In the following, some principles are presented that are important for the develop-
ment of effective institutions, both for national authorities and for transboundary
institutions. However, this should not give the perception that effective water man-
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agement institutions can simply be assembled from a design toolbox. Institution
building is always a laborious singular historical process, which refers to the respec-
tive individual case. Nevertheless, general principles should be considered in that
context.
• Purpose, objectives, and role: It must be clear from the outset why management
institutions have been set up. What are the actual objectives and purposes of the
institution? This question must be asked at every administrative level. For exam-
ple, is the purpose confined to the mere collecting and analyzing of relevant data?
Is it about coordination of decentralized decision-makers (passive management),
of advice, or does the institution established also have decision-making power
(active management)?
• Power and duties: If water management is endowed with power, it is particu-
larly important to precisely define its competences and, to communicate its limits.
These boundaries may be of an economic or geographical nature. Is the authority
able to take planning initiatives or does it only have a monitoring function to
enforce the regulatory measures laid down by other institutions (regional parlia-
ments, etc.)?
• Decision rules : The exercise of power requires legitimacy, otherwise, the imple-
mentation of water management measures will not be enforceable. It must be
transparent how decisions have been taken, and this with reference to the consti-
tutional legal basis.
• Accountability and responsibility The responsibilities of all participants must
be clearly defined. This applies on the one hand to the managers or civil servants
employed in the administrative units and on the other hand to thewater users. In the
course of the institutional implementation of water management, the assignment
of duties and the takeover of responsibilities must be clearly communicated. This
also includes the definition and description of sanction measures in the event that
those involved do not comply with them.
• Mediation: Integrated water management is often about competing claims. Con-
flicts will inevitably arise. As a rule, these cannot be decided top-down. The
institution must, therefore, build up the competence and capacity to resolve these
conflicts in an orderly communication and negotiation process.
• Competence and expertise: Institutions do not function abstractly. Design alone
does not ensure their effectiveness. It is important to build up a personnel devel-
opment with regard to competence and expertise right from the start (capacity
building). Administrative and decision-making units must have a critical mass of
a well-trained and competent core staff. In the long term, an institution cannot
rely on external consultancy (Biswas 1996).
6.6.3 Idealtypes of Governance
If the international water catchment area is regarded as a common complex ecosys-
tem, the institutional structure should take into account the specific complex interre-
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Fig. 6.9 Idealtypes of
governance. Source
Pahl-Wostl and Knieper
(2014)
lations. The fitting of the management structure to the hydro-ecological conditions
is called adaptive management.41 For this approach, it is particularly important that
the institutional structure must “mirror” the geographical, hydrological, and eco-
logical complexity of a catchment area. An institutionalized top-down approach,
for example, is usually not effective because decision-makers at the national level
make water management decisions without necessarily taking into account regional
impacts, leading to a so-called spatial scale mismatch. The spatial scale runs from
the global level to the regional level, then to the level of regional rivers (lakes) and
finally to subwater catchment areas. At all levels, effects can arise that must be per-
ceived by suitable institutions (government agencies, NGOs, municipalities, etc.).
The information must then be brought together promptly and effectively so that it
can be processed at the respective institutional levels.
Basically, international waters should only be managed as a multilevel common
pool within the framework of co-management of all open operational units. This
can lead to problems of sovereignty, problems that must be solved in the underlying
treaty. The increasing use of regional water systems and the increasing volatility of
weather events (heavy rainfall, drought, etc.) require a very high degree of flexibility
in the institutional structure, to be able to react effectively to these unforeseeable
events and should therefore be polycentric in nature. This idealtypical structure has
certain characteristics, which are illustrated by Fig. 6.9, based on Pahl-Wostl and
Knieper (2014).
Along the horizontal axis, the degree of power decreases from the left with cen-
tralized power to the right pole, where power is equally distributed among all insti-
tutional units involved. These could be, for example, regional water authorities that
are located at the same level without hierarchies. The vertical axis indicates the
degree of cooperation or coordination between the sub-institutions. This can refer,
for example, to the coordination of decisions or to the exchange of information.Coop-
41There is an extensive literature on this concept, see, e.g., Akamani and Wilson (2011).
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eration/coordination is strongly pronounced at the upper end; it ends in a completely
uncoordinated coexistence.
Four idealtypes result from this coordination system. At the top left is the coordi-
nated, centralized water institution as found in top-down approaches. Its adaptability
is low. The transparency of information is low, the degree of participation is just as
low, and it derives its legitimacy only from the national level. At the bottom left, we
find ourselves in a completely disintegrated situation. A few players, equipped with
comparatively much power, pursue their own interests to the detriment of the inter-
national water catchment area. Economic literature refers to this constellation as rent
seeking. This system is also very susceptible to corruption. The situation improves a
little on the lower right because the un-cooperating institutions are endowed with lit-
tle power. They cannot effectively implement their interests. However, this does not
mean that the catchment area will be managed sustainably. Fragmentation does not
allow the development of a targeted sustainability strategy. The polycentric structure
is the only idealtype that has the prerequisites for adaptive management. There are
no dominance structures, such that the various user interests can be balanced. The
individual stakeholders are well networked and coordinated. It is therefore possible
to react quickly to changing environmental conditions.
However, the polycentric configuration can only be understood as an ideal type.
Whether the structure can be implemented at all in the respective political gravi-
tational fields is a completely different question. It may be that, due to historical
path dependency and cultural conditions, certain forms of adaptive management can
only be implemented in the course of a long reform process. The development of
typologies is nevertheless useful because it elaborates the necessary institutional
prerequisites for successful transboundary water management. This makes it clear
that there is a long way between fundamental considerations about the allocation of
scarce water, as described in the previous sections, and practical implementation as
recognized institutional structures.
6.6.4 Application to Transboundary Agreements
Institutional design of integrated water resource management is even more chal-
lenging once cooperation between sovereign states is required. Figure 6.8 highlights
some institutional issues of transboundary water management. The political spheres
of both countries play a role in the joint management. At the political level, nego-
tiations are first held on the allocation of water, which is restricted by geographical
patterns of watercourses (tributaries, lakes, direction of streams, etc.). Of particular
importance is whether a multidimensional contract or only a contract for the quan-
tities of water should be negotiated. The compromise space is much larger in the
case of the multipurpose contracts because different economic sectors can be com-
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bined, for example, water use can be traded against energy supply.42 This negotiation
might be conducted in the presence of power asymmetries, whether due to the posi-
tion of the riparian states (upstream, downstream) or due to economic and military
dominance. These initial strategic positions become increasingly important as water
scarcity increases. In some circumstances, riparians may not be prepared to negotiate
the use of water because they feel strong enough to use water without taking into
account the needs of other riparian states. This does not necessarily mean, however,
that conflicts must arise. There may be something like a status quo under customary
law in which the management of a transboundary water body takes place. However,
these undefined floating conditions are likely to vanish as water scarcity increases.
When a contract becomes ready to be signed, implementation is an issue. This
raises the question of the institutional nature of transboundary water management.
Here, similar aspects to those described for the national or regional level must be
considered. The organization to be formed is located in the gravitational area of
sovereign states, which makes the institutionalization and administrative work con-
siderably more difficult. The Damocles’ sword of unilateral termination or simply
noncompliance with the treaty by the contracting parties is hovering over the insti-
tution established.
The effectiveness of a transboundary organization depends not only on the prin-
ciples introduced above, but also on the depth of cooperation granted to it by the
contractual partners. A distinction can be made between different degrees of coop-
eration (see Vollmer et al. (2009)):
• Shallow cooperation: There is only a loose connection between the contracting
parties. The cooperation is not “visible”, i.e., there are no formalized structures,
like joint committees, task forces, or established partnerships. There is only a loose
direct contact with the respective national organizational entities of the riparian
countries enclosed in a treaty. This minimal institutionalization is, of course, the
result of a contract that does not explicitly regulate much, but rather represents a
declaration of intent for cooperation.
• Intermediate cooperation: The operational level is visibly structured here. There
are regular meetings between the responsible representatives of the state authori-
ties, and a secretariat organizes this interaction, which also requires its own staff.
However, there is no budget sovereignty.
• Deep cooperation: Within this framework, the established authority has a certain
autonomy. It has an independent budget and its powers go far beyond preparatory
work (information, organization). It has decision-making powers.
The varying degrees of cooperation reflect the level of allocative power conferred
on the established institution. The wider the field of competence and organizational
depth of the institution, the greater its clout. Within the framework of the Sustainable
42Benefit sharing takes account of this exploitation of exchange gains, while bankruptcy rules
restrict themselves to water as a means of distribution.
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Development Goal, UNWater has defined the effectiveness of the institutionalization
of transboundary basin management (indicator 6.5.2).43 A transboundary manage-
ment institution is called “operational” if it meets the following criteria:
• There is a joint body, joint mechanism, or commission (e.g., a river basin organization)
for transboundary cooperation;
• There are regular (at least once per year) formal communications between riparian
countries in [the] form of meetings (either at the political or technical level);
• There is a joint or coordinated water management plan(s), or joint objectives are set,
and;
• There is a regular exchange (at least once per year) of data and information.
UNWater collects data on the organizational implementation of formalized coop-
eration.44 For surface water projects, 84 of the 155 international contractual coop-
erations responded to the survey 2018. 42 of these have a very high degree of orga-
nizational structure, mainly Europe and Northern America, and sub-Saharan Africa.
However, some caution is called for when evaluating the empirical results. As UN
Water notes, the degree of organization cannot be used automatically to draw con-
clusions about the results, such as better water quality or an improvement in the
livelihood of people living in the international waters under the organizational struc-
tures implemented. There is a critical literature on this indicator.45 The mere fact
that an organizational structure has been established does not necessarily mean that
the underlying contract is fair and inclusive in terms of sustainability, i.e., involves
the various stakeholders in transboundary water management.
6.7 Exercises
Exercise 6.1 Benefit sharing in a river with two riparian states
Assume there are two riparians at one river, riparian 1 which is upstream and riparian
2 which is downstream. The riparians are indexed with the indices i , with i = {1, 2}.
The natural inflow into the river upstream of riparian 1 is given with R1 = 100, while
the natural inflow downstream of riparian 1 but upstream of riparian 2 is given with
R2 = 50. Due to the diversion and consumption of water from the river with the level
wi , the riparians generate a benefit of Bi . The benefit functions are specified with
43McCracken and Meyer (2018) analyze the methodology of the SDG indicator 6.5.2 and report on
empirical results.
44See Bertule et al. (2018).
45See Hussein et al. (2018).
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Fig. 6.10 Benefit sharing in
a river basin with two
riparians. Source own
illustration
Bi (wi ) = ai · wi − 0.5 · bi · (wi )2
The parameters of the benefit functions are assumed with a1 = 100, a2 = 60, b1 =
b2 = 1.
The situation in the river is shown by Fig. 6.10. The marginal benefit of riparian
1 is illustrated from the left vertical ordinate to the right direction, while we plot the
marginal benefit of riparian 2 from the right vertical ordinate to the left direction.
The length of the abscissa stands for the water amount R1 + R2, while the upstream
external inflow R1 is represented by the distance between the left origin of the
diagram and the vertical line named with R1. Therefore, the downstream external
inflow R2 is represented by the distance between the right origin of the diagram and
the vertical line R1. In the following explanation, we would like to find the UID,
DID, and Shapley solution of the benefit sharing problem.
In the river basin, two cooperation scenarios are possible:
• The riparians act unilaterally in a noncooperative way. The water consumption
amounts of the riparians are symbolized with wNC1 . The consumption level of the
upstream riparian (wNC1 ) is represented in Fig. 6.10 by the distance from the left
origin of the diagram to the position of wNC1 , while the consumption level of the
downstream riparian (wNC2 ) is represented in Fig. 6.10 by the distance between
the position of wNC1 and the right origin of the diagram.• The riparians form a joint arrangement and act in a cooperative manner. The water
consumption amount for this scenario is represented by wC1 . The consumption
level of the upstream riparian (wC1 ) is represented in Fig. 6.10 by the distance
from the left origin of the diagram to the position of wC1 , while the consumption
level of the downstream riparian (wC2 ) is represented in Fig. 6.10 by the distance
between the position of wC1 and the right origin of the diagram.
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The first step of the benefit sharing problem is the calculation of the benefits under
each cooperation scenario. Let’s start with the unilateral acting. If the riparians act
in a noncooperative way, any riparian would like to maximize its own specific ben-
efit. Riparian 1 is upstream of riparian 2, hence riparian 1 will receive the natural
inflow R1 first. Therefore, we start with the benefit maximization problem of ripar-
ian 1. However, we have to note that the diverted amount w1 is restricted by the
water availability R1. Therefore, we are able to formulate the following optimization
problem:
max{w1}
[B1(w1)] s.t . w1 ≤ R1 (6.54)
Therefore, the following Lagrangian function can be formulated:
L1 = B1(w1) + λ1 · (R1 − w1) (6.55)
The resulting KKTs are
∂L1
∂w1
= B ′1(w1) − λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0
∂L1
∂λ1
= R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0
(6.56)
Both assumptions, on the one hand w1 ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 and on the other hand w1 ≥ 0
and λ = 0, are leading to the optimal solution. For the assumptionw1 ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0,
it is possible to find the following solution:
(λ1) : R1 − w1 = 0
→ wNC1 = R1 = 100
(w1) : B ′1(w1) − λ1 = 0
→ λ1 = B ′1(wNC1 ) = a1 − b1 · wNC1 = 0
(6.57)
Based on the other assumption w1 ≥ 0 and λ1 = 0, we find the same solution:
(w1) : B ′1(w1) = 0
→ a1 − b1 · w1 = 0
→ wNC1 =
a1
b1
= 100
(λ1) : R1 − w1 ≥ 0
→ R1 = 100 ≥ 100 = w1
(6.58)
Therefore, the benefit of riparian 1 for unilateral acting is
B1(w
NC
1 ) = a1 · wNC1 − 0.5 · b1 · (wNC1 )2 = 5000 (6.59)
which is represented by the illustration in Fig. 6.10 as the areas A + B + C .
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After the consumption of riparian 1 (w1) and the downstream headwater inflow
R2, the riparian 2 is able to divert and consume the water from the river. Due to
the former water abstraction by riparian 1, just R1 + R2 − w1 amounts of water are
available for riparian 2. The optimization problem of the downstream riparian 2 is
therefore
max{w2}
[B2(w2)] s.t . w2 ≤ R1 + R2 − w1 (6.60)
Hence, the following Lagrangian function can be formulated:
L2 = B2(w2) + λ2 · (R1 + R2 − w1 − w2) (6.61)
which leads to the following KKT:
∂L2
∂w2
= B ′2(w2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0
∂L2
∂λ2
= R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0
(6.62)
Based on the assumption that riparian 2will have a consumption (w2 ≥ 0) and that the
available water for riparian 2 is fully used (λ2 ≥ 0), the solution of the optimization
problem can be found as
(λ2) : R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 = 0
→ wNC2 = R1 + R2 − wNC1 = 50
(w2) : B ′2(w1) − λ2 = 0
→ λ2 = B ′2(wNC2 ) = a2 − b2 · wNC2 = 10 ≥ 0 
(6.63)
Therefore, the benefit of riparian 2 for the noncooperative acting in the basin is
B2(w
NC
2 ) = a2 · wNC2 − 0.5 · b2 · (wNC2 )2 = 1750 (6.64)
which is represeted by area E in Fig. 6.10.
If the riparians form a joint arrangement, in which they allocate the water in a way
that the benefit in the entire basin is maximized, the following optimization problem
can be formulated:
max{w1,w2}
[B1(w1) + B2(w2)] s.t . w1 ≤ R1, w2 ≤ R1 + R2 − w1 (6.65)
Similar to the problems (6.54) and (6.60), the water consumption of any riparian is
restricted by the available water at the respective abstraction point (see constraints of
problem (6.65)). The available water for riparians 1 and 2 is R1 and R1 + R2 − w1,
respectively. Based on problem 6.65, the following Lagrangian function can be set
up:
L = B1(w1) + B2(w2) + λ1 · (R1 − w1) + λ2 · (R1 + R2 − w1 − w2) (6.66)
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Therefore, it is possible to formulate the following KKT:
∂L
∂w1
= B ′1(w1) − λ1 − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w1 ≥ 0
∂L
∂w2
= B ′2(w2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ w2 ≥ 0
∂L
∂λ1
= R1 − w1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0
∂L
∂λ2
= R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0
(6.67)
The assumptionsw1 ≥ 0,w2 ≥ 0, λ1 = 0, and λ2 ≥ 0 lead to the following optimal-
ity condition46:
(w1) : B ′1(w1) − λ2 = 0
(w2) : B ′2(w2) − λ2 = 0
(λ1) : R1 − w1 ≥ 0
(λ2) : R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 = 0
(6.68)
It is therefore possible to find the optimal level of consumption based on the following
system of equations:
(w1) ∧ (w2) : B ′1(w1) = B ′2(w2)
→ a1 − b1 · w1 = a2 − b2 · w2
(λ2) : R1 + R2 − w1 − w2 = 0
(6.69)
The solution of the system of equations is
wC1 = 95 , wC2 = 55
This solution is optimal, because there are no contradictions within the optimality
conditions or assumptions:
(w1) ∧ (w2) : λ2 = B ′1(wC1 ) = B ′2(wC2 )
→ λ2 = a1 − b1 · wC1 = a2 − b2 · wC2 = 5 ≥ 0
(λ1) : R1 ≥ w1 → 100 ≥ 95
(6.70)
The benefits which result from consumption are therefore
46We assume that both riparians consume water and therefore, w1 ≥ 0 and w2 ≥ 0. Furthermore,
we assume that the upstream riparian 1 does not consume the entire available water at its abstraction
point and leaves water in the river, hence, λ1 = 0, while the downstream riparian 2 abstracts the
total amount which is available, hence, it can be assumed that λ2 ≥ 0.
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B1(wC1 ) = a1 · wC1 − 0.5 · b1 · (w1)2 = 4987.5 ,
B2(wC2 ) = a2 · wC2 − 0.5 · b2 · (w2)2 = 1787.5
The benefit from consumption for riparians 1 and 2 are represented in Fig. 6.10
by the areas A + B and C + D + E , respectively. Based on these benefits from
consumption, it is possible to calculate the cooperation gain, which is
Δ = B1(wC1 ) + B2(wC2 ) − B1(wNC1 ) − B2(wNC2 ) = 25 (6.71)
which is represented in Fig. 6.10 by area D.
In the joint arrangement, any riparian has to receive at least as much benefits as
it would generate for the unilateral acting case, which means z1 ≥ B1(wNC1 ) and
z2 ≥ B2(wNC2 ). Therefore, the question of how to share the cooperation gain is the
main focus of the benefit sharing problem for a basin with 2 riparians.
For the UID approach, the total cooperation gain is assigned to the upstream
riparian, hence,
xU I D1 = B1(wNC1 ) + Δ = 5000 + 25 = 5025, xU I D2 = B2(wNC2 ) = 1750
The benefit of the riparians 1 and 2 are represented by the area A + B + C + D
and E in Fig. 6.10, respectively. For realizing theUIDapproach, the upstream riparian
has to receive side payments from the downstream riparian:
spU I D2,1 = B2(wC2 ) − zU I D2 = 1787.5 − 1750 = 37.5
which is represented by the area C + D in Fig. 6.10.
However, the total cooperation gain is assigned to the downstream riparian 2 for
the DID approach, therefore,
xDI D1 = Bw
NC
1
1 = 5000 , xDI D2 = B
wNC2
2 + Δ = 1750 + 25 = 1775
These benefits for riparians 1 and 2 are represented in Fig. 6.10 by the areas
A + B + C and E + D, respectively. For realizing this solution, the downstream
has to make side payments to the upstream riparian of the level:
spDI D2,1 = B2(wC2 ) − xDI D2 = 1787.5 − 1775 = 12.5
which is represented by the area C in Fig. 6.10.
TheUIDandDIDsolution sets theminimumandmaximumbound for the assigned
benefits to the riparians in the joint arrangement (see Eqs. 6.72 and 6.73). Further-
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more, the generated benefit has to be assigned to the riparians in total to meet feasi-
bility and pareto-efficiency conditions (see Eq.6.74).
xDI D1 ≤ x1 ≤ xU I D1 → 5000 ≤ x1 ≤ 5025 (6.72)
xU I D2 ≤ x2 ≤ xDI D2 → 1750 ≤ x2 ≤ 1775 (6.73)
x1 + x2 = Bw
C
1
1 + B
wC2
2 → x1 + x2 = 4987.5 + 1787.5 = 6775 (6.74)
The Shapley solution is a specific focal point solution of the benefit sharing
problem, in which both riparians receive half of the cooperation gain:
x SH1 = B1(wNC1 ) + 0.5 · Δ = 5000 + 12.5 = 5012.5 , x SH2 = B2(wNC2 ) + 0.5 · Δ = 1750 + 12.5 = 1762.5
The assigned benefit for riparian 1 is represented by the areas A + B + C + 0.5 · D
in Fig. 6.10, while the benefit of riparian 2 is represented by areas E + 0.5 · D. This
Shapley solution could be realized by side payments made by riparian 2:
spSH2,1 = B2(wC2 ) − x SH2 = 1787.5 − 1762.5 = 25
which is represented by areas C + 0.5 · D in Fig. 6.10.
Exercise 6.2 Applying the focal point solution concepts of benefit sharing to a
water body with two riparians
Assume a water body with two riparians (1 and 2). Both riparians can either act
unilaterally (noncooperation scenario) or they can form a joint arrangement where
they act in a cooperative way:
• If both act unilaterally, we assume that the water consumption of riparians 1 and
2 is wNC1 and w
NC
2 , respectively. Based on the consumption levels, the riparians
1 and 2 generate a benefit of BNC1 (w
NC
1 ) and B
NC
2 (w
NC
2 ). For simplification
reasons, we will term the benefit in the case of noncooperation of riparian 1 by
BNC1 and the one of riparian 2 by B
NC
2 in the following. The benefit generated in
the entire basin is BNC1 + BNC2 .• If both form a joint arrangement, the riparians allocate the water in a way that the
benefit in the entire basin is maximized. Therefore, the riparians 1 and 2 receive
the water wC1 and w
C
2 , respectively. Based on the consumption, they generate a
benefit of BC1 (w
C
1 ) and B
C
2 (w
C
2 ), which can be simplified as B
C
1 and B
C
2 . The
generated benefit in the basin is BC1 + BC2 . The cooperation gain Δ results from
the difference of the benefit in the entire basin between cooperation and nonco-
operation:
Δ = BC1 + BC2 − BNC1 − BNC2
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Therefore, the benefit in the entire basin under the case of cooperation BC1 + BC2
can be also formulated as
BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ
Assume the joint arrangement is formed and the generated benefit in the basin
(BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ) should be assigned to the riparians 1 and 2. For solving this
benefit sharing problem, we want to apply the three formerly explained focal point
solution concepts which are presented in Sect. 6.3, for finding the Shapley, Nash-
Harsanyi, and nucleolus solutions.
The Shapley Solution
We apply Eq. (6.16) for finding the Shapley solution, which is explained in detail in
Sect. 6.3.47
The Shapley value solution of one riparian is affected by the weighting factor and
the incremental benefit of this user for various cooperation scenarios.
Regarding the weighting factor, there are just two cooperation scenarios which
can be realized, either the unilateral acting or the joint arrangement. We assume
in the Shapley approach that both cooperation scenarios have the same realization
probability, which is a purely normative assumption from the Shapley approach (see
(Wu and Whittington 2006)). Hence both cooperation scenarios have a realization
probability of 0.5:
• Unilateral acting: this cooperation scenario is represented by the sets {1} and {2}.
There is of course per definition just one riparian in these sets, hence #I SG = 1.
We have two riparians in the basin, hence the grand coalition {1, 2} consists
of these two riparians and therefore #G = 2. Inserting these parameters in the
weighting factor, we get
(#G − #I SG)! · (#I SG − 1)!
#G! =
(2 − 1)! · (1 − 1)!
2! =
1! · 0!
2! = 0.5
• Joint arrangement: this situation is represented by the set {1, 2} which consists of
two riparians, hence #I SG = 2. We already discussed the level of #G, which is
#G = 2. Inserting these parameters in the weighting factor, we get
(#G − #I SG)! · (#I SG − 1)!
#G! =
(2 − 2)! · (2 − 1)!
2! =
0! · 1!
2! = 0.5
47The formula for finding the Shapley solution is
xi =
∑
I : i ∈ I ∨
S : i ∈ S ∨
G
[
(#G − #I SG)! · (#I SG − 1)!
#G! · [V (...) − V (... − i)]
]
(6.16)
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The incremental benefit of riparian i , which is the second main element of the
Shapley approach, is represented in Eq. (6.16) by the term [V (...) − V (... − i)]. This
incremental benefit is
• in case of unilateral acting for riparians {1} and {2}: the level of the respective
benefit the unilaterally acting riparian generates.
• in case of a joint arrangement {1, 2}: the difference between the generated benefit
in the joint arrangement and the level of benefit the other riparian generates under
the situation of unilateral acting. Hence, the incremental benefit of riparian 1 is
the difference between the generated benefit in the joint arrangement and the
generated benefit of the unilaterally acting riparian 2, V ({1, 2}) − V ({2}), while
the incremental benefit of riparian 2 is the difference between the generated benefit
in the joint arrangement and the generated benefit of the unilaterally acting riparian
1, V ({1, 2}) − V ({1}).
We know that the benefit in the grand coalition is V ({1, 2}) = BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ,
while the benefit of the unilaterally acting riparian 1 is V ({1}) = BNC1 and the benefit
of the unilaterally acting riparian 2 is V ({2}) = BNC2 .
The riparian 1 is just part of the coalition scenarios {1} and {1, 2}, hence the
Shapley solution is
x SH1 = 0.5 · V ({1}) + 0.5 · [V ({1, 2}) − V ({2})]
= 0.5 · BNC1 + 0.5 · (BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ − BNC2 )
x SH1 = BNC1 + 0.5 · Δ
while the riparian 2 is just part of the coalition scenarios {2} and {1, 2}, hence, its
Shapley solution is
x SH2 = 0.5 · V ({2}) + 0.5 · [V ({1, 2}) − V ({1})]
= 0.5 · BNC2 + 0.5 · (BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ − BNC1 )
x SH2 = BNC2 + 0.5 · Δ
The following table at the next page can be also used as an auxiliary tool for
finding the Shapley solution:
The Nash-Harsanyi solution
The optimization problem of the Nash-Harsanyi solution concept is (see Sect. 6.3)
max{x1,x2}
[
(x1 − BNC1 ) · (x2 − BNC2 )
]
s.t . x1 + x2 = BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ
BNC1 ≤ x1
BNC2 ≤ x2
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Therefore, the following Lagrangian function results:
L = (x1 − BNC1 ) · (x2 − BNC2 ) + μ · (BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ − x1 − x2) + λ1 · (x1 − BNC1 ) + λ2 · (x2 − BNC2 )
And hence, we are able to set up the following KKT conditions:
(x2 − BNC2 ) − μ + λ1 ≤ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0 (6.75)
(x1 − BNC1 ) − μ + λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0 (6.76)
BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ − x1 − x2 = 0 , μ is free (6.77)
x1 − BNC1 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (6.78)
x2 − BNC2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (6.79)
Suppose that both riparians receive benefits which exceed their respective individ-
ual rationality conditions. Hence, we have to assume that x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, λ1 = 0,
and λ2 = 0.48 Based on Eqs. (6.75)–(6.77), we can set up the following system of
equations:
x1 − BNC1 = x2 − BNC2
x1 + x2 = BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ
The solution is
xNH1 = BNC1 + 0.5 · Δ
xNH2 = BNC2 + 0.5 · Δ
This solution meets the conditions (6.78) and (6.79).49
The nucleolus solution
The nucleolus solution can be calculated on the basis of the following optimization
problem (see Sect. 6.3):
min{x1,x2,e}
[e]
s.t . x1 + x2 = BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ
e + x1 ≥ BNC1
e + x2 ≥ BNC2
48The variable μ is a free variable, because it is related to an equality constraint.
49Based on condition 6.78, x1 ≥ BNC1 . Due to x1 = BNC1 + 0.5 · Δ, Eq. 6.78 is met.
Based on condition 6.79, x2 ≥ BNC2 . Due to x2 = BNC2 + 0.5 · Δ, Eq. 6.79 is met.
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Therefore, we can formulate the following Lagrangian function:
L = e + μ · (x1 + x2 − BNC1 − BNC2 − Δ) + λ1 · (BNC1 − e − x1) + λ2 · (BNC2 − e − x2)
and hence, we are able to set up the following KKT conditions:
μ − λ1 ≥ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0 (6.80)
μ − λ2 ≥ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0 (6.81)
1 − λ1 − λ2 = 0 , e is free (6.82)
x1 + x2 − BNC1 − BNC2 − Δ = 0 , μ is free (6.83)
BNC1 − e − x1 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (6.84)
BNC2 − e − x2 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (6.85)
Please note that e andμ are free variables, which means that they can have a positive
or negative value. Under the assumption that x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, and λ2 ≥ 0,
we are able to formulate the following system of equations50:
e = BNC1 − x1 = BNC2 − x2
x1 + x2 = BNC1 + BNC2 + Δ
The solution is
xnuc1 = BNC1 + 0.5 · Δ
xnuc2 = BNC2 + 0.5 · Δ
The maximum objection which is minimized by applying the nucleolus approach is
e = −0.5 · Δ.
Comparison of Focal Point Solutions
It becomes obvious from this analysis, that in a basin with just two riparians the three
presented focal point solution concepts lead to the same results:
x SH1 = xNH1 = xnuc1 = BNC1 + 0.5 · Δ
x SH2 = xNH2 = xnuc2 = BNC2 + 0.5 · Δ
This means that each riparian receives the benefit it would generate when acting
unilaterally in a noncooperative way and furthermore half of the cooperation gain.
Therefore, the cooperation gain is shared equally between the two riparians.
50We suppose that both riparians receive benefits, hence we assume x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0. If we
furthermore assume that the maximum objection in the nucleolus solution, denoted by e, is based
on the payoff of the unilaterally acting riparian 1 (which means e = BNC1 − x1) as well as on the
payoff of the unilaterally acting riparian 2 (which means e = BNC2 − x2), it becomes obvious that
the conditions 6.84 and 6.85 become binding, and hence, we have to assume that λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0.
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Exercise 6.3 Water allocation under bankruptcy rules
The importance of rationing rules will probably increase in the next few years. In
many internationalwaters, inflows are decreasing due to climate change. In particular,
justice issues will become even more important in the discussion. Thereby, it is
difficult to determine which bankruptcy rule leads to a fair distribution of water. We
have seen that this question is closely related to the legitimacy of claims. But even
if an agreement has been reached on what a justified level of claims is, the question
remains as to which of the bankruptcy rules is fair. We cannot answer this question
a priori here. That remains to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
What we can do, however, is to investigate how water allocations develop as a
function of the scarcity of water. Thereby, we are primarily interested in how the
relative allocation of scarce water as a function of R develops. To do so, we first
define the degree to which water claims are met51:
γ BRi = x BRi /ci , i = {1, 2}, BR = {P,CE A, AP} (6.86)
To compare this degree, we construct the relative fulfillment:

BR = γ BR1 /γ BR2 , BR = {P,CE A, AP} (6.87)
From Eq. (6.27), it is easy to derive the claim satisfaction of both countries for
the proportional rule:
γ P1 = x P1 /c1 =
R
c1 + c2 = γ
P
2 = x P2 /c2 (6.88)
From Eq. (6.88), it is clear that the relative fulfillment of claims does not change
with respect to R. This bankruptcy rule is obviously fairness-stable, i.e., the relative
claim fulfillment does not vary with R.
The same applies to the CEA rule, as can easily be shown. In our example in
Sect. 6.4, the CEA allocation led52 to xCE A1 = R/2 = xCE A2 . Thus,

CE A = γ CE A1 /γ CE A2 =
(R/2)/c1
(R/2)/c2
= c2
c1
(6.89)
which shows that the CEA rule is also fairness-stable with regard to a decrease of
the water supply.
It remains to analyze the Adjusted Proportional Rule. From Eq. (6.28), we have
x AP1 = (R − c2) +
c1 − R + c2
2(c1 + c2 − R) {R − (R − c2) − (R − c1)} (6.90)
51The superscript BR refers to bankruptcy rules.
52We have assumed the following numerical values: R = 200, c1 = 180, and c2 = 120. This has
led to water allocation as depicted in Fig. 6.3.
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which can be reduced to
x AP1 =
R + c1 − c2
2
⇒ γ AP1 = x AP1 /c1 =
R + c1 − c2
2c1
(6.91)
Finally, utilizing the claim fulfillment of country 2, we get

AP = γ AP1 /γ AP2 =
(
c2
c1
)[
R + c1 − c2
R + c2 − c1
]
(6.92)
It is left as an exercise to the reader to prove that
∂
AP
∂R
=
(
c2
c1
)
2(c2 − c1)
(R + c2 − c1)2 (6.93)
Our numerical example c1 = 180 > c2 = 120 implies that with increasing R, the
relative claim fulfillment for the upstream country gets worse. Thus, with a lower
water supply the relative claim fulfillment decreases for the downstream country.
What is the lesson of this task? It shows that the riparian countries choose
bankruptcy rules not only depending on the outcome for a certain water supply
currently provided by the regional hydrological cycle but also on the characteristics
of these rules when the water supply changes.
Exercise 6.4 The robustness of water agreements
In many international waters, water inflow has declined in recent years. This is partly
due to climate change. This unexpected change in the water cycle is often not taken
into account in international water treaties. We have addressed this problem in the
section on the robustness of water contracts. In the following, we will examine the
stability of fixed and proportional contracts with the help of a very simple numerical
example.
Assume two identical countries, country 1 (upstream) and country 2 (down-
stream). The benefit function of each is Bi (wi ) = awi − (b/2)w2i , i = {1, 2} Let
a = 100 and b = 1. As in Sect. 6.5, we assume that water inflow takes place only
upstream and is R = 100. Since both countries are identical, the optimal allocation
would be simply w∗1 = w∗2 = R/2 = 50, i.e., the upstream country allows half of
the water supply to flow through to country 2. It remains to analyze the non-water
transfer of the downstream country to the upstream country. Let us assume, that this
transfer is constructed such that the joint benefit of cooperation is distributed accord-
ing to the Shapley value. We know that the Shapely value lies for the case with just
two riparians in the core. The formula is
s1 = B1(R) + 1
2
[B1(R/2) + B2(R/2) − B2(0) − B1(R)] (6.94)
s2 = B2(0) + 1
2
[B1(R/2) + B2(R/2) − B2(0) − B1(R)] (6.95)
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This benefit division can be accomplished with the help of a transfer of country 2 to
country 1. We have
s1 = B1(R) + 1
2
[B1(R/2) + B2(R/2) − B2(0) − B1(R)] = B1(R/2) + T
(6.96)
where T is the non-water transfer from downstream to upstream. From this equation
it is easy to calculate T:
T = 1
2
[B1(R) + B2(R/2) − B1(R/2)] (6.97)
Notice thereby that B2(0) = 0. Sincewehave assumed identical countries B2(R/2) =
B1(R/2) and, hence, the transfer is simply
T = 1
2
B1(R) (6.98)
the downstream country ends up with
s2 = B2(R/2) − T (6.99)
It is now easy to determine the degree of robustness of both types of contracts
analyzed in Sect. 6.5 for the Shapley value. We begin with the fixed contract.
The upstream country delivers the fixed amount of water R/2 for a fixed payment
of T . As the water supply drops, the net benefit of the upstream country decreases.
Note that the benefit of country 2 is not affected by the water decrease. The contract
is robust as long as
B1(r − (R/2)) + T = B1(r − (R/2)) + (1/2)B1(R) ≥ B1(r) (6.100)
If we insert the quadratic benefit function, we can find the critical value of r for
which Eq. (6.100) is an equality:
r = (3/4)R (6.101)
This result can be found in Fig. 6.6. If the water decrease is less than 25% of R, the
water contract is stable. However, a larger water decrease would lead to a dissolution
of the agreement if the parties feel that the decrease will be long term.
To derive the r-range of the proportional contract, we start with the benefit of
the upstream county. The contract specifies that half of the available water flows
downstream. Utilizing Eq. (6.50), total benefit of country 1 is
B1(r/2) + T (r) = B1(r/2) + (r/R)T (6.102)
where T is defined in Eq. (6.98).
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To determine the range where total benefit defined in Eq. (6.102) within the con-
tract is higher than or equal to the conflict option, we have to set it equal to B1(r).
If we substitute the quadratic utility function into Eq. (6.102), it is an easy task to
calculate the critical r-value53:
r = (2/3)R (6.103)
It remains to check whether the downstream country sticks to the contract as the
water supply drops. The respective constraint is
B2(r/2) − (r/R)T = B2(r/2) − r
2R
B1(R) ≥ B2(0) = 0 (6.104)
Substituting the quadratic benefit function into this constraint yields after some
algebraic manipulation r ≤ 2R which is always satisfied, since r ≤ R. The down-
stream country never has an incentive to break the contract. It is always worse off
without water from upstream.
This analysis assumes that both countries only compare their benefits with respect
to the conflict case, i.e., the situation without a cooperative solution. However, we
know from the history of the bargaining process preceding the conclusion of a water
agreement that the distribution, i.e., the relative position of the contract partner, is
of high importance. Let us assume that in our example both countries were satisfied
with the distribution of the benefits at the outset. The allocation of water and the
transfer determined by the Shapley approach is deemed fair. As the water supply
drops, both net benefits decrease and the question remains whether the resulting
distribution of benefits continues to be regarded as just if the contract concluded for
r = R still applies. If not, it may happen that the contract will be broken even if the
conflict position makes the parties worse off. Such behavior due to an injured sense
of justice may well occur, as we know from experimental economics and also from
everyday life.
6.8 Further Reading
International environmental agreements as well as international water agreements
are often analyzed in economics as a sequence of strategic negotiation steps. Non-
cooperative game theory is particularly suitable for this purpose. Each negotiating
participant tries to maximize his advantages, taking into account the behavior of
the other participants. In cooperative game theory, the main purpose is to determine
joint action and the distribution of cooperative gains. The theory assumes that bind-
ing contracts can be concluded, i.e., the parties to the contract adhere to the agreed
arrangements. A very useful introduction to cooperative game theory with a number
of relevant examples from international water agreements is Dinar et al. (2007). Wu
53See in Fig. 6.7, the intersection between the blue and the gray line.
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and Whittington (2006) apply the concepts of the Shapley value and the nucleolus
to a water-sharing game of the Nile. In addition to the calculation of the benefits of
cooperation, the authors have also included hydrological constraints.
Contrary to cooperative game theory, bankruptcy rules deal with zero-sum games
in a noncooperative setting. What one gets, the other does not have, and vice versa. It
is obvious thatwith zero-sumgames, considerations of justice are of particular impor-
tance. Thomson (2002) gives a very instructive overview. Which rules of division
fulfill which axioms or criteria of justice? The relationship with cooperative game
theory is made. This concept can also be applied in the context of zero-sum games
(e.g., the Shapley value). Dagan and Volij (1993) compare different bankruptcy rules
with the bargaining approach of game theory. This is an interesting approach because
the criteria and properties of bankruptcy rules are interpreted as the result of cooper-
ative negotiations. For example, the authors show that the cooperative Nash solution
leads to CEA. Onemust be careful when applying bankruptcy rules to transboundary
water agreements. This applies in particular to river basins where there is a hierarchi-
cal structure of claims due to the unidirectionality of watercourses. It is possible that
a water allocation resulting from the direct application of a bankruptcy rule cannot
be implemented at all for hydrological reasons. Ansink and Weikard (2012) have
therefore developed modified bankruptcy rules (sequential sharing rules) that take
hydrological restrictions into account.
The effects of climate change will also affect international waters. For some time
now, scientists havebeenworkingon the questionof how the increasingwater scarcity
and variability of the water supply should be taken into account in international water
agreements. Cooley and Gleick (2011) analyze how existing contracts can accom-
modate these changes. The allocation rules must be made dependent on the amount
of water available. This requires a functioningmonitoring system embedded in awell
institutionalized transboundary management system. Ansink and Ruijs (2008) ana-
lyze the exact effects of sharing rules in a formal model when the average available
water quantity decreases and the variability increases at the same time. They conclude
that the increasing scarcity of water reduces the stability of international treaties, but
that increasing variability can even lead to a strengthening of contractual coopera-
tion. This analysis is deepened in Ambec et al. (2013). Different contract formats
(fixed and variable) are examined with regards to their vulnerability to increasing
water scarcity. An important finding of the authors is that contracts are stable when
their contractual components (water and compensatory transfers) are contingent on
a variable water supply. In this case, the contract becomes self-enforcing, i.e., there
is no incentive for the contracting parties to violate the contract.
The literature on the institutionalization of international treaties on water use is
very extensive. It is interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary. One of the latter is Biswas
(1996), who has worked on transboundary water management both as a scientist and
as an expert and practitioner. This also includes Draper (2007), who is active as a
researcher and political planner of water infrastructures. He developed criteria as a
necessary prerequisite for effective water-sharing agreements.
In addition to more descriptive studies, such as Vollmer et al. (2009), which bring
the institutional diversity of transboundarymanagement into a taxonomic order, there
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are analyses based on institutional economics, such as the comprehensive work of
Saleth and Dinar (2004). Here, the network of institutional structures at different
administrative and political levels is examinedwith regard to their effectiveness. This
depends primarily on the goals of the institutional units and the existing incentive
mechanisms.
The interdependence of institutional units, e.g., between water authorities at the
regional level and transboundary institutions, which are made up of representatives
of different riparian states, is also the focus of research dealing with adaptive man-
agement. However, the question is broader: How can the complexity of the ecological
system of an international water catchment area be combined with a correspondingly
adapted design of water management to form a sustainable and resilient ecological-
social integrated system? Akamani and Wilson (2011) and Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008)
give an overview. The basic philosophy is presented in Folke et al. (2005), and
Karkkainen (2004) provides two very instructive examples of how joint water man-
agement goes far beyond the rigid implementation of a treaty at a national level
(Chesapeake Bay Program, US-Canadian Great Lakes Program).
6.9 Chapter-Annex: Step-by-Step Solution of Optimization
Problems of Sect. 6.3
The Core: Identify the Number of Solutions in the Core
Optimization problem:
max
[
γ − x1 − x2 − x3
]
s.t . x1 ≥ α , x2 ≥ 0 , x3 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 ≥ β , x1 + x3 ≥ α , x2 + x3 ≥ 0
Lagrangian Function:
L = γ − x1 − x2 − x3 + λ{1} · (x1 − α) + λ{2} · x2 + λ{3} · x3
+ λ{1,2} · (x1 + x2 − β) + λ{1,3} · (x1 + x3 − α) + λ{2,3} · (x2 + x3)
KKT Conditions:
−1 + λ{1} + λ{1,2} + λ{1,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0
−1 + λ{2} + λ{1,2} + λ{2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
−1 + λ{3} + λ{1,3} + λ{2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
x1 − α ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1} ≥ 0
x2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{2} ≥ 0
x3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{3} ≥ 0
x1 + x2 − β ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1,2} ≥ 0
x1 + x3 − α ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1,3} ≥ 0
x2 + x3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{2,3} ≥ 0
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Assumption:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 = 0
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0, λ{1,2} ≥ 0
Solution: (Please note, the objective γ − x1 − x2 − x3 is denoted as Z )
x1 = α + δ, x2 = β − δ, λ{1,2} = 1
Z = γ − x1 − x2 − x3 = γ − β ≥ 0
The core: The Lower Bound of Each Player in the Core
Optimization problem:
min
[
x j
]
s.t . x1 + x2 + x3 = γ, x1 ≥ α, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 ≥ β, x1 + x3 ≥ α, x2 + x3 ≥ 0
Lagrangian Function:
L = x j + λ{1,2,3} · (x1 + x2 + x3 − γ ) + λ{1} · (α − x1) − λ{2} · x2 − λ{3} · x3
+ λ{1,2} · (β − x1 − x2) + λ{1,3} · (α − x1 − x3) + λ{2,3} · (−x2 − x3)
KKT Conditions of Dual Variables:
x1 + x2 + x3 − γ = 0 , λ{1,2,3} is free
α − x1 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{1} ≥ 0
−x2 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{2} ≥ 0
x3 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{3} ≥ 0
β − x1 − x2 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{1,2}
α − x1 − x3 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{1,3} ≥ 0
−x2 − x3 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{2,3} ≥ 0
KKT Conditions of Primal Variables (primal variable is in the objective):
1 − λ{1} − λ{1,2} − λ{1,3} + λ{1,2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0
1 − λ{2} − λ{1,2} − λ{2,3} + λ{1,2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
1 − λ{3} − λ{1,3} − λ{2,3} + λ{1,2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
KKT Conditions of Primal Variables (primal variable is not in the objective):
−λ{1} − λ{1,2} − λ{1,3} + λ{1,2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0
−λ{2} − λ{1,2} − λ{2,3} + λ{1,2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
−λ{3} − λ{1,3} − λ{2,3} + λ{1,2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
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Assumption for Problem of Riparian 1:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} ≥ 0, λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0
Solution for Problem of Riparian 1:
x1 = α
λ{1} = 1, λ{1,2,3} = 0
x2 = δ2, x3 = δ3
with 0 ≤ δ2 ≤ γ − α, 0 ≤ δ3 ≤ γ − α and δ2 + δ3 = γ − α
Assumption for Problem of Riparian 2:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} = λ{3} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0, λ{2} ≥ 0
Solution for Problem of Riparian 2:
x2 = 0
λ{2} = 1, λ{1,2,3} = 0
x1 = α + δ1, x3 = δ3
with: 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ γ − α, 0 ≤ δ3 ≤ γ − α and δ1 + δ3 = γ − α
Assumption for Problem of Riparian 3:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0, λ{3} ≥ 0
Solution for Problem of Riparian 3:
x3 = 0
The core: The Upper Bound of Each Player in the Core
Optimization Problem:
max
[
x j
]
s.t . x1 + x2 + x3 = γ, x1 ≥ α, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 ≥ β, x1 + x3 ≥ α, x2 + x3 ≥ 0
Lagrangian Function:
L = x j + λ{1,2,3} · (γ − x1 − x2 − x3) + λ{1} · (x1 − α) + λ{2} · x2 + λ{3} · x3
+ λ{1,2} · (x1 + x2 − β) + λ{1,3} · (x1 + x3 − α) + λ{2,3} · (x2 + x3)
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KKT Conditions of the Dual Variables:
γ − x1 − x2 − x3 = 0, λ{1,2,3} is free
x1 − α ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1} ≥ 0
x2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{2} ≥ 0
x3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{3} ≥ 0
x1 + x2 − β ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1,2} ≥ 0
x1 + x3 − α ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1,3} ≥ 0
x2 + x3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{2,3} ≥ 0
KKT Conditions of Primal Variables (primal variable is in the objective):
1 + λ{1} + λ{1,2} + λ{1,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x1
1 + λ{2} + λ{1,2} + λ{2,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
1 + λ{3} + λ{1,3} + λ{2,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
KKT Condition of Primal Variables (primal variable is not in the objective):
λ{1} + λ{1,2} + λ{1,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0
λ{2} + λ{1,2} + λ{2,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
λ{3} + λ{1,3} + λ{2,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
Assumption for Problem of Riparian 1:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 = 0, x3 = 0
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0
Solution for Problem of Riparian 1:
x1 = γ, λ{1,2,3} = 1
Assumption for Problem of Riparian 2:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 = 0
λ{1} ≥ 0, λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0
Solution for Problem of Riparian 2:
x2 = γ − α
x1 = α, λ{1} = 1, λ{1,2,3} = 1
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Assumption for Problem of riparian 3:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0, λ{1,2} ≥ 0
Solution for Problem of Riparian 3:
x3 = γ − β
α ≤ x1 ≤ α + δ, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ β − α − δ
with: 0 ≤ δ ≤ β − α as well as λ{1,2} = 1 and λ{1,2,3} = 1
The Nash-Harsanyi Solution
Optimization Problem:
max [(x1 − α) · x2 · x3] s.t . x1 + x2 + x3 = γ, x1 ≥ α, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 ≥ β, x1 + x3 ≥ α, x2 + x3 ≥ 0
Lagrangian Function:
L = (x1 − α) · x2 · x3 + λ{1,2,3} · (γ − x1 − x2 − x3) + λ{1} · (x1 − α) + λ{2} · x2 + λ{3} · x3
+ λ{1,2} · (x1 + x2 − β) + λ{1,3} · (x1 + x3 − α) + λ{2,3} · (x2 + x3)
KKT Conditions:
x2 · x3 + λ{1} + λ{1,2} + λ{1,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0
(x1 − α) · x3 + λ{2} + λ{1,2} + λ{2,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
(x1 − α) · x2 + λ{3} + λ{1,3} + λ{2,3} − λ{1,2,3} ≤ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
γ − x1 − x2 − x3 = 0, λ{1,2,3} is free
x1 − α ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1} ≥ 0
x2 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{2} ≥ 0
x3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{3} ≥ 0
x1 + x2 − β ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1,2} ≥ 0
x1 + x3 − α ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{1,3} ≥ 0
x2 + x3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ{2,3} ≥ 0
Assumption:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0
Optimality Conditions:
λ{1,2,3} = x2 · x3 = (x1 − α) · x3 = (x1 − α) · x2
x1 + x2 + x3 = γ
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Solution:
x1 = 1
3
· (2 · α + γ ), x2 = x3 = 1
3
· (γ − α)
The Nucleolus
Optimization Problem:
min [e] s.t . x1 + x2 + x3 = γ, x1 + e ≥ α, x2 + e ≥ 0, x3 + e ≥ 0
x1 + x2 + e ≥ β, x1 + x3 + e ≥ α, x2 + x3 + e ≥ 0
Lagrangian Function:
L = e + λ{1,2,3} · (x1 + x2 + x3 − γ ) + λ{1} · (α − x1 − e) + λ{2} · (−x2 − e) + λ{3} · (−x3 − e)
+λ{1,2} · (β − x1 − x2 − e) + λ{1,3} · (α − x1 − x3 − e) + λ{2,3} · (−x2 − x3 − e)
KKT Conditions:
λ{1,2,3} − λ{1} − λ{1,2} − λ{1,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0
λ{1,2,3} − λ{2} − λ{1,2} − λ{2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0
λ{1,2,3} − λ{3} − λ{1,3} − λ{2,3} ≥ 0 ⊥ x3 ≥ 0
1 − λ{1} − λ{2} − λ{3} − λ{1,2} − λ{1,3} − λ{2,3} = 0, e is free
x1 + x2 + x3 − γ = 0, λ{1,2,3} is free
α − x1 − e ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{1} ≥ 0
−x2 − e ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{2} ≥ 0
−x3 − e ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{3} ≥ 0
β − x1 − x2 − e ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{1,2} ≥ 0
α − x1 − x3 − e ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{1,3} ≥ 0
−x2 − x3 − e ≤ 0 ⊥ λ{2,3} ≥ 0
In accordance with the specification of α, β, and γ , we have to differentiate between two cases:
• Case 1 is valid if (β ≤ γ3 ) ∨ (( γ3 < β) ∧ ( 3·β−γ2 ≤ α))• Case 2 is valid if ( γ3 < β) ∧ (α < 3·β−γ2 )
Assumption under Case 1:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} ≥ 0, λ{2} ≥ 0, λ{3} ≥ 0, λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0
Optimality Conditions Under Case 1:
α − x1 − e = −x2 − e = −x3 − e = 0
x1 + x2 + x3 − γ = 0
λ{1,2,3} = λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{3}
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Solution Under Case 1:
x1 = 2 · α + γ
3
, x2 = x3 = γ − α
3
e = α − γ
3
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{3} = λ{1,2,3} = 1
3
Assumption Under Case 2:
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0
λ{1} = λ{2} = λ{1,3} = λ{2,3} = 0, λ{3} ≥ 0, λ{1,2} ≥ 0
Optimality Conditions Under Case 2:
β − x1 − x2 − e = −x3 − e = 0
x1 + x2 + x3 − γ = 0
λ{1,2,3} = λ{1,2} = λ{3}
Solution Under Case 2:
x1 + x2 = β + γ
2
, x3 = γ − β
2
e = β − γ
2
λ{3} = λ{1,2} = λ{1,2,3} = 0.5
The nucleolus for the sub-coalition {1, 2} can be solved using the following optimization prob-
lem:
min{e,x1,x2}
[e]
s.t . x1 + x2 = 0.5 · (β + γ ), e + x1 ≥ α, e + x2 ≥ 0
The step-by-step nucleolus solution for a coalition with two riparians is explained in detail in
Exercise 6.2.
Solution:
x1 = 2 · α + β + γ
4
, x2 = β + γ − 2 · α
4
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Appendix:Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
Conditions
Given is the following optimization problem:
max{x1,...,xI ,y1,...,yJ }
f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) (A.1)
s.t .gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) ≤ bm (λm) ∀m (A.2)
hn (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) = cn (μn) ∀n (A.3)
xi ≥ 0 ∀i (A.4)
The values of the variables x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ have to be set in that way
that the function value f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) is maximized (see Eq. (A.1)). The
values of the positive variables x1, . . . , xI are defined within the range [0,∞] (see
Eq. (A.4)); while the value of the free variables y1, . . . , yJ are defined in the range
[−∞,∞].
The solution space of the optimization problem is restricted by M inequality con-
straints (Eq. (A.2)) and N equality constraints (Eq. (A.3)). Due to the mth inequality
constraint of Eq. (A.2), the function value of gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) must not
exceed the value bm .
Every inequality constraint is related with one dual variable, hence the mth
inequality constrained is related with the dual variable λm . The value of the dual vari-
able variable dependson thebetteringof the functionvalue f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ),
if the related mth inequality constraint was relaxed by for instance one unit. A
relaxation of the mth inequality constraint by one unit means that we formulate
gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) ≤ bm + 1 instead of Eq. (A.2). The relaxation increases
the solution space, hence the functional value f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) becomes
higher. This increase of f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) due to the relaxation of mth
inequality constraint is stated by the value of the dual variable λm .
Furthermore, there are also N equality constraints in the optimization prob-
lem; the nth equality constraint (Eq. (A.3)) guarantees that the value of function
hn (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) becomes equal to the value cn . Similar to the inequality
constraints, the value of the dual variable (shadow price) μn represents the change
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of the objective value f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ), implied by a relaxation of the nth
equality constraint by one unit.1
For finding the optimal values of the maximization problem Eqs. (A.1)–(A.4), the
corresponding Lagrangian function can be set up
L = f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )
+ λ1 · [b1 − g1 (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )] + · · · + λM
· [bM − gM (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )]
+ μ1 · [c1 − h1 (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )] + · · · + μN
· [cN − hN (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )] (A.5)
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of the Lagrange function (see Eq. (A.5)) is
the objective function ( f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )). Furthermore, all the inequality
and equality constraints are also added as separate terms in the Lagrange function.All
these constraints are multiplied with their corresponding dual variables. For using a
more compact illustration, the Lagrangian function (A.5) can be rewritten as follows:
L = f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )
+
∑
m
λm · [bm − gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )]
+
∑
n
μn · [cn − hn (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )] (A.6)
Based on the Lagrange function, the KKT optimality conditions can be formu-
lated by the first derivatives of the Lagrange function with respect to all the primal
(x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) and dual variables (λ1, . . . , λM , μ1, . . . , μN ) in the follow-
ing way:
∂L
∂xi
≤ 0 ⊥ xi ≥ 0 ∀i (A.7)
∂L
∂ y j
= 0 ∀ j (A.8)
∂L
∂λm
= bm − gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) ≥ 0 ⊥ λm ≥ 0 ∀m (A.9)
∂L
∂μn
= cn − hn (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) = 0 ; μn is free ∀n (A.10)
TheEqs. (A.7) and (A.8) illustrate the derivative of theLagrange functionwith respect
to the positive and free primal variables, respectively; while Eqs. (A.9) and (A.10),
are the first derivatives of the Lagrange function with respect to the dual variables
1Respective equality constraint would become after relaxation: hn (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )
= cn + 1.
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related to the inequality and equability constraints, respectively. It becomes obvious
that the derivative of the Lagrange function with respect to a dual variable results in
the corresponding constraint.
The ⊥-sign in Eqs. (A.7) and (A.9), implies that either the inequality before or
after the ⊥-sign has to be equal to zero. Hence, instead of the ⊥-sign in Eq. (A.7), it
is also possible to write
∂L
∂xi
· xi = 0. Therefore, if we assume that xi = 0, it follows
that
∂L
∂xi
≤ 0; while if we assume that xi ≥ 0, it is necessary that ∂L
∂xi
= 0 in order
to the condition
∂L
∂xi
· xi = 0.
This is also valid for Eq. (A.9), therefore, instead of the ⊥-sign, we could
also write
∂L
∂λm
· λm = 0. If the mth inequality constraint (Eq. (A.2)) becomes an
equality, which means that the functional value of gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) is
equal to the value of parameter bm , i.e., gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) = bm , this
mth inequality constraint could be termed as a binding constraint. This formulation
bm − gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) = 0 is exactly: ∂L
∂λm
= 0. For this case, it results
from the complementarity condition
∂L
∂λm
· λm = 0, that we can assume λm ≥ 0.
Hence to conclude, in case that we would assume λm ≥ 0, it follows that ∂L
∂λm
= 0
which is nothing else than bm = gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) which means that the
mth inequality constraint is binding.
In contrast, if we would assume that λm ≥ 0, it follows from the comple-
mentarity condition (
∂L
∂λm
· λm = 0) that ( ∂L
∂λm
= 0) which is nothing else than
bm ≥ gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) which means that the mth inequality constraint
is non-binding.
Relaxing the mth equality constraint in Eq. (A.2) by one (which changes this
respective constraint to: gm (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) ≤ bm + 1) may lead to an
increase (but never a decrease) of the objective level f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ).
Hence, the dual variables of all inequality constraints must be positive and hence
λm ≥ 0 ∀m (see Eq. (A.9)).2 However, if we increase the level of parameter
cn by one in Eq. (A.3) (which changes this respective constraint to:
hn (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) = cn + 1), the value of the objective function
f (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ ) may decrease, may increase or may stay constant. There-
fore, the corresponding dual variables of all equality constraints are free, and thus
are defined in the range [−∞,∞] (see Eq. (A.10)).
2λm ≥ 0 ∀m means λ1 ≥ 0, . . . , λM ≥ 0.
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Fig.A.1 Illustration of first
example. Source own
illustration
We would like to illustrate the procedure with the help of three examples. Assum-
ing as first example the following maximization problem:
max{x} f (y) = 10 · (y + 8) − (y + 8)
2 (A.11)
Here the objective function f (y) should bemaximized byfinding an optimal value for
the variable y.We assume that variable y is a free one,whose domain is definedwithin
the range [−∞,∞]. The corresponding Lagrange Function of this mathematical
problem contains simply the objective function
L = 10 · (y + 8) − (y + 8)2 (A.12)
TheLagrange function inEq. (A.12) has to be derivedwith respect to the only endoge-
nous parameter y for finding the correspondingKKT conditions of the problem given
in Eq. (A.11)
∂L
∂ y
= 10 − 2 · (y + 8) = 0 (A.13)
The solution of Eq. (A.13), is the optimal value of variable y which maximizes the
objective function f (y)
y∗ = −3 (A.14)
A plot of the objective function f (y) is given in Fig.A.1.
The second example is characterized by a similar functional form as the first
example; however, here we have a positive variable x instead of a free variable. The
domain of the variable x is defined within the range [0,∞] (see Eq. (A.16))
max{x} f (x) = 10 · (x + 8) − (x + 8)
2 (A.15)
x ≥ 0 (A.16)
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Based on the optimization problem containing Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16), the following
Lagrange function can be set up:
L = 10 · (x + 8) − (x + 8)2 (A.17)
A KKT condition, which simply results from the derivative of the Lagrange function
with respect to the variable x , would be wrong, because the resulting optimal value
of variable x would be negative and hence would violate the non-negativity condition
(A.16)
∂L
∂x
= 10 − 2 · (x + 8) = 0 → x = −3 (A.18)
We address the non-negativity of variable x by the following KKT condition which
is correct:
∂L
∂x
= 10 − 2 · (x + 8) ≤ 0 ⊥ x ≥ 0 (A.19)
Because of the ⊥-sign, which means: ∂L
∂x · x = 0, two cases are possible:
• Case 1: x ≥ 0 and hence ∂L
∂x
= 10 − 2 · (x + 8) = 0 :
Solving the equation
∂L
∂x
= 10 − 2 · (x + 8) = 0 leads to the result x = −3
which violates the non-negativity condition. Due to this contradiction, the optimal
solution can not be found by this case.
• Case 2: x = 0 and hence ∂L
∂x
= 10 − 2 · (x + 8) ≤ 0 :
Setting x = 0 in the equation ∂L
∂x
leads to the result
∂L
∂x
= −6 ≤ 0 (A.20)
There is no contradiction in case 2, hence the optimal solution is x = 0.
Compared to the second example, in the following third example two additional
constraints are addressed (Fig.A.2)
max{x} f (x) = 10 · (x + 8) − (x + 8)
2 (A.21)
3 − x2 − 2 · x ≤ 0 (λ1) (A.22)
x ≤ 2 (λ2) (A.23)
x ≥ 0 (A.24)
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Fig.A.2 Illustration of
second example. Source own
illustration
These two additional constraints limit the solution space; their corresponding dual
variables are λ1 and λ2.
Based on this optimization problem (A.21)–(A.24), the following Lagrange func-
tion can be set up:
L = 10 · (x + 8) − (x + 8)2 + λ1 ·
[
x2 + 2 · x − 3] + λ2 · [2 − x] (A.25)
The resulting KKT conditions of this problem are
∂L
∂x
= 10 − 2 · (x + 8) + λ1 · (2 · x1 + 2) − λ2 ≤ 0 ⊥ x ≥ 0 (A.26)
∂L
∂λ1
= x2 + 2 · x − 3 ≥ 0 ⊥ λ1 ≥ 0 (A.27)
∂L
∂λ2
= 2 − x ≥ 0 ⊥ λ2 ≥ 0 (A.28)
Due to the ⊥-sign in Eqs. (A.26)–(A.28), we know that ∂L
∂x
· x = 0, ∂L
∂λ1
· λ1 = 0
and
∂L
∂λ2
· λ2 = 0, respectively, which are the complementarity conditions.3 In the
following we analyze different possible cases (for different made assumptions) to
find the optimal solution of the problem:
• Case 1: x = 0 :
3Either the inequality to the left or to the right of the ⊥-sign has to be equal to zero. Hence, for each
⊥-sign, two different cases are possible. Here we have 3 ⊥-signs in the KKT conditions, therefore,
a maximum of 23 = 8 cases is possible.
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– If we set x = 0 in Eq. (A.27) we get ∂L
∂λ1
= −3 < 0. The condition that ∂L
∂λ1
≥
0 is violated, and hence x = 0 is not the optimal solution.
– Therefore, we know that we have to assume x ≥ 0, which means that we can
specifyEq. (A.26) in the followingway: 10 − 2 · (x + 8) + λ1 · (2 · x1 + 2) −
λ2 = 0.
• Case 2: λ2 ≥ 0 :
– In this case, we assume that the inequality (A.28) is a binding constraint, hence
x = 2.
– If we set x = 2 in Eq. (A.27), we know that ∂L
∂λ1
= 5 > 0 and hence λ1 = 0.
– If we set x = 2 and λ1 = 0 in Eq. (A.26), we get λ2 = −10 < 0. This violates
the condition that λ2 ≥ 0.
– Therefore, we know that we have to assume λ2 = 0, which means that due to
Eq. (A.28): x ≤ 2.
• Case 3: λ1 ≥ 0 :
– In this case, we assume that constraint (A.27) is the binding constraint, which
implies that x = 1.
– We know from our analysis (see Case 2) that we have to assume λ2 = 0, which
means
∂L
∂λ2
≥ 0 (see (A.28)), which is met because ∂L
∂λ2
= 1.
– Because of Eq. (A.26) and x = 1 as well as our formermade analysis (see Case
1), we can state that
∂L
∂x
= 0. Calculating λ1, by setting x = 1 and λ2 = 0 in
equation
∂L
∂x
= 0, we get λ1 = 2.
– A contradiction can not be found in this case, hence the problem is maximized
for x = 1.
